ORDER : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Vilav Bhatia on behalf of the appellant and learned Advocate Mr. D.C. Sejpal on behalf of the respondent. 2. By way of this appeal, the appellant-original plaintiff seeks to challenge an order dated 17.08.2022 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gondal, Rajkot below application Exh.18 in Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 2020 rejecting the suit under provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Facts relevant for deciding the appeal are as follows: 3.1 The appellant -original plaintiff had instituted Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 2020 against the opponents herein inter alia challenging registered saledeed No. 4264 dated 23.09.1998 more particularly whereby land admeasuring 9 Acres 18 Guntha out of land admeasuring 37 Acre 35 Guntha situated at Revenue Survey No. 367/1 Village: Khirsara (Ranmalaji) Taluka: Lodhika, District: Rajkot. The appellant plaintiff had also prayed for setting aside a Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant no. 2 whereby the sale-deed had been entered into. 3.2 It was the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the land in question i.e land admeasuring 9 Acres 18 Guntha out of the total land admeasuring 37 Acres 35 Guntha of Revenue Survey No. 367/1 was of the ownership of her grandfather one Parakramsinh Jadeja and whereas upon his demise, the land had evolved upon father of the plaintiff one Manmohansinh Jadeja. It was the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the land had been sold by defendant no. 2 as Power of Attorney Holder vide registered sale-deed dated 23.09.1998 to the defendant no. 1 i.e. respondent no. 1 herein and whereas at the time of the sale-deed, the signature and thumb impression were forged more particularly with an intent to commit a fraud and whereas according to the plaintiff at the relevant point of time the plaintiff as well as her sister-defendant no. 7 were minor and whereas it was attempted to be clarified that the plaintiff and defendant no. 7 were aged less than 21 years. It was also contended that defendant no. 2 - Power of Attorney Holder had not paid any consideration to the plaintiff as mentioned in the sale-deed and therefore also the sale-deed was required to be set aside. 7 were aged less than 21 years. It was also contended that defendant no. 2 - Power of Attorney Holder had not paid any consideration to the plaintiff as mentioned in the sale-deed and therefore also the sale-deed was required to be set aside. The plaintiff had mentioned in the suit that while she was married in the year 2003 and residing at Bhuj and whereas she was not aware about the fraud or transfer or the bogus power of attorney but approximately two months prior to filing of the suit she had come to her maternal home at Rajkot and whereas she had come to know about such sale from discussion with her family members and at that time she has realized about the fraud and thus she had preferred the suit which was according to the plaintiff within time frame. 3.3 It appears that upon the notice of the suit being issued, the defendant no. 1 had appeared and had submitted an application vide Exh.18 under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC inter alia praying for rejection of the plaint. It was contended by the defendant no. 1 that the plaintiff had challenged a saledeed after approximately 20 years whereas the limitation provided for challenging a sale-deed being three years, the suit being hopelessly barred. 3.4 It appears that upon application below Exh.18 being filed, the plaintiff had tendered a reply to such application inter alia contending that the suit was within limitation and whereas it was requested to reject the said application. 3.5 It appears that vide the impugned decision, the learned Civil Court had agreed with the contention of the defendant no. 1 and had rejected the plaint under provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC more particularly on the ground that the suit was time barred. 4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia on behalf of the appellant who would submit that the learned Civil Judge, had committed a grave error in rejecting the suit more particularly holding that the suit is barred by limitation and the suit does not disclose a cause of action. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. 4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia on behalf of the appellant who would submit that the learned Civil Judge, had committed a grave error in rejecting the suit more particularly holding that the suit is barred by limitation and the suit does not disclose a cause of action. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia would submit that the plaintiff in the plaint had clearly averred that at the time of a sale-deed, the plaintiff was less than 21 years and whereas the plaintiff had been married thereafter and she had gone to her matrimonial home and whereas the plaintiff had also clearly mentioned that when she had come to her parental home around two months prior to filing of the suit, she had learnt about the same from her family members and whereas she had immediately preferred the suit. Learned Advocate would submit that the suit therefore clearly discloses that suit was filed well within limitation and whereas the learned Civil Court ought not to have rejected the plaint on the ground of the same being barred by limitation. Learned Advocate would further submit that as it is, it was not the case of even the defendant no. 1 that the suit did not disclose any cause of action and whereas the learned Civil Court had further committed an error in holding that the suit also did not disclose any cause of action and whereas learned Advocate would submit that the learned Civil Court had also not given any reasons insofar as rejecting a suit on the ground of lack of cause of action. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia would in support of his contention, has relied upon decision of Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Bardoli Shreerang Exhibitor Private Limited vs. Maheshbhai Babubhai Hirpara and Others, 2022 (2) GLR 1061 . Learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia would submit that the Hon’ble Division Bench in this decision has inter alia stated that a plea of limitation is mixed question of fact and law and whereas according to learned Advocate under such circumstances, the learned Civil Court ought not to have rejected the plaint without leading any evidence in that regard. Thus submitting learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia would request this Court to set aside the impugned decision passed by the learned Civil Court. 7. As against the same learned Advocate Mr. Sejpal on behalf of defendant no. Thus submitting learned Advocate Mr. Bhatia would request this Court to set aside the impugned decision passed by the learned Civil Court. 7. As against the same learned Advocate Mr. Sejpal on behalf of defendant no. 1 on caveat would submit that the learned Civil Court had rightly dismissed the suit more particularly according to learned Advocate, the suit was grossly delayed. Learned Advocate would submit that the plaintiff at the time of the sale-deed in question was aged around 20 years whereas the plaintiff in the suit has very ambiguously stated that she was a minor, being less than 21 years. Learned Advocate would submit that the plaintiff as per the plaint itself had got married in the year 2003 i.e. approximately five years after the power of attorney and sale-deed in question. Learned Advocate would submit that as far as the suit is concerned the same is filed 22 years after the date of registered sale-deed and a very ambiguous averment has been made in the suit that the plaintiff had come to know about the sale-deed in question just two months prior to filing of the suit when she had visited her parental home when the fact of sale was discussed between the family members. Learned Advocate would submit that such ambiguous submissions are nothing but clever drafting more particularly attempting to bring the suit within the ambit of law of limitation. Learned Advocate would submit that the Limitation Act provides for a limitation period of three years for cancelling or setting aside an instrument and whereas the suit filed after 22 years being grossly barred by limitation, the learned Civil Court had rightly rejected the suit as being barred by the law of limitation. 7.1 Learned Advocate in support of his contention would rely upon a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of C.S. Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil and Others, AIR 2022 SC 4724 . 7.2 Learned Advocate Mr. 7.1 Learned Advocate in support of his contention would rely upon a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of C.S. Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil and Others, AIR 2022 SC 4724 . 7.2 Learned Advocate Mr. Sejpal would further submit that as far as the aspect of the learned Civil Court having observed that the suit does not disclose a cause of action, the same is but a passing reference and whereas according to learned Advocate, nothing would turn on the same and whereas it is further submitted by learned Advocate that as such the learned Civil Court had after holding that the suit is barred by the law of limitation, had made a passing remark that the suit also does not disclose any cause of action. Learned Advocate would submit that the suit has not been dismissed on the ground that the suit did not disclose a cause of action and whereas earlier passing remark more particularly when the learned Court had already made elaborate observations and had come to a conclusion about the suit being barred under the law of limitation, may not confer right upon the original plaintiff, to contend before this Court that the judgment is erroneous. 7.3 Thus submitting, learned Advocate Mr. Sejpal would request this Court not to entertain the appeal and to reject the same. 8. Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents including the plaint and the impugned judgment. 9. The following questions arise for consideration of this Court: [1] Whether the learned Trial Court had committed any error in rejecting the suit under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure? [2] What would be the relief that may be granted? 10. My answer to the issues framed for determination are as follows: [1] In Negative. [2] As per the final order. 11. On issue no. (1) it appears that the original plaintiff has filed Special Civil Suit No. 11 of 2020 inter alia praying for setting aside of registered saledeed no. 4264 dated 23.09.1998 and for setting aside of the power of attorney on basis of which the registered sale-deed had been entered into. [2] As per the final order. 11. On issue no. (1) it appears that the original plaintiff has filed Special Civil Suit No. 11 of 2020 inter alia praying for setting aside of registered saledeed no. 4264 dated 23.09.1998 and for setting aside of the power of attorney on basis of which the registered sale-deed had been entered into. It was the case of the original plaintiff that the registered sale-deed had been entered into when she was less than 21 years and whereas she had been married in the year 2003 and recently i.e. two months prior to filing of the suit when she had come to her parental home she had come to know about the sale-deed during discussion between family members and whereas she had decided to challenge the same. The defendant no. 1 upon issuance of notice had appeared and filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) inter alia submitting that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The learned Civil Court vide the impugned judgment had upheld the contention of the defendant and had rejected the plaint. 11.1 While learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the plaintiff had filed the suit immediately upon coming to know about the registered sale-deed, on the other hand, it was the case of the defendant that the plaintiff had adopted clever drafting to bring the suit within the period of limitation. The appellant having relied upon decision of Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Bardoli Shreerang Exhibitor Private Limited vs. Maheshbhai Babubhai Hirpara and Others, this Court would first examine the law laid down by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court as to whether the proposition propounded by learned Advocate is in any way supported by law laid down by this Court. It is the submission of learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant that question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and whereas the suit ought not to have been rejected under provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC more particularly without leading any evidence. Paragraphs No. 32, 33 and 34 and paragraph no. 44 of the said judgment being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced herein-below for benefit: “32. We are of the view that the plaint could not have been rejected on the ground that the suit is time-barred. Paragraphs No. 32, 33 and 34 and paragraph no. 44 of the said judgment being relevant for the present purpose are reproduced herein-below for benefit: “32. We are of the view that the plaint could not have been rejected on the ground that the suit is time-barred. The plaintiff, in no uncertain terms, has pleaded in the plaint that he came to know about the execution of the sale deeds only when the defendants nos.7 and 8 filed their written-statement Exh.86 in the Regular Civil Suit No. 47 of 2011. The court below has gone to the extent of ascertaining the veracity of such statement made in the plaint. The court below imputes bad faith to the plaintiff saying that the plaintiff intentionally has not stated the date of filing of the said writ-statement. The entire approach of the court below, in our view, is not correct. In so far as the rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation is concerned, it is needless to emphasize that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. When it is the specific case of the plaintiff that he came to know about the sale deeds at the time when the written statement came to be filed in the civil suit referred to above, such averments may or may not be true, but if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the above averments, the issue of limitation cannot be put against the plaintiff. 33. The averment made in the plaint appears to be candid and does not intend to camouflage the intention of the plaintiff to circumvent Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The averment made in the plaint on close introspection does not indicate a bogus or a frivolous litigation or an illusory drafting to obviate the obstacle of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC appears to have been done as a matter of course as the averments made in the same suggest. 34. When limitation is a pure question of law and from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that a suit is barred by limitation, then, of course, it is the duty of the court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. 34. When limitation is a pure question of law and from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that a suit is barred by limitation, then, of course, it is the duty of the court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. However, in cases like the one on hand, where the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the suit does not appear to be barred by limitation on the face of it, then the facts necessary to prove limitation must be pleaded, an issue raised and then proved. (See Narne Rama Murthy vs. Ravula Somasundaram, 2005 (6) SCC 614 ).” 44. We sum up our final conclusions: (1) Undoubtedly, Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC provides that the plaint shall be rejected in case when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The object behind the said provision of law is to avoid manifestly vexatious and meritless litigation and to protect the parties being unnecessarily harassed by others. The clause (d) of Rule 11 of the Order 7 of the CPC would apply to the cases when it would reveal from the contents of the plaint that the suit is barred. In other words, in order to enable the court to arrive at the conclusion that the suit filed by plaintiff is barred, the pleadings in the plaint should apparently disclose the facts revealing the bar to the suit instituted by the plaintiff. The conclusion under clause (d) regarding the bar to the suit cannot be arrived at on the basis of materials extraneous to the pleadings in the plaint. The jurisdiction of the court to take action under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC can arise only in case where the pleadings in the plaint are sufficient to disclose the bar to the suit, and not otherwise. Of course, the jurisdiction can be exercised at any stage of the suit, however, the decision under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC has to be on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint.” 12. Of course, the jurisdiction can be exercised at any stage of the suit, however, the decision under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC has to be on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint.” 12. A conjoint reading of the aforequoted paragraphs would reveal that the Hon’ble Division Bench had inter alia observed that the object and intent behind Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC being to avoid manifestly vexatious and meritless litigation and to protect parties being unnecessarily harassed, and whereas what would be relevant to construe whether a suit is barred by any law would be the pleadings in the plaint. If the pleadings are sufficient to disclose a bar then jurisdiction could be exercised at any stage. 12.1 It would also appear that the Court is under an obligation to find out whether the averments in the plaint appear to be candid and do not intend to camouflage the intention of the plaintiff to circumvent Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC or whether on closer inspection bogus or frivolous litigation is attempted to perpetrated by illusory drafting. The Hon’ble Division Bench has clearly stated that when from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that the suit is barred by limitation then it is the duty of the Court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. 12.2 Having regard to the law laid down by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, the same in the thoughtful opinion of this Court, would not advance the cause of the appellant rather it would appear that the judgment clearly lays down the proposition that the Trial Court is required to look at the pleadings in the plaint and come to a conclusion whether the same is barred by limitation and whereas upon reaching such a conclusion, even in absence of a plea the jurisdiction has to be exercised. It is only if the Court comes to a conclusion, based upon averments that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and could only be decided after evidence is led that the application for exercise of jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC would not be entertained. It is only if the Court comes to a conclusion, based upon averments that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and could only be decided after evidence is led that the application for exercise of jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC would not be entertained. Viewed from the perspective of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the considered opinion of this Court, the averments in the plaint clearly portray the intent of the plaintiff to camouflage the aspect of delay to circumvent exercise of jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11(d). The plaintiff has merely stated that after 22 years of sale-deed, she had come to know about the same very recently when she had come to her parental home when her family members were discussing about the same. It requires to be noted here that the sale-deed appears to be signed by all family members i.e. parents and siblings of the plaintiff at the relevant point of time and whereas under such circumstances a bare averment that the plaintiff had come to know about the sale-deed recently after 22 years clearly appears to be a camouflage intended to circumvent provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. 13. Furthermore it would appear that in decision relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondent no. 1, i.e decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of C.S Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil & Ors.(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia observed that merely by stating that a fraud has been played would not be enough and the allegation of fraud ought to be specifically averred in the plaint. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had further observed that merely by using the word ‘fraud’ the plaintiff may not be entitled to get away with the suit which is otherwise barred by limitation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also observed that plaintiffs cannot be permitted to bring suits within period of limitation by clever drafting. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had further observed that merely by using the word ‘fraud’ the plaintiff may not be entitled to get away with the suit which is otherwise barred by limitation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also observed that plaintiffs cannot be permitted to bring suits within period of limitation by clever drafting. 13.1 In the considered opinion of this Court, having regard to the law laid down by Division Bench of this Court and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it would appear that the plaintiff should not be permitted to try and circumvent the rigors of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC by clever drafting and whereas in case if it appears from the plaint that the suit is barred by limitation then inspite of such clever drafting, the plaint should be rejected. 14. It would also be relevant to observe here that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of C.S Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil and Others (supra) relying upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of T. Arivandandam vs. T.V Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 4671 has inter alia observed as thus: “5......The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal- reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” 14.1 Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of C.S Ramaswamy vs. V.K. Senthil and Others (supra) at paragraph no. 7.9 has also stated as thus: “7.9 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to the facts of the case on hand and the averments in the plaints, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaints in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The respective suits have been filed after a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deeds. The respective suits have been filed after a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the registered sale deeds. It is to be noted that one suit was filed by the minor, which was filed in the year 2006, in which some of the plaintiffs herein were also party to the said suit and in the said suit, there was a specific reference to the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2005 and the said suit came to be dismissed in the year 2014 and immediately thereafter the present suits have been filed. Thus, from the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation, which otherwise are barred by limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra) and other decision of Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra), and as the respective suits are barred by the law of limitation, the respective plaints are required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.” 15. Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, it would clearly appear that the suits preferred by the plaintiff were manifestly vexatious, since the plaintiff by resorting to clever drafting had intended to bring the suits within the period of limitation whereas the suits otherwise being grossly delayed. 15.1 At this stage it would be relevant to refer to Article 59 of the Schedule to the law of Limitation 1963 which provides a period of limitation of three years for cancelling or setting aside the instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. Article 58 provides of limitation of three years to obtain any other declaration. The suit which ought to have been preferred within three years of the date of the sale-deed, has been preferred after 22 years i.e. with a delay of 19 years and as noted hereinabove an illusory incident has been stated to bring the suits within the ambit of limitation. 16. The suit which ought to have been preferred within three years of the date of the sale-deed, has been preferred after 22 years i.e. with a delay of 19 years and as noted hereinabove an illusory incident has been stated to bring the suits within the ambit of limitation. 16. It also clearly appears to this Court that there are no averments worth the name in the plaint which would in any way support the submission of the plaintiff as regards the knowledge with regard to sale-deed being acquired recently more particularly having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was residing in her parental home for almost five years after the sale-deed had been entered into before being married. Other family members of the plaintiff from her parental side including her parents and siblings appear to be signatories to the sale-deed. 17. Having regard to the above discussions and observations and conclusions, in the considered opinion of this Court, issue no. 1 is required to be answered in negative, it would also be required to be mentioned that the learned Trial Court has not committed any error whatsoever in rejecting the suits in exercise of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC rather in the considered opinion of this Court, the exercise of powers by the learned Trial Court was well justified and whereas the exercise of powers also appear to be well within the ambit of law as regards exercise of jurisdiction more particularly in cases where suits are stated to be barred by law of limitation, as laid down by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Having regard to the determination on issue no. 1 as hereinabove in the considered opinion of this Court, the appeal is not required to be entertained and the same is rejected. 19. In view of the order passed in the first, appeal, civil application would not survive. Hence disposed of.