JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. Heard Sri Narendra Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent-returned candidate, namely, Hakim Lal. 2. The election petition questions election to the constituency 58 Handia, district of Prayagraj for the U.P. State legislative assembly. The returned candidate Mr. Hakim Lal has moved application to reject election petitioner under Section 86(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short R.P. Act) and also under rule 11(a) of Order VII of CPC. There is another misc. application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC. 3. The election petition questions the election of returned candidate Mr. Hakim Lal for corrupt practise at his end that led to his victory. 4. It was submitted by learned counsel appearing for the returned candidate that petitioner was eligible to contest the election of the legislative assembly of the State and earned no disqualification either under the R.P. Act,1951 or under the Constitution of India vide its Article 173. It was further submitted that affidavit that contained necessary information on a printed format prescribed for under Rule 4-a read with Section 33 of the R.P. Act, 1951, is meant for display both on the conspicuous place by returning officer, inasmuch as, uploaded on the official website of the State Election Officer. He submitted that such an information continues to be available on the official website and anybody can have easy access to the same. It was also argued that political parties are also required to publish such information regarding their respective candidates and, therefore, every information is made available in the public domain before the election is held and so nobody can be mislead as to credentials of a candidate in public election. 5. He submitted that Section 83(1) provided for an election petition to contain concise statement of material facts upon which petitioner relies and then to set-forth the material particulars of any corrupt practise that is alleged by the petitioner indicating the name of parties who committed such corrupt practise, then date and place of commission of such practise, the petition to be verified and signed by the petitioner and then proviso to Section 83(1), further required election petitioner to file an affidavit to accompany the election petition in a prescribed format in support of allegations of such corrupt practise and particulars thereof. 6. 6. It was argued that sub-section 2 of Section 83 provided that schedule or annexure appended to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and in the event if any of these were found to be lacking in an election petition it would deserve dismissal. He submitted that since affidavit was available in the public domain, it ought to have been filed in support of the pleadings, that would have clarified the allegations made as the pleadings, according to him, raised in the relevant paragraphs were quite vague. He also argued that since manner in which pleadings had been raised appeared to be frivolous and vexatious for want of specific and concise statement as to the corrupt practise and the Court even might strike down such pleadings. 7. Now to examine the pleadings as to ground No. 8-a and the pleadings in respect thereof made in paragraph 10 of the election petition, learned Advocate took the Court to the affidavit accompanying election petition as required as per proviso to Section 83-1 of the R.P. Act 1951. 8. Arguing in support of miscellaneous applications Sri Pandey submitted that election petition on the ground that nomination paper and affidavit on form 26 were not properly filled as per Section 33 and 33-A of the R.P.Act, itself was not maintainable for the reason that no such nomination form as filed under Section 33 nor, form 26 accompanied it. He submitted that Section 33 of the R.P. Act, 1951 referred to nomination paper to be completed and filled on prescribed format. The form was prescribed under Rule 4 of the 1961 Rules and nomination paper was given as form 2-b. He submitted that prior to the Amending Act No. 72 of 2002 whereby Section 33-A was inserted after Section 33, further rule 4-a came to be inserted after Rule 4 under Rules 1961 and then part III-A also came to be added. He submitted that form 26 was altogether a different form prescribed for under Rule 4-a read with Section 33-A and the column that were referred to in part 'a' and part 'b' of that form had nothing to do with Section 33. In so far as information furnished by the candidate in form 26 was concerned, it was submitted that there was description of criminal antecedents. In so far as information furnished by the candidate in form 26 was concerned, it was submitted that there was description of criminal antecedents. He submitted that ground though talked of criminal antecedents not having been disclosed, but this ground has not been developed in pleadings to be a ''concise statement of material facts'' and ''full particulars of corrupt practise'' so as to maintain election petition under Section 81 of the R.P. Act, 1951. It was submitted that the ground was that description of criminal antecedents had resulted in unduly influencing the voter in casting their votes in favour of the returned candidate being quite vague and misleading. 9. It was submitted that in paragraph 10, it was stated that 'part- a column 5', dealt with information of pending criminal cases and while in 5-i, the candidate had put mark ''(v)''. He had to argue further in detail the pending criminal case in column 5 ii and then later on it was stated in paragraph 10 that petitioner instead of referring to any First Information Report with details of criminal case number or year of complaint case number had merely referred to range case number and this according to the election petitioner was enough to misguide and mislead the voters inasmuch as information so far furnished was also fake one. 10. It was further submitted that statement in paragraphs were to the effect that in absence of First Information Report number, case number, or year number, there was no possibility to trace out the details of the case and resultantly no verification could have been done and so likewise since no registration of the case number was disclosed in column 5-ii, he found on verification from the Court of ACJM-5, Prayagraj that at that time no such case was pending in the Court's record diary. Thus even this fact was quite misleading, likewise other informations furnished in other sub columns of the column 5 had been claimed to be misleading. 11. Learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that furnishing of information as zero in column 11(v) of part-b was not wrong as declaration was made by the respondent himself that three criminal cases were pending. 11. Learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that furnishing of information as zero in column 11(v) of part-b was not wrong as declaration was made by the respondent himself that three criminal cases were pending. Learned counsel for the returned candidate, therefore argued that then in the first instance if there was no pending case in the Court of ACJM as is claimed by election petitioner as per verification obtained by him, mentioning of zero in respect of any criminal case would certainly not be misleading. He further submitted that if range case has been referred to in column 5-ii ka, it is because there was no First Information Report lodged as such by any private person but it was forest department which would register a as case referred to as a range case relating to a particular forest range. 12. Besides above, he argued that no details had been given regarding particular case number or regarding any particular incident that election petitioner had the knowledge or regarding which he acquired the knowledge so as to suggest by way of pleading that information furnished by the petitioner was misleading and that had caused undue influence upon the voters in their free exercise of franchise in an open general election. 13. Thus, it is submitted that since paragraphs that are in support of ground No. 8-A do not contain the material particulars so as to hold there to be any specific material fact and contents of paragraph are quite vague also and so it can be safely concluded that allegations do not meet parameters of clauses a and b of sub-section 1 of Section 83 of the Act, 1951. 14. On affidavit accompanying the election petition, counsel for the respondent submits that proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 83, requires an affidavit of corrupt practice but the affidavit only refers to certain criminal antecedents and non closure of movable or immovable properties only and there is no reference to any 'corrupt practice' as such as has come to be referred to under Section 23 of the R.P. Act, 1951. So affidavit itself is not sufficient to meet requirement of law. He would take this argument further by submitting that affidavit has been sworn on personal knowledge. 15. So affidavit itself is not sufficient to meet requirement of law. He would take this argument further by submitting that affidavit has been sworn on personal knowledge. 15. In so far as paragraph 10 to 19 are concerned it was submitted that what was personal knowledge about non disclosure or concealment of material fact has not been detailed out. It was submitted that personal knowledge of given case can be had so as to make a substantive allegation in support of the ground raised in the petition but that personal knowledge must be specific and concise so as to refer to a particular criminal case or criminal antecedent. It was argued that in order to support this personal knowledge, the affidavit ought to have formed part of the election petition or the affidavit as required under proviso to sub-section 1 and 2 of Section 83 of the Act, 1951 but that had not been done. It was submitted, therefore, that affidavit being defective not supporting the election petition as such regarding corrupt practise, grounds taken as 8A, 8B of the election petition, the petition deserved to be dismissed. 16. It is argued that criminal antecedents or declaration of criminal antecedents by itself would not be a corrupt practise within definition as given thereof under Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. 17. Summarizing the argument, following points have been pressed regarding undue influence in which grounds have been raised as ground Nos. 8-A and 8-B, 8C and 8D. (i) the pleadings raised in paragraph 10 and 11 in support thereof do not contain concise statement as to the material fact that may have resulted into corrupt practise of undue influence; (ii) since allegations raised in the ground supported by pleadings vide paragraph 10 and 11 of the election petition referred to form 26 and the averments are based on personal knowledge, the said form being the basis of the information disclosed and/or not disclosed so as to suggest suppression of material information, ought to have been annexed alongwith election petition as it also forms integral part as per sub-section 2 of Section 83 and in absence of this material in support of pleadings based upon this document, election petition was liable to be rendered is incomplete and having been supplied so also to the defendant respondent as per Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act, 1951. (iii) The objection which has been raised for non compliance of proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act, 1951 as it ought to have expressly referred to corrupt practise as defined under Section 123 of the R.P. Act, 1951 and mere words and expression suppression of material information, would not by itself be a corrupt practise inasmuch as swearing of the paragraph Nos. 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 is the nature without specifying as to which part of it is based on personal knowledge and which part is based on information and so is liable to be rendered vague not within the meaning of proviso to Section 83(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Such details therefore would not be sufficient within the meaning of Section 83(i)(b) of the Act, 1951. (iv) There is no disclosure of the names of the person agents or representatives from whom information has been received qua corrupt practise and, therefore, allegations are vague in the affidavit. Taking the entire pleadings together and grounds raised the averments to not lead to constitute a cause of action for vagueness and the nomination papers were wrongly and illegally accepted by the Election Officer. 18. Yet another argument has been advanced that parties relying upon the documents in support of the pleadings raised ought to have filed the same alongwith election petition, it being integral part, as per Section Section 81(i)(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 19. In support of arguments advanced by learned learned Advocate Mr. N.K.Pandey and authorities relied upon are M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Handa and others, AIR 1983 SC 558 , U.S. Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran and another, AIR 1990 SC 924 , Mulayam Singh Yadav v. Dharampal Yadav and others, (2001) 7 SCC 98 , Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal, (2009) 10 SCC 541 , V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, (2000) 2 SCC 294 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and others v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and others, (2006) 3 SCC 100 . 20. Meeting the argument, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Prasad appearing for the election petitioner has argued that petition under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act can only be dismissed if it does not comply with the provisions as contained under Sections 81 and 82 and Section 117 of the R.P. Act. 20. Meeting the argument, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Prasad appearing for the election petitioner has argued that petition under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act can only be dismissed if it does not comply with the provisions as contained under Sections 81 and 82 and Section 117 of the R.P. Act. He submits that non-compliance of the Section 83 cannot be a ground for a dismissal of election petition under Section 86(1). He submits that rules have been framed by the High Court in exercising the power under Section 225 of the Constitution of India to laying down the procedure for presentation and disposal of the election petition. According to him, this power has an overriding effect upon the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 14 C.P.C. He argues that chapter 15(A) Rule 3 of the High Court rules provides the election petition should be presented alongwith a list of documents. This according to him is a departure from the procedure prescribed under Order VI Rule 14 where documents were required to be appended with the plaint. He has argued that in the case of Kailash v. Nanku 2005, law suit it has been held by the Supreme Court vide paragraph 11 of the Allahabad High Court rules framed under chapter 15(A) consisting of 13 rules are special provisions relating to the trial of election petitions and there is no conflict between the rules framed by the High Court and rules under the R.P. Act and the C.P.C. It has been argued by learned Senior Advocate that reference of the document in the paragraph by itself is sufficient and it is not necessary to file those documents also. As according to him, placing reliance upon a document, if the allegations are sufficiently made in the election petition, would be of only evidenciary value and that can be filed at a later stage when the opportunity is afforded to file evidence. 21. Taking the argument further, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Manish Goel has submitted that if the contents of a document have been detailed out in the pleadings then such document is not required to be filed alongwith election petition and will be only of evidenciary value. 21. Taking the argument further, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Manish Goel has submitted that if the contents of a document have been detailed out in the pleadings then such document is not required to be filed alongwith election petition and will be only of evidenciary value. He has drawn the attention of the Court, towards paragraph 15 and 16 of the judgment in the case of U.S. Sashidharan v. K. Karunakaran and anther, AIR 1990 SC 424, wherein the legal principle has been discussed in detail and it has been held that if the contents of the document are pleaded in the election petition. Then such documents does not form an integral part of the election petition. Learned counsel for the petition submitted that in that case the Court require the audio cassette in that case form also as to form an integral part of the election petition because the audio cassette titled as Malayudi Purogathi because the contents of the audio cassette were not pleaded in the election petition. Learned Senior Advocate has also relied upon the judgment in the case of M. Karunanidhi v. H.P. Handa and others, where the Supreme Court after discussing a number of judgments had already held by paragraph 34 and 35 that if the allegations as to the pamphlet could be detailed in the pleadings and held that if the proper contents have been detailed out regarding a document in the pleading part of the election petition then such a document would only be an evidence. In proof of the averments so need not be filed with the election petition. 22. It is submitted that since where clauses and the details that were filled in by the returned candidate in affidavit as per prescribed form 26, the said affidavit was not required to be filled. In so far as the allegations regarding verification of facts as to the criminal proceedings of which range case number was given in column 5(ii)(a), a mere statement was sufficient that verification was made from the Court record registered and no such case was found to be registered. However, he would admit that there is no date given about the inspection/verification. However, he would admit that there is no date given about the inspection/verification. Mr Manish Goel further submits that details of the form as filled in have already been averred in the paragraph 10 and 11 and merely because one verification was sought from the Court record was one verification was taken regarding one entry would not weaken other allegations made according to wrong information given in the affidavit. He further argues that rest of the paragraph had refer to various documents have demonstrated that they ought to have been declared as such correctly in the form, have already been filed and referred to in the schedule appended 2 in the election petition and complete set of the paper book has been served upon the returned candidate and other contesting respondents in the election petition. 23. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Manish Goyal as well as Sri Ravi Shankar Prasad appearing for the election petitioner have also relied upon some more authorities of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanomizhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar and others passed in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28241 of 2019 and A. Manju v. Prajwal Revanna @ Prajwal R and others, (2022) 3 SCC 269 , Kantaru Rajeevaru (Sabarimala Temple Review-5J.) v. Indian Young Lawyers Association through Its General Secretary and others, (2020) 2 SCC 1 , Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and another, (2002) 5 SCC 294 , Spencer & Company Ltd. and another v. Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and others, (1995) 1SCC 259, Satish Ukey v. Devndra Gangadharrao Fadnavis and another, (2019) 9 SCC 1 , Madiraj Venkata Ramana Raju v. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddu and others, AIR 2018 SC 3012 and Adesh Tyagi v. Mahesh Sharma, 2020 SCC Online All 589. 24. 24. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, noticing their arguments as above and authorities cited by learned Advocates and having perused the record, I find that the basic grounds upon which election petition is based, is of corrupt practice committed by returned candidate in getting elected in public election for the legislative assembly, and therefore, question that arises for consideration at this stage while I am dealing with miscellaneous applications are; Whether the there has been concise statement of material facts regarding charge of corrupt practise and statements as to material particulars of corrupt practise and whether nomination and affidavit on form 26 would form an integral part of the election petition and not accompanying election paper, election petition would be liable to be dismissed under Section 81(1) of R.P. Act, 1951, and the second aspect that is required to be looked into; and Whether election petition discloses a cause of action to maintain it and that the statement of facts are not so vexatious or vague so as to dismiss the petition at the very threshold under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of CPC. 25. In so far as first point that I need to address, relates to miscellaneous application moved by the returned candidate to reject the petition having not been presented in the form as is prescribed for that it not only lacks concise statement of material facts and material particular as to corrupt practise but is also not accompanied by document of nomination form and affidavit on form 26 which are claimed to be an integral part, and therefore, petition is liable to be rejected under Section 86(1) of the Representatives of the People Act, 1951. 26. The second point refers to miscellaneous application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the CPC and Order 6 Rule 16 of the CPC to reject the petition as it does not disclose the cause of action even if it is taken in its entirety. The averments made in certain paragraphs in writ petition are alleged, to be quite vexatious and vague and deserve to be struck off. 27. Now coming to the first point, I need to first take into account the grounds upon which challenge to election petition has been developed in this petition. The averments made in certain paragraphs in writ petition are alleged, to be quite vexatious and vague and deserve to be struck off. 27. Now coming to the first point, I need to first take into account the grounds upon which challenge to election petition has been developed in this petition. The first ground No. 8A is to the effect that material facts as to details of criminal cases that were required to be disclosed in affidavit on form-26 prescribed under the R.P. Act, were concealed and suppressed vide Column 5(ii) (a)(b) and (c) of part A of the form and then false declaration in Column 5 (ii) (e)(g) and then further in Column 11(5) of part B of form 26 of nomination form and Clause 6(A) and such practise would constitute corrupt practise of undue influence in terms of Section 123 (2) of R.P. Act read with Section 100 (1) (b) of the R.P. Act, 1950. 28. This suppression of criminal antecedents, to the credit of the returned candidate was, it was alleged deliberately done, in order to mislead public and such non disclosure or disclosure of misleading particulars vitiated the mandate contained under Section 33-A of the R.P. Act and Clause 6(A) note 5 of Form 26 a prescribed form of affidavit. 29. Similarly vide ground 8B, it is stated that Column7(A) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v), 7 (B) (i)(iii) and Column 8(i) of nomination form were not complete qua liability towards bank loan. So there was a deliberate attempt to suppress crucial facts relating to property, income and liability towards bank and has counted to corrupt practise. 30. Similar set of allegations have been made in ground No. 10 that relate to disclosure regarding pending criminal cases and charge is that returned candidate had put (v) mark in affirmative in Column 5(ii) a-g and then details recording FIR number name of police station with address where criminal cases have been registered, were not at all disclosed and only disclosure was 'range case' number in Column 5 (ii) (a) which amounted to a fake information. Neither year, nor police station was disclosed and similarly in Column 5 (ii) (b)(c) no registration number of the case was disclosed and when he enquired from the Court of ACJM vth, Prayagraj, then it was found that no such case was registered in the Court's diary that was maintained to mention cases. Neither year, nor police station was disclosed and similarly in Column 5 (ii) (b)(c) no registration number of the case was disclosed and when he enquired from the Court of ACJM vth, Prayagraj, then it was found that no such case was registered in the Court's diary that was maintained to mention cases. Similarly, information was stated to be misleading in Column 5 (ii) (d). Again in column 5 (ii) (e), the disclosure of date of charge was given while the Court had taken cognizance upon the charge by summoning the returned candidate. Since there was no proper nomination paper filed giving all those particulars required, of which verification was to be done by the election officer as to whether requisite form 26 was properly filled up or not as required under Section 33A of the R.P. Act and the manner in which it was filled, it was intended to unduly influence the voter. 31. One of the grounds, therefore, is that acceptance of nomination paper of the returned candidate was against provision of Section 33 of the Act read with Rule 4 of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. 32. Sri Pandey, since has mainly attacked on these three grounds to be not only vague confusing but lacking concise statement of material facts and also material particulars in relation to corrupt practise of non disclosure of relevant case number and confusing declaration in affidavit that makes nomination form to be defective and yet despite mentioning of these documents as item number 1 in the schedule, they were not made part of the election petition by appending them with to make election petition competent and further that affidavit that was required to be filed indicating corrupt practise as such was not as mandated, I proceed to examine these grounds and the facts stated in support thereof in the first place to answer the question raised regarding maintainability of this petition. 33. As to first point above to which ground No. 8A, 8B and 8C and paragraph Nos. 33. As to first point above to which ground No. 8A, 8B and 8C and paragraph Nos. 10 and 1 are relevant, these grounds and paragraphs are being reproduced hereunder: ''8A Because returned candidate while delivering the nomination form in term of Section 33 of the Act deliberately not disclosed and suppressed of facts regarding criminal antecedents in entirety with full details in part A Column 5 (ii) (ka) (kha) (ga) and made a false declaration in part A Column 5 (ii) (ng) (chha) as well as in Part B column 11 (5) of form 26 of nomination form which constitute a corrupt practice of undue influence in terms of Section 123 (2) and covered under Section 100 91)(b) of the Act, especially where the returned candidate has special knowledge of the pending cases in which the Court has taken cognizance upon the charge. Deliberate attempt to suppress the criminal antecedents required to be inform as mandated by Section 33 A of the Act and clause 6(ka) note 5 of form 26 would effort to misguide and keep the people/voter in dark; thus it is undue influence and its amounts to corrupt practice in terms of Section 123(2) of the Act as the Section 33 A of the Act and rule 4-A creates impediment upon the candidates to disclose information in free exercise of electoral right. 8B. Because returned candidate while delivered the nomination form in term of Section 33 of the Act deliberately not disclosed and suppressed the material facts regarding the movable, immovable property and liability towards banks loan, the account shown in part A column 7 (a) (ii) (iii)(iv) (v) column 7 (b), (i)(iii) and column 8 (I) in entirety is incomplete and the full detail of bank accounts, property, share in joint family property and proprietorship business has been suppressed by the returned candidate which constitute corrupt practise of undue influence covered under Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act, especially where the returned candidate has special knowledge of the transition. Deliberate attempt to suppress the property, income and liability of the bank required to be furnishing as mandated by Section 33-A of the Act would effort to misguide and keep the people in dark,Ttus it is undue influence. The act of returned candidate amounts to corrupt practise under Section 12(2), thereby covered under Section 100 (i)(b) of the Act. 8C. Deliberate attempt to suppress the property, income and liability of the bank required to be furnishing as mandated by Section 33-A of the Act would effort to misguide and keep the people in dark,Ttus it is undue influence. The act of returned candidate amounts to corrupt practise under Section 12(2), thereby covered under Section 100 (i)(b) of the Act. 8C. Because returning officer improperly accepted the nomination paper of Returned Candidate against the provision of Section 33 of the Act read with rule 4 of the conduct of election Rule 1961 and failed to adhere with the provision of Section 36 of the Act thus the election of the returned candidate from 258 legislative assembly constituencies is required to be declared void. 10. That the returned candidate delivered his nomination from accompanying with form 26 in terms of Section 33 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the conduct of election Rules 1961 on 5.2.2022. The form 26 contains in two parts; Part ''A'' column 1 to 4 was filled up by the returned candidate where the personal details of himself, spouse and his dependents were furnished. Part ''A'' column 5 deals with the information of pending criminal cases. This column further divided into two parts; first part 5(i) requires that if there is no criminal case pending against the candidate he puts the mark '' '' against the column 5(i) and it further says that if there is a criminal case pending against the candidate he put the mark ' ' against column 5(ii) and furnish the details of pending criminal cases in later part of column 5(ii) ka-chha. The returned candidate put the mark ' ' against column 5 (ii) and declared that criminal case was pending against him Column 5 (ii) (ka) mandate the information of FIR number and the name of the police station with the address where the criminal case has registered. The returned candidate instead of furnishing the FIR No. or case crime No. and year or complaint case No. and year with the name and address of the police station or Court filled up the column 5 (ii) (ka) as ''range case No. '' and year to misguide the voters. The returned candidate instead of furnishing the FIR No. or case crime No. and year or complaint case No. and year with the name and address of the police station or Court filled up the column 5 (ii) (ka) as ''range case No. '' and year to misguide the voters. In fact this was a fake information and the some sections were also not in-existence moreover the criminal or complaint case are being identified in the State of U.P. from the FIR No./case crime No. with the particular years and police station. In each police station there is separate register maintain permanently for the registration of each crime known as FIR Register and in absence of the FIR No., date and year or case crime No., date year or complaint case No. and year or details of Court it could not be possible to trace out the detail of case. Since each police station there is separate numbers allotted to the crime and in complaint case separate No. of complaint and year has been registered by the concerned Court. Therefore in absence of FIR No. year or name of the police station and its address or complaint case No. year, or details of Court description the information of case could not be possible. Likewise the return candidate to misguide and keep the people/voter in dark in order to make undue influence upon them irrelevant and fake information has furnished in part A column 5(ii)(ka), likewise in column 5(ii) (kha) (ga) the return candidate id not disclose the registration of case No., year registered in Court. The returned candidate further given a false declaration that criminal case is pending in the Court of ACJM 5 Prayagraj while at the time of declaration i.e. 5.2.2022 no such case was found in the Court record diary maintain for the functioning of Court. The false declaration is made to misguide and keep people in dark. In column 5(ii) (gha) the return candidate did not describe the details of offence while against column No. 5 (ii) (ng) declared as ''no'' while in his case the Court has taken the cognizance on filling a charge and summoned the return candidate. In column 5 (ii) (cha) mentioned that disclosure of the date of charge is not applicable while in fact the Court had taken the cognizance on the charge and summoned the return candidate.'' 34. In column 5 (ii) (cha) mentioned that disclosure of the date of charge is not applicable while in fact the Court had taken the cognizance on the charge and summoned the return candidate.'' 34. Upon bare reading of these above grounds as quoted above three questions basically emerge for consideration to meet first point, as follow: a. whether there is concise statement of material facts and material particulars have been setforth as to criminal antecedents referred in paragraphs so as to a arrive at conclusion that there was to suppression or concealment of fact; b. whether facts detailed in paragraphs amount to concise statement as to the misleading facts in the nomination paper/form so as to arrive at conclusion that these things have mislead the electorate; and c. whether facts referred to in paragraph are concise and specific statement detailed in the nomination form and the affidavit referable to form 26 so as to reduce these documents of an evidenciary value only and not an integral part of the election petition. 35. In order to appreciate the above, one must keep in mind that election laws that provide for an opportunity to losing candidate to question election petition is not a common law remedy and being a statutory remedy, it is always to be ensured that petition presented must conform to the requirements of election law and this is why it is stated that provisions of the statute dealing with election laws that provided statutory remedy, must be strictly construed (FA Sapa v. Singoria) 1991 SCC 375 . Still further while election Tribunal is dealing with an election petition on the ground of corrupt practise then allegations are not only to be specific but very clear so as to form a view that if statement of fact made, if proved, it will lead to irresistible conclusion of unseating an elected candidate on such charge. Thus it is clear that any fraudulent practise if taken as a ground and does not give a concise material fact statement leading two equal inferences, then pleadings deserve to be dismissed. (Daulatram Chauhan v. Anand Sharma, (1984) 2 SCC 64 . 36. Making a distinction between material facts and particulars, speaking for the bench of C.K.Thakur, J in the case of Virendra Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh and others, (2007) 3 SCC 617 , have observed vide paragraph 50 thus: ''50. (Daulatram Chauhan v. Anand Sharma, (1984) 2 SCC 64 . 36. Making a distinction between material facts and particulars, speaking for the bench of C.K.Thakur, J in the case of Virendra Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh and others, (2007) 3 SCC 617 , have observed vide paragraph 50 thus: ''50. There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts required to be proved i.e. material facts) and facta probantia (the facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in the pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.'' 37. Now when one refers to material facts, the Courts have also held that particulars have evidenciary value if material facts are very specific and detail out particulars which may not be then necessary for the document to accompany the election petition. In the case of M.Karunanidhi (supra) the Court had referred to its earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar, (1968)3 SCR 13 : AIR 1968 SC 1 , to draw conclusion as to when particular document would not require to accompany election petition, as in that case details published in the pamphlet were reproduced in the election petition itself which led to the Court to conclude that pamphlet would not be an integral part of the election petition and would be only evidence of what has been averred, as a proof thereof and that is why the Court observed that ''it follows as a necessary corollary that if pamphlet had not been incorporated in the body of the election petition, decision of the Court in Sahodrabai Rai's case (supra), would have been otherwise .......'' 38. These above legal propositions regarding statement of material facts and document to accompany petition or not, as discussed above, have been repeatedly followed in various authorities of Supreme Court and this Court but it is equally clear as to what particular given in a document referable to grounds would amount to an integral part of the election petition, would depend upon case to case. So every election petition has to be examined in respect of statement of facts made and particulars of corrupt practise referred to, so as to arrive to an answer to the question whether there is concise statement of material facts and material particulars to maintain election petition and that every document referred to therein would only be of an evidenciary value only and not an integral part thereof. 39. Now examining the grounds raised in the grounds 8A, 8B & 8C, I find that they particularly indicate to certain details given in the affidavit as prescribed on form 26 under the R.P. Act. Column 5 of the form relates to pending criminal cases and clause (i) thereof prescribes for various columns for details of pending cases. Clause ii of the form prescribes for cases in which conviction has been done. Now reverting to the grounds as quoted above, I find that in ground 8A the only concise statement, if at all to be referred to, is to the suppression of material facts regarding criminal antecedents and then a false declaration. In the column referred to hereinabove so as to develop ground of corrupt practise in terms of Section 100 (1) (b) and Section 123 (2), what are the criminal antecedents, what kind of misleading statements have been made, what kind of material particulars have been suppressed, has not been referred to at all. In paragraphs 10 and 11, the defects are cited in form 26 which is required to be furnished and which is in two part referable to information in pending criminal cases, and the cases in which it is alleged that charges have been framed. The only particular fact that occurs in paragraph 10 is with regard to 'Range Case Number' given in column number 5 (ii) (a) of the form, but again at the strength of some information obtained from the Court of ACJM-V, Prayagraj, it is alleged that no such case was mentioned in the Courts' diary. The only particular fact that occurs in paragraph 10 is with regard to 'Range Case Number' given in column number 5 (ii) (a) of the form, but again at the strength of some information obtained from the Court of ACJM-V, Prayagraj, it is alleged that no such case was mentioned in the Courts' diary. It is alleged that though there is mention not in front of Column 5 (ii) (e) but Court in that case, it is alleged, had taken cognizance on filing of charge-sheet and had summoned the returned candidate. This is all vague for want of date of access to Court's diary, sanction letter for inspection of Court's diary etc. 40. Having discussed these above details, I find that the allegations are as to the suppression of material fact and misleading/mis-statement of facts as to the some particular criminal cases pending or registered against the returned candidate and allegations are that by this act, he created confusion in mind of electorate and got them unduly influenced to vote in his favour. So all this has been stated to make out a case of corrupt practise and corrupt practise of undue influence as well, referable to Section 123(2). This cannot be said to be a concise statement of material facts for want of material particular details as to the corrupt practise. They are quite vague as to words and expression ''Suppression and mis statement''. These statements of facts in the ground cannot be said to be the concise statement of material facts and particulars as to the corrupt practice to meet mandatory requirement of Section 83 (1)(a) and (b). 41. In the case of Ram Sukh (supra) cited by learned counsel for the applicant, it has been clearly held vide paragraph 24 thus: ''It needs little reiteration that for the purpose of Section 100 (1) (d) (iv), it was necessary for the election petitioner to aver specifically in what manner the result of the election insofar as it concerned the first respondent was materially affected due to the said omission on the part of the Returning Officer. Unfortunately, such averment is missing in the election petition.'' 42. Unfortunately, such averment is missing in the election petition.'' 42. Whenever it comes to entertain an election petition on the charge of corrupt practise, it is to be taken as serious issue because it does not question the election but if election is held void it may lead to debarring a candidate for future election upto 6 years and, therefore, it is held that ''an election petition in which corrupt practise is alleged stands on a different footing from election petition which does not to carry such allegation. The legislature has special care to ensure that the ordinary verification will not suffice'' and the Court therefore, rightly held that the person making an allegation of corrupt practise must bear in mind seriousness of such charge, and therefore, he has to be very precise and specific in making allegations giving concise statement of material facts and then material particulars as required under Section 83(1) (a) (b). The allegations must be so clear and specific that inference of corrupt practise will irresistibly admit no doubt or question (Daulatram Chauhan v. Anand Sharma, (1984) 2 SCC 64 ) vide paragraph 18 the Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Mani v. P. J. Antony and others, (1979) 2 SCC 221 , has observed thus:. ''23. An allegation regarding the commission of a corrupt practice at an election is a very serious matter not only for the candidate but for the public at large as it relates to the purity of the electoral process. Where therefore the allegation relates to the charge that a candidate obtained the assistance of a police officer for the purpose of addressing a meeting on the eve of the poll and exhorting those present to work for his victory, it is reasonable to expect that, wherever possible, a transcript of his speech shall be made available to the Court in support of the allegation. Besides furnishing the precise material relating to the allegation to the Court, it has the advantage of giving the respondent an opportunity of meeting a precise allegation. But it may be that this may not be possible in a given situation. In that case it will be reasonable and fair to expect that the election petitioner will produce a contemporaneous record of the points that were made in the speech, or at least its substance. But it may be that this may not be possible in a given situation. In that case it will be reasonable and fair to expect that the election petitioner will produce a contemporaneous record of the points that were made in the speech, or at least its substance. But no such record has been made available in this case........................'' 43. In the case of U.S. Sasidharan (supra), it was very categorically held vide paragraph 12 'it is apparent from clauses (a) and (b) of S. 83 that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts and also set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice. These two requirements are also mandatory in nature. So, whenever there is an allegation of corrupt practice, the election petition shall contain a concise statement as, to the material fact on which the petitioner relies and also must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner.'' 44. Thus question (a) is answered in negative and so in favour of returned candidate. 45. Now if the allegations, therefore, upon bare reading of the statement of facts and statement of particulars are found related to particular document as in this case nomination paper and affidavit do not lead to definite conclusion to form a view of such corrupt practise, it would be necessary that such document accompanied the election petition as it would be forming an integral part thereof in such circumstances. 46. Besides the above in context of material facts/material particulars relating to corrupt practise may be contained in a document without pleadings material facts, the Court observed: ''We have already referred to Section 83 relating to the contents of an election petition. The election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts and also set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice. The material facts or particulars relating to any corrupt practice may be contained in a document and the election petitioner, without pleading the material facts or particulars of corrupt practice, may refer to the document. When such a reference is made in the election petition, a copy of the document must be supplied inasmuch as by making a reference to the document and without pleading its contents in the election petition, the document becomes incorporated in the election petition by reference. In other words, it forms an integral part of the election petition. When such a reference is made in the election petition, a copy of the document must be supplied inasmuch as by making a reference to the document and without pleading its contents in the election petition, the document becomes incorporated in the election petition by reference. In other words, it forms an integral part of the election petition. Section 81(3) provides for giving a true copy of the election petition. When a document forms an integral part of the election petition and a copy of such document is not furnished to the respondent alongwith a copy of the election petition, the copy of the election petition will not be a true copy within the meaning of Section 81(3) and, as such, the Court has to dismiss the election petition under Section 86(1) for non-compliance with Section 81(3).'' 47. Again in the case of Mulayam Singh Yadav (supra) where video cassettes contained videograpy with regard to practise of booth capturing etc. was not filed in original and copies were meant only for the contesting respondents, it was held to be an integral part of the election petition as videography details upon not discussed and referred to in the grounds and that having not been filed, the High Court had dismissed the election petition being not presented in the form it required under Section 81 vide paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14, the Court observed thus: 11. Whether or not Schedule 14 is an integral part of the election petition does not depend on whether or not the draftsman of the election petition has so averred. It has to be decided objectively, taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances. Schedule 14 is one of 25 schedules which is, as a matter of fact, part of the bound election petition. In respect of each of these schedules, except Schedule 14, it is averred that it is a part of the election petition. Each of these schedules, other than Schedule 14, mentions, verifies and contains some paper or document which can be placed between the leaves of paper that comprise that schedule and be bound with the election petition. Schedule 14 mentions and verifies a video cassette which cannot be placed between two leaves and be bound with the election petition. Each of these schedules, other than Schedule 14, mentions, verifies and contains some paper or document which can be placed between the leaves of paper that comprise that schedule and be bound with the election petition. Schedule 14 mentions and verifies a video cassette which cannot be placed between two leaves and be bound with the election petition. This is the explanation for the difference in the manner in which the averments relating to Schedule 14 and the other schedules are made in the election petition. Clearly, the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 is as much an integral part of the election petition as the papers and documents mentioned and verified in the other schedules. Further, that the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 is a part of the election petition and was intended to be such is evident from the affidavit of the first respondent verifying the allegations of corrupt practice made in the election petition. Therein, the first respondent has verified the correctness of what is stated in para 83 of the election petition, which refers to Schedule 14 and which has been quoted above, and to Schedule 14 itself. Yet again, that the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 is and was intended to be a part of the election petition is shown by the fact that 15 video cassettes which were copies of the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 were filed in the High Court alongwith the election petition for being served upon the respondents thereto. 12. Ordinarily, what is shown upon the video cassette that is mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 would have been set out in the election petition and then that video cassette could have been said to be evidence of the allegations made in the election petition. As this election petition is drafted, there is no description of what is shown on this video cassette except to say that it shows booth-capturing, violence and arson. As to booth-capturing, there are particulars contained in the other schedules but even in that regard the later paragraphs of the election petition make reference to Schedule 14 so that even in regard to booth-capturing the particulars shown in the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 are relied upon. As to booth-capturing, there are particulars contained in the other schedules but even in that regard the later paragraphs of the election petition make reference to Schedule 14 so that even in regard to booth-capturing the particulars shown in the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 are relied upon. So far as the allegations of violence and arson are concerned, there are no particulars in the election petition absent the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14. 13. We are, therefore, satisfied that the video cassette mentioned and verified in Schedule 14 is an integral part of the election petition and that it should have been filed in Court alongwith copies thereof for service upon the respondents to the election petition. Whereas 15 copies thereof were filed for service upon the respondents, the video cassette itself was not filed. The election petition as filed was, therefore, not complete. 14. Section 81 contemplates the presentation of an election petition that is complete and satisfies the requirements of Section 83. An election petition that is not complete must, having due regard to the imperative mandate of Section 86, be dismissed. The present election petition must, therefore, be dismissed. 48. It is true that in the case of A. Manju (supra), it was stated that appropriate affidavit if not filed, it would be only a technical defect and it would not be a ground to defeat the election petition at the very threshhold and in this regard, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore, AIR 1964 SC 1545 , was referred to arrive at such conclusion vide paragraph 25 and 26 the Division Bench of the Supreme Court has observed thus: 25. We may take note of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore [Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore, (1964) 3 SCR 573 : AIR 1964 SC 1545 ] which opined that the defect in verification of an affidavit cannot be a sufficient ground for dismissal of the petitioner's petition summarily and such an affidavit can be permitted to be filed later. This Constitution Bench judgment was also referred to in G.M. Siddeshwar case [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] to come to a conclusion that non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the RP Act was not fatal to the maintainability of an election petition and the defect could be remedied i.e. even in the absence of compliance, the petition would still be called an election petition. We cannot say that the High Court fell into an error while considering the election petition as a whole to come to the conclusion that the allegations of the appellant were not confined only to Section 33-A of the RP Act, but were larger in ambit as undue influence and improper acceptance of nomination of Respondent 1 were also pleaded as violation of the mandate under Sections 123 and 100 of the RP Act. 26. However, we are not persuaded to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the non-submission of Form 25 would lead to the dismissal of the election petition. We say so because, in our view, the observations made in Ponnala Lakshmaiah case [Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 ] which have received the imprimatur of the three-Judge Bench in G.M. Siddeshwar case [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] appear not to have been appreciated in the correct perspective. In fact, G.M. Siddeshwar case [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715] has been cited by the learned Judge to dismiss the petition. If we look at the election petition, the prayer clause is followed by a verification. There is also a verifying affidavit in support of the election petition. Thus, factually it would not be appropriate to say that there is no affidavit in support of the petition, albeit not in Form 25. This was a curable defect and the learned Judge trying the election petition ought to have granted an opportunity to the appellant to file an affidavit in support of the petition in Form 25 in addition to the already existing affidavit filed with the election petition. This was a curable defect and the learned Judge trying the election petition ought to have granted an opportunity to the appellant to file an affidavit in support of the petition in Form 25 in addition to the already existing affidavit filed with the election petition. In fact, a consideration of both the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned Judge i.e. Ponnala Lakshmaiah [Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 ] as well as G.M. Siddeshwar [G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 715], ought to have resulted in a conclusion that the correct ratio in view of these facts was to permit the appellant to cure this defect by filing an affidavit in the prescribed form.'' 49. I have carefully gone through the entire judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Manju (supra), and have found that the division bench though has referred to the Constitution bench judgement in the case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar (supra) but did not refer to the judgment of the three judges bench in the case of V. Narayanswamy (supra) wherein Supreme Court had referred to and discussed the constitution bench judgment in the case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar (supra). Since affidavit was not in a prescribed form as an inexperienced Oath Commissioner made a mistake in verification of portion of affidavit, the Court held that to be not such a defect which could be be said to be fatal to the election petition and then the Court referred to the judgment of the Constitution bench. Thus on facts the judgment in A. Manju (supra) is distinguishable and principles of law laid down in by the Supreme Court in the case of M.Karunanidhi (supra) and V. Narayanswamy (supra) and U.S. Sashidharan (supra) have yet not been diluted in subsequent judgments. 50. One of the arguments advanced by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent Sri Manish Goyal was that ingredients as to the grounds questioning the election that are required to be furnished alongwith affidavit, in compliance to Section 33-A is in the nature of a mere information. 50. One of the arguments advanced by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent Sri Manish Goyal was that ingredients as to the grounds questioning the election that are required to be furnished alongwith affidavit, in compliance to Section 33-A is in the nature of a mere information. Whether such information is misleading or suppressing one so as to amount to an act of undue influence within the meaning of 'corrupt practise' would require a trial to be established after parties lead their respective evidence, and therefore, it would not be ground to dismiss the petition in limine. 51. In support of this above argument, reliance has been placed upon judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Satish Ukey (supra). Factually, I find that to be a case arising out of a criminal complaint lodged under Section 125A of the R.P. Act as details of two cases in which the cognizance had been taken against returned candidate were not mentioned despite returned candidate having due knowledge of the date of submission of nomination form. The Court in that circumstances rejected the complaint to be not maintainable. The District Judge had reversed the order of Magistrate which led to filing of appeal before the High Court. The High Court maintained the order of Magistrate and thus returned candidate, who had become Chief Minister preferred SLP before the Supreme Court. It is in background of that case, that Supreme Court had held that the details given in the affidavit were in response to the voter's right to information as contemplated under Section 33 A of the R.P. Act. Thus the Court while dealing with information part of the provision interpreted it as a mere information as is required in terms of affidavit on a prescribed format. The Court returned a finding that it was a mere information and vide paragraph 24,25 and 26 held thus: 24. Thus the Court while dealing with information part of the provision interpreted it as a mere information as is required in terms of affidavit on a prescribed format. The Court returned a finding that it was a mere information and vide paragraph 24,25 and 26 held thus: 24. A cumulative reading of Section 33-A of the 1951 Act and Rule 4-A of the 1961 Rules and Form 26 alongwith the letters dated 24-8-2012, 26-9-2012 and 26-4-2014, in our considered view, make it amply clear that the information to be furnished under Section 33-A of the 1951 Act includes not only information mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1), but also information, that the candidate is required to furnish, under the Act or the Rules made thereunder and such information should be furnished in Form 26, which includes information concerning cases in which a competent Court has taken cognizance [Entry 5(ii) of Form 26]. This is apart from and in addition to cases in which charges have been framed for an offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more or cases in which conviction has been recorded and sentence of imprisonment for a period of one year or more has been imposed [Entries 5(i) and 6 of Form 26 respectively]. 25. In the light of the view that we have taken and in view of the clear averment made in the complaint to the effect that the first respondent had knowledge of the two cases against him which had not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by the first respondent alongwith his nomination papers, we unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that the order of the learned trial Court upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 3-5-2018 [Devendra Gangadharrao Fadnavis v. Satish Ukey, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 924 : 2018 Cri LJ 2582] is legally not tenable and the same deserves to be set aside which we hereby do. The complaint of the appellant will be considered afresh by the learned trial Court from the stage where it was interdicted by the order dated 30-5-2016. 26. Our view as above is in consonance with a similar view expressed by this Court in para 75 of the Report in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359]. 26. Our view as above is in consonance with a similar view expressed by this Court in para 75 of the Report in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359]. Para 75 of the Report in Krishnamoorthy [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359] reads as under: (SCC p. 514) ''75. On a perusal of the aforesaid format, it is clear as crystal that the details of certain categories of the offences in respect of which cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed must be given/furnished. This Rule is in consonance with Section 33-A of the 1951 Act. Section 33(1) envisages that information has to be given in accordance with the Rules. This is in addition to the information to be provided as per Sections 33(1)(i) and (ii). The affidavit that is required to be filed by the candidate stipulates mentioning of cases pending against the candidate in which charges have been framed by the Court for the offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more and also the cases which are pending against him in which cognizance has been taken by the Court other than the cases which have been mentioned in Clause (5)(i) of Form 26. Apart from the aforesaid, Clause (6) of Form 26 deals with conviction.'' 52. In the case of Adesh Tyagi v. Mahesh Sharma, (2020) SCC Online All 589, the Court proceeded to hold that a mere non compliance of Section 83(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 would not result in dismissal of the election petition at the very outset and in forming such a view reliance has been placed upon an authority of Supreme Court in the case of T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose and others, (1999) 4 SCC 274 . 53. In Adesh Tyagi's case the question was as to the true copy of the election petition and where Court held may not be 'exact copy' meant to be served upon the respondent. It was observed that when a reasonable person can understand a copy which is reasonably true to the original one, there cannot be said any violation of Section 81(3). But here there is no such case. It was observed that when a reasonable person can understand a copy which is reasonably true to the original one, there cannot be said any violation of Section 81(3). But here there is no such case. Hence the issue of concise statement of facts and material particulars, in my considered view, if petition lacks concise statement of facts and fails to detail material particulars in respect therefor, thus would lead a reasonable person to draw only one reference that election petitioner himself is not sure of the ground to question election and that he is confused about material particulars as to corrupt practise. Once one finds it to not be sure enough, than for this the concerned document becomes an integral part. A vague or confused statement of facts by itself cannot make an election petition maintainable, otherwise every election can be challenged in a routine manner. It is not common law suit but statutory remedy and so statute needs to be strictly followed. The learned Judge himself has referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of F.A.Sapa that ''maintainability of an election petition, in the context will depend on whether schedule or annexure to petition constituting on integral part, it must satisfy the requirements of Section 81(3) and further in that behalf would be fatal.'' 54. In the case of Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511 , putting emphasis on the words and expression material facts which an election petition must contain with common details of particular, Supreme Court vide paragraph 51 and 52 has held thus ''51. A distinction between ''material facts'' and ''particulars'', however, must not be overlooked. ''Material facts'' are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. ''Particulars'', on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. ''Particulars'' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. 52. All ''material facts'' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. ''Particulars'' thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. 52. All ''material facts'' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.'' 55. In T.M.Jacob's case (supra) the Court had affirmed the judgment of the High Court that had rejected election petition filed on the ground of suppression of material facts qua two criminal cases; one in which appeal had been allowed and other one in which sentence imposed was of less than a year. The Court took this view that there could not be any influential regarding first criminal case and connection showed set aside and the other case being an award of sentence of less than one year, it would not have disqualified. 56. As I have already discussed above and has been held that in matters of election petition where election of returned candidate is being questioned then every provision of the election law/statute has to be interpreted literally and strictly and petition filed questioning the election under such statute, has also to be seen strictly falling within four corners of the relevant provisions of law that require election petition to be presented in a definite form. 57. In the finding of part of the judgment in Ram Sukh, Supreme Court has held the provisions as contained Section 83 to be mandatory and if election petition is not presented in that form then it deserves to be dismissed. vide paragraph 10,11,12,13,14 and 15 interpreting the provisions the Court held thus: 10. Section 83, the pivotal provision for the present case, requires that: (a) the election petition must contain a concise statement of ''material facts'' on which the petitioner relies and (b) he should also set forth ''full particulars'' of any corrupt practices which the petitioner alleges. vide paragraph 10,11,12,13,14 and 15 interpreting the provisions the Court held thus: 10. Section 83, the pivotal provision for the present case, requires that: (a) the election petition must contain a concise statement of ''material facts'' on which the petitioner relies and (b) he should also set forth ''full particulars'' of any corrupt practices which the petitioner alleges. Proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 also provides that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the election petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. It is plain that the requirement of disclosure of ''material facts'' and ''full particulars'' as stipulated in the section is mandatory. 11. Section 86 mandates that where the election petition does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act, the High Court should dismiss the election petition. Section 87 which lays down the procedure required to be followed by the High Court while trying an election petition, requires that every election petition shall be tried, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code to the trial of the suits, subject of course to the provisions of the Act and of any requirement made thereunder. 12. It is evident that the controversy in this appeal lies in a narrow compass. It revolves around the ambit of Section 83 of the Act. The point for consideration is whether the election petition lacked ''material facts'' required to be stated in the election petition in terms of Section 83(1) of the Act and if so, could it be dismissed summarily without trial? As already noted, it is mandatory that all ''material facts'' are set out in an election petition and it is also trite that if material facts are not stated in the petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. Therefore, the question is as to whether the election petitioner had set out ''material facts'' in his petition? 13. The phrase ''material facts'' has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code and, therefore, it has been understood by the Courts in general terms to mean the entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of action. 13. The phrase ''material facts'' has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code and, therefore, it has been understood by the Courts in general terms to mean the entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of action. In other words, ''material facts'' are facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. (See Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu [ (2004) 7 SCC 181 ].) Broadly speaking, all primary or basic facts which are necessary either to prove the cause of action by the plaintiff or defence by the defendant are ''material facts''. Material facts are facts which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for. But again, what could be said to be material facts would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. 14. The requirement in an election petition as to the statement of material facts and the consequences of lack of such disclosure with reference to Sections 81, 83 and 86 of the Act came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [ (1969) 3 SCC 238 ]. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, M. Hidayatullah, C.J., inter alia, laid down that: (i) Section 83 of the Act is mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then the fullest possible particulars; (ii) omission of even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and statement of claim becomes bad; (iii) the function of particulars is to present in full a picture of the cause of action and to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet;(iv) material facts and particulars are distinct matters-material facts will mention statements of fact and particulars will set out the names of persons with date, time and place; and (v) in stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote the words of the section because then the efficacy of the material facts will be lost. 15. 15. At this juncture, in order to appreciate the real object and purport of the phrase ''material facts'', particularly with reference to election law, it would be appropriate to notice the distinction between the phrases ''material facts'' as appearing in clause (a) and ''particulars'' as appearing in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. As stated above, ''material facts'' are primary or basic facts which have to be pleaded by the petitioner to prove his cause of action and by the defendant to prove his defence. ''Particulars'', on the other hand, are details in support of the material facts, pleaded by the parties. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. Unlike ''material facts'' which provide the basic foundation on which the entire edifice of the election petition is built, ''particulars'' are to be stated to ensure that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 58. The ground 8C would only be entertainable if ground 8 A, 8B, 8D are made out prima facie. Section 33 (A) the R.P. Act was incorporated by amendment Act, 1972. It prescribed an affidavit on a format verifying information contained in Section 1 of Section 33 (1)(a). For ready reference. Section 33 A (1) of R.P. Act, reproduced hereunder:'' ''33A. Right to information.- (1) A candidate shall, apart from any information which he is required to furnish, under this Act or the rules made thereunder, in his nomination paper delivered under sub-section (1) of Section 33, also furnish the information as to whether- (i) he is accused of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case in which a charge has been framed by the Court of competent jurisdiction; (ii) he has been convicted of an offence [other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of Section 8] and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.'' 59. Going by bare reading of aforesaid provisions two types of information an electorate has a right to know about the candidate: (i). Going by bare reading of aforesaid provisions two types of information an electorate has a right to know about the candidate: (i). whether a candidate is an accused of a punishable offence for 2 years or more in a pending case in which charge has been framed by the Court of competent jurisdiction; and (ii) the other one is whether he has been convicted for an offence with an exception given therein. 60. Now when a candidate is required to furnish these two details, either he does not furnish it or furnishes it by suppressing material particulars or gives confusing particulars so as to unduly influence voters. Such details or particulars are to be mentioned in the ground by way of not only concise statement of fact but statement of particulars regarding such suppressed facts and if this is not done, the only statement of fact has been made then such affidavit wherein such particulars have been either suppressed or disclosed or is presented in confusing form, has to compulsorily accompany the election petition as integral part of election petition on the ground of corrupt practise. 61. Prior to 2002 only document on which affidavit was required to be furnished was form 25 but now since form 26 prescribed for an affidavit to contain statement of facts and regarding statement and particulars of criminal cases which are pending and also there in which a candidate has been convicted previously. Allegations regarding non proper disclosure of the same, amounted to a reference directly to the affidavit, and therefore, affidavit ought to have been filed alongwith an election petition. Even on the other grounds that are mentioned in 8B, which is also claimed to be a corrupt practise that returned candidate did not deliberately disclose the correct facts and suppressed material facts qua movable and immovable properties and other bank loans, I find that the grounds are abosluely silent as to what kind of misleading statement has been made or what kind of material facts have been suppressed. This also relates to nomination papers and affidavit filed in support thereof and since no nomination paper nor, affidavit has been filed, in my considered view these two documents being integral part of the election petition, election petition is liable to be rejected on this count also. 62. This also relates to nomination papers and affidavit filed in support thereof and since no nomination paper nor, affidavit has been filed, in my considered view these two documents being integral part of the election petition, election petition is liable to be rejected on this count also. 62. Coming to the argument advanced by learned counsel for election petitioner regarding presentation of election petition special provision relating to trial of election petition vide chapter XV-A of the High Court Rules, 1952 I find that definition clause or Rule 2 thereof provides for election petitions means ''an election petition presented under Section 81 of the Act'' and the Act vide definition Rule 2(i) means representation of the People Act, 1951''. Now Rule 3 provides for presentation of election petition before Registrar and further provides that petition shall bear office report regarding Court fee and compliance with Section 81, 82 and 83 and 117 of the Act. It also requires petitioner to file a list of documents whether in his possession or not upon which he realizes as evidence in support of his claim. The question, therefore, comes to same as to what is to be led in evidence and what is an integral part of petition to be filed to make it a complete presentation within meaning of Section 83 and 81 of the R.P. Act. The High Court has simply referred to the presentation of petition for the purposes of trial as contemplated under the R.P. Act, 1951. Rules are procedural but rules do not in any manner dilute the provisions of the R.P. Act, 1951. What it requires is that list of documents to be submitted alongwith election petition which petitioner wants to rely upon, whether in possession or not. The question is, mere mention of list of documents in any manner as prescribed would dilute the format of the election petition. Now if the format has not been prescribed and which naturally would not be there under High Court rules. While interprating Rule 3 of Chapter 15-a of the Rules of the High Court, 1952, one has to keep in mind that it talks of presentation only as per R.P. Act which is substantive law on the subject. Now if the format has not been prescribed and which naturally would not be there under High Court rules. While interprating Rule 3 of Chapter 15-a of the Rules of the High Court, 1952, one has to keep in mind that it talks of presentation only as per R.P. Act which is substantive law on the subject. When the Court refers to the presentation of petition under Section 81, and requires registry to submit a report as to compliance of Section 81, then it is very much clear that format prescribed under Section 81 has not been diluted at all. It is by way of abandoned precaution that Rule 3 further provides that whatever documents being relied upon, a list in that regard may also be appended with petition. I do not see that provision as prescribed under Rule 2 of the High Court Rules to provide a list of document as an evidence to rely upon affidavit does in any manner dilute any proposition of law regarding presentation of election petition. Thus argument advanced by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that election petition was presented as per rules of the Court, and therefore, even if documents that formed an integral part if were not filed, it would not lead to rejection of election petition is unsustainable. The election petitioner in the present case has annexed a schedule alongwith election petition as prescribed for and though has referred to the nomination paper and affidavit on form 26 but these two documents do accompany it, does not consist of that. 63. Thus the questions (b) and (c) are answered in affirmative and so against the election petitioner. 64. Since I have already held that election petition was not presented as it was not accompanied by nomination form and the affidavit, it would mean that it has not been presented in terms of Section 81 to hold trial under Section 86 of the R.P. Act. 65. In view of the above first point is decided against the election petitioner and in favour of returned candidate/respondent No. 1. 66. Besides the above, on the point of affidavit of corrupt practise to be not meeting the requirements of law, I find that the affidavit refers to various paragraphs and form 26 regarding suppression of criminal antecedents and non disclosure of movable and immovable properties. 66. Besides the above, on the point of affidavit of corrupt practise to be not meeting the requirements of law, I find that the affidavit refers to various paragraphs and form 26 regarding suppression of criminal antecedents and non disclosure of movable and immovable properties. Affidavit as such would have been good enough if the concise statement of fact and particulars of any corrupt practise as required under Section 83(1) (a) and (b) were disclosed in those grounds and paragraphs. Since I have held that in those paragraphs particularly regarding criminal antecedents, no particulars as such have been disclosed, the affidavit of corrupt practise automatically fall as it also does not refer to any particular corrupt practise. A mere reference to paragraphs which itself vague and sketchy, would not make it sufficient enough to hold that to be legally acceptable affidavit within definition of law qua presentation of election petition. 67. Now coming to second point, I am reminded of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanimozhi Karunanidh (supra) in which proposition of law has been discussed relating to legal aspects herein involved in the present case and the Court having discussed various authorities proceeded to hold that if the election petition does not contain a concise statement of facts upon which petitioner relies and if such material facts also are not stated and particulars are not disclosed, then election petition would be liable to be dismissed not only under 86(i) of R.P. Act, 1951 also on the ground of Rule 11 (a) of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 68. After discussing a great deal, authorities of the Supreme Court delivered from time to time vide 28 the Court summarize the law as under: ''28. The legal position enunciated in afore-stated cases may be summed up as under : i. Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act, 1951 mandates that an Election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies. If material facts are not stated in an Election petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as the case would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. ii. If material facts are not stated in an Election petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as the case would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. ii. The material facts must be such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of action, that is every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff/petitioner to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgement of Court. Omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of plaint would become bad. iii. Material facts mean the entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of action. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. iv. In order to get an election declared as void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, the Election petitioner must aver that on account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or any rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate, was materially affected. v. The Election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated lightly or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses it as a handle for vexatious purpose. vi. An Election petition can be summarily dismissed on the omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action, or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, in exercise of the powers under Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC read with the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the RP Act.'' 69. The Court in that case was dealing with ground as contemplated under Section 100 (1)(d) (iv) of the R.P. Act to declare election of the returned candidate void. The Court in that case was dealing with ground as contemplated under Section 100 (1)(d) (iv) of the R.P. Act to declare election of the returned candidate void. The bone of contention was, as the Court observed, with regard to certain financial issues relating to income tax dues of her spouse where she had mentioned 'No' and then she stated that her spouse had bank accounts in Singapore with deposits in dollar in further columns prescribed for under form 26 but status of income tax was not disclosed. The Court held election petition carried bald allegations as to the statement of facts. The concise statement of facts and setting-forth of particular was absolutely vague so much so that no prima facie view could be formed as to the allegations made so to hold that there was complete cause of action to maintain election petition. vide 31, 32 and 33 the Court held : ''31. Mere bald and vague allegations without any basis would not be sufficient compliance of the requirement of stating material facts in the Election Petition. As well-settled not only positive statement of facts, even a positive statement of negative fact is also required to be stated, as it would be a material fact constituting a cause of action. The material facts which are primary and basic facts have to be pleaded by the Election petitioner in support of the case set up by him to show his cause of action and omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action, entitling the returned candidate to pray for dismissal of Election petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act. 32. It is also significant to note that an affidavit in Form 26 alongwith the nomination paper, is required to be furnished by the candidate as per Rule 4A of the said Rules read with Section 33 of the said Act. The Returning Officer is empowered either on the objections made to any nomination or on his own motion, to reject any nomination on the grounds mentioned in Section 36(2), including on the ground that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33 of the Act. The Returning Officer is empowered either on the objections made to any nomination or on his own motion, to reject any nomination on the grounds mentioned in Section 36(2), including on the ground that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33 of the Act. However, at the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper and the affidavit in the Form 26 furnished by the Appellant-returned candidate, neither any objection was raised, nor the Returning Officer had found any lapse or non-compliance of Section 33 or Rule 4A of the Rules. Assuming that the election petitioner did not have the opportunity to see the Form No. 26 filled in by the Appellant-returned candidate, when she submitted the same to the Returning Officer, and assuming that the Returning Officer had not properly scrutinized the nomination paper of the appellant, and assuming that the election petitioner had a right to question the same by filing the Election petition under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the said Act, then also there are no material facts stated in the petition constituting cause of action under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act. In absence of material facts constituting cause of action for filing Election petition under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the said Act, the Election petition is required to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 13(1)(a) of the RP Act. 33. As elaborately discussed earlier, Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act mandates that an Election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which petitioner relies, and which facts constitute a cause of action. Such facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of negative fact. Omission of a singular fact would lead to incomplete cause of action. So far as the present petition is concerned, there is no averment made as to how there was non-compliance with provisions of the Constitution or of RP Act or of the Rules or Order made thereunder and as to how such non-compliance had materially affected the result of the election, so as to attract the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, for declaring the election to be void. The omission to state such vital and basic facts has rendered the petition liable to be dismissed under rder VII, Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 83(i)(a) of the RP Act, 1951.'' 70. The omission to state such vital and basic facts has rendered the petition liable to be dismissed under rder VII, Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 83(i)(a) of the RP Act, 1951.'' 70. Applying the above principle to the facts stated in various paragraph in support of the ground on the aspects of movable and immovable property running from ground to paragraph 12,13,14,15,16 and 17 in the present election petition, I find that those details though have already been given, of returned candidate of statement of accounts etc. but in the absence of affidavit filed in support of nomination paper and the affidavit on form 26 as well, it could not be concluded even prima facie that there was any concealment of material facts and particular details indicating corrupt practise in question so as to hold the election petition disclosed a substantial ground to entertain it. Entire bundle of facts that have been stated in paragraphs of the petition, even if are examined very minutely with microscopic eyes, would only lead to a conclusion then that certain statements of facts made regarding criminal antecedents with certain particulars and details regarding immovable properties but what kind of concealment, what kind of misleading statement of suppressed material accounted to in the nomination papers are absolutely vague. 71. One of the arguments could be that, even if material facts are disclosed and material particulars are lacking to some extent then material facts that constitute cause of action would hold petition maintainable. This argument was also advanced by learned counsel appearing for the election petitioner in the case of petitioner V. Narayanswami (supra) as were referred to, which is reproduced hereunder: ''27. It is contended by Mr Bhandare that all the material facts have been stated in the election petition and that for lack of material particulars, the petition could not have been thrown out at the threshold. He said opportunity should have been given to the appellant to supply the material particulars. It is really a strange proposition to advance. Till the date of the impugned judgment, the appellant had persisted that the petition did not lack material particulars and that the verification was in accordance with the Code and the affidavit in support of the corrupt practice in the form prescribed. It is really a strange proposition to advance. Till the date of the impugned judgment, the appellant had persisted that the petition did not lack material particulars and that the verification was in accordance with the Code and the affidavit in support of the corrupt practice in the form prescribed. Admittedly, the petition lacked material particulars, the verification to the petition was not in accordance with the Code and the affidavit did not conform to the form prescribed. At the first opportunity, the respondent raised objection that the petition lacked both material facts and the material particulars and that the verification to the petition and the affidavit were not in accordance with law. This was repeated in the miscellaneous application (Original Application No. 298 of 1998). In the counter-affidavit and in the reply to the miscellaneous application, the appellant persisted in his stand and termed the objections raised by the respondent as irrelevant. It is not that the appellant did not have the opportunity to correct his mistake which he could have easily done in the rejoinder filed by him to the counter-affidavit of the respondent or even his reply to the miscellaneous application (OA No. 298 of 1998). He had every opportunity even at that stage to supply the material particulars which admittedly were lacking and also to amend the verification and to file the affidavit in the form prescribed but for reasons best known to him, he failed to do so. The existence of material facts, material particulars, correct verification and the affidavit are relevant and important when the petition is based on the allegation of corrupt practice and in the absence of those, the Court has jurisdiction to dismiss the petition. The High Court has undoubtedly the power to permit amendment of the petition for supply of better material particulars and also to require amendment of the verification and filing of the required affidavit but there is no duty cast on the High Court to direct suo motu the furnishing of better particulars and requiring amendment of the petition for the purpose of verification and filing of proper affidavit. In a matter of this kind the primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and to file a petition in full compliance with the provisions of law is on the petitioner. In a matter of this kind the primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and to file a petition in full compliance with the provisions of law is on the petitioner. (See in this connection the Constitution Bench decision in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani [ AIR 1955 SC 610 : (1955) 2 SCR 428 ] SCR at p. 144.)'' 72. However, the Court in that case after going through every details discussed in the petition came to finally hold that petition not only lacked material facts but also lack material particulars with the effect that there was defective verification and affidavit was also not in the form prescribed order and hence confirmed the order of the High Court rejected the election petition vide paragraph 30 and 31 thus: ''30. It will thus be seen that the election petition not only lacked the material facts, it lacked material particulars, defective verification and the affidavit filed was not in the form prescribed. Moreover, the ingredients of corrupt practices, as defined in Section 123(1)(B) and 123(2) of the Act are also lacking. It is also not the case of the appellant that any MLA whom the appellant could not meet, received any gratification, as defined, whether as a motive or a reward for voting or refraining from voting, or there was any inducement or attempt to induce any such MLA to vote or refrain from voting. Also it is not the case of the appellant that any undue influence was exercised with the free exercise of any electoral right of any MLA which right, as noted above, has been defined in clause (d) of Section 79 of the Act. There is no allegation if any particular MLA was induced to vote or not to vote in a particular way because he was entertained or otherwise. The allegation is that the appellant himself could not meet the MLAs and he believed that if he had been given a chance to meet them he would have influenced their vote in his favour and against their party of affiliations. There is no allegation that the MLAs were prevented or influenced from freely exercising their electoral right. As stated earlier the appellant did not show as to why he could not meet the MLAs on 2-10-1997 when they were available in Pondicherry. There is no allegation that the MLAs were prevented or influenced from freely exercising their electoral right. As stated earlier the appellant did not show as to why he could not meet the MLAs on 2-10-1997 when they were available in Pondicherry. The material fact must be that the appellant was prevented from meeting the MLAs which he did not allege and as to how he was so prevented would constitute material particulars. 31. The election petition read as a whole did not disclose any cause of action or triable issue. Considering the facts of the case and the principles of law applicable, the election petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court in limine'' 73. In the considered view of the Court, therefore, in the total circumspect of the facts stated in the election petition, they do not constitute cause of action as such to maintain election petition. Thus second point stands answered in favour of returned candidate and against the election petitioner. 74. The grounds that have been raised as ground No. 8 A, 8B and 8D, in so far as they relate to suppression of material facts regarding criminal antecedents, in nomination papers and affidavit filed on the form 26, do not clarify specifically as to what kind of exact concealment of material particulars have taken place which necessitated election petitioner to question election on the ground of alleged corrupt practise. The material facts not only very sketchy but material particulars as to corrupt practise are not quite specific and are also not detailed therein in the relevant paragraphs. The nomination papers including affidavit referred to in the schedule as one of the documents are liable to be held as integral part of the election petition as proper construction of grounds raised relating to the statement facts and particulars would not be possible in the absence of these two documents and so the election petition, election petitioner is liable to be held as not maintainable as proper election petition and its presentation as such within meaning of Section 83 (1) 83 (a), and therefore, such election petition deserves rejection under Section 86(1) of R.P. Act on this count alone. There is no further clarity as to how ground 8D is made out. 75. There is no further clarity as to how ground 8D is made out. 75. In the present case as I have already discussed that no such definite particulars have been setforth in the election petition so as to form a view qua corrupt practise for such suppression or misleading facts and since such detailed information was required to be made on an affidavit prescribed then such an affidavit which has also been referred to in the schedule ought to have been filed alongwith election petition. 76. In view of above and having discussed various authorities on the point and since I have held that election petition not only lacks concise statement of material facts but has failed to set-forth material particulars which are mandatorily required under Section 83 (1)(a),(b) and both the documents, namely nomination form and affidavit mentioned in the scheduled appended to the election petition being an integral part of it and yet having not been filed, the instant election petition deserves rejection under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. Further averments being vague and confusing in totality in various paragraphs, petition also fails to disclose cause of action as such to maintain it. Accordingly, miscellaneous application filed under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 being No. 7 of 2022 moved by the returned candidate and miscellaneous application being No. 4 of 2022 filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC are hereby allowed. 77. Election petition is dismissed. 78. Parties to bear their own cost.