JUDGMENT : 1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.12.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Gandhidham at Kutch (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court) in Special Atrocity Case No.39 of 2008, whereby the accused – respondent herein came to be acquitted from the charge of the offences punishable under Sections 354, 452, 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”) and under Sections 3(1)(11) of the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989, the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred present criminal appeal under Section 378(1) (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”). 2. Briefly stated that on 30.04.2008, while the complainant was alone in her house and doing household work at that time accused had illegally entered into the house at about 2:30 in the afternoon and as she was going back side, accused suddenly caught hold her wrist. However, she tried to shout, but with another hand, accused had pressed her mouth and thereafter complainant had escaped from the accused but again the accused had caught hold her right hand wherein right hand side blouse was torn and as the husband of the complainant came there, accused had run away from the place. 3. On completion of the investigation, investigating agency recorded statements of the prosecution witnesses, drawn panchanama and collected relevant expert evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. After having found sufficient material against the respondent herein for the aforesaid offence, charge-sheet came to be filed in the concerned Court of JMFC. Since the case was exclusively triable by Sessions Court, concerned JMFC committed the case to the Sessions Court as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused - respondent herein for the aforesaid offence. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 9 prosecution witnesses and also produced documentary evidence before the learned trial Court 6. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial Court recorded further statements of respondent as provided under Section 313 of the Code, wherein, the respondent herein denied his involvement in the offence and stated that false case has been filed against him. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial Court recorded further statements of respondent as provided under Section 313 of the Code, wherein, the respondent herein denied his involvement in the offence and stated that false case has been filed against him. After hearing both the sides and after appreciating evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial Court acquitted the respondent herein from the charge of offence under Sections 354, 452, 504 and 506(2) of the IPC and under Sections 3(1)(11) of the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989. 7. Heard Mr.R. C. Kodekar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat and Mr.A. R. Thacker, learned advocate for the respondent – accused and minutely examined the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced before the Trial Court discussed at great length in the impugned judgment and order itself. 8. Mr.Kodekar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat has submitted that the Trial Court ought to have considered evidence of Prosecution Witness No.5 Smt. Naynaben w/o Sanjaybhai Naik, complainant, who has been examined at Exh.37. Witness has deposed in her testimony that while she was in her home in the noon hours, the accused suddenly came into her house and while she was going back of the house, accused had attacked on her wherein she tried to escape but accused caught hold her hand and thereby torn her blouse. Thereafter, accused again tried to catch her but as the husband of the complainant came, accused had run away from back side of the house. Witness has identified the torn blouse before the Court which was recovered. Witness has been cross-examined by the other side but nothing adverse which would render her deposition doubtful has come on record. He also submitted that the Trial Court ought to have considered the evidence of Prosecution Witness No.6- Brijesh Popatlal Naik, husband of the complainant, who has been examined at Exh.25. Witness has deposed in his testimony about the concerned of incident wherein involvement of the accused is clearly established as well as the evidence of this witness is clearly corroborated with the evidence of the complainant. Witness has been cross-examined by the other side but nothing adverse which would render her deposition doubtful has come on record. Witness has deposed in his testimony about the concerned of incident wherein involvement of the accused is clearly established as well as the evidence of this witness is clearly corroborated with the evidence of the complainant. Witness has been cross-examined by the other side but nothing adverse which would render her deposition doubtful has come on record. Therefore, the Trial Court has committed an error while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, there was a motive with regard to the earlier incident took place between the two families which is on record, however, the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence with regard to the motive. He has also submitted that the prosecution has produced necessary documentary evidence before the Trial Court, but the same is not considered by the Trial Court and has committed an error while appreciating the corroborative piece of evidence. He has urged to hold the accused guilty and convict him for the alleged offence. He has prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 9. Per contra, Mr.Thacker, learned advocate for the respondent has pointed out that the prosecution has failed to establish the motive as alleged by the complainant and there was no cogent and material evidence with regard to the motive as alleged and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly discarded the evidence of the complainant. He has submitted that there was delay in lodging the complaint and the same was registered after 15 days of the alleged incident and no sufficient explanation was given by the complainant for delay occurred in registration of FIR. He also submitted that the Investigating Officer P.W. No.9 was examined at Exh.52 and in his crossexamination he has admitted that he has not collected any evidence with regard to earlier complaint filed by the complainant against the respondent accused and no evidence is produced by the complainant about earlier alleged incident took place on 30.04.2008 and there is nothing on the record regarding pending proceedings about such complaint. It has been observed by the learned Trial Court that ingredients of alleged offence are not fulfilled and proved by the prosecution and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned order of acquittal. It has been observed by the learned Trial Court that ingredients of alleged offence are not fulfilled and proved by the prosecution and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned order of acquittal. He has also submitted that the Trial Court has rightly disbelieved and discarded the evidence of the witnesses. He has submitted that the appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court may be confirmed. 10. While appreciating the submissions made at the Bar, this Court has carefully examined the depositions of the witnesses namely complainant Naynaben Brijeshbhai Nayak, P.W. 5 at Exh.37, Chanchalben Popatbhai Parmar, P. W. 8 at Exh.50, husband of complainant Brijeshbhai Popatbhai Nayak, P.W. 4 at Exh.25, Investigating Officer- Mahipatsinh Lakhubha Jadeja, P.W.6 at Exh.45. The evidence of these witnesses are contradictory to each other. So far as the case put forward by the prosecution with regard to the motive is concerned, the same is destroyed by the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. It appears that both the families are neighbours and they were having cordial relations in past. It also appears that there were cross complaints between the family in the past. It also appears that the complaint was given after a delay of 15 days as observed by the learned Trial Court which is an afterthought. It also appears that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. From bare perusal of the evidence, it also reveals that the complainant did not say anything before the police, when they were called by the Adipur Police Station and she has also not mention a word about any humiliation made by the present respondent-accused. According to the version of the witnesses, the prosecution is unable to establish the case against the accused. Thus, though in the evidence of prosecution witnesses there is lot of inconsistency in their depositions and the version of complainant-Naynaben, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge levelled against the accused person and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly discussed the evidence in detailed and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. On re-assessment and re-appreciation of entire evidence by this Court, this Court does not find that there is any infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court. On re-assessment and re-appreciation of entire evidence by this Court, this Court does not find that there is any infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court. Under the circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and this Court also endorses the view/finding of the Trial Court leading to the acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP has not been able to point out to this Court as to how the findings recorded by the Trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 12. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280 , Supreme Court has held as under: “The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal." 13. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal." 13. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 14. The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , reads as under:- “The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 15. It would be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs No.151, 153 and 165 as under:- “151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this where various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court. 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade V/s. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri.) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 165. So far as this matter is concerned, in such cases the Court must carefully scan the evidence and determine the four important circumstances which alone can justify a conviction : (1) there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased. (2) that the deceased died of poison said to have been administered. (3) that the accused had the poison in his possession. (4) that he had an opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased.” 16. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present criminal appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and it is according dismissed. 17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present criminal appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and it is according dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.12.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Gandhidham at Kutch in Special Atrocity Case No.39 of 2008 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Registry is directed to transmit back the record and proceedings of the case to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.