JUDGMENT Manish Mathur, J. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties. 2. Petition has been filed challenging the order dated 28th March, 2018 passed under Section 47A of Stamp Act 1899 as well as order dated 11th December, 2019 passed under Section 56 of the Act in appeal whereby additional stamp duty has been imposed upon petitioner with regard to two of the plots purchased by him by means of deed of transfer dated 22nd August 2015, which has been treated to be residential in nature although it has been indicated as agriculture in instrument of transfer. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that by means of sale deed dated 22nd August, 2015, portions of four properties indicated in gata Nos. 495 Ka, 818, 819 and 820 in the village in question were purchased by petitioner. It is submitted that since the properties at the time of purchase were being used for agriculture purpose, stamp duty in accordance therewith was paid but thereafter reference under Section 47-A of the Act was made for treating the properties to be residential in nature. It is submitted that reference has been made in view of spot inspection report by Deputy Registrar dated 18th January 2016. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the authorities have erred in placing reliance on the ex parte spot inspection report dated 18th January, 2016 as well as the subsequent spot inspection report dated 27th September, 2017. Two pronged arguments have been raised against aforesaid spot inspection reports to the effect that aforesaid spot inspection was conducted very much after execution of deed of transfer whereas the same was required to be conducted and nature of property purchased was also required to be considered at the time of execution of deed not thereafter. Another ground taken is with regard to violation of Rule 7(3)(c) of the U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules 1997')inasmuch as no prior notice whatsoever was given to petitioner prior to conducting the spot inspection. It is thus submitted that spot inspection having been conducted quite some time after execution of deed, could not have formed the basis of orders impugned since they indicated situation of properties quite subsequent to the purchase of properties and not as on the date of execution of deed. 5. It is thus submitted that spot inspection having been conducted quite some time after execution of deed, could not have formed the basis of orders impugned since they indicated situation of properties quite subsequent to the purchase of properties and not as on the date of execution of deed. 5. Learned counsel has also submitted that specific objections had been taken by the petitioner to the spot inspection report to submit that there was no construction on the property as on the date of execution of deed but the said objections have not been adverted to in the impugned order and burden of proof has been incorrectly placed upon the petitioner. Learned counsel also submits that even otherwise spot inspection having not been conducted by the Collector himself in terms of aforesaid Rules, can not be the sole basis of passing of impugned order. On that score, petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of this court in the case of Ram Khelawan alias Bachchha v. State of U.P. and others reported in 2005 (23) Lucknow Civil Decisions 1681. 6. It is submitted that even the appellate authority has not adverted to pleadings raised in appeal and has also rejected the same only on the basis of spot inspection report. 7. Learned State Counsel has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with submission that perusal of subsequent inspection report clearly indicates presence of petitioner at the time of spot inspection and therefore submits that due compliance of Rule 7(3)(c) of Rules 1997 was made and due to his presence, there was no occasion to have issued notice for his presence. It is submitted that there is no dichotomy in spot inspection report which clearly indicates permanent construction having been made on the properties which are subject matter of instrument of transfer and therefore no error has been made by the authorities concerned for placing reliance on the aforesaid reports. 8. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it transpires that instrument of transfer is dated 22nd August, 2015 but the first spot inspection report was made only on 18th January, 2016 by the Deputy Registrar whereafter matter was referred under Section 47-A (3) of the Act. 8. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it transpires that instrument of transfer is dated 22nd August, 2015 but the first spot inspection report was made only on 18th January, 2016 by the Deputy Registrar whereafter matter was referred under Section 47-A (3) of the Act. A perusal of the said spot inspection report does not indicate presence of petitioner at the time of inspection while indicating permanent constructions having been raised on the property in question. It is also on record that a portion of the properties which was subject matter of sale deed were declared to be non agricultural by means of order passed subsequently on 17th March, 2016 under section 80 of Revenue Code 2006 (pari materia Section 143 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act). It appears that another spot inspection report was submitted on 27th September, 2017; a perusal of which also does not indicate any prior notice to the petitioner before conducting the spot inspection. A specific plea has been raised in paragraph 14 of the writ petition regarding violation of Rule 7 (3)(c) of Rules 1997. Reply to the aforesaid paragraph has been indicated in paragraph 14 of counter affidavit which does not dispute the said fact but only indicates that since the petitioner was already present at the time of inspection, therefore no notice was required. Learned State counsel has also submitted the same. 9. So far as the aspect of dispensing with provisions of Rule 7 (3) (c) of Rules 1997 is concerned on the ground that assessee was already present at the spot, in the considered opinion of the Court would be inconsequential since the fortuitous circumstance of the assessee being present at time of spot inspection has no relevance with regard to mandatory provisions of Rule 7(3)(c) of Rules 1997 as indicated in the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Ganga Ram v. State of U.P. and others reported in 2020 (38) LCD 1991. 10. Primary purpose of giving prior notice to an assessee under Rule 7(3)(c) is for his prior intimation that such an inspection would be taking place and that he should be available to object to the actual situation of purchased property when the spot inspection is taking place. 10. Primary purpose of giving prior notice to an assessee under Rule 7(3)(c) is for his prior intimation that such an inspection would be taking place and that he should be available to object to the actual situation of purchased property when the spot inspection is taking place. As such prior notice is an essential ingredient of mandatory provisions of Rule 7(3)(c) of Rules 1997 and mere fortuitous circumstance of an assessee being present at the time of spot inspection would be completely irrelevant. 11. In the present case, it is clearly indicated not only in objections taken by petitioner but as well as in the petition itself that no prior notice whatsoever was given to petitioner prior to conduct of spot inspection, the said objection remains unattended in the impugned orders and even the specific plea thereto taken in the writ petition has not been specifically denied by the opposite parties. In such circumstance, by opposite parties with regard to violation of Rule 7(3)(c) of Rules, 1997 is writ large. 12. Another aspect of matter requiring consideration is that the impugned orders are based completely only on two spot inspection reports. First aspect of the matter is that spot inspection whether by means of inspection dated 18th January, 2016 or 27th September, 2017 have taken place quite belatedly and were not required to be taken into cognizance for the purposes of indicating actual possession of property in question at the time of execution of sale deed. Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of Ambrish Tandon and another reported in (2012) 5 SCC 566 has held as follows:- "15. The impugned order of the High Court shows that it was not seriously disputed about the nature of user of the building, namely, residential purpose on the date of the purchase. Merely because the property is being used for commercial purpose at the later point of time may not be a relevant criterion for assessing the value for the purpose of stamp duty. The nature of user is relatable to the date of purchase and it is relevant for the purpose of calculation of stamp duty. Merely because the property is being used for commercial purpose at the later point of time may not be a relevant criterion for assessing the value for the purpose of stamp duty. The nature of user is relatable to the date of purchase and it is relevant for the purpose of calculation of stamp duty. Though the matter could have been considered by the appellate authority in view of our reasoning that there was no serious objection and in fact the said alternative remedy was not agitated seriously and in view of the factual details based on which the High Court has quashed the order dated 27-9-2004 passed by the Additional District Collector, we are not inclined to interfere at this juncture." 13. In view of aforesaid, spot inspections taking place extremely belatedly as in the present case, can not be considered a good ground for consideration of actual situation of the property at the time of execution of sale deed. 14. The orders impugned in present petition are clearly in violation of not only Rule 7(3)(c)of the Rules 1997 but are also against the dictum of this Court in the case of Ram Khelawan (supra) as well as that of Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of Ambrish Tandaon (supra). 15. In view of discussions made herein above, impugned orders dated 28th March, 2018 as well as order dated 11th December, 2019 passed by opposite parties 3 and 2 respectively being against law are hereby set aside. 16. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with consequences. Parties to bear their own costs.