JUDGMENT : SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA, J. 1. The applicants to the C-482 Application, have put a challenge to the impugned summoning order dated 08.06.2018, as it has been rendered in a proceedings of Criminal Complaint Case No. 883 of 2015, Km. Kamla Bisht vs. Bhuwan Singh Waldia and Others whereby the present applicants have been summoned to be tried for commission of offence under Section 500 of the I.P.C. The challenge has also been given to the revisional court’s judgment dated 11.02.2021, as it was passed by the learned Session Judge, Pithoragarh in Criminal Revision No. 14 of 2018, Bhuwan Singh Waldia and Others vs. State and Another. 2. The learned counsel for the applicants has submitted, that no offence under Section 500 of I.P.C. could be made out against the present applicant son the basis of the publication made on 30.07.2015, because the said communication made by way of a publication will not be an offence which could be termed as to be a defamatory publication as per Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. He further submits that the allegations levelled pertaining to the alleged published defamatory remarks is absolutely not sustainable because there was no conclusive evidence available before the learned trial court to enable to draw the proceedings under Section 500 of the I.P.C. as against the present applicants, on the basis of the complaint which has been registered by the respondent before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pithoraghar. 4. In response to it, the learned counsel for the respondent submits, that the publication made in the newspaper on 30.07.2015, itself would be a defamatory remark and the provisions contained under Section 500 of I.P.C. has been rightly attracted against the present applicants. He further submitted that the cognizance order itself, which has been issued by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, is based on cogent reasons and it cannot be said that the summoning order has been issued without application of mind, which could at all call for any interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because there is no apparent illegality whatsoever to set of allegations pertaining to the defamatory remarks as it has been levelled in the summoning order, as that would be a matter to be adjudicated apart from appreciation of facts which may not be a scope under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. It is not in dispute between the parties that the basis of proceedings under Section 500 of the I.P.C. by way of Complaint Case No. 883 of 2015, has been the publication in newspaper which was made on 30.07.2015. Though, the counsel for the respondent had attempted to shoulder the exclusive burden of publication on the applicants in order to fasten upon him the liability for commission of an offence under Section 500 of the I.P.C. but this Court is of the view that if the publication itself is taken by the respondent as to be a defamatory remark, the relevant part of which is extracted hereunder: ^^vej mtkyk C;wjks vkn'kZ dkyksuh ds v/;{k Hkqou ofYn;k ,oa dqlkSyh ds Á/kku j?kqohj flag dh vksj ls MhŒ,eŒ vkSj ,lŒihŒ dks lkSais Kkiu esa vkjksi yxk;k gS fd [kqn xyrh djus ds ckn vc deyk fc"V xkao ds yksxksa ij iqfyfl;k jkSc fn[kkus yxh gSA** 6. In fact, it’s not an opinion which has been individually expressed by the applicants but rather the said publication has been made by “Amar Ujala Bureau” which is a body itself constituted by the publisher, who publishes the news on the basis of the material which is made available to them, upon the same being duly edited. 7. The question would be as to whether any defamatory remark, which is published by the “Bureau of a newspaper”, could be taken as to a defamatory remark on behalf of an individual or not. In order to deal with the aforesaid argument and also an argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the issue requires an appreciation of factual aspects, which may not be the scope available under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. The appreciation of definition of defamation given under Chapter 21 of the I.P.C. is required to be considered: “499. Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.” 9. Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.” 9. The term defamation as extracted above uses the word “whoever” by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation remarks will amount to harm the prestige of an individual to call for to be an offence under Section 500 of the I.P.C. Court feels it appropriate to classify Section 499 of the I.P.C. to appreciate the controversy as to what is the actual defamation, would be as per the opinion of this Court the defamation would have been, had the applicant individually being responsible directly by leading an evidence on record, that it was he who was instrumental in getting the publication made of or it was based upon his exclusive communication, that the publication was made, but rather the observation made in the publication of 30.07.2015, was a general information imparted to the bureau of the newspaper, which has published the news on a general demonstration being made by public at large as against the respondent. 10. On a simplicitor reading of Section 499 of the I.P.C. and the explanations given therein, when it uses the word “whoever” it rather personifies an individual and the personification of an individual would be in relation to this word spoken or words written to be read or signs which could be visualized while making representations or a publication made by an individual. 11. 11. Since, in the instant case the publication has been made by the bureau, based on public agitation made against the present applicants, it would not be a defamation as defined under Section 499 of the I.P.C. as against the present applicants, individually because it will not be read as to the words spoken by the applicants, nor it could be read as to be a sign or symbolic impression given by the present applicants, nor it is a publication made by the present applicants, but rather it is an opinion which was expressed by the newspaper bureau on a public information which was gathered by it due to the demonstration which was being made by the public at large before the office of the District Magistrate. 12. In that eventuality, this Court is of the view that once it is not an individual act to bring it within a definition of Section 499 of the I.P.C. Section 499 the defamation as contended against the present applicants would not be made out and, in that eventuality, the penal provision of Section 500 of the I.P.C will not be attracted. 13. The learned counsel for the applicants has referred to a judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench as reported in Nupur Singh @ Nupur Chauhan vs. Kunwar Pranav Singh, 2017 SCC Online Uttarakhand 1159 and, particularly, the counsel for the respondent has made reference to Para-17 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder: “(17) Another decision of Sanjay Veer Singh Sisodia vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, decided by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application (C-482) No. 760 of 2017, vide order dated 12.06.2017, is placed to buttress such argument. Sisodia's decision is based on Ghananand Joshi's decision. In Sisodia's case (supra), the allegation was that in some paragraph of his written statement, the accused-applicant used defamatory language against the complainant. It may be noted here that, in the instant case, the allegations were not levelled in any written statement or in any pleadings, but were got published by or on behalf of the applicant in a National Daily, having wide circulation, which, according to the complainant- respondent, has tarnished his image in the estimation of the society.” 14. In fact, para-17 is nothing, but an extract of the earlier judgment as rendered in C-482 Application No. 760 of 2017, in the matter of Sanjay Veer Singh Sisodia. In fact, para-17 is nothing, but an extract of the earlier judgment as rendered in C-482 Application No. 760 of 2017, in the matter of Sanjay Veer Singh Sisodia. The decision taken therein, it was being derived to be a defamatory after reading some of the contents of the paragraph of his written statement, that the accused/applicant has used a defamatory language. The situation therein was that the person filing a written statement, that is an individual had used a defamatory remarks in writing in his written statement, hence it is an allegation leveled against an individual and not against a body corporate, which has made the paper publication as in the instant case and hence, an act of an individual reflected in the written statement in writing would obviously be a defamatory remarks under Section 499 of the I.P.C and, hence, the principle laid down in para-17 since not being factually akin to the instant case, the same would not be applicable in the present case because here it is not the case of the respondent that the applicants had at all made any publication or defamatory remarks in individual capacity rather it’s the bureau which has published reviews based on the information gathered by its reporters, from the general demonstration made by the public at large. Hence, it will not be a defamatory remark under Section 499 of the I.P.C. so far it relates to the present applicants in order to attract Section 500 of the IPC. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent had further referred to a judgment as reported in Jeffrey J. Diermeier and Another vs. State of West Bengal and Another, (2010) 6 SCC 243 . The said judgment has been attracted to be read by the learned counsel for the applicant in view of the observations made in para-27 onwards as to what was the scope of the exercise of powers under Section 482. As to whether the Court’s exercise of powers under Section 482 can go into the factual dispute in order to arrive at the conclusion as to whether and at all the offence which is complained of is made out against the accused person or not. As to whether the Court’s exercise of powers under Section 482 can go into the factual dispute in order to arrive at the conclusion as to whether and at all the offence which is complained of is made out against the accused person or not. There cannot be any dispute on the said principles, and legal preposition, but powers under Section 482 too being inherent in nature and basically intended to curtail the abuse of process, it could be exercised by the court where on a simplisitor reading of the complaint, that is a publication herein, if no offence under Section 499 of the IPC is made out and there was no necessity to undergo the long drawn research in relation to the factual aspect as it has been contended by the respondent, that it would be a subject matter of trial. 16. Since, prima facie, this Court is satisfied that the publication itself is not an expression casted by the present applicant to bring it within the defamation under Section 499 of the IPC, because it is not an act of an individual which was complained of rather it was an act of the bureau of the publisher, no individual allegation could be levelled against the present applicants, because under criminal law prosecution could be only for an individual act, which doesn’t stand established beyond doubt in the instant case. 17. Hence, for the aforesaid reason the C-482 Application is allowed. As a consequence, thereto, the proceedings of Criminal Complaint Case No. 883 of 2015, Km. Kamla Bisht vs. Bhuwan Singh Waldia and Others pending consideration before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pithoragarh, would hereby stands quashed.