JUDGMENT : NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS, J. 1. The appellant by way of this appeal has challenged the judgment of conviction dated 03.09.2002 passed by the Special Judge and the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur District Bastar (C.G.) in Special Case No. 3/99 whereby and whereunder, he has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction U/s. Sentence R.I. Fine In default of payment of fine U/s 13(1) (C) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act, 1988 2 Years 20,000/- R.I. for 1 year U/s 467 of IPC 2 Years 10,000/- R.I. for 6 months U/s 468 of IPC 2 Years 10,000/- R.I. for 6 months U/s 471 of IPC 2 Years 10,000/- R.I. for 6 months U/s 120-B of IPC 2 Years 10,000/- R.I. for 6 months 2. In brief, the prosecution story is that the District Rural Development Agency under mandatory employment scheme for the year 1994-95 has granted approval to the Executive Engineer, Rural Development Department, Kondagaon for construction of stop dam at village Nayanar Tahsil Keshkal District Bastar with an estimated cost of construction Rs. 4,99,000=00. At the relevant time, H.R. Kanaskar was Executive Engineer, the present appellant was SDO and Ranjit Singh Tomar was Sub Engineer under whom the construction works were to be carried out. The administrative approval for carrying out the construction was granted by the Collector, District Rural Development Agency on 30.01.1995. Some works were started by the SDO and Sub-engineer at the construction site of Nayanar Stop Dam. Later, on the direction of the Project Officer, District Rural Development Agency the Superintendent Engineer, the Rural Engineering Service, Jagdalpur Circle inspected the site and submitted his report wherein it has been found that at the place of construction site no work was carried out. It has been assailed in the report that without actual progress of work the Executive Engineer H.R. Kanskar has submitted expenditure to the tune of Rs. 2,70,700=00 out of which 84,884=00 towards labour payment, Rs. 41,837=00 for foodgrain given to the labours and Rs. 1,39,000=00 towards construction materials. 3. It is case of the prosecution that as per the decision taken by the Rural Development Agency whenever there is negligible work, then Executive Engineer shall send proposal for cancellation of the site work, but, no such steps were taken and thus, he has deliberately not complied the direction issued by the agency. 1,39,000=00 towards construction materials. 3. It is case of the prosecution that as per the decision taken by the Rural Development Agency whenever there is negligible work, then Executive Engineer shall send proposal for cancellation of the site work, but, no such steps were taken and thus, he has deliberately not complied the direction issued by the agency. The present appellant, who was working as SDO had informed that due to sandy strata, no further construction work is possible. Therefore, the matter was sent to the Special Police Establishment Lokayukta Office Bastar for investigation. The Inspector R.S. Dhruv registered the Preliminary Enquiry number No. 27/97 and found that no stop dam was constructed in the spot. It has also been found that by using forged bills, forged muster rolls with criminal conspiracy and misusing their position labour payment to the tune of Rs. 1,26,468=83, Stationery expenditure to the tune 1,103=00, Cement 500 bags to the tune of Rs. 48,125=00, Signboard Rs. 1,384=50, Diesel expenditure 5,725=00, office cleaning Rs. 120=00, Guard 4097=35 total Rs.1,38,899=47 expenditure were done. It has also been alleged that thumb impression was taken but payment was made to other persons, causing loss to the Government. On the basis of this investigation, the Special Police Establishment Division, Bhopal registered the offence as Crime No. 11/98 under Section 13(1)(D) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC and investigation was carried out. 4. During the investigation, documents related to Nayanar Stop Dam, muster roll and bills etc. were seized from the Accountant Purshottam Sharma and thumb impression was sent to the Thumb Impression Expert. Orders of posting of the accused were seized. Statements of the alleged labours were recorded. Thereafter, after taking sanction from the Government of Madhya Pradesh and District Magistrate to prosecute, charge sheet under Section 13(1)(D) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC was filed before the Special Court on 18.08.1999 which was registered as Special Case No. 3/99. 5. Thereafter, after taking sanction from the Government of Madhya Pradesh and District Magistrate to prosecute, charge sheet under Section 13(1)(D) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC was filed before the Special Court on 18.08.1999 which was registered as Special Case No. 3/99. 5. The prosecution to bring home the guilt of the appellant has examined 44 witnesses namely Purshottam Prasad Sharma (PW-1), A.K. Dubey (PW-2), Kaleshwar Singh Rajput (PW-3), Virendra Prasad Khatri (PW-4), Vinay Shrivastava (PW-5), Moti Singh Maskole, SDO (PW-6), Ramesh Kumar Dewangan (PW-7), Halal as (PW-8), Amol (PW-9), Punauram (PW-10), Pilsai (PW-11), Phool Singh (PW-12), Chaitram (PW-13), Harchand (PW-14), Mansaram (PW-15), Chamara Ram (PW-16), Mannuram (PW-17), Seema Khatri (PW-18), Chainsingh (PW-19), Sitavati (PW-20), Chaitram (PW-21), A.K. Choudhari, Superitendant Engineer (PW-22), Budhiyarin Bai (PW-23), Manglu (PW-24), Chikka (PW-25), Dhannu (PW-26), D.S. Parganiya (PW-27), Saladuram (PW-28), Battamarkam (PW-29), Nathuram (PW-30), Jai Singh (PW-31), Chamra (PW-32), Mukalu (PW-33), Sukalu (PW-34), Budhdhu (PW-35), Rasauddin Sidhdki, Finger Print Expert (PW-36), Kamlu (PW-37), Ranjn Singh (PW-38), Surjan Acharya (PW-39), Bharat Chandra Rai (PW-40), Phoolsingh (PW-41), Balsingh (PW-42), Arjunsingh Markam (PW-43), R.S. Dhruv, Inspector (PW- 44) and exhibited documents Letter dated 7.8.97 (Ex.P/1),Certified documents by M.P. Dixit (Ex.P/2 to 14), Document Seizure Memo (Ex.P/15), Documents seized as per Seizure Memo (Ex.P/16 to 65), Sanction to prosecute (Ex.P/66), Memo of Chief Executive Officer, District Panchaya (Ex.P/67), Seizure Panchanama (Ex.P/68), Measurement book (Ex.P/69), Musterrolls (Ex.P/70 to 99), Document submitted by Special Police Lokayukt, Bastar (Ex.P/100 -101), Seizure Memo of document (Ex.P/102), police statement of Halal, Amrit, Punauram (Ex.P/103 to 105), Documents singed by Harchandra (Ex.P/106 to 117), Police Statement of Mansaram (Ex.P/118), photographs taken by Seemarani Kulshrestha (Ex.P/119 to 152), Envelope of negatives (Ex.P/153), Police Statement of Chaitram (Ex.P/154), Report of Additional Collector Jagdalpur (Ex.P/155), Report of Dinesh Shrivastava (Ex.P/156), Verification Report (Ex.P/157), Appointment of Rajnish Tomar and service book (Ex.P/158), Police Statement of witness (Ex.P/159), Memo No. 1628 (Ex.P/160), Transfer of charges certificate (Ex.P/161), Last certificate, Salary withdrawn certificate (Ex.P/163), Thumb impression of Ghutta (Ex.P/164 - 175), Police Statement of Saradu (Ex.P/176), Police Statement of Dhutta (Ex.P/177), thumb impression Chichka (Ex.P/178 to 189), Thumb impression of Chhannu (Ex.P/190 to 201), police statement of Naththuram, Jaisingh, Chamara, Sukalu, Sukalurm (Ex.P/214 to 218), Memo sent by the Director (Ex.P/219), Certificate of examination (Ex.P/220), police statement of Ranjan Acharaya and Phoolsingh (Ex.P/221 to 222), Thumb impression of labours working in musterrolls (Ex.P/223 to 306), Memo dated 07.07.1998 (Ex.P/307), Estimate (Ex.P/308), Index (Ex.P/309), Map (Ex.P/310), Certificates (Ex.P/311), Stop dam report (Ex.P/312), Stopdam Sileutendem (Ex.P/313), dam design (Ex.P/314), Estimate (Ex.P/315), description (Ex.P/316), Consumption statement (Ex.P/317), map (Ex.P/318), thumb impression of chamra Mandawi, Punauram, Chain Singh Netam, Chaitram, Pilasai, Sukaru, Chamra, Ghutta, Halala, Chichka, Jansingh, Punau, Dhannu, Chainsingh Chamra, Angaru, Manmati and Chaitram (Ex.P/319 to 444), Memo (Ex.P/445 to 446), letter of Lokayukta (Ex.P/447 to 448), order of WRD, Bhopal (Ex.P/449 to 450), memo dated 24.02.99, 25.02.99 (Ex.P/451 to 452), Certified copy of measurement book (Ex.P/453 to 477), Memo of Executive Engineer (Ex.P/478), order of WRD (Ex.P/479), report of muster roll (Ex.P/480), details of material purchased for dam (Ex.P/481), Sanction order (Ex.P/482), FIR (Ex.P/482 to 483), List of documents (Ex.P/483) and List of witness (Ex.P/484). 6. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrP.C. wherein he has pleaded innocence and false implication and examined K.R. Shashtri as DW-1 and Laluram as DW-2 and exhibited Statement of Pilsai (Ex.D/1), Statement of Phool Singh (Ex.D/2), Statement of Mannuram (Ex.D/2A), Statement of Chain Singh (Ex.D/3), Statement of Siyavati (Ex.D/4) and Statement of Buddhuram (Ex.D/5.) 7. The learned trial Court while appreciating the evidence and material on record passed the order on 03.09.2002 and has recorded its finding that present appellant and the Executive Engineer have forged the muster roll with intention to commit fraud with the Government and they have used the forged muster roll to show the payment made to the labours, thus the charges levelled against the appellant are proved beyond doubt. Learned trial Court acquitted one of the accused M.P. Dixit and other co-accused Ranjeet Singh Tomar expired during pendency of the criminal case. As such, the appellant and H.R. Kanskar were convicted. Being aggrieved with the order the appellant has preferred this appeal before this Court. 8. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would submit that no cogent, positive, sufficient or adequate evidence was tendered against the appellant, however, the trial Court without due application of mind and analysing the evidence, recorded its finding that the appellant has committed the offence for which he has been charged, thus, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court is perverse and contrary to the evidence. He would further submit that as per the directives the responsibility of engagement of labour and payment of labour lies on the shoulder of Sub Engineer, therefore, the appellant would not have been saddled with such charges for want of his direct knowledge or supervision. He would further submit that the appellant is SDO and therefore, he is not responsible for purchase of any stores in accordance with the Works Department Manual. Thus the finding recorded by the learned trial Court is also perverse. He would further submit that from bare perusal of the evidence and material on record, the ingredients of the offence with regard to Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC is not proved as the appellant had never responsibility to prepare such document for which charges of forgery have been alleged, thus, offence under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC is not made out. No ingredient for involving the appellant under 120B of the IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt since neither he is responsible for purchase nor identification of the labours, still conviction has been made which is erroneous finding of the trial Court. 9. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would further submit that in the examination thumb impressions of 9 labours were found forged out of them only 7 persons were examined as prosecution witnesses, out of which 3 persons turned hostile and remaining 3 did not support the prosecution story. He would further submit that estimate of the work was not made by the appellant and other coaccused. The estimate was made in 1992 when none of the accused persons was posted at the said place, therefore, they cannot be held responsible for making such estimate for construction of Nayanar Stop Dam. 10. Learned Senior Advocate would raise additional ground that the State Government has granted sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. only for the offence under Section 420 and 468 of the IPC. However, ignoring the sanction order, learned trial Court has framed charges under Section 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC therefore, illegality has been committed by the learned trial Court. He would further submit that the Police Inspector, PW-44 has prepared thumb impression and signature of witness, which were sent to the Thumb Impression Expert for comparison with thumb impression found on muster rolls, but it is not mentioned whether these specimen documents were produced in the police station, this fact has been ignored by the learned trial Court. The attesting witnesses have also not stated that thumb impressions were taken in their presence, even, identity of the person from whom impression was taken, has not been produced, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that other persons have been paid whose thumb impression has not been taken, is perverse and illegal finding. 11. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would further submit that learned trial Court has committed illegality in recording the facts that appellant was responsible for payment of labour and as per the PWD Manual, it is the Sub Engineer who is responsible for engaging labour and making payment to them. 12. 11. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant would further submit that learned trial Court has committed illegality in recording the facts that appellant was responsible for payment of labour and as per the PWD Manual, it is the Sub Engineer who is responsible for engaging labour and making payment to them. 12. Learned Senior Advocate to substantiate his submission would draw attention of this Court towards the M.P. Works Departmental Manual and judgments passed in K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala, 2005 AIR SCW 5437, P.K. Narayanan vs. State of Kerala, 1994 AIR SCW 5043, The State vs. Laldas and Others, AIR 1953 Bombay 177, Raghav Chandra and Others vs. Smt. Tarvinder Kaur, 2003 Cri. L.J. 2208, Murlidhar Agrawal vs. State of M.P. 2011 SCC Online M.P. 2233, Jagdish Prasad Sharma vs. State of M.P. and Another, 2017 Cri. L.J. 707, State of H.P. vs. Meet Singh Sodhi and Another, 2011 SCC Online H.P. 3571, Mangobinda Mahapatra vs. State of Odisha, 2020 SCC Online Ori. 592, The State vs. Karu Gope and Another, 1954 Cri. L.J. 201, Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and Another, (2008) 4 SCC 530 , Lambodar Pujari vs. State of Orissa, (2018) 125 CLT 90 , State of H.P. vs. Shashi Pal and Another, 2011 SCC Online H.P. 643, Shiv Kuamr Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC Online SC 997 and State of Rajasthan vs. Shivratan Singh and Others, 2009 SCC Online Raj. 5373. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the submission would submit that learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has recorded its finding which does not suffer from perversity or illegality, therefore, would pray for dismissal of the appeal. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost satisfaction. 15. From the contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties, following points emerged for determination of this Court: (I) Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC is legal and justified in absence of any specific sanction for this offence? (II) Whether the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court against the appellant suffers from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court? Point for determination No. 1 16. (II) Whether the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court against the appellant suffers from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court? Point for determination No. 1 16. Learned senior Counsel for the appellant would submit that from bare perusal of the Ex.P/482, the sanction letter, it is evident that the State has granted sanction to prosecute the appellant under sections 420, 468, 120-B of I.P.C and 3(1)(C) and 3(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988. But learned Trial Court has framed charges U/Ss. 467 and 471 for which no sanction by the State Government was granted, therefore, the conviction as ordered by the learned trial court is bad in law and without jurisdiction. 17. The learned counsel for the State would submit that the learned trial Court has framed charges on 09.05.2001 and the framing of charges was never subject of challenge before any higher Court. Thereafter, trial has been concluded, evidence has been recorded, as such, the plea taken by the appellant is afterthought story which deserves to be rejected. 18. The judgment referred to by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant in case of Raghav Chandra (supra) is distinguishable as this judgment deals with the case where no sanction has been granted whereas in the present facts of the case the State Government has grated sanction under Section 13(1)(C) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988. From bare perusal of sanction letter Ex.P/482 it is quite vivid that sanction was granted for prosecution under Section 468 and 420 of the IPC, Section 468 deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating and forgery has been defined in Section 463 of IPC which reads as under: Section 463: [Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury] to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 19. Section 467 deals with forgery of valuable security and provides that whoever forged document which purports to be a valuable security or a will and includes to receive or deliver any money. 19. Section 467 deals with forgery of valuable security and provides that whoever forged document which purports to be a valuable security or a will and includes to receive or deliver any money. Similarly, 468 deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating. The appellant has been charged under Section 468 and since the Section 467 is interconnected with the Section 468 of the IPC thus, it is not required to get sanction for prosecuting the appellant under Section 467 of the IPC. Similarly, Section 471 deals with using as genuine a forged document. The appellant was charged for fabrication of forged muster roll and the document which has been used for committing such offence is a muster roll, thus the offence was committed by the appellant by using forged muster roll, therefore, there is no requirement for the prosecution to get separate sanction to prosecute under Section 471 of the IPC. Thus, submission made by the learned Senior Advocate that conviction of the appellant without sanction to prosecute the appellant under Section 467 and 471 is misconceived and deserves to be rejected, and accordingly it is rejected. Point for determination No. 2 20. Learned Senior Advocate while making his submission on point No. 2 would submit that the Inspection was carried out after 04 years, in between 04 rainy seasons are there, therefore, as such verification of earth work is not possible. He would further submit that as per the statement of PW-6 (Moti Singh Maskole) who has admitted in cross-examination that after 2 or 3 rainy seasons it is difficult to identify the workers and he would further submit that pit was filled up on account of 01 rainy season. With regard to identification of labour he would submit that as per the PWD Manual it is the responsibility of the Sub-Engineer to identify the labour. He would further submit that the witness PW-22 (A.K. Choudhary) who was Superintendent Engineer has admitted in his cross-examination that the appellant has informed due to sandy strata it is difficult for him to continue the work as such work was stopped. He would further submit that this witness in his evidence, particularly in Para-12 and 13 has stated that all the materials were purchased by the material department. He would further submit that this witness in his evidence, particularly in Para-12 and 13 has stated that all the materials were purchased by the material department. The witness has further stated that in Para-16 of the evidence that the work is executed by Sub Engineer who used to bring Labour and prepare the Muster Roll and bill and attendance has also been marked by him, the labours are identified by him. He has further stated that it is responsibility of S.D.O. to check work of the Sub Engineer. On the basis of the statement of PW-22, learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant would submit that from bare perusal of the evidence of witness PW-22, the entire responsibility is upon Sub Engineer, thus, convicting the appellant is not legal and based on perverse finding. He would draw attention of the Court towards para-55 of PW-44 and would submit that identification of the labour is doubtful, PW-44 is not supposed to identify the labour at least any of the persons who is from the department could have been examined by the prosecution to identify the person whether they have worked or not, therefore, the prosecution has failed to identify the persons. 21. He would further submit that PW-44 R.S. Dhruw Ivestigating Officer has taken Thumb Impression of the workers. The specimen for thumb impression has been obtained by him after visiting house of the person even after four days. The witness has stated in para-18 that on 26/08/1998 after visiting to Village- Nayanaar he has taken specimen signature of Chetram S/o Rashi in presence of the witness which is Ex.P/223 to 234 who was examined as PW-13 and he has stated that he used to put signature and he was given Rs.100/- or 200/- for the work he has done while construction of Dam for which he has worked for two weeks. He also stated that he has never make complaint. The witness in cross-examination has stated that he is not aware of wages which have been paid to him and also stated that no statement before the police has been recorded and he has also not put any thumb impression in front of Police. 22. He also stated that he has never make complaint. The witness in cross-examination has stated that he is not aware of wages which have been paid to him and also stated that no statement before the police has been recorded and he has also not put any thumb impression in front of Police. 22. He would draw attention of this court towards witness PW-33 Sukalu who was declared to be hostile witness and in his examination-inchief in his leading question by the prosecution he has denied that he has worked for 04 days and he is not aware that whether bills for Rs. 147.45P, Rs. 123.35p and 133.35p were prepared in his name. He has stated that it is true that this amount has never been given to him. The witness in cross-examination has stated that it has not been informed whether someone has put thumb impression in his place and has stated that he has not given statement in police, particularly in Ex.P/217. 23. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant while criticizing the manner and procedure followed by the prosecution to collect evidence of thumb impression would submit that no due care has been taken and prosecution is not able to prove whether the person who was involved in the construction of dam whose signature has been taken or the person who was not employed in the construction, his signature has been taken. The prosecution has failed to prove that particular person was employed but he was not given wages and persons who were not employed their signature have been marked in the Muster Roll and caused financial loss to the Government. He would further submit that PW-43 (Arjun Singh Markam) has admitted in the cross examination that he has put his signature in all the papers and also admitted that Sir who has gone has asked him to put his signature in the papers and all the pages were turned by the officer. He has also admitted that he cannot say whose thumb impression has been put in which paper. He has also admitted that persons whose thumb impression were taken were called upon and also admitted that so many persons were there. He has also stated that the persons have worked in the construction of dam, and their thumb impressions have been taken but he cannot say definitely how many persons thumb impressions have been taken. He has also admitted that persons whose thumb impression were taken were called upon and also admitted that so many persons were there. He has also stated that the persons have worked in the construction of dam, and their thumb impressions have been taken but he cannot say definitely how many persons thumb impressions have been taken. He has also admitted that he cannot say whose thumb impression has been taken, thus, the learned Senior Advocate would submit that the thumb impression itself is doubtful. 24. Learned Sr. Counsel would submit that the signature was sent for hand writing expert and has been denied their specimen or thumb impression, thus, the prosecution case has become doubtful. Sr. Counsel would further submit that the persons whose signatures were sent for obtaining the opinion from the expert has denied the fact that they have given specimen signature for verification by the hand writing expert. As such, on the basis of Thumb Impression which was sent for expert opinion, the prosecution cannot prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He would submit that even otherwise the expert opinion is a very weak evidence unless it is corroborated by other evidence. In absence of any such corroboration the conviction of the appellant is not safe. To substantiate his submission he would attention of this Court towards judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivshankar Sharma (Supra). He would further submit that the prosecution has not sent the specimen signatures of the labour which have been taken in the month of April- 1998 as explained in Para 18 to 26 by PW-44 and would submit that if these documents would have been sent to expert for opinion then it might have been against prosecution, therefore, the prosecution has deliberately not sent this to the expert and he would further submit that adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution in view of Section 112 of the Evidence Act. 25. Learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant would submit that PW-18 Smt. Seema Rani who has done the photography of thumb impression was examined and she has stated that she has not done any Diploma course of photography and also admitted that she has received finger prints only one time and she has taken their photographs and footage was sent to fingerprint expert. 26. 26. Now criticizing the expert opinion dated 25/09/1998 Ex.P/220 and referring to the evidence of PW-36 Shirajuddin Siddiqui, Finger Print Expert he would submit that the expert in paragraph 4 has stated that 9 thumb impressions of labours which have been marked in question muster roll are not matched and six labours thumb impression he was not able to match with thumb impression of the muster roll. The witness was cross examined and has admitted that in their office two thumb impressions were sent but only one thumb impression was sent to him. He has admitted that he has done the examination only once. He has admitted that if the eight characteristics of thumb impression are tallied then the opinion with regard to disputed thumb impression can be given. Thus, he would submit that the report given by the hand writing expert is disputed and on the basis of thumb impression conviction by the trial Court of the appellant is illegal and suffers from perversity. 27. Learned Sr. counsel for the appellant would further submit that during preliminary examination certain materials have been collected but they have not been placed on record by the prosecution, therefore, adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant now criticizing the judgment of the trial Court would submit that finding at Para-40 is perverse as there is no material on record produced by the prosecution to prove that the spot has been selected by the present appellant and estimation of the construction was done by him. He would also submit that from bare perusal of Ex.P.309 to Ex.P-310 and Ex.P/315, it is quite vivid that the estimation of the construction site was prepared on 26/11/1992 whereas the present appellant was posted there from October, 1994 to November 1996. As such the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that appellant has given wrong estimation and selected the wrong place is perverse and on the basis of preserve finding the conviction of appellant is bad in law. 29. He would further submit that bills of the materials which have been purchased by department have been produced by the prosecution but the trial court has recorded perverse finding that it is forged one without any witness examined by the prosecution. 29. He would further submit that bills of the materials which have been purchased by department have been produced by the prosecution but the trial court has recorded perverse finding that it is forged one without any witness examined by the prosecution. He would further submit that PW-22 (A.K. Choudhary) in Para-12 and 13 has stated that materials which have been purchased by the department were kept reserved with the department. Learned Sr. Counsel further submit that the transport entry vide Ex.P/64 & 65 has supported the case of the defence, but the trial court has not taken any consideration to it and on the contrary and perverse finding has reached to conclusion that because of the negligence of the appellant the depart has suffered loss of Rs. 2,20,000/- whereas the material can be returned back and no loss caused to the department. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant is illegal. 30. Considering the submission made learned counsel for the parties it is not in dispute that the prosecution has sent the thumb impression of the alleged labour for opinion of the expert. The opinion of the expert is very weak evidence unless it is corroborated by other cogent evidence. The prosecution star witness PW-43 and Investigating Officer, PW-44 have nowhere stated that the persons whose thumb impressions have been sent for examination have been identified by the persons who were involved in the construction of dam. Merely relying upon the expert opinion the conviction of the appellant is not safe as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) through legal representatives and Another, (2019) 14 SCC 220 has held as under: “10. In our considered opinion, the decisions in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) strengthen the proposition that it is the duty of the Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously while determining its reliability and that the Court may seek independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of prudence. Clearly, these observations in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) do not go against the proposition stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) that the evidence of a handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence. 11. Clearly, these observations in Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) do not go against the proposition stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) that the evidence of a handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence. 11. In light of these principles, it is necessary to evaluate the correctness of the findings of the High Court as to the genuineness of the signature of the first defendant on Ext.A-1. 12. As mentioned earlier, Ext.A-1 is the agreement of sale entered into by the plaintiff and the first defendant. Ext.A-2 is the receipt evidencing the payment of earnest money of Rs. 61,200/- in pursuance of this agreement of sale. The receipt bears the signature of the first defendant on the revenue stamps affixed thereon. Curiously, Ext.A-2 was not sent for obtaining expert opinion. At the same time, no reliable material was brought on record that the first defendant has not received the amount under Ext.A-2. In the absence of any challenge to the first defendant’s signature on Ext.A-2, and in the absence of any reliable material produced by the first defendant to deny the receipt of such earnest money, the High Court, in our considered opinion, should have relied upon this receipt. In fact, we find that the High Court has not considered Ext.A-2 in its entire judgment. As a matter of fact, Ext.A-1 and Ext.A-2 go hand in hand, and Ext.A-2 should not have been ignored by the High Court. Moreover, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not present on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement altogether. This is because the agreement was signed by the first defendant and clearly reveals that he had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a due consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/- This agreement was followed by Ext.A-2, which shows the payment and receipt of the earnest money. In addition to the signature of the first defendant, this receipt bears the signature of the plaintiff on revenue stamps. As mentioned earlier, Ext.A-1 and Ext.A-2 are part of the same transaction. Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on Ext.A-1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted. In addition to this, the evidence of DW-3 (the brother of the first defendant) belies the allegation of the first defendant that the signature found on Ext.A-1 is forged. As mentioned earlier, Ext.A-1 and Ext.A-2 are part of the same transaction. Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on Ext.A-1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted. In addition to this, the evidence of DW-3 (the brother of the first defendant) belies the allegation of the first defendant that the signature found on Ext.A-1 is forged. DW-3 specifically admitted during his cross-examination that he could identify the signature of the first defendant, who is his elder brother. He has further admitted that Ext.A-1 and Ext.B-1 bears the signature of the first defendant. It may be noted here that a partition had taken place between the first defendant and DW-3 in the year 1980, and such partition was effected through Ext.B-1, an unregistered partition deed. Crucially, the first defendant has also admitted his signature on Ext.B-1 in his cross-examination. Thus, it is clear that such admitted signature and the disputed signature of the first defendant have been identified by his brother as those of the first defendant himself.” 31. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 35 , has held in paragraph 14 to 16 which is as under: “14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that without independent and reliable corroboration, the opinion of the hand- writing experts cannot be relied upon to base the conviction. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 , wherein the Supreme Court held as under: “28. Thus, the evidence of PW 3 is not definite and cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally consider it as offering ‘conclusive’ proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210 , while dealing with the evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined: 7........we think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. In Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210 , while dealing with the evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined: 7........we think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad vs. Mohd. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this view was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was pointed out by this Court that expert’s evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin vs. State of M.P. AIR 1967 SC 1326 and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.” 15. Of course, it is not safe to base the conviction solely on the evidence of the hand-writing expert. As held by the Supreme Court in Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210 that: “7.........expert opinion must always be received with great caution......it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. Of course, it is not safe to base the conviction solely on the evidence of the hand-writing expert. As held by the Supreme Court in Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210 that: “7.........expert opinion must always be received with great caution......it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.” 16. It is fairly well settled that before acting upon the opinion of the hand-writing expert, prudence requires that the court must see that such evidence is corroborated by other evidence either direct or circumstantial evidence. In Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704 , the Supreme Court held as under: “4.........True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses - the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses - but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of fingerprints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty “is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the Judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence (Vide Lord President Cooper in Davis vs. Edindurgh Magistrate, quoted by Professor Cross in his evidence).” 5............. 6. Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person “specially skilled” “in questions as to identity of handwriting” is expressly made a relevant fact........So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of an handwriting expert and there need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.” 32. Thus, the finding recorded by the learned trial court that the forged muster roll has been prepared and knowingly these documents are forged and are being used, is perverse and illegal finding. Considering the evidence of the witnesses and materials on record it is quite vivid that recommendation was made to construct dam on 16.11.1992 and cost of Stop Dam was also assessed to the tune of Rs. 4,99,000/- and for that a map was also prepared. The prosecution has not produced any material or evidence to prove that the estimation or decision to construct the dam was taken by the appellant. Even, the prosecution has not produced any evidence to establish that appellant was final authority to grant final sanction to attract the charges levelled against him. 33. The prosecution has not produced any material or evidence to prove that the estimation or decision to construct the dam was taken by the appellant. Even, the prosecution has not produced any evidence to establish that appellant was final authority to grant final sanction to attract the charges levelled against him. 33. Even from report of the Superintendent Engineer A.K. Choudhury dated 19.07.1996 (Ex.P/155) wherein it has been mentioned that the present appellant has informed him that Nayanar Stop Dam cannot be continued because of sandy strata, and also considering that in the evidence this witness has stated that for constructing the questioned Stop Dam the materials which were required for construction of the dam like rod, cement, shutter, sign board were purchased by the department and it is also admitted that the amount of work which has been shown also include materials which has been purchased by the department and theses materials are preserved. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that loss of Rs. 2,20,000/- has been caused to the department because of the appellant, is perverse and illegal finding. The witness has also admitted that plinth was dug out and the appellant has no responsibility to bring the labours or to pay them wages and it is for the Sub-engineer. The muster roll is also prepared by the Sub-Engineer and he used to take attendance of the labour, thus the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that forged muster roll was prepared by the appellant to obtain illegal benefits causing loss to the Government is without any evidence, material on record, thus suffers from perversity, as such, the prosecution is unable to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 34. Considering the evidence of PW-22 who has admitted that after one or two years the approach road cannot be in good condition and the plinth which has been constructed will also be damaged due to flow of water and soil will be filled up in the plinth and hutment will also get damaged. Thus, the finding recorded by the trial Court that no work has been carried out is illegal finding. Thus, the finding recorded by the trial Court that no work has been carried out is illegal finding. Considering the statement of the Investigating Officer, R.S. Dhruv, PW-44 who has admitted that he has not identified the labours whose thumb impressions have been taken and also admitted he is not aware that the materials which have been purchased by the department have been received by the department or not. Thus, finding recorded by the trial Court that loss has been caused to the Government by the appellant, is illegal finding. 35. Learned trial Court while recording its finding in paragraph 40 and 41 has recorded its finding that without preparation of trial sheet, the work has been carried out that shows the involvement of the appellant without any evidence led by the prosecution. Thus, the trial Court has not considered the material which was produced by the prosecution and convicted the appellant. Learned trial Court while recording such finding has not considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution itself as the prosecution witness A.K. Dubey (PW-1) has nowhere stated about these things. Even the prosecution has not collected any material to substantiate this finding recorded by the trial Court. Learned trial Court has travelled beyond evidence and materials collected by the prosecution. Thus, the findings suffer from perversity and illegality which can be very well set aside by this Court while exercising power under 386 of the Cr.P.C. 36. The learned Trial Court while disbelieving the statement has recorded its finding in para 38 that all the accused have made forged payment to labours without recording any finding against the appellant how he is responsible for payment to the labours. Learned Trial Court has recorded its finding in paragraph 33 that no construction work has been carried out in Nayanar Stop Dam and relying upon the statement of the villagers and the workers deployed in the construction work and on the opinion of the Thumb Impression Expert he has recorded that the muster roll and maximum bills are forged. Learned Trial Court has recorded its finding in paragraph 33 that no construction work has been carried out in Nayanar Stop Dam and relying upon the statement of the villagers and the workers deployed in the construction work and on the opinion of the Thumb Impression Expert he has recorded that the muster roll and maximum bills are forged. The SDO (present appellant) and the Executive Engineer with mala-fide intention has caused loss to the Government and got personal and illegal gain though the trial Court has recorded its finding that construction was carried out from February, 1994 to April, 1995 and the inspection of spot was done after three years, but has not considered the statement of Motisingh Maskole who has admitted in cross-examination that construction place after two to three rains was inspected. After two to three rainy seasons, construction work disappeared. He has also stated that the plinth which was dug out was filled back after one season. Despite this clinching evidence in favour of the appellant, the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant for the said charges. 37. The appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has stated that he has not forged any document and has not committed any offence and denied the questionnaire. The defence witness K.R. Shastri who was working as Sub-engineer in the department has stated that the labours have to be identified by the Sub-Engineer and the responsibility of SDO is to the extent of 20% of the attendance only. The witness has specifically asked by the prosecution whether the cost of the dam is five lakhs, whether two lakhs can be used for making approach road. He has stated that if the competent authority has granted permission to make approach road, then it can be done. The defence witness Laluram has stated the approach road was prepared, plinth was also dug out. The labours who have worked have been paid wages and rice. He has also stated that the labours were deployed by the Sub-Engineer Tomar. In the cross-examination he has stated that in the year 1994-1995 the stop dam was constructed. At the time of digging out the plinth, diesel pump was used which was done by Balsingh and Pushuram Netam of Bhandarapanchi. He has also stated that the labours were deployed by the Sub-Engineer Tomar. In the cross-examination he has stated that in the year 1994-1995 the stop dam was constructed. At the time of digging out the plinth, diesel pump was used which was done by Balsingh and Pushuram Netam of Bhandarapanchi. He has denied that in place of Balsingh and Pusuram the Sub-Engineer has written name of the Girsingh of the village Bhandarvadi and Punnuram. The learned trial Court has not taken into consideration the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and witness examined by him under significance has been considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jai Prakash Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2022 SC 3601 has highlighted the aims and objects of Section 313 Cr.P.C. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “20. This Court in the case of Satbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 , while emphasising upon the significance of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has delineated the duty of the trial Court and held thus: “22. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, trial courts record the statement of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defence. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the part of the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution. The court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defence, since the inception of the trial, with due caution.....” 30. Moreover, it is the solemn duty of the courts below to consider the defence of the accused. The same must be considered with caution and must be scrutinised by application of mind by the judge. The Court may accept or reject the same, however it cannot be done cursorily. The reasoning and the application of mind must be reflected in writing. The same must be considered with caution and must be scrutinised by application of mind by the judge. The Court may accept or reject the same, however it cannot be done cursorily. The reasoning and the application of mind must be reflected in writing. However, from the observations extracted above, it is clear that the courts below have failed to undertake this solemn duty. Rather, the evidence of the accused has been dealt by the Court in a casual manner.” 38. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Premchand vs. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 211 decided on 03.03.2023 has considered objects of Section 313 Cr.P.C. and held in paragraphs 13 to 15 as under: “13. There is a plethora of judicial pronouncements on consideration of section 313, Cr.P.C. a few of which need to be noted at this stage. 14. A bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Lakhmi has extensively dealt with the aspect of value or utility of a statement under section 313, Cr.P.C. The object of section 313, Cr.P.C. was explained by this Court in Sanatan Naskar vs. State of West Bengal. The rationale behind the requirement to comply with section 313, Cr.P.C. was adverted to by this Court in Reena Hazarika vs. State of Assam. Close on the heels thereof, in Parminder Kaur vs. State of Punjab, this Court restated the importance of section 313, Cr.P.C. upon noticing the view taken in Reena Hazarika (supra) and M. Abbas vs. State of Kerala. 15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus: (a) section 313, Cr.P.C. [clause (b) of sub-section 1] is a valuable safeguard in the trial process for the accused to establish his innocence. (b) section 313, which is intended to ensure a direct dialogue between the court and the accused, casts a mandatory duty on the court to question the accused generally on the case for the purpose of enabling him to personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. (c) when questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court. (d) the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognized defences. (c) when questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court. (d) the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognized defences. (e) an accused can make a statement without fear of being cross-examined by the prosecution or the latter having any right to cross-examine him. (f) the explanations that an accused may furnish cannot be considered in isolation but has to be considered in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, therefore, no conviction can be premised solely on the basis of the section 313 statements. (g) statements of the accused in course of examination under section 313, since not on oath, do not constitute evidence under section 3 of the Evidence Act, yet, the answers given are relevant for finding the truth and examining the veracity of the prosecution case. (h) statement(s) of the accused cannot be dissected to rely on the inculpatory part and ignore the exculpatory part and has/have to be read in the whole, inter alia, to test the authenticity of the exculpatory nature of admission; and i. if the accused takes a defence and proffers any alternate version of events or interpretation, the court has to carefully analyze and consider his statements. (j) any failure to consider the accused explanation of incriminating circumstances, in a given case, may vitiate the trial and/or endanger the conviction. 16. Bearing the above well-settled principles in mind, every criminal court proceeding under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 313 has to shoulder the onerous responsibility of scanning the evidence after the prosecution closes its case, to trace the incriminating circumstances in the evidence against the accused and to prepare relevant questions to extend opportunity to the accused to explain any such circumstance in the evidence that could be used against him. Prior to the amendment of section 313 in 2009, the courts alone had to perform this task. Instances of interference with convictions by courts of appeal on the ground of failure of the trial court to frame relevant questions and to put the same to the accused were not rare. Prior to the amendment of section 313 in 2009, the courts alone had to perform this task. Instances of interference with convictions by courts of appeal on the ground of failure of the trial court to frame relevant questions and to put the same to the accused were not rare. For toning up the criminal justice system and ensuring a fair and speedy trial, with emphasis on cutting down delays, the Parliament amended section 313 in 2009 and inserted subsection (5), thereby enabling the court to take the assistance of the Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing such questions [the first part of sub-section (5)]. Ideally, with such assistance (which has to be real and not sham to make the effort effective and meaningful), one would tend to believe that the courts probably are now better equipped to diligently prepare the relevant questions, lest there be any infirmity. However, judicial experience has shown that more often than not, the time and effort behind such an exercise put in by the trial court does not achieve the desired result. This is because either the accused elects to come forward with evasive denials or answers questions with stereotypes like “false, I don’t know, incorrect” etc. Many a time, this does more harm than good to the cause of the accused. For instance, if facts within the special knowledge of the accused are not satisfactorily explained, that could be a factor against the accused. Though such factor by itself is not conclusive of guilt, it becomes relevant while considering the totality of the circumstances. A proper explanation of one’s conduct or a version different from the prosecution version, without being obliged to face cross- examination, could provide the necessary hint or clue for the court to have a different perspective and solve the problem before it. The exercise under section 313 instead of being ritualistic ought to be realistic in the sense that it should be the means for securing the ends of justice; instead of an aimless effort, the means towards the end should be purposeful. The exercise under section 313 instead of being ritualistic ought to be realistic in the sense that it should be the means for securing the ends of justice; instead of an aimless effort, the means towards the end should be purposeful. Indeed, it is optional for the accused to explain the circumstances put to him under section 313, but the safeguard provided by it and the valuable right that it envisions, if availed of or exercised, could prove decisive and have an effect on the final outcome, which would in effect promote utility of the exercise rather than its futility.” 39. Thus from appreciation of the evidence, material on record and considering the law on the subject it is held that prosecution has failed to prove the commission of offence by appellant under Section 13(1)(C) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt, as such the judgment dated 03.09.2002 passed by the Special Judge and First Additional Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur, District-Bastar (C.G.) convicting the appellant deserves to be set aside so far as the present appellant is concerned and is set aside, accordingly appellant is acquitted from the charges leveled against him . 40. Accordingly the instant appeal is allowed. 41. It is reported that the appellant is on bail, the bail bond of the appellant shall remain in force for six months as per the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. The fine amount, if any, paid be returned to the appellant forthwith.