JUDGMENT : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J. 1. The appellant is the respondent-wife in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 on the file of the Family Court, Pathanamthitta, which was one filed by the respondent herein-husband, seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. In that original petition, the appellant was set ex-parte and an ex-parte decree was also passed on 07.02.2020. Seeking an order to set aside that ex-parte decree, the appellant filed R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) on 23.12.2021, which was accompanied by I.A. No. 1 of 2021 for condonation of delay of 654 days. The respondent entered appearance and filed counter, opposing the reliefs sought for in those petitions. On the side of the appellant, PWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Ext.A1 was marked. On the side of the respondent, RW-1 was examined and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. 2. After considering the rival contentions, the Family Court by the order dated 19.01.2023 dismissed I.A. No. 1 of 2021 on the ground that the appellant has willfully abstained from contesting the original petition for dissolution of marriage for a long period of 2 years. As an afterthought, the appellant filed the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree. The appellant’s father accepted notice and intimated the same to her. Admittedly, the appellant was having knowledge about the proceedings. Even then she has not taken any steps to contest the matter. Only when the appellant got information about the marriage of the respondent-husband, she filed the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree only to harass the respondent. If the petition is allowed, after a long period of delay, without sufficient cause, it will cause prejudice to the respondent. In view of the dismissal of I.A. No. 1 of 2021, the application for condonation of delay of 654 days, the Family Court by the order dated 19.01.2023 dismissed R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021), the application to set aside the ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-wife is before this Court in this appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 3. On 13.03.2023, when this appeal came up for admission, the respondent-husband entered appearance through counsel and sought time to file vakalat. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant-wife is before this Court in this appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 3. On 13.03.2023, when this appeal came up for admission, the respondent-husband entered appearance through counsel and sought time to file vakalat. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-wife and the learned counsel for the respondent-husband. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant-wife, relying on the orders of the Apex Court in Suo Motu W.P. (C) No. 3 of 2020, would contend that, when the actual delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 is only 5 days, the Family Court committed a grave error in dismissing I.A. No. 1 of 2021, the application for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-husband would contend that the finding of the Family Court that, if the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree is allowed, after a long period of delay, without sufficient cause, it will cause prejudice to the respondent, warrants no interference in this appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court. The appellant-wife, who was having knowledge about the proceedings before the Family Court, has not taken any steps to contest the matter. 7. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for setting aside ex-parte decree against defendant. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 13, in any case in which a decree is passed ex-parte against a defendant, he may apply to the court which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. As per the first proviso to sub-rule (1), where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also. As per the first proviso to sub-rule (1), where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also. As per the second proviso to sub-rule (1), no court shall set aside a decree passed ex-parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim. As per the Explanation, where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex-parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside that ex-parte decree. 8. In G.P. Srivastava vs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54 in the context of an application filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, for setting aside an ex-parte decree, the Apex Court held that the word ‘was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing’ occurring in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties, particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 9. In G.P. Srivastava (2000) 3 SCC 54 , the Apex Court held further that, ‘sufficient cause’ for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex-parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If ‘sufficient cause’ is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex-parte proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. If ‘sufficient cause’ is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex-parte proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where defendant approaches the court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits. 10. In Peeves Enterprises vs. Muhammed Ashraf, 2015 (3) KHC 981 , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in G.P. Srivastava (2000) 3 SCC 54 , a Division Bench of this Court held that, on an application filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court has to find out whether the erring party has made out sufficient cause for setting aside the ex-parte decree. When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party and the absence was not mala fide or intentional, the discretion has to be exercised in his favour, especially when the application is within the statutory time limit. In appropriate cases, the plaintiff can be compensated by adequate costs for the loss of time and the inconvenience caused to him. But any such condition shall not be too onerous. 11. The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted by the Parliament to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. Section 5 of the Act deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As per Explanation to Section 5, the fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section. 12. As per Explanation to Section 5, the fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section. 12. It is well settled that the Law of Limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that the parties to a litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy without delay. In an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court has to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay is one of the guiding principles, but such liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to approach the court-at-will disregarding the time limit fixed by the relevant statute. The acts of negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay, sufficient cause is required to be shown, thereby explaining the sequence of events and the circumstances that led to the delay. 13. In Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , in the context of Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court held that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. 14. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 the Apex Court while summerising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay held that, the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The Apex Court held further that, there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 15. The Apex Court held further that, there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 15. In Esha Bhattacharjee (2013) 12 SCC 649 , after summerising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the Apex Court added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, that an application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 16. In Rafeek and Another vs. K. Kamarudeen and Another, 2021 (4) KHC 34 : (2021) 2 RCR (Rent) 223 : 2021 AIR CC 2752 a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.] was a party held that, though the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, as held by the Apex Court in Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play, as held by the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (2013) 12 SCC 649 . Inordinate delay, which attracts doctrine of prejudice, warrants strict approach, whereas, a delay of short duration or few days, which may not attract doctrine of prejudice, calls for a liberal delineation. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and no court shall deal with such an application in a routine manner. 17. Inordinate delay, which attracts doctrine of prejudice, warrants strict approach, whereas, a delay of short duration or few days, which may not attract doctrine of prejudice, calls for a liberal delineation. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and no court shall deal with such an application in a routine manner. 17. In March 2020, the Apex Court took suo motu cognizance of the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other quasijudicial proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. On 23.03.2020, the Apex Court directed - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2020) 19 SCC 10 extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before courts/tribunals including the Apex Court with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. In the said order it was made clear that the Apex Court is exercising its power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities. On 08.03.2021 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2021) 5 SCC 452 , the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. While doing so, the Apex Court made it clear that the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021. By the order dated 27.04.2021 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: 2021 (3) KHC 122 the Apex Court restored the order dated 23.03.2020 and in continuation of the order dated 08.03.2021 directed that the period of limitation, as prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended till further orders. It was further clarified that the period from 14.03.2021 till further orders shall also stand excluded in computing the period prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. Thereafter, due to a second surge in Covid-19 cases, vide order dated 23.09.2021 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: 2021 (5) KHC 508 : 2021 SCC Online SC 947 the Apex Court extended the period of limitation in all proceedings before the courts/tribunals including the Apex Court with effect from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021. 18. Later, by the order dated 10.01.2022 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2022) 3 SCC 117 the Apex Court restored the order dated 23.03.2020 (2020) 19 SCC 10 and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021 (2021) 5 SCC 452 , 27.04.2021 (2021) 3 KHC 122 and 23.09.2021 2021 (5) KHC 508 : 2021 SCC Online SC 947, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. The Apex Court further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 19. In the instant case, the appellant-wife was set ex-parte and the Family Court passed an ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 on 07.02.2020. Seeking an order to set aside that ex-parte decree, the appellant filed R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) before the Family Court on 23.12.2021. 19. In the instant case, the appellant-wife was set ex-parte and the Family Court passed an ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 on 07.02.2020. Seeking an order to set aside that ex-parte decree, the appellant filed R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) before the Family Court on 23.12.2021. In view of the order of the Apex Court dated 10.01.2022 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2022) 3 SCC 117 , whereby the order dated 23.03.2020 [ (2020) 19 SCC 10 ] stands restored and the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 stands excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021 (2021) 5 SCC 452 , 27.04.2021 (2021) 3 KHC 122 and 23.09.2021 2021 (5) KHC 508 : 2021 SCC Online SC 947, R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) filed by the appellant-wife on 23.12.2021, to set aside that ex-parte decree dated 07.02.2020 in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019, has to be treated as one filed with a delay of 7 days. 20. The respondent-husband filed O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 before the Family Court, Pathanamthitta, on 14.10.2019. On 06.12.2019, the case was posted before the Family Court for the appearance of the appellant-wife. The appellant, who was examined as PW-1, has deposed that she, who gave birth to a child on 18.02.2019, has gone to Bangalore in November, 2019 for competing her BDS course and she returned only in November, 2021. In her absence, notice in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 was received by her father. 21. The appellant, who was examined as PW-1, has deposed that she, who gave birth to a child on 18.02.2019, has gone to Bangalore in November, 2019 for competing her BDS course and she returned only in November, 2021. In her absence, notice in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 was received by her father. 21. In view of the law laid down in G.P. Srivastava (2000) 3 SCC 54 and Peeves Enterprises 2015 (3) KHC 981 , when no negligence or inaction can be imputable to the appellant-wife, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and her absence on 07.02.2020 cannot be said to be mala fide or intentional, the discretion has to be exercised in her favour, especially when the delay in filing the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only 7 days, in view of the order of the Apex Court dated 10.01.2022 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2022) 3 SCC 117 , which provides for the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. 22. The orders referred to hereinbefore at paragraphs 17 and 18 are issued by the Apex Court in exercise of the powers under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India, are binding orders within the meaning of Article 141 on all courts/tribunals and authorities. Instead of deciding the issue in the light of the order of the Apex Court dated 10.01.2022 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2022) 3 SCC 117 , the Family Court proceeded with the matter as if there is a delay of 654 days in filing R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021), the application filed by the appellant-wife to set aside the ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019. The reasoning of the Family Court that, if the petition filed to set aside the ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 is allowed, after a long period of delay, without sufficient cause, it will cause prejudice to the respondent-husband, is perverse and patently illegal, which warrants interference in this appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 23. 23. In the result, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the orders dated 07.02.2020 of the Family Court, Pathanamthitta in R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 and I.A. No. 2 of 2021 in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019. Consequently, R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) will stand allowed by restoring to file O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019. Since R.P. No. 8 of 2021 (I.A. No. 2 of 2021) filed to set aside the ex-parte decree in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 is one filed within the period of limitation, in view of the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for the purpose of limitation, vide the order of the Apex Court dated 10.01.2022 - Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re: (2022) 3 SCC 117 , I.A. No. 1 of 2021 in O.P. (HMA) No. 1087 of 2019 is closed. 24. Since the original petition is of the year 2019, the Family Court is directed to dispose of the same, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment