JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA MAITHANI, J. 1. The challenge in this petition is made to the order dated 18.02.2020, passed in Criminal Case No. 727 of 2010, by the court of Judicial Magistrate, Nainital (for short “the case”). By which, an application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the court observed that there are sufficient grounds for framing charge under Sections 420, 406, 506, 120B IPC. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. The facts necessary to appreciate the controversy briefly stated are as follows: The respondent no. 2 (for short “the informant”) filed an FIR, on 25.11.2008, against the petitioner and others under Sections 420, 406, 506 IPC at Police Station Tallital, District Nainital (for short “the first FIR”). According to it, the petitioner and the co-accused on 13.06.2008, induced him to deliver Rs. 67,760/- and ensured that he would be paid Rs. 50,500/- per month for running a computer shop. But, thereafter, assured sum was not paid and when demanded, threats were extended to him. According to the FIR, the petitioner, the co-accused and others, cheated other persons also. In this FIR, after investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner and others for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 506, 120-B IPC. On 15.06.2010, cognizance was taken on it, and the petitioner and the co-accused were summoned to answer the accusation. The order taking cognizance was challenged by the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application (C-482) No. 26 of 2011, Kapil Adwetya (Pilot Baba) vs. State of Uttarakhand before this Court, which was dismissed on 06.04.2017. The Court had observed that: “(9) The Court was taken through the contents of FIR. From a bare perusal of FIR, it is apparent that foundation of criminal offence is laid against the present applicant in the instant case. Criminal proceedings pending against him, therefore, should not be quashed. The jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to stifle or scuttle the legitimate prosecution.” 4. Still aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) No. 3864 of 2017, Kapil Adwetya (Pilot Baba) vs. State of Uttarakhand, which was dismissed on 17.05.2018. The trial of the case proceeded. The jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to stifle or scuttle the legitimate prosecution.” 4. Still aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) No. 3864 of 2017, Kapil Adwetya (Pilot Baba) vs. State of Uttarakhand, which was dismissed on 17.05.2018. The trial of the case proceeded. At the stage of framing of charge, arguments were raised on behalf of the petitioner for discharge, but by the impugned order the court held that there are sufficient grounds to frame charge. This order is impugned herein. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that it is the case in which the petitioner ought to have been discharged. He would raise the following points in his submissions: (i) According to the prosecution case, a society was registered on 10.12.2006, but on that date the petitioner was not in India. His signatures were forged. (ii) The petitioner has been falsely implicated in the case. On behalf of the petitioner an FIR was filed on 21.11.2017 with the averments that petitioner’s name was used by Himanshu Rai and others; the society was registered based on forged documents on the name and style of Aikawa International Educational Society. At the relevant time, the petitioner was travelling abroad; the Manager of Pilot Baba Ashram gave a complaint to the police, which was registered as FIR No. 393 of 2017, Police Station Haldwani, District Nainital (for short “the second FIR”). (iii) After investigation in the second FIR, the police had submitted a charge-sheet. Not only this, it is argued that in the charge-sheet, the police has categorically recorded that the signatures of the petitioner were forged on the documents. (iv) The second FIR after investigation was found true. Charge-sheet has been submitted. It, according to the learned Senior Counsel, falsify the allegations levelled against the petitioner. It is some sterling material which cannot be lost sight of at the stage of framing of the charge. It is not such a case that petitioner has to establish his plea of alibi. In the second FIR, after investigation the police, in fact, verified the foreign journey of the petitioner from Assistant Director, Central Foreign Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and thereafter, concluded that at the relevant time, the petitioner was travelling abroad. 6. It is not such a case that petitioner has to establish his plea of alibi. In the second FIR, after investigation the police, in fact, verified the foreign journey of the petitioner from Assistant Director, Central Foreign Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and thereafter, concluded that at the relevant time, the petitioner was travelling abroad. 6. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the principle of law as laid down in the case of State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 . In the case of Debendra Nath Padhi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the parameters of rare and exceptional circumstances while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”). Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder: “21. It is evident from the above that this Court was considering the rare and exceptional cases where the High Court may consider unimpeachable evidence while exercising jurisdiction for quashing under Section 482 of the Code. In the present case, however, the question involved is not about the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code where along with the petition the accused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis seek quashing, but is about the right claimed by the accused to produce material at the stage of framing of charge.” 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that witnesses have proved the prosecution case. He would refer to the statement of one Neha Agarwal, who has stated that she had met the petitioner, who, along with the co-accused, gave her the work of printing the document pertaining to the society. He would also submit that the petitioner is the President of the society and whether the signatures on the documents pertaining to the society are forged or not, it is a matter which would find deliberation during trial. In the proceeding under Section 482 of the Code, such matters cannot be decided. Learned State counsel would also submit that there is no reason to make any interference in the order framing charge. 8. Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code. The jurisdiction, which is much wide, but also guided by the principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in umpteen number of cases. Learned State counsel would also submit that there is no reason to make any interference in the order framing charge. 8. Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code. The jurisdiction, which is much wide, but also guided by the principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in umpteen number of cases. The jurisdiction is exercised to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order passed by the court or to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 9. In the case of State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has illustrated the list of the circumstances under which the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code may be exercised. In paragraph 102 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 10. On the question of framing of charge in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the order framing charge should be disturbed in rare and exceptional circumstances. In Para 12 and 13 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C.” 11. Not only this, in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and Another vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, “Thus, even while reiterating the view that there is no bar to jurisdiction of the High Court to consider a challenge against an order of framing charge in exceptional situation for correcting a patent error of lack of jurisdiction, exercise of such jurisdiction has to be limited to the rarest of rare cases. Even if a challenge to order framing charge is entertained, decision of such a petition should not be delayed. Though no mandatory time-limit can be fixed, normally it should not exceed two-three months. If stay is granted, it should not normally be unconditional or of indefinite duration ” 12. Even if a challenge to order framing charge is entertained, decision of such a petition should not be delayed. Though no mandatory time-limit can be fixed, normally it should not exceed two-three months. If stay is granted, it should not normally be unconditional or of indefinite duration ” 12. The law is well settled that the order framing charge should not lightly be interfered with. The Court may not conduct a mini trial at this stage. But then, there may be sterling circumstances, which may make the grounds for framing of charges baseless, in such cases, the Court is not devoid of jurisdiction to make an interference. 13. Instance is a case, which requires interference. An FIR was lodged against the petitioner and others on 25.11.2008 with the averments that the petitioner formed a society and he along with the co-accused induced the informant of that case to deliver money. The informant in that case delivered some money with the assurance that he would be paid Rs. 50,500/- per month in return, which was not paid. And when he demanded the money, he was threatened and abused. The second FIR was filed by the Dushyant Singh Chauhan with the averments that the society was got registered by Himanshu Rai by forging the signatures of the petitioner. The petitioner has nothing to do with the undertaking given by Himanshu Rai. The petitioner was not in India when such acts were done. Cannot it be said that the subject matter of the second FIR was related to the subject matter of the first FIR. The Investigating Officer of the first FIR, would have gone into those aspects, which was alleged in the second FIR. That aspect is not for consideration before this Court in this proceeding. 14. The fact remains that in the second FIR, Investigating Officer, after detailed investigation, has submitted the charge-sheet against one Himanshu Rai and the narration in this charge-sheet is quite important for deciding the instant petition. It records that specimen signature of the petitioner was taken and they were examined with the documents submitted for registration of the society. It was found that the petitioner had not signed on those documents and his signatures were forged. It records that specimen signature of the petitioner was taken and they were examined with the documents submitted for registration of the society. It was found that the petitioner had not signed on those documents and his signatures were forged. Not only this, the Investigating Officer of the second FIR verified from Assistant Director, Central Foreign Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and concluded that from 15.12.2006 to 04.01.2007, the petitioner was not in India. The Investigating Officer verified that the petitioner was not in India at the relevant time. It is the prosecution case in the second FIR that the petitioner was not in India at the relevant time. The petitioner is not required to prove this fact at least in the second FIR and even in the first FIR, he may call the Investigating Officer of the second FIR, if he is so advised. 15. Under the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that, in fact, there is no sufficient ground for framing the charge under Sections 420, 406, 120-B IPC against the petitioner. The court below has committed an error. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be allowed and the charge dated 18.02.2020 framed, in the case, deserves to be set aside. 16. The petition is allowed. 17. The charge dated 18.02.2020 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is discharged of the offence under Sections 420, 406, 120-B IPC. 18. The petitioner is on bail, his bond cancelled and sureties are discharged of his liability. 19. Let a copy of the judgment alongwith the record of the case be sent to the court concerned.