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2023 DIGILAW 2882 (ALL)

Kalyani Devi v. State Of U. P.

2023-12-21

J.J.MUNIR

body2023
JUDGMENT : (J.J. Munir, J.) 1. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 07.07.1995 passed by the Chief Superintendent, Women Hospital, Varanasi altering the petitioner's date of birth from that recorded in her service-book to 18.01.1956. The one originally recorded is 18.01.1963. Also, under challenge is an order dated 05.09.2014 passed by the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, affirming the fact that the petitioner's date of birth, according to the medical certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi and recorded in her service-book is 18.01.1956. Thus, by the orders impugned, the respondents have advanced the petitioner's date of birth, originally recorded in her service-book, by as much as seven years hastening her superannuation. 2. The petitioner says that she hails from the caste known as Valmiki (a Scheduled Caste). She is illiterate and can barely sign her name in a clumsy hand. An advertisement was issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi for recruitment of sweepers at the Government Hospital, Varanasi. No educational qualifications were prescribed for the said post. The petitioner, being qualified for the post of a sweeper, applied along with others. She was appointed by the Chief Medical Officer last mentioned on 31.08.1982 and posted as a sweepress at the Women Hospital, Varanasi under the administrative control of the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Kabir Chauraha, Varanasi. The petitioner was medically examined on 18.01.1983 for ascertaining her correct age. The Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi issued a certificate, estimating the petitioner's age as 27 years on the date of her appointment. The estimation was made by the Chief Medical Officer on 18.01.1983 on a casual determination, without an ossification test. Nevertheless, in the absence of any record of the petitioner's age, such as her educational certificate or a Nagar Panchayat record, it was entered in her service-book, fixing for her date of birth, the date 18.01.1963. This determination of age was apparently made, accepting the petitioner’s assertion about it and not the Chief Medical Officer’s estimation of her age carried in his certificate dated 18.01.1963, which was considered but not accepted. 3. Much later, the same issue arose relating to certain sweepers with regard to their age, which did not concern the petitioner. Those sweepers said that their date of birth in the service record was not correctly recorded. 4. 3. Much later, the same issue arose relating to certain sweepers with regard to their age, which did not concern the petitioner. Those sweepers said that their date of birth in the service record was not correctly recorded. 4. It is the petitioner's case that after consultation with the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, it was decided that the date of birth mentioned in the service-book should be treated as correct, and, accordingly, the report of all the sweepers working under the control of the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, was circulated by respondent No.4 on 07.07.1995. Surprisingly, the petitioner's name figured at Sr. No.9, but in the letter dated 07.07.1995 issued by the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, her date of birth was mentioned in column No.6 as 08.01.1963. In column No.4, the year was mentioned as 1963. There is a case that some unknown person attempted to change the petitioner's date of birth from 1963 to 1956, which does not bear anyone's signatures. Thus, the actual date of birth of the petitioner was changed from 1963 to 1956 without her knowledge, consent and without affording her an opportunity of being heard. It is also said that no scientific method, like an ossification test was adopted to alter the petitioner's date of birth by dint of the order dated 07.07.1995. 5. The petitioner has come up with a case that she thought that the change notified by the order dated 07.07.1995 was the result of interpolation, because on 17.06.1998, she was put up for a fresh medical examination and her age was estimated by the Medical Superintendent as 35 years. The petitioner has pleaded a case of forgery in her service-book changing her date of birth from 18.01.1963 to 18.01.1956. By her pleadings in the writ petition, it is asserted that she was not precisely aware of the terms of the order dated 07.07.1995, authorizing the change of its contents, being an illiterate person. She came to know of the fact that there was a change of her date of birth in her service-book by word of mouth in the month of April, 2014 and requested the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi for the provision of a copy of her service-book. The officer remained elusive. The petitioner was persistent. She came to know of the fact that there was a change of her date of birth in her service-book by word of mouth in the month of April, 2014 and requested the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi for the provision of a copy of her service-book. The officer remained elusive. The petitioner was persistent. She was supplied a photostat copy of her service-book, on the basis of which, she found that her date of birth was wrongly mentioned as 27 years there instead of 20 years on the date of her appointment. She submitted a complaint, on 30.08.2014, in this regard to the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi to enter her actual date of birth, that was there in her service-book at the time of appointment and confirmation. Representations made by the petitioner herself and on her behalf by the U.P. Safai Mazdoor Sangh led to no result. 6. It is the petitioner's case that since the date of her appointment in service, her date of birth in the service-book was recorded as 08.01.1963, which was changed by dint of the order dated 07.07.1995 without hearing her. The change was made on the basis of a medical certificate, also based on the petitioner’s general appearance and without doing an ossification test. The petitioner has pleaded that in view of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 (for short, 'the Rules of 1974'), the date of birth of a non-matriculate shall be regarded as the one that is recorded in his/ her service-book at the time of entry into service for all purposes, including superannuation. There can be no change to it, later on. 7. The petitioner’s case about the nature and contents of the order dated 07.07.1995 and the basis of the impugned change to her date of birth in the service-book appears to be a bit mixed up and incorrect about the description of the relative record. Nevertheless, the thrust of the case is that the petitioner’s date of birth recorded at the time of her entry into service was changed after 12 years, based on mere medical opinion. Nevertheless, the thrust of the case is that the petitioner’s date of birth recorded at the time of her entry into service was changed after 12 years, based on mere medical opinion. As would presently be seen, the change was not based on any fresh medical opinion sought, but the same certificate that was issued by the Chief Medical Officer in the year 1983, after considering which, years earlier the petitioner’s age was recorded in her service-book as 08.01.1963. 8. In the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.4, that is to say, the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, it is stated that the petitioner's date of birth was not interpolated in her service-book, changing it from 18.01.1963 to 18.01.1956. The aforesaid date of birth was recorded according to the certificate/opinion given by the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi. It is asserted that the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi fixed the petitioner's age at 27 years. It is asserted in Paragraph No.8 that after expiry of the petitioner's period of probation, the petitioner's service-book was prepared and in the age column, her age was filled up as 27 years on the basis of the Chief Medical Officer's opinion, which is final. It is asserted that there is no overwriting or interpolation in the petitioner's service-book, a fact she has pleaded throughout the petition. 9. In Paragraph No.4 of the rejoinder affidavit, it is asserted that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1982 and at that time, based on her medical examination, her age was estimated as 20 years. The fact that it was estimated as 20 years at the time of her entry into service is evident from a perusal of the medical certificate dated 18.01.1983, annexed as Annexure No.2 to the writ petition. It is also averred that in her service-book, her age was mentioned as 20 years as well, when appointed. There is also a traverse of the case that the petitioner's date of birth recorded by the CMO, Varanasi was 18.01.1956, because that was not the age mentioned in her medical certificate dated 18.01.1983, when she entered service. It was not this age, that was entered at the time of her appointment. 10. There are other pleas raised, which need not be recorded for all that they say. 11. Heard Mr. Amar Nath Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. It was not this age, that was entered at the time of her appointment. 10. There are other pleas raised, which need not be recorded for all that they say. 11. Heard Mr. Amar Nath Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 12. Looking to the allegations about interpolation in the petitioner's date of birth and the very important fact as to what was the petitioner's date of birth recorded initially, that is to say, at the time of her entry into service, this Court summoned the petitioner's service-book in original. A perusal of the service-book rules out any case of interpolation. At the same time, it is true that the petitioner's date of birth entered in her service-book at the time of entry in service is 18.01.1963, which is also written in figures. The basis of this entry is shown to be CMO's Letter No.19/82-83 dated 18.01.1983. The certificate dated 18.01.1983 by the CMO is based on the petitioner's general appearance and bodily development, with the CMO expressing an opinion based on impression. The certificate shows that the petitioner claimed herself to be 20 years, but the CMO by an ipse dixit of his, going by general appearance, thought that the petitioner was aged 27 years. Nevertheless, the petitioner's date of birth was entered by the respondents cognizant of this certificate dated 18.01.1983 as ‘18.01.1963’ on 06.05.1983, that is to say, at the time of her entry in service. The CMO’s certificate dated 18.01.1983 is no proof of the petitioner's age; it is not even based on an ossification test. It is merely an opinion of the doctor based on general appearance. In the absence of supporting medical basis for the estimation, it is of no worth or value. All that matters is that when the petitioner entered into service, the respondents, cognizant of the Chief Medical Officer’s Certificate dated 18.01.1963, estimated or acknowledged her to be 20 years old, and, therefore, recorded her date of birth as 18.01.1963; not 18.01.1956. 13. A further perusal of the service-book shows that the petitioner's date of birth originally recorded in words and figures, has all been scored off in blue ink and an order in red ink entered at the top of the page, authorizing the petitioner's date of birth to be changed. 13. A further perusal of the service-book shows that the petitioner's date of birth originally recorded in words and figures, has all been scored off in blue ink and an order in red ink entered at the top of the page, authorizing the petitioner's date of birth to be changed. This order is one indicated to be passed by the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi and bears Order No.55/95-96 dated 07.07.1995. There is a pointer arrow in blue ink, where, after scoring out the original date of birth recorded in the service-book, that is to say, 18.01.1963, the amended date of birth recorded is 18.01.1956, both in figures and words. This Court, therefore, finds that there is absolutely no case of an interpolation or forgery. At the same time, we find that the petitioner's date of birth originally recorded at the time of her entry into service has indeed been changed by dint of the impugned order dated 07.07.1995 from 18.01.1963 to 18.01.1956. 14. Now, the question is whether it is open to the respondents to change the petitioner's date of birth once recorded in her service-book given the fact that the petitioner is neither a matriculate nor the holder of an equivalent educational certificate. The Rules of 1974 have been made by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rules 2 and 3 of the Rules of 1974 read: “2. Determination of correct date of birth or age.– The date of birth of a Government servant as recorded in the certificate of his having passed the High School or equivalent examination, or where Government Servant has not passed any such examination as aforesaid, the date of birth or the age recorded in his service book at the time of his entry into Government service, shall be deemed to be his correct date of birth or age, as the case may be, for all purposes in relation to his service, including eligibility for promotion, superannuation, premature retirement or retirement benefits, and no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such date or age in any circumstances whatsoever. 3. Overriding effect.–These rules shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the relevant service rules or orders.” 15. In this case, there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is an illiterate woman. She holds no educational qualifications. 3. Overriding effect.–These rules shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the relevant service rules or orders.” 15. In this case, there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is an illiterate woman. She holds no educational qualifications. She has certainly not passed her High School or an equivalent examination. Therefore, her date of birth, recorded in the service-book at the time of entry into service, shall be deemed to be her correct date of birth, for all purposes, including superannuation. The petitioner's date of birth recorded at the time of her entry into service was clearly 18.01.1963. Since the medical certificate dated 18.01.1983, on the basis of which the petitioner's date of birth was entered as 18.01.1963, had opined the petitioner to be about 27 years old as against the 20 years, claimed by her, the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, after a conversation in this regard and directions issued to him on 27.06.1995 by the Regional Additional Director, passed the order impugned dated 07.07.1995, changing the petitioner's date of birth, according to the medical certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, that is to say, the one dated 18.01.1983. It is by dint of that certificate and the estimation of the petitioner's age there as 27 years that the petitioner's date of birth has now been changed to 18.01.1956 from 18.01.1963. 16. This change, whatever be the basis, is clearly one in teeth of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974. Once the petitioner's age was recorded at the time of her entry into service as 18.01.1963, there is no scope for effecting a change, either at the instance of the petitioner or the respondents, as she had not passed her High School or equivalent examination before entry into government service. I had occasion to consider this issue in Subhash Chand v. State of U.P. and others, 2023 (2) AWC 1219 , where it was held: “12. Apparently, the first amendment does not apply to the petitioner's case because he never passed his High School either before or during service. When the petitioner entered service, he was not a matriculate and had not passed his High School or an equivalent examination. Apparently, the first amendment does not apply to the petitioner's case because he never passed his High School either before or during service. When the petitioner entered service, he was not a matriculate and had not passed his High School or an equivalent examination. A perusal of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 makes it pellucid that all that is relevant for the purpose of recording a government servant's date of birth is his High School Certificate or a certificate of an equivalent examination and in a case, where the government servant has not passed any such examination, the date of birth or age recorded in his service-book at the time of entry into service shall be deemed to be correct. A perusal of the Rules of 1974 would show that any certificate from an educational institutions below the Grade of High School is not at all relevant to determine a government servant's age. It is perhaps for this reason that when the petitioner appeared before the Appointing Authority at the time of appointment, and as he says, produced his transfer certificate, he was directed to appear for his medical examination before the Chief Medical Officer. Apparently, when any school certification below the High School or an equivalent examination is not relevant to determine the employee's age, the Appointing Authority would not have looked into a transfer certificate relating to Class VII. These are circumstances which show that what the petitioner asserts is correct. Even if it was incorrect, the transfer certificate relating to Class VII is not at all relevant to determine the petitioner's age. Now, what remains relevant about the petitioner's age is the entry at the time of his appointment recorded in the servicebook and nothing else. The said entry is immutable and cannot be imperilled by sundry complaints from busy bodies, or may be sworn enemies. A government servant's age of retirement cannot be subjected to perpetual uncertainty on account of disgruntled complainants questioning his date of birth and laying complaints to the Appointing Authority, saying that the government servant's recorded date of birth in the service record is incorrect. If that were permitted, it would introduce a pernicious uncertainty about the tenure of government servants and much affect their efficiency. 13. If that were permitted, it would introduce a pernicious uncertainty about the tenure of government servants and much affect their efficiency. 13. Quite apart, Rule 3 of Rules of 1974 indicate that the said Rule gives the 1974 Rules overriding effect over any other service rules or orders. Therefore, what Rule 2 provides has to be given its fullest effect. The result is that the petitioner's date of birth recorded in his service-book cannot be questioned. It cannot be questioned by the petitioner; and likewise, it cannot be questioned by the employers as well. This Court, therefore, is of opinion that the impugned order dated 03.10.2022 is manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction.” 17. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that the decision in Subhash Chand (supra) has been set aside on appeal by the Division Bench in Nagar Palika Parishad, Kairana v. Subhash Chand and 3 others, Neutral Citation No.2023 AHC 93646-DB. The following remarks of their Lordships of the Division Bench are relevant: “From perusal of the resolution of the Board, Nagar Palika Parishad, it is evident that an exception has been taken to the action of the writ petitioner in not producing the transfer certificate of Class VII at the time of entry into service in the year 1991. It was opined that the petitioner had conveniently concealed his correct date of birth by projecting him an illiterate person at the time of entry into service whereas for promotion to the Safai Nayak, the transfer certificate was produced in the year 2003 to seek benefit of the minimum eligibility criteria of Class V pass, for promotion to the said post. The copy of the transfer certificate filed by the petitioner has appended at page No.'17' of the supplementary affidavit filed by the counsel for the appellant. Placing the said certificate before us, it is demonstrated that the petitioner had concealed the material information with regard to his correct age at the time of entry into service and the assessment of his age by the medical experts cannot override the entry of the date of birth in the transfer certificate produced by the petitioner himself for the purposes of promotion. Having gone through the transfer certificate appended at page No.'17' of the paper book, we find that the said certificate was issued on 21.01.1984/17.08.1990 and it bears the seal and signature of the Principal of the institution concerned having the date as 17.08.1990. It is, thus, evident that the transfer certificate was with the petitioner at the time of joining on the post of Safai Karmi in the Nagar Palika Parishad on 04.12.1991. It seems that the petitioner had deliberately concealed the said document in order to give an impression that he was illiterate and that was the reason for assessment of his age by the medical expert. In any case, the date of birth of the petitioner in the transfer certificate produced by him for the purpose of promotion is the proof of his age which cannot be disputed by the petitioner. The entry of the date of birth in the transfer certificate would definitely prevail over the assessment of the medical expert, in as much as, the assessment of age through medical examination was merely an opinion of the expert. At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1/writ petitioner submits that similar complaint was filed in the year 2010 by some person which was turned down by the authority itself with the assertion that the entry of date of birth in the service record was final and it could not be changed for any reason. We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. Having noted the above facts, we are of the opinion that once the petitioner availed the benefit of the transfer certificate of having fulfilled the minimum eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Safai Nayak, he cannot be allowed to turn around to assert that he is entitled to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation as per the entry of his date of birth in the said certificate, to seek benefit of the entry of his date of birth in the service record based on the medical opinion. The submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to continue in service as per the entry of his age/date of birth in service record, therefore, is turned down. The submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to continue in service as per the entry of his age/date of birth in service record, therefore, is turned down. The stand of the appellant that the petitioner is not entitled to continue in service beyond the date of superannuation which is to be determined as per his date of birth as 07.01.1961 recorded in the transfer certificate is found force. With due respect to the learned Single Judge, we find that an error has been committed in holding that the writ petitioner herein is entitled to continue in service as per the entry of his date of birth in the service record. The judgement and order dated 10.01.2023 is hereby set aside.” 18. It appears that the judgment in Subhash Chand was set aside by their Lordships, going by the fact that the petitioner in that case had claimed promotion to the post of a Safai Nayak, where the essential qualification was a Class-V certificate. In order to seek promotion, he had relied on a transfer certificate of Class-VII, which he did not produce at the time of entry into service, as their Lordships held. He, according to the Division Bench, concealed his correct date of birth by projecting himself to be an illiterate. Going by a plain reading of the provisions of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974, nothing is relevant to determine the age of a person, who has not passed his High School examination or an equivalent, except the date of birth entered at the time of entry into government service, whatever be the basis for that entry. 19. The mandate of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 admits of no other interpretation except that all certificates of education below that of the High School or an equivalent are irrelevant for the determination of a person's age. With great respect to their Lordships of the Division Bench, this Court finds that there is no reference to the provisions of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 in the decision of the Division Bench in Nagar Palika Parishad, Kairana v. Subhash Chand (supra). With great respect to their Lordships of the Division Bench, this Court finds that there is no reference to the provisions of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 in the decision of the Division Bench in Nagar Palika Parishad, Kairana v. Subhash Chand (supra). If there were, on facts, a case here that the petitioner's date of birth was altered on the basis of a Class-V or Class-VII certificate, going against the originally recorded date of birth at the time of entry into government service relating to the petitioner, this Court, with utmost respect, would have had no hesitation in referring the issue for consideration by a larger Bench, as the Bench decision clearly ignores the mandatory provisions of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974 in this Court's opinion. But, that course of action may not be necessitated at all in this case, because the petitioner here is an abject illiterate, as already noted. Therefore, the consideration that prevailed with their Lordships of the Division Bench in Nagar Palika Parishad, Kairana v. Subhash Chand, the employee in that case having passed his Class-VII examination, held a certification thereof, which mentioned his age different from that mentioned in his service-book, and above all, had taken advantage of his qualification in seeking promotion to a higher post, does not apply here at all. The Bench decision in Nagar Palika Parishad, Kairana v. Subhash Chand, therefore, would not at all affect the rights of the petitioner here, founded on Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974. The petitioner's date of birth, as recorded at the time of entry into service, is the only date which would govern all her rights in respect of superannuation, including eligibility for promotion, premature retirement or retirement benefits. No other date would be relevant. That date can never be changed or altered. It is, accordingly, held. For the said reasons, the impugned orders dated 07.07.1995 and 15.09.2014 are manifestly illegal. 20. There are added reasons why the impugned orders are bad. The foremost is that the petitioner's date of birth originally recorded in her service-book at the time of entry in service in the year 1982, remained so recorded until the year 1995, when the order dated 07.07.1995 was passed, directing its alteration. 20. There are added reasons why the impugned orders are bad. The foremost is that the petitioner's date of birth originally recorded in her service-book at the time of entry in service in the year 1982, remained so recorded until the year 1995, when the order dated 07.07.1995 was passed, directing its alteration. The order dated 07.07.1995 was passed, based on some kind of a conversation on 27.06.1995 between some functionary, described as the Regional Additional Director and the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, without hearing the petitioner in the slightest measure. The impugned orders, which visit the petitioner with adverse civil consequences, have been passed behind her back, without provision of any opportunity of hearing. On this short ground alone, the impugned orders are bad in law. 21. The principle, that before the employer moves to alter the recorded date of birth of an employee to his/ her prejudice, they must hear the employee concerned about it, has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Limited and others, (2022) 6 SCC 211 , where it has been held: “27. We find the action of the employer lacking in authority of law in this case on two counts. First, it fails for not adhering to the principles of natural justice. The decision not to follow the service book recordal was taken without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The opportunity of hearing of the appellant also accrued because the employer themselves had proceeded on the basis that the later date i.e. 21-9-1949 was the birthdate of the appellant and this was a long established position. Moreover, since in the own records of the employer two dates were shown, under normal circumstances it would have been incumbent on their part to undertake an exercise on application of mind to determine in which of these two records the mistake had crept in. That process would also have had to involve participation of the appellant, which would have been compatible with the principles of natural justice.” 22. That process would also have had to involve participation of the appellant, which would have been compatible with the principles of natural justice.” 22. The added reason, which would persuade this Court to think that the respondents' action in altering the petitioner's date of birth recorded at the time of her entry into service is utterly bad in law, is the fact that the decision is based on the Chief Medical Officer's certificate dated 18.01.1983, which proceeds to opine the petitioner as 27 years old on the basis of her general appearance. The certification by the Chief Medical Officer is not founded on any scientific test like ossification. It is merely an opinion. Matters get worse for the respondents here, because this certificate was before them in the year 1983, shortly after the petitioner entered into service, and yet, they chose to enter the petitioner's date birth as 18.01.1963, contrary to the Chief Medical Officer's estimation. What made them to rethink their decision after 12 years, quite apart from the embargo in Rule 2 of the Rules of 1974, is itself a fact, which might have required more explanation to be carried in the impugned order than just a conversation between the Regional Additional Director and the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, that is mentioned there. 23. The petitioner’s case, based on the medical certificate of 1998 is more of an ill-found apprehension that her date of birth was changed, which she calls an interpolation, because she was put up for fresh medical test on 17.06.1998 and a certificate of that date issued, certifying her to be 35 years old by the Medical Superintendent. The said certificate is irrelevant, because it does not figure as the basis of the respondents’ decision even in the impugned order dated 15.09.2014. The order dated 15.09.2014 also refers to the age determination certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, which is the same certificate dated 18.01.1983, that was issued when the petitioner entered service. The other order impugned dated 07.07.1995, as a direct consequence of which the petitioner’s date of birth was altered in her service-book, cannot possibly be based on a subsequent medical certificate dated 17.06.1998 issued by the Medical Superintendent. 24. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The other order impugned dated 07.07.1995, as a direct consequence of which the petitioner’s date of birth was altered in her service-book, cannot possibly be based on a subsequent medical certificate dated 17.06.1998 issued by the Medical Superintendent. 24. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders dated 07.07.1995 and 15.09.2014, both passed by the Chief Medical Superintendent, Government Women Hospital, Varanasi, are hereby quashed. The petitioner, having superannuated, will not be reinstated in service, but shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, including the payment of arrears of her salary and the revision of post retiral benefits, which the respondents shall determine and pay within six weeks of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 25. Let the original service-book of the petitioner be returned to Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for its onward and safe transmission to the respondents.