ORDER : 1. Although, prayer in the writ petition is also made to quash and set aside the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 04.01.2023; but, at the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner confines his challenge in the writ petition to the legality and validity of the order dated 04.01.2023 (Annexure-3) placing her under suspension as also the order dated even whereby, charge of post of Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti Sapotara, District Karauli, has been handed over to the Deputy Pradhan. 2. Before proceeding to decide the matter on merit, this Court deems it just and proper to decide the Application No. 1/2023 filed by the applicants, Ms. Rupanti, Ms. Samay Bai Meena, Ms. Rekha Bai Meena, S/Shri Purshottam Meena, Ganesh Meena and Ram Singh Gurjar, the elected Members of the various Wards of Panchayat Samiti Sapotara, District Karauli under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking their impleadment as respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that on account of dereliction in discharge of her duty by the petitioner, the entire development work of Panchayat Samiti Sapotara came to a standstill. He submits that the applicants are responsible and accountable to the voters of the area and have time and again represented to the authorities against the petitioner and hence, be impleaded as respondents. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is a lis between her and official respondents wherein, action of the respondents in placing her under suspension is subject-mater of challenge. He submits that the applicants are neither necessary nor proper party to the litigation and the application filed by them deserves to be dismissed. 5. It is trite law that in a lis in between an individual and official respondents, the stranger, even if the complainant, is neither necessary nor proper party. 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court of India has, in case of Mohd. 5. It is trite law that in a lis in between an individual and official respondents, the stranger, even if the complainant, is neither necessary nor proper party. 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court of India has, in case of Mohd. Hussain Gulam Ali Shariffi vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, 2016 SCC Online SC 1887, held as under: “It is a settled principle of law, which does not need any authority to support the principle, that the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be forced to add any person as party to his suit unless it is held keeping in view the pleadings and the relief claimed therein that a person sought to be added as party is a necessary party and without his presence neither the suit can proceed and nor the relief can be granted. It is only then such person can be allowed to become party, else the suit will have to be dismissed for non-impleadment of such necessary party. Such does not appear to be a case here. We do not find that the presence of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the facts of this case is required for deciding the legality of notice impugned in the suit on merits because the dispute centers around the question of legality and validity of the notice which, as mentioned above, arises between respondent No. 1, who has issued the notice and the person to whom it is given, i.e. appellant. In the suit in question, the Court is not called upon to adjudicate the rights between the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in relation to the suit house. Any such dispute, if arises, the same can be decided in the separate suit, which is pending between the parties or may be filed, if required, by the parties against each other but such dispute cannot be tried on the cause of action pleaded in the present suit by the appellant where the lis is essentially between the appellant (plaintiff) and respondent No. 1. Merely because the suit house is the subject matter between all the parties is no ground to get the dispute arising between the parties settled in one suit regardless of the nature of cause of action on which the suit is founded.” 7. Merely because the suit house is the subject matter between all the parties is no ground to get the dispute arising between the parties settled in one suit regardless of the nature of cause of action on which the suit is founded.” 7. A Division Bench of this Court has, in case of Surendra Kumar Garg and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, held as under: “(6) So far as the ground of locus-standi is concerned, it may be mentioned that once the complaint is made, the business of the complainant is over. He is no more person to make any interference as the complaint is the subject-matter of enquiry between the party concerned and the Government and no-one has a right to make an interference. The complainant is only an informer and the business has been completed by the appellants, while making complaint against the respondent No. 3 and they have no interest left in the matter to get acquaintance with the further development of the proceedings. Apart from that, the State Government has always inherent jurisdiction to revoke its earlier order in view of the subsequent events taking place in the matter. In this connection, reference of Bharat Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan and Others and Mahadev Prasad Yadav vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, may be made.” 8. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principle, this Court is not satisfied that impleadment of the applicants is necessary for just and effective disposal of the controversy involved in the matter. 9. In view thereof, the Application No. 1/2023 is dismissed. 10. The relevant facts in brief are that the petitioner was elected and appointed as Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti Sapotara, District Karauli on 23.12.2021. Levelling two charges, a charge-sheet dated 04.01.2023 was issued to her under Rule 22(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (for brevity “the Rules of 1996”). Vide order No. 46 dated even, she was placed under suspension under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1994”). Vide Letter No. 1753-60 dated even, her charge was handed over to the Deputy Pradhan with immediate effect. 11. Vide order No. 46 dated even, she was placed under suspension under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1994”). Vide Letter No. 1753-60 dated even, her charge was handed over to the Deputy Pradhan with immediate effect. 11. Assailing the order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that vide impugned order, she, an elected representative, has been placed under suspension in a mechanical manner merely because she has been served with a charge-sheet under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994 without recording any finding that her continuation in the office shall prejudice the pending enquiry or that it is reasonably impracticable to continue her in the office during pendency of the enquiry. He further submits that making similar allegations against the government officers of the Panchayat Samiti Sapotara, they have been issued charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short “the Rules of 1958”) and they have also not been placed under suspension. Drawing attention of this Court towards the note-sheets placed on record as Annexure-R/2 by the respondents along with their reply, learned counsel submits that after putting up the file before her for supply of the Digital Signature Certificate (for brevity “the DSC”) on 18.02.2022, the matter was brought before her after the lapse of about six months, i.e. on 10.08.2022. He submits that there is not a whisper of averment in the reply of the respondents as to why, if the matter was of such grave importance as contended, the file was not put up before her for supply of DSC for a period of six months. He submits that these circumstances are in themselves evident of the fact that the respondents have proceeded against her malafidely and on account of political vendetta as she has been elected as a Member/Pradhan from a party having ideology different from the ruling party in the State. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order dated 04.01.2023 placing her under suspension as also the order dated even giving charge of the Pradhan to the Deputy Pradhan be quashed and set aside. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order dated 04.01.2023 placing her under suspension as also the order dated even giving charge of the Pradhan to the Deputy Pradhan be quashed and set aside. He, in support of his submissions, relies upon judgments of this Court in cases of Naresh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9244/2022 dated 23.11.2022 and Soniya Soni vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6927/2022 dated 24.08.2022. 12. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General, would submit that on issuance of charge-sheet under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994, which contains, inter-alia, grave allegation against the petitioner of not providing her DSC which resulted into hampering of development work in the entire area of Panchayat Samiti Sapotara for a period of almost one year, invoking power under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, she has been placed under suspension. He submits that the reasons for suspending the petitioner are inherent in the note-sheets as also the communications related to the enquiry and suspension. He submits that although, initially, charge-sheets under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 were issued to the three officials of the Panchayat Samiti Sapotara; but, considering the gravity of conduct of these officials, an approval has been granted to convert the charge-sheets under Rule 17 of Rules of 1958 to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. Relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Meena vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 234, learned Additional Advocate General submits that no reason was required to be recorded in the order placing the petitioner under suspension if a charge-sheet under Section 38 (1) of the Act of 1994 was issued to her. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 13. Heard. Considered. 14. The order dated 04.01.2023 placing the petitioner under suspension provides that it is issued as a charge-sheet dated 04.01.2023 issued to her reflects that she has misconducted in discharge of her duties and is guilty of disgraceful conduct. It is trite law that an elected representative cannot be placed under suspension in a routine manner. 15. 13. Heard. Considered. 14. The order dated 04.01.2023 placing the petitioner under suspension provides that it is issued as a charge-sheet dated 04.01.2023 issued to her reflects that she has misconducted in discharge of her duties and is guilty of disgraceful conduct. It is trite law that an elected representative cannot be placed under suspension in a routine manner. 15. This Court has, after taking into consideration the precedential law in the cases of Pradeep Hinger vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, MANU/RH/0600/2007, Geeta Devi Narooka vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2008 (2) WLC (Raj.) 261 and Vimla Devi vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3279/2007 decided on 17.08.2007, held as under: “Thus, the principle which can be culled from the aforesaid judgments is that an elected member should not and cannot be placed under suspension in a routine manner and the Government must satisfy itself with regard to the fact that the charges are of grave nature and continuation of the incumbent on the elected post would seriously prejudice the judicial enquiry and it is, rather, reasonably impracticable to continue the elected representative in office during pendency of the enquiry.” 16. The order impugned dated 04.01.2023 fails to withstand the judicial scrutiny if tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid settled legal principle inasmuch as it does not reflect any reason for placing her under suspension except that she has been issued a charge-sheet dated 04.01.2023 under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994 which is an enabling provision. Since, the order impugned is bereft of any reason, this Court required the State Government to submit original record pertaining to suspension of the petitioner for its perusal. The original record also does not reflect any reason except that alongwith issuance of a charge-sheet under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994, it was decided to suspend her. 17. Since, the order impugned is bereft of any reason, this Court required the State Government to submit original record pertaining to suspension of the petitioner for its perusal. The original record also does not reflect any reason except that alongwith issuance of a charge-sheet under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994, it was decided to suspend her. 17. This Court also finds substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that while, the petitioner, an elected public representative having limited tenure, has been placed under suspension, the Government Officers, facing similar allegations, have neither been placed under suspension nor, charge-sheet has been issued to them under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 for levy of major penalty; rather, a charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 has been issued to them providing for minor penalty which reflects that the respondents have acted in colourable exercise of their power. 18. This Court has, in case of Pradeep Hinger (supra), held as under: “34. Therefore, until a persons is removed from office, he is entitled to continue to act and exercise all powers and perform all duties of a member. The exception to it has been given under Sub-Section (4) of Section 63 of the Act of 1959. The petitioner, after election as Member of the council and Chairman of the Municipal Council, is elected for a term and that he acquires right to continue and exercise all powers and perform all duties as Member/Chairman, still proviso has been appended under Sub-Section (1) of Section 63 of the Act of 1959. Exception to it is because of Sub-Section (4) of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. Because of this provision only, the elected member, before he is removed, cannot exercise his right as of Member/Chairman. The removal dis-entitles the elected Member from exercising his said right permanently and for ever, whereas suspension makes him disentitles such person from exercising his rights as such as elected Member or as Chairman as the case may be till his suspension is revoked or he is exonerated. The removal dis-entitles the elected Member from exercising his said right permanently and for ever, whereas suspension makes him disentitles such person from exercising his rights as such as elected Member or as Chairman as the case may be till his suspension is revoked or he is exonerated. It is true that the suspension is not punishment but the consequence of suspension of an elected Member during enquiry, also cannot be taken either in the light manner or in routine manner as that is against the democratic governance policy established by the Constitution of India which gives status and recognition of elected member who are elected by the majority of votes of public. This proposition that the suspension order cannot be passed lightly or in routine manner or in mere consequence of State Government's decision to hold enquiry under Section 63(2) has its own purpose. Therefore, it must come out from the record that the presence of the said suspended Member will affect the enquiry or will prejudice the enquiry, as held in the judgments referred above. 35. It will be further beneficial to look into the reasons given by the Division Bench of This Court in the case of Sohan Lal Mareja vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 626/2004 dated 18.1.2005. The Division Bench of this Court after considering the seriousness and gravity in the order suspending a Member/Chairman of the Municipal Council, clearly held as under: Thus wholesome reading of Sub-Section (1) read with Sub-Section (2) prima facie suggests that ordinarily temporary removal from the office is not contemplated as a matter of course by resorting to Sub-Section (4) simply on subjective satisfaction of the State about holding an enquiry into facts which may lead to removal of members under Sub-Section (1) of Section 63, or on mere commencement or proceedings contemplated under proviso to Sub-Section (1). 38. 38. This Court also take guidance from the Division Bench judgment delivered in the case of Sohan Lal Mareja (supra) as well as the judgments referred above relied upon by both the parties and on facts, this Court is of the view that the suspension order may not be the punishment and may not have civil and evil consequences but still it denies an elected Member from discharging his duties as well as deprives him from his right to hold the post and, therefore, the suspension order cannot be made merely in consequence of decision to hold an enquiry under Sub-Section (2) of Section 63 and/or in routine manner. 39. Coupled with above proposition, the balance is required to be there so as to give due respect to the wish of the public who elected the person to hold the post as of Member or as for the post for which the person is directly elected by the majority of votes of the electoral and for the persons who are elected indirectly to the post by the elected member from public in election. From above proposition, this will be reasonable and just interpretation of Sub-Section (4) of Section 63 that the elected Member cannot be deprived from discharging his duties and exercising his rights till he holds the majority of votes in his favour as well as public faith, is an important right of not only elected candidate but also a right of public to have governance of and from man of their choice. The elected Member can be removed from the post of Chairman when he looses confidence of the public/body concerned. The suspension of chair person should not be substitute of desperate effort of some one who cannot remove the elected person by no confidence motion. (Of course there may be mere chances that even a corrupt person may not be removed because of majority of Members of his political party and/or due to lack of commitment to fairness in public life) When the order of suspension is under challenge, the court is required to keep all these principles of law laid down in mind to decide whether the action of the State suspending a Member of the Municipal Council exercising power under sub-section (4) of Section 63, there were reasons to show that the action is not arbitrary.” 19. In view thereof, the order dated 04.01.2023 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 20. True, the respondents have decided to convert charge-sheets of the three Government Officers from Rule 17 to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958; but, the manner in which the decision has been taken again smells of lack of bona-fide. Charge-sheets to the co-delinquents under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 were issued vide memorandum dated 16.11.2022. The instant writ petition was filed on 07.01.2023. During the course of hearing, when a specific contention in this regard was raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents have initiated an action on 20.01.2023 to convert the charge-sheets issued under Rule 17 to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 as is reflected from the Annexure-AA7 placed on record by the respondents alongwith their additional affidavit dated 27.01.2023. Obviously, it is an attempt by the respondents to cover up the issue raised by the petitioner during pendency of the writ petition. This Court has, in case of Naresh Kumar (supra), held as under: “12. The another aspect of the matter, which is in the form of subsequent development, taking approval from the Minister-In-Charge at Note No. 72 which is with regard to earlier Note No. 44, the same on the face of record depicts that it has been done just to save their skin by the respondents and to frustrate the filing of the present writ petition and also to give legs to their earlier baseless violative action of passing of the order dated 17.06.2022 and such practice of manipulation cannot be appreciated by this Court of playing with the proceedings of the Court.” 21. Therefore, the respondents cannot be permitted to take benefit of their subsequent decision taken during pendency of the writ petition to convert the charge-sheets issued to the three Government Officers to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. 22. Therefore, the respondents cannot be permitted to take benefit of their subsequent decision taken during pendency of the writ petition to convert the charge-sheets issued to the three Government Officers to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. 22. Since, the charge-sheet dated 04.01.2023 has not been assailed by the petitioner, this Court refrains itself from making any comment upon its validity; but, as is evident from the note-sheets placed on record as Annexure R-2 by the respondents alongwith their reply, for the first time, the file was put up before the petitioner for supply of DSC on 18.02.2022 and thereafter, after sitting tight over the file for a period of about 6 months, it was put up before her again only on 10.08.2022. This fact also reflects upon the manner in which the respondents have proceeded in the matter and the petitioner has been put to hostile discrimination qua the government officers. 23. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Meena (supra) is of no assistance to the respondents having been rendered in entirely different facts and circumstances. Although, that case also involved suspension of an elected Member under Section 38 (4) of the Act of 1994; but, a perusal of the judgment reveals that assailing the order of suspension, contention of the appellant was that his suspension was based on a criminal case and not on the basis of the enquiry conducted under Section 38 (1) of the Act of 1994. This gains strength from the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that ratio of judgment in case of Ajeet Singh and Another vs. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government and Another, (2009) 16 SCC 308 to be inapplicable, which involved interpretation of Section 51(1)(a) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 which permits suspension of a Sarpanch in case where any criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial. In case of Sardar Meena, the Hon’ble Apex Court of India did not examine validity of the suspension order qua aspect it being bereft of any reason except issuance of a charge-sheet. It is trite law that the judgments of the Courts cannot be applied as Euclid’s formula and have to be read in the context they were rendered. 24. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 25. It is trite law that the judgments of the Courts cannot be applied as Euclid’s formula and have to be read in the context they were rendered. 24. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 25. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. The order no. 46 dated 04.01.2023 placing the petitioner under suspension as also the order No. 1753-60 dated even handing over charge of the Pradhan to Deputy Pradhan are quashed and set aside. Consequences to follow. 26. At this stage, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Meena (supra), directed the respondents for conclusion of the proceedings expeditiously and prays for similar direction. 27. Although, the prayer is not opposed by the learned counsel for the petitioner; but, it lies in the realm of the respondents to conduct the enquiry as early as possible for which no direction from this Court is required. However, learned counsel for the petitioner extends his assurance that she will cooperate in early disposal of the enquiry.