JUDGMENT : RAKESH THAPLIYAL, J. 1. In all these writ petitions, common questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, all the writ petitions are heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. For the sake of convenience, Writ Petition (SB) No. 176 of 2023 is treated as leading case and its facts are taken into consideration for proper adjudication of all the cases. 3. Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the following reliefs: “(i) Issue an appropriate writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the office memo no. 33/USDMA-974 (2019) TC dated 11.04.2023 (Annexure No. 17). (ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to the effect that writ petitioner be permitted to work on his incumbent post of District Disaster Management Officer, till the regular appointment is made on the said sanctioned post. (iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the clause 3 (1) of the Office Memo bearing no. 1615/XVIII-B-1/2021-3 (2)/2016 dated 30.11.2021 (Annexure No. 15), in so far as it delegates the power to fix educational qualification/experience for the contractual appointments to the Chief Executive Officer, Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority.” 4. Brief facts of the case are that petitioner was initially engaged with United Nations Development Programme in March, 2008, for a period of one year. Subsequently, he was appointed, under a project, as Specialist, Disaster Management for District Uttarakashi vide letter dated 06.05.2010. Again, he was appointed, on contract basis, for a period of one year, vide order dated 31.12.2010 issued by the District Magistrate, Uttarkashi, in pursuance of Government Order dated 18.11.2009, issued under Section 25 (1) of the Central Act No. 53 of 2005 whereby Disaster Management Authority was constituted under the Chairmanship of District Magistrate. Another Government Order dated 15.09.2010 was issued which provides that for selection on the post of Disaster Management Officer preference will be given to those, who had been working as Disaster Project Officer under the aided Disaster Risk Management Project of the United National Development Programme and the term of contract shall not exceed five years. Vide Government Order dated 07.10.2015, the term of contract of Disaster Management Officer was further extended for a period of three years. Vide Government Order dated 07.10.2015, the term of contract of Disaster Management Officer was further extended for a period of three years. Vide Government Order dated 09.08.2016, several new posts were created in the State Disaster Management Authority and for the post of District Disaster Management Officer, pay scale of Rs. 15600 - 39100 with Grade Pay 5400 was sanctioned for regular appointee and Rs. 40,000/- per month was sanctioned for contractual employee. Vide Government order dated 11.05.2018, cadre restructuring of posts was done in the State Disaster Management Authority, however, the number of the post of District Disaster Management Officer remained the same. 5. The Government issued an order dated 30.11.2021 which inter alia provides, that educational qualification/experience for the contractual posts will be fixed by the Chief Administrative Officer, Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority and such contractual employees working on the contractual posts shall continue to work until their term of contract applicable to that post is over. After that, the concerned post will be automatically terminated. Vide Government Order dated 31.03.2022, the District Magistrate was authorised to take decision for extension of contract; whether the service of the incumbent is satisfactory, or; to carry out fresh appointment. Vide Government Order dated 11.04.2023, Secretary, Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority prescribed the educational qualification for the post of District Disaster Management Officer. Petitioner does not possess the qualification prescribed vide Government Order dated 11.04.2023, so the petitioner is under an apprehension that his service will be discontinued. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner has approached this Court. 6. Petitioner, by the instant writ petition, particularly by relief no. 1 read with relief no. 3 is challenging clause 3 (1) of the 30.11.2021, as well as the office memo dated 11.04.2023 on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that the Secretary, State Disaster Management Authority, is not authorised to prescribe and determine educational qualification and experience for the post, in question, and as such, impugned office memo dated 11.04.2023 is liable to be quashed, as the same is without jurisdiction. Secondly, that the delegation of rule making power to the Chief Administrative Officer by office memo dated 30.11.2021 is bad in law, being contrary to the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2005”) as well as to the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution. 7. Secondly, that the delegation of rule making power to the Chief Administrative Officer by office memo dated 30.11.2021 is bad in law, being contrary to the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2005”) as well as to the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution. 7. First, we may deal with the issue of determination of educational qualification and experience for the post of District Disaster Management Officer, which according to the petitioner, should be determined by Chief Administrative Officer, Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority, pursuant to Clause 3(1) of office memo dated 30.11.2021. 8. Before dealing with the issue in respect of determination of educational qualification/experience for the post, in question, it is necessary to give reference of certain provisions of the Act, 2005, enacted by the Parliament on 23.12.2005. The object for enactment of the said Act is to provide for requisite institutional mechanism for drawing up and monitoring the implementation of the disaster management plans, ensuring measures by various wings of Government for prevention and mitigating effects of disasters, and for undertaking a holistic, coordinated and prompt response to any disaster situation. Chapter II of the Act, 2005 deals with establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority, and Chapter III deals with establishment of the State Disaster Management Authority. Chapter IV deals with constitution of District Disaster Management Authority. Section 25 of Chapter IV the Act, 2005 reads as under: “25. Constitution of District Disaster Management Authority: (1) Every State Government shall, as soon as may be after issue of notification under sub-section (1) of section 14, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish a District Disaster Management Authority for every district in the State with such name as may be specified in that notification. (2) The District Authority shall consist of the Chairperson and such number of other members, not exceeding seven, as may be prescribed by the State Government, and unless the rules otherwise provide, it shall consist of the following, namely: (a) the Collector or District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the district who shall be Chairperson, ex-officio. (b) the elected representative of the local authority who shall be the co-Chairperson, ex-officio: Provided that in the Tribal Areas, as referred to in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, the Chief Executive Member of the district council of autonomous district, shall be the co-Chairperson, ex officio. (b) the elected representative of the local authority who shall be the co-Chairperson, ex-officio: Provided that in the Tribal Areas, as referred to in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, the Chief Executive Member of the district council of autonomous district, shall be the co-Chairperson, ex officio. (c) the Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority, ex-officio. (d) the Superintendent of Police, ex-officio. (e) the Chief Medical Officer of the district, ex-officio. (f) not exceeding two other district level officers, to be appointed by the State Government. (3) In any district where zila parishad exists, the Chairperson thereof shall be the co-Chairperson of the District Authority. (4) The State Government shall appoint an officer not below the rank of Additional Collector or Additional District Magistrate or Additional Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the district to be the Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority to exercise such powers and perform such functions as may be prescribed by the State Government and such other powers and functions as may be delegated to him by the District Authority.” 9. As per Section 25 (2) of the Act, 2005, the District Authority shall consist of the Chairman and such number of other members, not exceeding seven, as may be prescribed by the State Government. As per Section 25 (2) (a) of the Act, 2005, the Collector or District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the district shall be Chairman, ex-officio. As per Section 25 (4) of the Act, 2005, the State Government shall appoint an officer not below the rank of Additional Collector or Additional District Magistrate or Additional Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the District to be the Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority to exercise such powers and perform such functions, as may be prescribed by the State Government and such other powers and functions, as may be delegated to him by the District Authority. 10. Section 26 of the Act, 2005 deals with the powers of Chairperson of District Authority. Section 26 of the Act reads as under: “26. Powers of Chairperson of District Authority (1) The Chairperson of the District Authority shall, in addition to presiding over the meetings of the District Authority, exercise and discharge such powers and functions of the District Authority as the District Authority may delegate to him. Section 26 of the Act reads as under: “26. Powers of Chairperson of District Authority (1) The Chairperson of the District Authority shall, in addition to presiding over the meetings of the District Authority, exercise and discharge such powers and functions of the District Authority as the District Authority may delegate to him. (2) The Chairperson of the District Authority shall, in the case of an emergency, have power to exercise all or any of the powers of the District Authority but the exercise of such powers shall be subject to ex post facto ratification of the District Authority. (3) The District Authority or the Chairperson of the District Authority may, by general or special order, in writing, delegate such of its or his powers and functions, under sub-section (1) or (2), as the case may be, to the Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as it or he deems fit.” 11. On plain reading of Section 25 (4), it clearly reveals that the Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority is empowered to exercise such powers and perform such functions, as may be prescribed by the State Government and such other powers and functions, as may be delegated to him by the District Authority. 12. Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021 empowers the Chief Executive Officer for determining the educational qualification and experience for appointment on contractual posts. Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021, which is put to challenge, reads as under: ^^mDrkuqlkj Lohd`r lafonk ds inksa dks Hkjs tkus ds lEcU/k esa fuEukuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxh%& 01- lafonk ds inksa gsrq 'kSf{kd vgZrkvksa@vuqHkoksa dk fu/kkZj.k eq[; dk;Zokgh vf/kdkjh] mRrjk[k.M jkT; vkink ÁcU/ku Ákf/kdj.k }kjk fd;k tk;sxkA** (Emphasis supplied) 13. On perusal of this Clause, which empowers the Chief Executive Officer to determine the educational qualification and experience, it is clear that the same is in conformity with Section 25 (4) of the Act, 2005, as the State Government, by this office memo dated 30.11.2021 empowered the Chief Executive Officer to determine the educational qualification and experience. Hence, the relief, as sought by way of relief no. 3 wherein Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021 is put to challenge, cannot be granted. Accordingly, this Court declines to grant relief no. 3, as sought in the writ petition. 14. Hence, the relief, as sought by way of relief no. 3 wherein Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021 is put to challenge, cannot be granted. Accordingly, this Court declines to grant relief no. 3, as sought in the writ petition. 14. So far as relief no. 1 is concerned, whereunder the petitioner has challenged office memo dated 11.04.2023, it is clearly apparent that the qualification and experience has been determined by the Chief Executive Officer in the light of the powers conferred upon him by the State Government. Extract of this office memo dated 11.04.2023, which gives reference of the powers exercised by the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to Clause 3 (1) of the office memo 30.11.2021, is reproduced below: “Qualification - Bachelor in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Management) with Master/PG in Disaster Risk Management (DRM) or Security Studies or Emergency Management or any other field related to DRM. Experience - Experience in the above-mentioned fields will be desirable.” 15. On perusal of Clause 3 (1) of office memo dated 30.11.2021 issued by respondent no. 1 and the office memo dated 11.04.2023, it is clear that the Chief Executive Officer has rightly determined the educational qualification and experience for the appointment to the post of Disaster Management Officer and this power, he has derived from Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021, which is also in conformity with Section 25 (4) of the Act, 2005. 16. Petitioner, in paragraph 31 of the writ petition contends that in fact, by office memo dated 11.04.2023, the Secretary, Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority was not authorised to prescribe the educational qualification and experience. 17. The stand taken by the petitioner in this regard is totally misconceived and untenable. Since, it appears from the contents of office memo dated 11.04.2023, this office memo is authenticated by the Secretary with his signature, it does not mean that by this office memo dated 11.04.2023, the Secretary has determined the educational qualification and the experience for the post, in question. Since, it appears from the contents of office memo dated 11.04.2023, this office memo is authenticated by the Secretary with his signature, it does not mean that by this office memo dated 11.04.2023, the Secretary has determined the educational qualification and the experience for the post, in question. The extract of this office memo dated 11.04.2023 is quoted below: ^^vkink ÁcU/ku vuqHkkx&01] mRrjk[k.M 'kklu ds 'kklukns'k la[;k 1615/XVIII-B-I/2021-3(2)/2016 fnukad 30 uoEcj] 2021 }kjk iquZxfBr foHkkxh; ढkaps ds ÁLrj&3 ds fcUnq la[;k&01 esa ^^lafonk ds inksa gsrq 'kSf{kd vgZrkvksa@vuqHkoksa dk fu/kkZj.k eq[; dk;Zdkjh vf/kdkjh] mRrjk[k.M jkT; vkink ÁcU/ku Ákf/kdj.k }kjk fd;k tk;sxk** }kjk ÁnRr 'kfDr;ksa ds vkyksd esa tuin vkink ÁcU/ku Ákf/kdj.k ds vUrxZr l`ftr ftyk vkink ÁcU/ku vf/kdkjh ds inksa dk lafonk ds vk/kkj ij fd;s tkus okys p;u gsrq 'kSf{kd vgZrk@vuqHko dk fu/kkZj.k fuEuor~ fd;k tkrk gSA** 18. The above extract clearly reveals that educational qualification and the experience has been determined by the Chief Executive Officer in exercise of powers conferred upon him pursuant to Clause 3 (1) of office memo dated 30.11.2021. 19. As discussed above, this Clause 3 (1) of the office memo dated 30.11.2021 is in conformity with Section 25 (4) of the Act, 2005 and hence, this contention of the petitioner that the educational qualification and experience has been determined by the Secretary is misconceived, hence, rejected. 20. It has been consistently held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the determination of educational qualification or any eligibility or requirement for any post is a matter of policy, and there is limited scope of judicial review. 21. In reference to this, Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank vs. Anit Kumar Das, (2021) 12 SCC 80 observed that the State as employer is entitled to prescribe qualification and condition of eligibility. The prescription of qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial review to expound upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications. Not only this, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. Not only this, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies of administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrative decision-making. The State as a public employer may well take into account social perspectives. It is for the employer to determine and decide relevancy and suitability of the qualifications for any post and it is not for the Courts to consider and assess. A greater latitude is permitted by the courts for the employer to prescribe qualifications for any post. There is a rationale behind it. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need and interest of an institution or an industry or an establishment, as the case may be. The courts are not fit instruments to assess expediency or advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications. 22. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of the Maharashtra Public Service Commission and Others vs. Sandeep Shriram Warade and Others, AIR 2019 SC 2154 in paragraph 10 has held as under: “10. The essential qualifications for appointment to a post are for the employer to decide. The employer may prescribe additional or desirable qualifications, including any grant of preference. It is the employer who is best suited to decide the requirements a candidate must possess according to the needs of the employer and the nature of work. The court cannot lay down the conditions of eligibility, much less can it delve into the issue with regard to desirable qualifications being at par with the essential eligibility by an interpretive re-writing of the advertisement. Questions of equivalence will also fall outside the domain of judicial review. If the language of the advertisement and the Rules are clear, the Court cannot sit in judgment over the same. Questions of equivalence will also fall outside the domain of judicial review. If the language of the advertisement and the Rules are clear, the Court cannot sit in judgment over the same. If there is an ambiguity in the advertisement or it is contrary to any Rules or law the matter has to go back to the appointing authority after appropriate orders, to proceed in accordance with law. In no case can the Court, in the garb of judicial review, sit in the chair of the appointing authority to decide what is best for the employer and interpret the conditions of the advertisement contrary to the plain language of the same.” 23. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Hiteshbhai Bhikabhai Vyas vs. State of Gujarat, 2012 SCC Online Guj. 4883 in paragraphs no. 9.4 and 10.5 has held as under: “9.4 The right to prescribe eligibility criteria including upper age limit, for any post, is employer's prerogative. Employer alone can determine the requirements for the post in question. When employer prescribes particular qualification, then Court would not be justified in imposing its view and would also not claim expertise so as to substitute its view or decision for that of the employer. In present case when the respondent State, in its capacity as employer has, while creating now (sic) post and while prescribing eligibility criteria as policy, considered it necessary and appropriate to prescribe upper age limit, then such decision cannot be interfered with and it would not be within the purview of judicial review and Court would not examine the propriety of the decision. xxx xxx xxx 10.5 Furthermore this aspect also is in employer's domain and it is employer's prerogative to set the standard and fix the criterion for requisite experience. When the employer is State, the decision may be examined on touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and so long as it is not arbitrary court would not interfere with such decision. In present case, the rationale behind the decision is apparent and does not seem to be arbitrary or irrational or unfair. It also does not appear to be designed to exclude otherwise eligible category, without any justification. In present case, the rationale behind the decision is apparent and does not seem to be arbitrary or irrational or unfair. It also does not appear to be designed to exclude otherwise eligible category, without any justification. It is claimed and clarified by the respondent State that all schools/institutes which are clubbed and included in clause (d) of Rule-4, for the purpose of determining 5 years combined experience are imparting education in only primary division or are connected with education at primary division.” 24. Thus, in view of the observations as quoted above and in the light of several judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, since the employer is the best person to determine the educational qualification, eligibility and requirement for the post, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order determining the qualification and experience for the post, in question. Hence, the relief no. 1, as sought in this writ petition, is refused to be granted. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the determination of qualification is nothing but an attempt to oust the petitioner from service. Such a contention cannot be sustained in view of the observation made above that it is for the employer to determine the qualification, as required for a particular post and it is for the candidate to attain that eligibility and on this ground the determination of qualification cannot be challenged. 26. Now, by relief no. 2, petitioner is seeking a writ of Mandamus that the petitioner be permitted to work on the post of District Disaster Management Officer till the regular appointment is made. 27. Admittedly, the status of the petitioner is of a contractual employee and as such, by efflux of time the appointment of the petitioner comes to an end. Therefore, no legal enforceable right accrues in favour of the petitioner, his status being as a contractual employee. Since no legally enforceable right accrues in favour of the contractual employee, as such, the contractual employee cannot ask for issuance of a writ of Mandamus. The contractual appointee is bound by the terms of appointment order. He can neither claim for regularization of service, nor claim for any extension of service, as a matter of right. The contractual appointee cannot stretch his or her claim beyond the terms of appointment and therefore, no Mandamus can be issued. In view of above, relief no. The contractual appointee is bound by the terms of appointment order. He can neither claim for regularization of service, nor claim for any extension of service, as a matter of right. The contractual appointee cannot stretch his or her claim beyond the terms of appointment and therefore, no Mandamus can be issued. In view of above, relief no. 2, as sought in the writ petition, cannot be granted. 28. It has been consistently held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments that in case of contractual appointments for a fixed term, no Mandamus can be issued for continuing them in service. This has also been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of India Literacy Board and Others vs. Veena Chaturvedi and Others, (2005) 3 SCC 79 . 29. It is settled principle of law that contractual employee has no right to seek a writ of Mandamus and apart from this petitioner is not having requisite qualification, as prescribed by the office memo dated 11.04.2023 and therefore, petitioner cannot seek a writ of Mandamus that he may be permitted to continue till regular selection is made, so this relief cannot be granted since petitioner status is of a contractual employee and as such, he has no right to claim to continue. 30. In view of the above discussion, all the writ petition fail and are hereby dismissed. All the pending applications also stand disposed of. 31. Let copy of this judgment be placed in all the connected writ petitions.