JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. These Letters Patent Appeals arise from a common order dated 23rd April 2012 by which WP(C) Nos. 1981 of 2003 and 6816 of 2005 filed by M/s Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited (in short, Tata Steel) have been dismissed. 2. In WP(C) No. 1981 of 2003, the Tata Steel has challenged the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum under section 90 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (in short, Tenancy Act). This order was passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer on the application of Alomoni Kamarin who is daughter-in-law of the recorded raiyat, for correction in the record of rights in respect of 5.26 acres of land comprised in RS Plot Nos. 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570 and 1572 of Khata No. 40 within Mouza Khuntadih (hereinafter referred to as “subject-property”). After this order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the Government of Jharkhand has issued series of orders contained in the letters dated 5th September 2005, 27th October 2005 and 10th November 2005 for release of the subject-property in favor of Alomoni Kamarin and her daughter Baisali Kamarin. All these communications and the General Notice dated 19th November 2005 inviting objection(s) to release of the subject-property in their favor were put to challenge by the Tata Steel by filing WP(C) No. 6816 of 2005. 3. More precisely, the Tata Steel has made the following prayer in WP(C) No. 1981 of 2003: “That this is a writ application for quashing the order dated 5.8.2002 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum East, respondent no. 5 in case no. 264 of 2001-2002 in the purported exercise of power under section 90 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, contained in annexure 7 to this writ application whereby and whereunder the Assistant Settlement Officer, Jamshedpur has passed order in favour of respondent no. 6 Alomoni Kumarin holding inter alia that old plot nos. 1566, 1567, 1569, 1570 and 1572 of old Khata no. 40 and plot no. 1517 of old khata no. 13 portion of which have been recorded under new plot no. 6048 of new khata no. 622 area 227.00 hectars situated at village Khutadih, PS Bistupur, District Singhbhum East within ward no. 1566, 1567, 1569, 1570 and 1572 of old Khata no. 40 and plot no. 1517 of old khata no. 13 portion of which have been recorded under new plot no. 6048 of new khata no. 622 area 227.00 hectars situated at village Khutadih, PS Bistupur, District Singhbhum East within ward no. 1 of Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee which have been recorded in the current survey record of right in the name of Anabad Bihar Sarkar and possession of the petitioner has been shown as lessee in column no. 6 of the record of right actually belong to the respondent no. 6 and the entire proceeding under sections 83 and 89 of the CNT Act and orders passed there in have been made by keeping the respondent no. 6 in dark.” 4. In WP(C) No. 6816 of 2005, the Tata Steel has sought the following reliefs: “That in the instant writ application the petitioner prays for quashing the Letter/Order No. 305/Ra, dated 5.9.2005 from the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand to the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum East, (Annexure : 1) and Letter No. 5/Sa. Bhu.Pu. Singh-54/05-3553/Ra, dated 27.10.2005 (Annexure : 2) from the Deputy Secretary, Department Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand to the Deputy Commissioner, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum and Letter no. 5/Sa. Bhu.Pu. Singh-54/05-3650/Ra, dated 10.11.2005 (Annexure : 3), and the General Notice dt. 19.11.2005 (Annex 4) issued by the Circle Officer Respondent No. 4 whereby and whereunder the respondent authorities of the State are bent upon releasing the RS Plot Nos. 5/Sa. Bhu.Pu. Singh-54/05-3650/Ra, dated 10.11.2005 (Annexure : 3), and the General Notice dt. 19.11.2005 (Annex 4) issued by the Circle Officer Respondent No. 4 whereby and whereunder the respondent authorities of the State are bent upon releasing the RS Plot Nos. 1566, 1567, 16\568, 1569, 1570, 1572, Khata No. 40 in Mauza Khuntadih measuring an area of 5.26 acres, which stand statutorily leased to the Petitioner, treating the said land to the raiyati land and allotting the same in favour of the Respondents No. 6&7, although the said plots of land are no more raiyati lands as decided by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in the judgment reported in 1986 BLT (Rep.) 220 (Pat.) (Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar) and also in utter disregard and violation of the terms of statutory lease, renewed by Indenture dated 20.08.2005 by the State of Jharkhand in favour of the Petitioner Company w.e.f. 1.1.1996 for a period of 30 years, where under the said plots of land stand recorded under Appendix : D (consisting of sub-leased land) to the Indenture of lease aforesaid in favour of the Company, as New Plot No. 6048 under ward No. 1JNAC. For Prohibiting and Restraining the Respondents 1 to 4 from acting in any manner and or from passing any orders pursuant to the decision of the State Government as contained in the letters orders in Annexures 1, 2, 3 and the General Notice dated 19.11.05 Annex.4 Pass such order or orders restraining the Respondents 1 to 4 from giving effect to and or acting in any manner in releasing or allotting the plots in question to the Respondents 6 and or 7 during the pendency of this writ petition.” 5. Briefly stated, the Tata Steel has pleaded that the lands comprised within eight villages of Jamshedpur admeasuring about 15,725 acres were acquired by the Provincial Government and conveyed to the Tata Steel through registered deeds dated 19th January 1912 and 23rd March 1929. According to the Tata Steel, the subject-property which was recorded in the name of Bengal Kumhar in the revisional survey settlement operations during 1934-1937 is part of the acquired lands comprised in the aforesaid deeds of conveyance. According to the Tata Steel, the subject-property which was recorded in the name of Bengal Kumhar in the revisional survey settlement operations during 1934-1937 is part of the acquired lands comprised in the aforesaid deeds of conveyance. Later on, the Tata Steel filed a petition under section 50 of the Tenancy Act for acquisition of the subject-property from Bengal Kumhar and an order for restoration of the said property was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum at Chaibasa, pursuant thereof the delivery of possession of the subject-property was affected through the Bailiff of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner. 6. On coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short, BLR Act), a proceeding for fixation of fair and equitable rent was initiated by the State of Bihar under sections 5, 6 and 7 of the said Act which was registered as Misc. Case No. 223 of 1965-66. In the said proceeding, the Tata Steel which was opposite party no. 1 set-up a plea that it was not liable to pay any rent in view of the exemption under section 2B of the BLR Act which provided that the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purposes of any industrial undertaking shall be excluded, except to such portion thereof as was in possession of a tenant who had acquired right of occupancy in accordance with the tenancy law of the area - later on, section 2B was omitted. The Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by an order dated 30th August 1966 determined fair and equitable rent for the subject-property to be paid by the Tata Steel. However, this order has been set-aside in Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 106 of 1966-67 by the appellate Authority by an order dated 18th September 1969. Subsequent thereto, Bachhu Kamar who is the son of late Bengal Kumhar filed an application vide Revenue Misc. Case No. 4 of 1970-71 for fixation of rent of the subject-property under sections 5, 6 and 7 of the BLR Act. This application was disposed of by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by an order dated 31st July 1971 holding that rent for the subject-property can be realised from him. The appeal preferred by the Tata Steel vide Revenue Misc. This application was disposed of by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by an order dated 31st July 1971 holding that rent for the subject-property can be realised from him. The appeal preferred by the Tata Steel vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 10 of 1971-72 against this order was dismissed on 15th September 1980 and both these orders were challenged by the Tata Steel before the Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench) in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R). The writ Court has observed that the application filed by the son of Bengal Kumhar was not maintainable and, as such, the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities were without jurisdiction. 7. At this stage, the Tata Steel filed an application before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Jamshedpur which was registered as Objection No. 467 of 1986-87. This application was filed for modification/correction in the record of rights on the ground that the Tata Steel has become lessee of the subject-property by virtue of the leasedeeds dated 4th August 1984 and 1st August 1985 executed in its favor by the State of Bihar. However, Objection No. 467 of 1986-87 was dismissed by an order dated 29th June 1991 and this order was put to challenge by the Tata Steel in Revision No. 138 of 1992-93, purportedly filed under section 89 of the Tenancy Act. In this proceeding, the application for impleadment filed on behalf of Alomoni Kamarin was dismissed by the Charge Officer and correction in the record of rights has been ordered on the ground that the subject-property was leased in favor of the Tata Steel w.e.f. 1st January 1956 for a period of 40 years. 8. Being aggrieved of the aforementioned correction order, Alomoni Kamarin and Baisali Kamarin moved a representation to the Government of Bihar on 23rd December 1999 and an enquiry was ordered to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, who submitted a report on 4th November 2000 for taking appropriate action in the matter. As noticed above, the Assistant Settlement Officer has allowed the application under section 90 of the Tenancy Act filed by Alomoni Kamarin for correction in the record of rights and, subsequent thereto, the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand through letter dated 5th September 2005 asked the Deputy Commissioner, Jamshedpur to release the subject-property in favor of Alomoni Kamarin and Baisali Kamarin. A further communication was made to the Deputy Commissioner, Jamshedpur through letter dated 27th October 2005 intimating him that the Government of Jharkhand has decided to release the subject-property in favor of Alomoni Kamarin and Baisali Kamarin. This has also been brought on record that through communications dated 10th November 2005 and 19th November 2005 the Government of Jharkhand acted upon the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer and, pursuant thereto, the Circle Officer, Jamshedpur has issued a public Notice inviting objection(s) against release of the subject-property in favor of Alomoni Kamarin and Baisali Kamarin. A copy of the order passed by the Additional Collector, East Singhbhum has also been produced to show that jamabandi in the name of the purchaser has been ordered by the competent authority. 9. With the aforementioned history of the dispute which had been raging since last half a century, the Tata Steel approached the writ Court laying its claim over the subject-property by virtue of the Indenture of lease dated 1st August 1985 executed in its favor by the State of Bihar. This leasedeed has been executed by the State of Bihar after the Tata Steel came to a compromise and accepted its position in law that it has become a statutory lessee under the State of Bihar, by operation of sections 7D and 7E of the BLR Act. Before the writ Court, the main target of attack was the order dated 5th August 2002 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 90 of the Tenancy Act. However, the writ Court did not accept the case set-up by the Tata Steel that the subject-property was given to Bengal Kumhar for cultivation and later on resumed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act. The writ Court has held that (i) the purpose for which the land was resumed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act has not been disclosed (ii) there is no evidence of payment of compensation to Bengal Kumhar and (iii) there is no evidence that the Tata Steel resumed possession over the subject-property. The writ Court has also refused to accept the plea put forth by the Tata Steel that the proceeding under section 90 of the Tenancy Act was barred in law by virtue of the order passed by the Patna High Court in CWJC Nos. 202 of 1981(R). Taking note of the entries under Column Nos. The writ Court has also refused to accept the plea put forth by the Tata Steel that the proceeding under section 90 of the Tenancy Act was barred in law by virtue of the order passed by the Patna High Court in CWJC Nos. 202 of 1981(R). Taking note of the entries under Column Nos. 5 & 6 of the record of rights captioned as “Anabad Bihar Sarkar” and the finding recorded by the Assistant Settlement Officer that the Tata Steel never came in khas possession over the subject-property, the writ Court has held that the Tata Steel being a lessee is not an aggrieved party to the order dated 5th August 2002 because the State of Jharkhand has accepted the status of Bengal Kumhar as a raiyat. 10. The writ Court has held as under: “I have carefully analyzed the arguments on behalf of the petitioner as well as the State counsel and also the Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents and scrutinized the decision dated 23.09.1986 in C.W.J.C. Nos. 204, 205 and 202 of 1981 (R). The law laid down by the Patna High Court is only that subsequent proceedings under Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 is not maintainable in case the applicant had not contested the earlier proceedings. On a review of the entire facts as narrated in foregoing paragraphs, the admitted position is that vacant land measuring 5.26 acres was given in cultivatory possession to Bengal Kumar. The petitioner claimed possession consequent to the land being released under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act much before the B.I.R. Act came into force. After deletion of Section 2B of the BLR Act and insertion of Section 7D and 7E, the petitioner became lessee of the State. On the advent of the said Act, the entire land evidently vests in the State and the State is the paramount landlord. Thus, once the petitioner entered into a lease with the State, obviously, it resiled from its stand that they were a tenure holder of the land and was released under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act. On the advent of the said Act, the entire land evidently vests in the State and the State is the paramount landlord. Thus, once the petitioner entered into a lease with the State, obviously, it resiled from its stand that they were a tenure holder of the land and was released under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act. Besides, the land could be released only if it was sought to be released by the petitioner for a specific purpose as detailed under Section 50(a) and only after paying compensation to the contesting respondents under Section 50(5) of the said Act, who were in cultivatory possession. The petitioners have nowhere pleaded that they had paid any compensation whatsoever or the DCLR was satisfied that the release of the land being asked for any charitable, educational or any other purposes, as required under Section 50. When the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 10 of 1971-72 filed by the petitioner was dismissed, the petitioners were liable to challenge the said order in a suit under Section 87 before a Revenue Officer, the factual controversy could be thrashed out in the appeal, which admittedly was not done. The provisions of Section 6 of the BLR Act relates to fixation of fair rent in respect of the land which was under Khas possession of ex-landlord before vesting and the status of the ex-landlord changes to that of the tenant under the State, who starts paying rent to the State as a tenant. In the instant case, a finding of fact has been recorded in the impugned order dated 05.08.2002 that Tata Company was never in Khas possession of the disputed land. The petitioner previously contested their claim that the land in question released under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act and, therefore, no application under Section 6 of the BLR Act for fixation of fair rent was preferred. It was in these circumstances, the State initiated a proceeding under Section 6 of the BLR Act for fixation of fair rent. The petitioner previously contested their claim that the land in question released under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act and, therefore, no application under Section 6 of the BLR Act for fixation of fair rent was preferred. It was in these circumstances, the State initiated a proceeding under Section 6 of the BLR Act for fixation of fair rent. It is also an admitted fact that at the time before the final decision was pronounced by the Patna High Court in the writ petition reported in 1986 BLT 220, the petitioner had already acquired the status of lessee which is clearly mentioned in paragraph-18 of the said judgment and the only question that was decided in the said petition that the subsequent proceeding entertained by the revenue authorities was not maintainable. The genesis of the present case arose when the petitioner filed an application under Section 83 of the C.N.T. Act contended inter alia that entry in the recent survey wherein the disputed land is recorded in column 5 and 6 of the Record of Right as ‘Anabad Bihar Sarkar’ which was registered as Case No. 467 of 1986 Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar) and the same was dismissed by Assistant Settlement Officer in terms of the order dated 29.06.1991. The order impugned in the instant writ petition was on a fresh proceeding and it proceeds on the premise that since the forefathers of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were put in cultivatory possession, they continued to be in possession even after the BLR Act came into force. Name of the contesting respondents was published in the survey records of right. Mere claim on the basis of release of the land under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act is not acceptable, more so when the petitioner has admittedly paid no compensation. In my opinion, the petitioner-TISCO Ltd. being a lessee is not an aggrieved party to the order dated 05.08.2002 (Annexure-7 to W.P.(C) No. 1981 of 2003) whereby the order of Assistant Settlement Officer under Section 90 of the C.N.T. Act, in place of entry in the Record of Right, the State Government has accepted Respondent No. 6 to be a raiyat. There is no correction in the remarks column of finally published Record of Right of the Leased Right of the petitioner. There is no correction in the remarks column of finally published Record of Right of the Leased Right of the petitioner. The petitioner is not claiming any title independently but claims only to be lessee under the State. The Assistant Settlement Officer, on the basis of materials brought by the petitioner and Respondent No. 6, has given a finding of fact that Bengal Kumar was a recorded raiyat during 1937 survey, and also admitted by the petitioner. The petitioner has never brought any documents regarding fixation of rent under Section 6 of the B.L.R. Act in favour of the petitioner or any document of deed of transfer by recorded tenants and delivery of possession under Section 50 of the C.N.T. Act or any document regarding of payment of compensation under Section 50(5) of the C.N.T. Act. The petitioner did not produce any material document before Respondent No. 5 that any payment was made as required under Section 50(5) of the C.N.T. Act to the recorded raiyat or his successor. Besides, the decision in the Patna High Court relates to a limited portion of land measuring 0.64 decimal. Moreover, the said decision only decides that a second proceeding for fixation of rent under Section 6 of the BLR Act is not maintainable and, therefore, in my view, certain factual controversies raised in the instant writ petition cannot be gone into. The petitioner is lessee in respect of the land and they cannot claim simultaneously raiyati rights, is absolutely correct. There is no force in the writ petitions and accordingly, for the reasons already detailed hereinabove, the writ petitions are dismissed.” 11. The petitioner is lessee in respect of the land and they cannot claim simultaneously raiyati rights, is absolutely correct. There is no force in the writ petitions and accordingly, for the reasons already detailed hereinabove, the writ petitions are dismissed.” 11. In these Letters Patent Appeals, the Tata Steel has challenged the aforesaid order of the writ Court inter alia on the following grounds: (i) The orders passed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act and Patna High Court in the writ petition filed by the Tata Steel shall constitute res judicata and the application filed by the legal heir and successor of the recorded tenant under section 90 of the Tenancy Act was barred in law; (ii) The order passed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act being binding on the Assistant Settlement Officer could not have been reopened in a proceeding under section 90 of the Tenancy Act; (iii) Under section 90 of the Tenancy Act, an issue pertaining to right, title and interest of the parties over the subject-property could not have been adjudicated and decided by the Assistant Settlement Officer; and (iv) The orders passed by the State of Jharkhand for release of the subject-property which are comprised under the leasedeeds executed in favor of the Tata Steel are patently illegal. 12. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, the learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has contended that the order passed by the Patna High Court shall be binding on the parties and the latter proceeding under section 90 was barred by res judicata. The learned senior counsel has made elaborate arguments with reference to the orders dated 20th May and 24th June 1944 in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum at Chaibasa to demonstrate that the order dated 5th August 2002 passed under section 90 of the Tenancy Act by the Assistant Settlement Officer is illegal. It is contended that the amount of compensation paid to the raiyats is mentioned in the order dated 20th May 1944 and this also cannot be disputed that possession over 5.26 acres land was delivered to the Tata Steel through process of the Court. While so, acquisition of the subject-property under section 50 of the Tenancy Act and possession of the Tata Steel thereon must be held beyond any pale of doubt. While so, acquisition of the subject-property under section 50 of the Tenancy Act and possession of the Tata Steel thereon must be held beyond any pale of doubt. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that even after introduction of section 2B in the BLR Act the Tata Steel continued to exercise its rights over the subject-property and the same was not affected in any manner by virtue of the provisions under section 4(a) of the BLR Act. 13. Per contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that if Bengal Kumhar was a tenant under the Tata Steel on coming into force of the BLR Act he has to be treated as a tenant under the State of Bihar because all intermediary rights have vested in the State of Bihar, and the Tata Steel can claim leasehold rights only over the lands which were in its possession excluding the holdings in actual possession of the raiyats for the agricultural purposes. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the record of rights prepared in the name of the State of Bihar clearly excludes any claim of the Tata Steel with respect to the subject-property and the State of Jharkhand has accepted status of Bengal Kumhar as a tenant and issued the orders dated 5th September 2005, 27th September 2005 and 10th November 2005. 14. Mr. S.D. Sanjay, the learned senior counsel who appears for M/s. Utility Transport Company which has been made respondent no. 7 in LPA No. 227 of 2012 and respondent no. 10 in LPA No. 236 of 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “Transport Company”) has defended the order dated 5th August 2002 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer on the ground that the order passed under section 90 of the Tenancy Act is based on indisputable materials on record and is not open to challenge in a writ proceeding. It is submitted that the entire proceeding purportedly carried out under section 50 of the Tenancy Act was a paper-work inasmuch as the records of the said proceeding including any evidence of notice served upon Bengal Kumhar have never been produced. It is submitted that the entire proceeding purportedly carried out under section 50 of the Tenancy Act was a paper-work inasmuch as the records of the said proceeding including any evidence of notice served upon Bengal Kumhar have never been produced. Even so, there is no evidence that Bengal Kumhar was dispossessed by process of the Court and the Tata Steel came in actual physical possession over the subject-property and exercised its rights for any of the purposes under section 50 of the Tenancy Act. The learned senior counsel for the Transport Company has also referred to Rule 75(A) of the Defence of India Rules and the Bihar Government Notification No. 1706-C dated 8th May 1942 and the judgment in “Roy Estate”, Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 12 SCC 194 to submit that after the requisition of the subject-property for the Garrison Engineers in L.A. Case No. 11 of 1942-43 which paid rent to the recorded tenant no order as contemplated under section 50 of the Tenancy Act could have been passed by the Deputy Commissioner. It is submitted that the Transport Company being the bonafide purchaser has a valuable interest in the subject-property and that is the reason it was impleaded as a party-respondent. 15. On behalf of the Union of India, Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned ASGI has made submissions with reference to section 23 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 to controvert the stand taken by the Tata Steel that the subject-property reverted back to it by virtue of an order passed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act. 16. Mr. Rohitashya Roy, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 11 in LPA No. 236 of 2012 has raised a question on maintainability of the writ petition, with support of “New Okhla Industrial Development Authority” New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti, (2006) 9 SCC 524 (para nos. 12 & 13), “Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma”, State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321 (para nos. 13 & 19) and “Satya Pal Anand”, Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 10 SCC 767 (para nos. 27 & 28). 17. The main plank of the Tata Steel is that the subject-property admeasuring about 5.26 acres comprised in RS Plot Nos. 13 & 19) and “Satya Pal Anand”, Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 10 SCC 767 (para nos. 27 & 28). 17. The main plank of the Tata Steel is that the subject-property admeasuring about 5.26 acres comprised in RS Plot Nos. 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570 and 1572 under Khata No. 40 within Mouza Khuntadih given to Bengal Kumhar on payment of rent was resumed by virtue of the order passed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act, whereafter the interest of Bengal Kumhar in the aforesaid property extinguished and he had no right, title or interest in the subject-property. To demonstrate acquisition of the subject-property under section 50 of the Tenancy Act, the Tata Steel has relied on the order dated 20th May 1944 passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 whereunder a reference of deposit of Rs. 11,117.14/- vide Challan No. 326 has been made and the order dated 24th June 1944 which records that possession of the subject-property was delivered by the Bailiff of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum at Chaibasa. The Tata Steel has sought to further support this plea regarding resumption of the subject-property with reference to the order passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R), wherein the Patna High Court has observed that: “the interest of the recorded raiyat was extinguished and the petitioner company was in possession of the plots in question”. On the other hand, attacking the delivery of possession of the subject-property to the Tata Steel in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44, the learned senior counsel for the Transport Company would submit that the delivery of possession on 24th June 1944 through the Bailiff was in the absence of Bengal Kumhar, and his legal heirs and successors have continued to remain in cultivatory possession over the subject-property. It is submitted that the subject-property was requisitioned for the Garrison Engineers, Military Engineering Service, Tata Nagar Division, Tata in L.A. Case No. 11 of 1942-43 which paid the ground rent for the period between 10th April 1942 to 7th August 1953 and while so, no order under section 50 of the Tenancy Act could have been passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum at Chaibasa and, that too, for use of the subject-property for any of the specific purposes mentioned under section 50(1)(a). The learned senior counsel for the Transport Company has submitted that the order passed by the Patna High Court which is a kind of ex parte order does not deal with and adjudicate upon the right, title and interest of Bengal Kumhar and his legal heirs and successors in the subject-property. It is submitted that the Patna High Court was seized with the issue whether a second application under section 6 of the BLR Act was maintainable and that is quite apparent on a mere glance at paragraph no. 16 of the writ Court's order dated 23rd September 1986 whereunder the Patna High Court has formulated the issue, namely; “the question for consideration is whether such application was maintainable under section 6 of the Land Reforms Act?”. 18. Section 50 of the Tenancy Act lays down the conditions and procedure for acquisition of tenure or holding by the landlord. Section 50 provides the following conditions on fulfilling of which the procedure as laid down thereunder has to be observed by the Deputy Commissioner: “50. Acquisition of tenure or holding by landlord for certain purposes. 18. Section 50 of the Tenancy Act lays down the conditions and procedure for acquisition of tenure or holding by the landlord. Section 50 provides the following conditions on fulfilling of which the procedure as laid down thereunder has to be observed by the Deputy Commissioner: “50. Acquisition of tenure or holding by landlord for certain purposes. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 46 and 47, the Deputy Commissioner, may,- (a) on the application of the landlord of a holding and on being satisfied that he is desirous of acquiring the holding or any part thereof for some reasonable and sufficient purpose having relation to the good of the holding or of the tenure or estate in which it comprised, such as the use of the land for any charitable, religious or educational purpose, or for the purpose of manufacturer or irrigation, or as building ground for any such purpose or for access to land used or required for any such purpose, and after such inquiry as the Deputy Commissioner may think necessary, authorise the acquisition thereof by the landlord upon such conditions as the Deputy Commissioner may think fit, and require the tenant to sell his interest in the holding or part to the landlord upon such terms as may be approved by the Deputy Commissioner, including compensation to the tenant; (b) on the application of the landlord of a tenure or holding and on being satisfied that he is desirous of acquiring any land within the said tenure or holding for the purpose of mining or for any other purpose which the [State] Government may by notification declare to be subsidiary thereto or for access to land used or required for such purpose, and after such inquiry as the Deputy Commissioner may think necessary, authorise the acquisition by landlord of such land or part thereof upon such conditions as the Deputy Commissioner may think fit, and require all persons holding interests directly or indirectly subordinate to him in the land to sell their interest to the said landlord upon payment to every such holder or such compensation as the Deputy Commissioner may determine. (2)(a) In determining the compensation to be paid under this Section, the Deputy Commissioner shall take into consideration the matter specified in clauses first to fifthly of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) and the damage, if any, resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the notice under sub-section (3) and the time when the person making the application under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) makes tender of compensation under sub-section (5). (b) The Deputy Commissioner shall not take into consideration any of the matters specified in clause first to sixthly of Section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), nor any outlay or improvements on, or disposal of, the land acquired commenced, made or effected after the date of the publication of the notice under subsection (3). (c) The Deputy Commissioner shall, in addition to the market value of the land ascertained in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of this sub-section, award to the holder of any interest acquired under this Section a sum of 20 percentum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. (3) The Deputy Commissioner shall, before holding the inquiry mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), give notice in the prescribed manner of the application for acquisition under this Section and of his intention to hold such inquiry, to all persons known or believed to be interested in any land proposed to be acquired, and shall receive and decide any objection to the proposed acquisition which may be made by any person; Provided that if any person, being the owner or lessee of the minerals lying under the land proposed for acquisition or under any part thereof, shall so subject to the Deputy Commissioner, such land or part thereof, as the case may be shall not be required under clause (b) of sub-section (1): Provided also that if the landlord applies for the acquisition of a part of a holding, whether such part includes the homestead land of the Raiyat or not, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the Raiyat does not wish to retain the remainder of the holding, reject the application or acquisition, unless the landlord is willing to acquire the entire holding. (4) On the acquisition under this Section of a part of any tenure or holding, the Deputy Commissioner may order such reduction of rent as may be fair and equitable. (5) If the landlord making an application under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) tenders to any person, whose holding or interest or part thereof is being acquired such sum as the Deputy Commissioner has determined as compensation under sub-section (2) and such person refuses the same, the Deputy Commissioner may, on the landlord depositing the said sum with the Deputy Commissioner, give possession of such holding or interest to the landlord in the prescribed manner. (6) Any person interested, who has not accepted the award under this Section may, by written application presented to the Deputy Commissioner within six weeks of the date of the award, require that the matter be referred to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction for determination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Part II of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894). (7) Nothing herein contained shall enable the Deputy Commissioner to authorize the acquisition of any part of a holding whereon a temple, mosque or other place of worship, sacred grove, burial or burning ground exists.” 19. Section 50 presupposes existence of 3 conditions, namely; (i) a landlord on whose application the Deputy Commissioner shall pass an order for acquisition of the holding or any part thereof (ii) use of the land for any charitable, religious or educational purpose, or for the purpose of manufacture or irrigation, or as building ground for any such purposes or for access to land used or required for any such purpose and (iii) a tenant who is in possession of the holding. The elaborate procedure provided under section 50 of the Tenancy Act requires hearing of both the parties by the Deputy Commissioner who if thinks necessary to authorize the acquisition by the landlord may provide such conditions as he may think fit including compensation to the tenant. There are several other conditions under section 50 including notice in the prescribed manner of the application for acquisition and preparation of the award. It further provides that the objection raised by the tenant or any person interested who has not accepted the award shall be referred under sub-section 6 to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. 20. There are several other conditions under section 50 including notice in the prescribed manner of the application for acquisition and preparation of the award. It further provides that the objection raised by the tenant or any person interested who has not accepted the award shall be referred under sub-section 6 to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. 20. From the materials produced by the Tata Steel to demonstrate that Bengal Kumhar was a tenant and the subject-property was resumed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act, this does not appear that Bengal Kumhar was a party to the proceedings in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44, was paid compensation and handed over possession of the subject-property to the Tata Steel through Bailiff of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner. The orders passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 clearly indicate that execution of the Award prepared under section 50 of the Tenancy Act was an ex parte proceeding against Bengal Kumhar. There is no mention of the payment of compensation to Bengal Kumhar or his presence at the time of delivery of possession to the Tata Steel, or that any notice was served upon him fixing the date of delivery of possession of the subject-property. 21. The orders in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 which were not before the writ Court and have been produced for the first time in the proceeding of the present Letters Patent Appeals are reproduced below: “Munsif's Nyayalaya Jamshedpur 28 FEB. 1962. Singhbhum In the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum, at Chaibasa T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur – Applicant Versus Hari Kharura & Others – Opp. Party Nature of the case : For delivery of possession of the lands of the opposite party. ORDER - SHEET 1/20-5-44 To J.P. Chaibassa for check with record and for necessary action by 25.5.44. Sd. G.M. Roy. Deputy Commissioner. The connected record has been sent to the District Judge Manbhum on reference vide this office memo. no. 3185 J, dated the 8th May, 1944. Camp B.C. may be asked to check with the certified copy of the award taken by the applicant Co. In the meanwhile, let the amount of Rs. 11,117/14/- sent by the applicant Co. be deposited into the Treasury by transfer credit to Revenue Deposit. Sd/- S.T. Hussain-J.P.25.3.44. no. 3185 J, dated the 8th May, 1944. Camp B.C. may be asked to check with the certified copy of the award taken by the applicant Co. In the meanwhile, let the amount of Rs. 11,117/14/- sent by the applicant Co. be deposited into the Treasury by transfer credit to Revenue Deposit. Sd/- S.T. Hussain-J.P.25.3.44. Order 30-5-44 Camp. B.C. to check with the certified copy of the award taken by the applicant Co. and send the record to Sadar for necessary action. In the meantime, cash the cheque and deposit the amount into the Treasury as Revenue deposit. Sd/- I1legible. 30-5. Dy. Commr. 4-6-44. Rs. 11,117/14/- credited into the Treasury by Ch. No. 3 dated 2.6.44. Nazir to deliver possession to the applicant after (page 2 begins) after announcing by beat of drum in the locality and report by 26.6.44. An amin should be deputed with the Nazir. Expense to be borne by the applicant Co. Sd/- I1legible. D.C. 9-06-44 Attachment order for attaching, a sum of Rs. 126/6/- out of the compensation money deposited in favour of Sk. Rurai and Kunjo Behari Singh received from the R.S.Dy. Collr. Dhalbhum Rs. 126/6/- is hereby attached. Accountant and Rev. deposit clerk to note. Sd/- S.A. Ahmed-A.D.C. 2-7-44 Possession delivered. File. Sd. J. R. Gillaspie. D.C. Typed by-D.P. Lall. Sd/- D.P. Lall Compared by-Sd/- J.P. Singh. 19/1/62. Comparing-clerk. Certified to be a true copy-Sd/- Seikh Ashuf Ali-19-6-62. Record-Keepter. Dy. Commr.'s Office, Singhbhum. Authorised under Sec. 76 Act 1 of 1972. Dated of application for the copy-6-1-62. Date fixed for notifying the requisite number of stamps and folios. 6-1-62. Date of delivery of the requisite stamps and folios. 6-1-62. Date on which the copy was ready for delivery. 19-1-62. Date of making over the copy to the applicant. Sd/Illegible. 19/1. Record-Keeper Dy. Commr.'s office, Singhbhum T.S. No. 399/23/58 of 60-61. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SINGHBHUM COPYING Department Ext. B. Sd/G.N. Gupta-1st Addl. Munsif. 28-2-62. Typed by Compared by Authentication fee payable Rs. 2.25np. B. Prasad Comparing-clerk. c.c.” 22. The objection taken by the respondents as to the delivery of possession of the properties comprised under several khatiyans within Thana No. 1155 of Mouza Khuntadih is not without any reason. In T.A. Misc. B. Sd/G.N. Gupta-1st Addl. Munsif. 28-2-62. Typed by Compared by Authentication fee payable Rs. 2.25np. B. Prasad Comparing-clerk. c.c.” 22. The objection taken by the respondents as to the delivery of possession of the properties comprised under several khatiyans within Thana No. 1155 of Mouza Khuntadih is not without any reason. In T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44, the subject-property was delivered to P.D. Kandulana for the Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited on 24th June 1944 but the records of the original proceedings under section 50 of the Tenancy Act are not on record. It is clear that possession of the properties has been given to the representative of the Tata Steel by the Nazir in absence of Bengal Kumhar and even the proceeding under section 50 of the Tenancy Act has been taken out in absence of Bengal Kumhar. The report submitted by the Nazir about delivery of possession on 24th June 1944 mentions that the delivery of vacant possession of all plots covered by the writ was affected on identification of the lands by the Assistant Land Officer of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited. This report makes reference of identifier, drummer and witnesses but there is no indication in any of the orders passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 that Bengal Kumhar was present at the time of delivery of possession. In these facts, it was incumbent upon the Tata Steel to plead necessary facts and produce the entire records of section 50 proceedings. 23. Pertinently, observation by the Patna High Court that the rights of the raiyat had extinguished is not a finding of fact based on any legal evidence and, moreover, this observation is not the ratio decidendi of that case. Therefore, the said order shall not constitute res judicata and thereby preclude the Assistant Settlement Officer to entertain the application filed under section 90 of the Tenancy Act by Alomoni Kamarin who is descendant of the recorded raiyat. No doubt a decision by a Court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties and constitutes a precedent but the binding force of the decision has to be gathered from what actually has been decided by the Court - ratio decidendi. Therefore it is not every observation or what may logically flow from observations in the judgment that becomes ratio decidendi. No doubt a decision by a Court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties and constitutes a precedent but the binding force of the decision has to be gathered from what actually has been decided by the Court - ratio decidendi. Therefore it is not every observation or what may logically flow from observations in the judgment that becomes ratio decidendi. The Earl of Halsbury, L.C., Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 has rendered an opinion that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. In “Bachan Singh”, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 727 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the statements which are not necessary to the decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a rule that is unnecessary for the purpose in hand have no binding authority on another Court. This seems to be the reason the Courts are bound by the principle laid down in a judgment and not by the facts of that case wherever a plea of res judicata is raised in a subsequent proceeding. 24. The relevant part of the order dated 23rd September 1986 passed in CWJC Nos. 202 of 1981(R), Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1986 BLT (Rep.) 220 (Pat) reads as follows: “15. The basic issue before the Revenue Authorities who passed impugned orders was whether the raiyati holding in question was extinguished or and as to whether they were empowered under the LR Act to assessee a fair rent in respect of the holding in favour of the so called raiyat. It was contended that the LR Act did not give power to the authorities to determine the rent in favour of a raiyat under section 6 of the LR Act. In my view section 6 only contemplates that the land will be deemed to be settled by the state with such intermediary who was in Khas possession of the holding at the time of vesting of the estate or tenure comprising such holding and such intermediary shall be entitled to retain possession as a raiyat under the state having occupancy rights in respect of such land subject to the payment of rent as determined by the collector. The LR Act never contemplated for fixation of rent in respect of any company raiyat. 16. The LR Act never contemplated for fixation of rent in respect of any company raiyat. 16. After giving my anxious consideration on these points I find force in the submission of Mr. Chatterjee. From the order contained in Annexure-3, it appears that all these plots have been acquired by the Government for industrial purposes and were made over to the petitioner company. Subsequently they were recorded in possession of the raiyat during survey operation but the interest of raiyat (the father of the respondent no. 4) was acquired under Section 50 the CNT Act in respect of the plots in question sometime in the year, 1944. The finding was that the interest of the recorded raiyat was extinguished and the petitioner company was in possession of the plots in question. From the materials available on the record, it appears that the father of the respondent no. 4, was also given notice in the said proceeding but he did not raise any objection nor appeared in the said proceeding. The first initial impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 was passed in Revenue Misc. Case No. 4/1970-71 purported to have been passed under Section 6 of the LR Act on an application filed by the respondent No. 4. The claim of respondent No. 4 was that he being son of the recorded tenant was in possession of the land and rent should be accepted from him. The question for consideration is whether such application was maintainable under Section 6 of the LR Act. For the reasons state above, I am of the opinion that the Deputy Collector Land Reforms had no jurisdiction to entertain such application when all the matters had already been concluded in a regular proceeding earlier. The subsequent application filed by the respondent No. 4 was not at all maintainable under the LR Act. 17. Respondent No. 4 in all these writ applications did not contest the matter in this Court. Mr. Mejethia, the learned counsel, who had appeared on behalf of respondent No. 4 in all the writ applications stated that he had no instruction in the matter. 18. 17. Respondent No. 4 in all these writ applications did not contest the matter in this Court. Mr. Mejethia, the learned counsel, who had appeared on behalf of respondent No. 4 in all the writ applications stated that he had no instruction in the matter. 18. Before concluding I may indicate here that the petitioner has also filed certified copy of deed of lease dated 1-8-1985 which was registered on 6-8-1985 between the Governor of the State of Bihar of one part as ‘Lessor’ and the Times as the ‘Leasee’ giving lease of certain properties in favour of the petitioner-company mentioned in different schedule of the lease deed-including the lands in question of these applications. In that view of the matter, it has also been accepted by the State Respondent that these lands were in khas possession of the petitioner and subsequently the State of Bihar leased all these lands in favour of the petitioner-company. 19. Having given my anxious consideration to the materials placed before me and after examining the facts in all its remification, I am of the opinion that the subsequent proceedings entertained by the Revenue Authorities was without jurisdiction and fit to be quashed. 20. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order contained in annexure 4, and 5 are hereby quashed. Accordingly, the applications are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of these cases. I will make no order as to costs as respondent No. 4 has not appeared to contest these applications. Applications allowed.” 25. The order passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) is open to attack on several grounds. The proceeding before the Patna High Court was almost like an ex parte proceeding in which no counter-affidavit was filed either by the State of Bihar or the successor of Bengal Kumhar who was the respondent no. 4. This is also quite apparent that the writ Court has made observations in paragraph no. 16 of the said order with reference to the stand taken by the Tata Steel and are not the findings of fact by the writ Court, inasmuch as, the order passed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act with reference to which the Tata Steel has contended that interest of the recorded raiyat has extinguished and it resumed possession of the subject-property has yet not seen the light of the day. The writ Court's focus was engaged to consider whether the application moved by the respondent no. 4 who is son of the recorded tenant was maintainable under section 6 of the BLR Act. This becomes further clear on a reading of paragraph no. 15 of the said order whereunder the Patna High Court has expressed its opinion that section 6 of the BLR Act shall apply to such intermediaries who were in khas possession of the holding at the time of the vesting. Except to the aforesaid extent, the writ Court's order in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) does not make any statement of law which can be used by the Tata Steel to set-up a plea of res judicata. 26. The importance of the rule of res judicata was emphasized by Lord Coke who once said; “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which means otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence of law. In “Daryao” Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the binding character of judgments pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. The provisions under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, “CPC”) start with the expression “no Court” to convey the intention that there is an absolute bar on raising the same issue which was directly and substantially the subject matter in a former suit between the same parties and was heard and finally decided by the Court. Simply put, section 11 CPC embodies the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment of a Court of law. 27. In “Sulochana Amma”, Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. Section 11 of CPC embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially in issue and became final. Section 11 of CPC embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially in issue and became final. In a later suit between the same parties or their privies in a court competent to try Such subsequent suit in which the issue has been directly and substantially raised and decided in the judgment and decree in the former suit would operate as res judicata. Section 11 does not create any right or interest in the property, but merely operates as a bar to try the same issue once over. In other words, it aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies, been decided and became final, so that parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation would be put to an end and the valuable time of the court is saved. It is based on public policy, as well as private justice. They would apply, therefore, to all judicial proceedings whether civil or otherwise. It equally applies to quasi-judicial proceedings of the tribunals other than the civil courts.” 28. The Explanations to section 11 CPC provide further insight to the width and ambit of the rule of res judicata. Explanation IV provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made a defence or a ground of attack in a former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the latter suit. Therefore, a matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated in connection with the subject matter of the litigation shall also constitute res judicata between the parties. But a distinction has to be made between a matter which was “collaterally or incidentally” in issue and the matter which was “directly and substantially” in issue. The rule of res judicata is attracted only if the matter is “directly and substantially” in issue in the latter suit and was decided between the same parties in a former suit in which also the matter was “directly and substantially” in issue. This distinction between the two expressions has been lucidly explained by the Privy Council. The rule of res judicata is attracted only if the matter is “directly and substantially” in issue in the latter suit and was decided between the same parties in a former suit in which also the matter was “directly and substantially” in issue. This distinction between the two expressions has been lucidly explained by the Privy Council. Rajah Run Bahadoor Singh v. Mussumut Lachoo Koer, 1884 SCC OnLine PC 26 In that case, a claim for rent was made by the brother-in-law of the defendant claiming himself the surviving male coparcener of the joint Hindu family property. The two issues framed in the suit were : (i) whether the deceased alone received the whole rent of the property in his lifetime, or whether the rent was received by him jointly with his deceased brother and; (ii) whether any rent was due and, if so, how much was due from ‘defendant’. The Court had held that the deceased alone received the whole rent in his lifetime. On the basis of such a finding on issue No. (i), an issue whether the deceased and his brother were joint or separate came for determination in a latter suit instituted by brother-in-law of the defendant for claiming the property by right of survivorship by declaration that he and his brother were joint. The Privy Council has held that the finding in the former suit was not res judicata inasmuch as the issue regarding title of the deceased's brother in the rent suit was not “directly and substantially” in issue in the former suit. The law as evolved is that a matter can be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue if that is necessary for adjudicating the main issue and has been decided by the Court. Therefore, it is necessary to examine pleadings of the parties, issues framed and final judgment of the Court to find out if the matter which has been sought to be set up as a ground for res judicata was the matter “directly and substantially” in issue. Therefore, it is necessary to examine pleadings of the parties, issues framed and final judgment of the Court to find out if the matter which has been sought to be set up as a ground for res judicata was the matter “directly and substantially” in issue. Isher Singh v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 948 In “Nand Ram” Nand Ram v. Jagdish Prasad, (2020) 9 SCC 393 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in cases where a plea of res judicata is set up the test to be applied should be whether the Court considered the adjudication of the issue material and essential for the decision in the former suit. Moreover, the matter with respect to which the plea of res judicata is set-up should have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other party in the former suit. On a consideration of the materials on record including the subject-matter before the Patna High Court and the context in which the aforementioned observation has been made, we are of the opinion that the order passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) is of no avail to the Tata Steel. No counter-affidavit was filed by the respondent no. 4 or the State of Bihar and the writ Court has passed the order dated 23rd September 1986 on the basis of the pleadings of the Tata Steel. 29. The Tata Steel has brought on record a copy of the order dated 7th August 1995 passed in SLP(C) No. 656 of 1987 which was filed by Alomoni Kamarin to set up a plea that the order passed by the Patna High Court has become final and must bind the legal heir(s) and successor(s) of Bengal Kumhar. 30. The order dated 7th August 1995 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted below: “Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER Dismissed.” 31. The binding nature of the order dated 23rd September 1986 passed by the Patna High Court has to be examined in the context of the doctrine of merger. 30. The order dated 7th August 1995 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is extracted below: “Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER Dismissed.” 31. The binding nature of the order dated 23rd September 1986 passed by the Patna High Court has to be examined in the context of the doctrine of merger. This is quite noticeable from a glance at the order dated 7th August 1995 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that; (i) there is no indication in the said order that the Special Leave Petition has been dismissed on the ground that the main order passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) was not under challenge and (ii) the Special Leave Petition has been dismissed as the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find any merit in the challenge laid to the order passed in the review petition before the Patna High Court. The records produced by the Tata Steel do not speak any challenge to the order dated 23rd September 1986 passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) laid before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by any party. Bachhu Kamar who is the son of Bengal Kumhar was the respondent no. 4 in the writ proceeding before the Patna High Court but he did not contest the matter and the order dated 23rd September 1986 has been passed by the writ Court without an affidavit-in-opposition by the State of Bihar and Bachhu Kamar. Apparently, when Alomoni Kamarin came to know about the passing of the order dated 23rd September 1986 she preferred a review petition which was dismissed by the Patna High Court by an order dated 28th April 1987 - this order was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is a well-accepted position in law that a Special Leave Petition filed against the order passed in the review petition is not maintainable (reference may be made to the decisions in “Shanker Motiram Nale”, Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753 , “M.N. Haider”, M.N. Haider v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, (2004) 13 SCC 677 , “Suseel Finance & Leasing Co.”, Suseel Finance & Leasing Co. v. M. Lata, (2004) 13 SCC 675 and “Shiv Charan Singh”, Shiv Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 370 )). That precisely seems to be the reason for dismissal of the Special Leave Petition filed by Alomoni Kamarin. v. M. Lata, (2004) 13 SCC 675 and “Shiv Charan Singh”, Shiv Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 370 )). That precisely seems to be the reason for dismissal of the Special Leave Petition filed by Alomoni Kamarin. Now this needs no elaboration that there is no merger when the prayer for review is declined and the main order shall be the one which affects the aggrieved party. Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 696 Even assuming that the Special Leave Petition filed by Alomoni Kamarin against the review order dated 28th April 1987 has been dismissed not on such grounds, applying the ratio of “Kunhayammed”, Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 the order dated 23rd September 1986 passed in CWJC No. 202 of 1981(R) remains the main operative order which is open to criticism by the respondents in a collateral proceeding. The doctrine of merger has no universal application and in all situations the order passed in a revision, review or appeal shall not be the operative order by merger of the order passed by the inferior Authority/Tribunal or the Court. The doctrine of merger does not envisage an automatic fusion of the two orders passed in the same proceeding by two different authorities in the hierarchy of jurisdiction. Therefore, the subject matter, scope of the review, revision or appeal under the statute and the nature of the order passed by the inferior Authority/Tribunal or the Court have to be examined before a decision is taken what is the final operative order or judgment. In “Kunhayammed” Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when a Special Leave Petition is dismissed at the initial stage without granting leave to appeal there is no merger of the order under challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 32. In “Kunhayammed”, (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “44. . ……………………………………………………………………………………… (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. In “Kunhayammed”, (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “44. . ……………………………………………………………………………………… (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.” 33. The Tata Steel has taken a position that the subject-property was given on lease to the Army for 30 years. To support this plea, the Tata Steel has produced communication dated 13th February 1990 from the Ministry of Defence and a message to the Defence Estate Officer, Bihar Circle, Danapur Cantt. dated 22nd May 1990 in its rejoinder affidavit dated 7th September 2006. The Tata Steel has also produced letters dated 6th August 1988 and 30th April 1996 which are the communications made by the Tata Steel to the Defence Estate Officer about hiring and renewal of sub-lease for 94.535 acres land. On the basis of the aforementioned communications two of which are its own letters, the Tata Steel has pleaded before the writ Court that since 1st January 1956 the Ministry of Defence has been in possession over 94.535 acres land which includes the subject-property. 34. The letter dated 13th February 1990 of Ministry of Defence is reproduced below: “No. 69436/Q3L(Central))/647/D(Lands) Government of India Ministry of Defence New Delhi The 13th February, 1990 To The Chief of the Army Staff, New Delhi Subject : Hiring of land at Jamshedpur belonging to M/S Tata Iron and Steal Co. Ltd. Sir, In continuation of Govt. letter No. 69436/Q3(H)/500-S/D(Qtg) dated 22nd July, 1960, I am directed to convey the sanction of the President to the Hiring of land measuring 94.535 acres belonging to M/S Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur at a rental of Rs. 2/- (Rupees two only) per acres per annum for a further period of 10 years w.ef. 1st January, 1986 to 31st December, 1995. 2. The expenditure involved is debitable to Major Head 269 Minor Head 10, Sub Head ‘D’ (Central Charges), Mi or Sub Head (b)2 Code No 486/01 of the Defence Services Estimates. 3. 2/- (Rupees two only) per acres per annum for a further period of 10 years w.ef. 1st January, 1986 to 31st December, 1995. 2. The expenditure involved is debitable to Major Head 269 Minor Head 10, Sub Head ‘D’ (Central Charges), Mi or Sub Head (b)2 Code No 486/01 of the Defence Services Estimates. 3. This is issued with the concurrence of Ministry of Defence (Finance) vide their ID No. 16/S/W-I/90 of 1990. Your faithfully, Sd/- (Satnan Singh) DESK OFFICER” 35. The letter dated 6th August 1988 of the Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. to the Defence Estate Officer for hiring of land measuring 94.535 acres for a further period of 30 years reads as under: “TAL/SPL/3444 Defence Estate Officer, Danapur Cantt, Danapur Patna Pin-801 503. 6 AUG 1988 Dear Sir, Sub : Hiring of land measuring 94.535 acres for a further period of 30 years. Please refer to your letter No. B&O/4/HRG/B&O Circle’ dated 20-5-88 on the subject and subsequent reminder vide B&O/4/HRG/B&O Circle/Vol 111/103 dt. 13.7.88. As you are aware, the piece of land measuring 94.535 acres in the Circuit House Area, Jamshedpur, was leased to the Military for a period of 30 years from 1.1.1956 on a nominal rent of Rs. 1/- per acre per annum. The deed of lease in respect of the land could not be executed and registered, and the period of the intended lease expired on 31.12.1985. We are now glad to inform you that renewal and registration of leases, which had remained suspended on account of the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, are being resumed shortly. The renewal of the lease in respect of your land in question will also therefore be taken up in due course. In this connection, we would like to further inform you that as per the lease dated 1.8.85 granted by the Govt. of Bihar to Tisco, the Company has become the lessee of the Government and consequently all the erstwhile lessees of the Steel Company have become its sub-lessees. Since the present lease granted by the State Govt. extends upto 31.12.1995 only, renewal of your aforesaid lease can be granted from 1.1.1986 to 31.12.1995, and the ground rent will be enhanced by 100%. As regards further renewals from 1.1.96, we would like to inform that the renewal will be for 30 years, depending upon the renewal of the Company's lease by the State Govt. extends upto 31.12.1995 only, renewal of your aforesaid lease can be granted from 1.1.1986 to 31.12.1995, and the ground rent will be enhanced by 100%. As regards further renewals from 1.1.96, we would like to inform that the renewal will be for 30 years, depending upon the renewal of the Company's lease by the State Govt. Please, therefore, let us have your acceptance of the enhanced rent and the terms and conditions of the renewal at an early date in order to enable us to proceed further in the matter. Yours faithfully, f. THE TATA IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. Sd/- (T.A. GABBA) F. LAND OFFICER.” 36. On the basis of these letters, the Tata Steel has set-up the aforesaid plea in WP(C) No. 6816 of 2005 in the following terms: “9. That on vesting of the rights of Petitioner in the land under BLR Act, 1956, vide a Lease dated 1.8.1985 between the Governor of the State of Bihar of one part as “Lessor” and the Petitioner as “Lessee” giving lease of lands, inter-alia, covered under Sections 7 D & 7E of the BLR Act, 1956, comprising of Schedules I to IV and the non-statutory portion of the land under Schedule V, of the Agreement for lease dated 4.8.1984 and the Indenture dated 1.8.1985. The Plots in question formed part of Schedule IV of the Lease deed. The Lease was initially effective for a period of 40 years w.e.f. 1.1.56, with provision for renewal for period of 30 years each. 10. That the Petitioner submits that an area measuring 94.535 acres comprising of R.S. Plots in question including other adjacent R.S. Plots, was sub-leased to the Ministry of Defence for a period of 30 years from 1/1/1956. The formal sanction of the President of India, contained in letter No. 69436/Q3(H)/500-D/D(Qtg) dated 22/7/1960, in respect of the said lease in favour of the Ministry of Defence, was communicated by letter No. 6043/Q dated 14.2.69. On the expiry of the said lease on 31/12/1985, the lease was further renewed initially for a period of 10 years i.e. from 1/1/86 to 31/12/95. That the sub-lease in favour of the Ministry of Defence was further renewed for a period of 30 years commencing from 1/1/1996. The said renewal was subject to renewal of the lease of the Petitioner herein. That the sub-lease in favour of the Ministry of Defence was further renewed for a period of 30 years commencing from 1/1/1996. The said renewal was subject to renewal of the lease of the Petitioner herein. As aforesaid with the renewal of the lease of the Petitioner with effect from 1/1/96 by Indenture dated 20/8/2005 for a period of 30 years, the sublease in favour of the Ministry of Defence is subsisting and valid.” 37. The first and foremost of all the inconsistencies in the stand of the Tata Steel is that a copy of the lease/sub-lease executed in favor of the Ministry of Defence has not been brought on record. On the contrary, it can be easily inferred from the aforementioned communications that the proposal to acquire 94.535 acres land by the Ministry of Defence did not fructify in execution of any leasedeed/sub-lease, and all that can be projected by the Tata Steel is that there were discussions with the Ministry of Defence over a proposal for hiring of 94.535 acres land for which sanction of the President was taken - but, not even the sanction order of the President has been produced on record. The Tata Steel did not produce the records of handing over to and taking over possession by the Ministry of Defence and there is no evidence of the Ministry of Defence or its agent/representative coming into possession over the said lands. From the letter dated 13th February 1990 of the Ministry of Defence, it transpires that the proposal for hiring of 94.535 acres land was mooted sometime in 1960 or even before that. In its letter dated 6th August 1988, the Tata Steel has made a reference of a lease for a period of 30 years from 1st January 1956 which was neither executed nor registered. There is also a reference of the leasedeed dated 1st August 1985 executed by the Government of Bihar in favor of the Tata Steel and, in view thereof, the Tata Steel seems to have suggested the Estate Officer for execution of a lease for a period of 10 years ending on 31st December 1995. The letter by the Tata Steel also does not provide any clue as to when the sub-lease was executed, if at all that was done. The letter by the Tata Steel also does not provide any clue as to when the sub-lease was executed, if at all that was done. Therefore, what emerges is that there is absolutely no description of the land admeasuring about 94.535 acres for which the President has accorded sanction for hiring of the said land from the Tata Steel. Secondly, no other document leave alone any leasedeed has been produced by the Tata Steel or the Union of India. Thirdly, the sanction of the President was for 30 years which period has lapsed long back. In summation, the plea set-up by the Tata Steel is not substantiated and it was a misconceived defence. 38. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, the learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has contended that a certiorari shall lie against the order of a statutory Authority which has exceeded its jurisdiction as encompassed under section 90 of the Tenancy Act. The learned senior counsel would submit that the Assistant Settlement Officer while passing the order dated 5th August 2002 has exceeded his jurisdiction inasmuch as the powers under section 90 of the Tenancy Act can be exercised only for correcting a mistake in the record of rights and in exercise of such a power the Settlement Officer could not have gone into the question of title and declared that Bengal Kumhar has title over the subject-property. It is submitted that a dispute over title in the land is not a bonafide or material error in the garb of which any correction in the record of rights can be made. N. Subramanian @ Shri Mani Iyer v. The State of Bihar, (1990) 1 PLJR 577 & LPA No. 5 of 2019 : Shashi Tiwari v. Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited 39. Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is extracted herein below: 90. Correction by Deputy Commissioner or Revenue Officer of mistake in record-of-rights. N. Subramanian @ Shri Mani Iyer v. The State of Bihar, (1990) 1 PLJR 577 & LPA No. 5 of 2019 : Shashi Tiwari v. Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited 39. Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is extracted herein below: 90. Correction by Deputy Commissioner or Revenue Officer of mistake in record-of-rights. - In case of discovery of bona fide or material error in record-of-rights within five years from the date of the certificate of its final publication under sub-section (2) of Section 83, the Deputy Commissioner or any Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf may, on his own motion, or on application made to him within the said period, after holding an inquiry in the prescribed manner, by order in writing, direct that such error shall be corrected in the manner specified in the order: Provided that no such correction shall be made, - (i) until reasonable notice has been given to the parties concerned to appear and be heard in the matter; (ii) if a suit under Section 87, clause (8) of Section 111 or Section 252, or an appeal under clause (10) of Section 111 or Section 253, affecting such an entry is pending. 40. Under section 90, the Legislature has contemplated a bonafide material error in the final record of rights which is published under sub-section 2 of section 83. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner or any Revenue Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf may after holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner direct that such error shall be corrected in the manner specified in the order. The proceedings before a statutory authority under the Tenancy Act are civil in nature and the authorities under the Act exercise powers of the Civil Court to a limited extent. Therefore, the power of the Deputy Commissioner or Revenue Officer of correcting a mistake in the record of rights is not akin to any ministerial function and not confined to mere typographical errors. The provisions under section 90 provide that the power to make an order for correction in the record of rights can be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner or any Revenue Officer especially empowered by the State Government in this behalf on his own motion or on any application made to him. The provisions under section 90 provide that the power to make an order for correction in the record of rights can be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner or any Revenue Officer especially empowered by the State Government in this behalf on his own motion or on any application made to him. It is further provided that the Deputy Commissioner or any Revenue Officer especially empowered by the State Government shall conduct an enquiry in the prescribed manner. Therefore, an authority which can exercise any statutory power on his own and is required to conduct an enquiry into the matter would have powers to refer to the previous proceedings between the parties before the Revenue Authorities or in a Court of law and the authority shall be entitled to record a finding of fact through inferences drawn from the previous proceedings between the parties. This is precisely what has been done by the Assistant Settlement Officer in Case No. 264 of 2001-2002. He has drawn inferences which are easily deductible from the orders passed in the previous proceedings between the parties which exercise is definitely permissible under section 90. Before the Assistant Settlement Officer, the Tata Steel had produced (i) the proceedings in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 titled “Tata v. Hari Kharorara” and (ii) paper-book of the petition filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Whereas, Alomoni Kamarin has produced a bundle of the orders passed in the previous proceedings. The Assistant Settlement Officer did not embark upon a fact-finding exercise by inviting the parties to lead oral evidence. The documents laid by the parties before him are admitted documents and relating to previous proceedings in most of which the Tata Steel was a party. The Assistant Settlement Officer has recorded the previous proceedings between the parties so as to trace the history of litigation, and, the facts of the case and rival submissions in the process of adjudication and it is not correct to say that it has formed an opinion on the basis of overruled orders by the statutory Authorities. While so, the exercise of power by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 90 was not an improper exercise of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction vested in him. While so, the exercise of power by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 90 was not an improper exercise of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction vested in him. In “Shashi Tiwari”, LPA No. 5 of 2019 : Shashi Tiwari v. Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited the question posed by the Division Bench unto itself was whether a declaration as regards possession of the land on the ground that the land was utilized by the devotees for a long period could have been made by the writ Court. So, the decision in “Shashi Tiwari” (supra) turns on its own facts and does not support the Tata Steel. 41. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that the true construction of the provisions under sections 4, 6, 7D and 7E of the BLR Act is that Bengal Kumhar's raiyati rights which are transferable rights shall be protected by operation of law and his legal heirs have become direct tenants under the State of Bihar. Mr. S.D. Sanjay, the learned senior counsel for the Transport Company has also stressed that by operation of section 4(a) read with section 6 of the BLR Act, Bengal Kumhar became a tenant directly under the State of Bihar and, therefore, acquisition of the subject-property by the Tata Steel under the Land Acquisition Act, even if admitted, had gone out of its hands and was not even saved under section 2B of the BLR Act. The learned senior counsel has referred to “Sheo Narayan Chaudhury” Sheo Narayan Chaudhury v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 Pat 226 (FB) and “Brijnandan”, Brijnandan v. Jamuna Prasad Sahu, AIR 1958 Pat 589 wherein it has been held that by operation of law all intermediary rights have extinguished and vested in the State of Bihar, except the occupancy rights of a raiyat or under-raiyat having khas possession over the land. It is submitted that the ex parte proceedings under section 50 of the Tenancy Act to resume possession of the subject-property did not affect the possession of Bengal Kumhar and his legal heirs and successors have exercised their occupancy rights all through these years, except for a brief period when the subject-property were leased on rent to the Garrison Engineers, Tata Nagar Division. 42. 42. The Preamble to the BLR Act, 1950 refers to two important objects viz; (a) transference to the State of the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders in land, and of the mortgagees and lessees of such interests, and (b) constitution of a Land Commission with powers to advise the State Government on the agrarian policy. The BLR Act has been enacted as a measure of social justice and for general good of the society. The intention behind the transference to the State of Bihar (now, State of Jharkhand) of all proprietary and tenure interests in the land and of certain interests of the mortgagee and lessee was in furtherance of the objectives enshrined in the Constitution of India under the Directive Principles. Section 3 thereof provided that the State Government may from time to time declare through a notification that the estate or tenures of a proprietor or tenure-holder have passed to and became vested in the State. In “Sheo Narayan Chaudhury”, Sheo Narayan Chaudhury v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 Pat 226 , a full Bench of the Patna High Court has held that except the sole exception of any raiyati interest, the entire estate shall vest in the State on issuing of a notification under section 3. The provisions under section 3 have been further retained by the State Government under section 3A which provided that the State Government may, at any time by notification, declare that the intermediary interests of all intermediaries in the whole of the State have passed on to and vested in the State. Section 4 provided that all kinds of interests of the proprietor or tenure-holder in mines and minerals including such rights of lessee except the interest of raiyats and under-raiyats shall vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. In “Kameshwar Singh”, Kameshwar Singh v. The State, AIR 1951 Pat 91 , a Special Bench of Patna High Court accepted the challenge to Constitutionality of the BLR Act and declared the BLR Act unconstitutional. However, a Constitution Bench, State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528 : AIR 1952 SC 252 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court before which the judgment in “Kameshwar Singh”, (supra) came under challenge upheld the Constitutionality of the BLR Act, except the provisions under sections 4(b) and 23(f) which were declared unconstitutional and void. However, a Constitution Bench, State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528 : AIR 1952 SC 252 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court before which the judgment in “Kameshwar Singh”, (supra) came under challenge upheld the Constitutionality of the BLR Act, except the provisions under sections 4(b) and 23(f) which were declared unconstitutional and void. For the sake of fullness, we would indicate that sub-section (b) to section 4 provided that all arrears of rents including royalties and all cesses together with interest due thereon for any period prior to the date of vesting shall also vest in and be recoverable by the State, provided the same were not barred by any law of limitation. 43. Section 4 of BLR Act is extracted as below: “4. Consequences of the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contract and notwithstanding any non-compliance or irregular compliance of the provisions of Sections 3, 3A and 3B except the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 3 and sub-section (1) of Section 3A, on the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), of Section 3 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3A, the following consequences shall ensue and shall be deemed always to have ensued, namely: (a) Such estate or tenure including the interests of the proprietor or tenure-holder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure and used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars, [mela] and ferries and all other sairati interests, as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether been worked or not, inclusive of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats) shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act. (b) All rents, cesses and royalties accruing in respect of lands comprised in such estate or tenure on or after the date of vesting shall be payable to the State and not to the outgoing proprietor or tenure-holder and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be binding on the State Government. Explanation. - The expression “rent, cess and royalty” in relation to the year in which an estate or tenure vests in the State, shall mean the amount of rent, cess or royalty accruing in respect of lands comprised in such estate or tenure for the period commencing from the date of vesting which amount shall bear the same proportion to the total rent, cess or royalty, as the case may be, accruing in respect of such lands for the whole year as such period bears to the whole year. (c) All arrears of revenue and cesses remaining lawfully due in respect of the estate or tenure on the date of vesting and all other amounts recoverable by the State Government from the outgoing intermediary under any law for the time being in force, shall continue to be recoverable from him and shall, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recoverable, when so ordered by the Collector, by the deduction thereof from the amount payable to such intermediary under Section 32, Section 32A or Section 33. Explanation. - The expression ‘arrears of revenue and cesses in relation to an estate or tenure vested in the State shall mean the amount of land revenue and the amount of cess in respect of such estate or tenure for any period prior to the date of vesting, which amount shall bear the same proportion to the total amount of the land revenue or, as the case may be, to the total amount of cess, of such estate or tenure payable for the whole year as the period prior to the date of vesting bears to the whole year. (cc) in case any out going intermediary have recovered any amount from the tenant of an estate or a tenure payable by such tenant as rent for any period after the date of the vesting of such estate or tenure, such amount shall without any prejudice to any other mode of recovery be recoverable from the amount of compensation payable to him under Section 32, Section 32A or Section 33: Provided that an appeal against an order passed under this clause, if preferred within sixty days of the date of such order, shall lie to the prescribed authority not below the rank of the Collector of district who shall dispose of the same according to the prescribed procedure. (d) No suit shall lie in any Civil Court for the recovery of any money due from such proprietor or tenure-holder the payment of which is secured by a mortgage of, or is a charge on, such estate or tenure and all suits and proceedings for the recovery of any such money which may be pending on the date of vesting shall be dropped. (e) No such estate or tenure shall be liable to attachment or sale under the processes of any Court and any orders of attachment passed in respect of such estate or tenure before the date of vesting shall cease to be in force. (ee) In every suit, appeal or proceeding, in respect of any estate or tenure which has vested under Section 3 or Section 3A pending on the date of the commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1953, the Court in which the suit, appeal or proceeding is pending shall cause a notice thereof to be served on the State Government who may within three months of the service of the notice apply to the Court to be added, and shall thereupon be added, as a party there to and shall be entitled to conduct or defend such suit or proceeding, as the case may be, and in the absence of service of such notice, the decree or order passed in such suit, appeal or proceeding shall not be binding on the State Government. (f) The Collector shall be deemed to have taken charge of such estate or tenure and of all interests vested in the State under this Section: Provided that nothing contained in this clause or in any other provision of this Act shall be deemed to authorise the Collector to take charge of any institution, religious or secular, of any trust or any building connected therewith or to interfere with the right of a trustee to apply the trust money to the objects of the trust. (g) Where by reason of the vesting of any estate or tenure or any part thereof in the State under the provision of this Act, the Collector is of opinion that the State is entitled to the direct possession of any property he shall, by an order in writing served in the prescribed manner on the person in possession of such property, require him to deliver possession thereof to the State or show cause, if any, against the order within a time to be specified therein and if such person fails to deliver possession or show cause or if the Collector rejects any cause, shown by such person after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Collector shall for reasons to be recorded, take or cause to be taken such steps or use or cause to be used such force as, in his opinion may be necessary for securing compliance with the order or preventing a breach of the peace : Provided that if the order under clause (g) is passed by an officer below-the rank of the Collector of a district, an appeal shall if preferred within sixty days of the order, lie to the Collector of the district and the Collector shall dispose of the appeal in accordance with the prescribed procedure. (h) The Collector shall have power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer including the settlement or lease of any land comprised in such estate or tenure or the transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure or part thereof, and if he is satisfied that such transfer was made [at any time after the first day of January, 1946, with the object of defeating any provisions of this Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation thereunder the Collector may, after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard annul such transfer, dispossess the person claiming under it and take possession of such property on such terms as may appear to the Collector to be fair and equitable: Provided that an appeal against an order of the Collector under this clause if preferred within sixty days of such order, shall lie to the prescribed authority not below the rank of the Collector of a district who shall dispose of the same according to the prescribed procedure: Provided further that no order annulling a transfer shall take effect nor shall possession be taken in pursuance of it unless such an order has been confirmed by the State Government. (hh) the Collector shall have power to make inquires into all cases of reduction or partial or entire remission of rents of agricultural holdings comprised in such estate or tenure made by the outgoing intermediary either for a specified period or in perpetuity and may, after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard, if he is satisfied that such reduction or remission was made after the first day of January, 1946, with the object of defeating the purpose of the Act or causing loss to the State, cancel all such reduction or remission and order the restoration of the rents of such holdings or class of such holdings which were payable in respect of the said holdings immediately before the first day of January, 1946 : Provided that an appeal against an order of the Collector under this clause, if preferred within sixty days of such order, shall lie to the prescribed authority not below the rank of the Collector of a district who shall dispose of the same according to the prescribed procedure. (i) After serving a notice in writing on the proprietor or tenure holder for the production of such documents, registers and papers as are in his opinion necessary for the management of such estate or tenure, and if such notice is not complied with within forty-eight hours or such further time as the Collector may allow it shall be lawful for the Collector or any officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Deputy Collector, authorised by him in writing in this behalf, to enter upon any land or building with such assistance as he considers necessary and seize and take possession of such documents, registers and papers as are in his opinion necessary for the management of such estate or tenure: Provided that no action under this clause shall be taken unless a requisition under Section 40 has not been complied with within the time fixed in the said requisition.” 44. Section 6 of BLR Act is extracted as below: “6. Certain other lands in khas possession of intermediaries to be retained by them on payment of rent as raiyats having occupancy rights. - (1) On and from the date of vesting all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of such vesting, including. Certain other lands in khas possession of intermediaries to be retained by them on payment of rent as raiyats having occupancy rights. - (1) On and from the date of vesting all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of such vesting, including. - (a)(i) proprietor's private land let out under a lease for a term of years or under a lease, from year to year, referred to in Section 116 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885), (ii) landlord's, privileged lands let out under a registered lease for a term exceeding one year or under a lease, written or oral, for a period of one year or less; referred to in Section 43 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act 6 of 1908), (b) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and held in the direct possession of a temporary lessee of an estate or tenure and cultivated by himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock, and (c) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes forming the subject-matter of a subsisting mortgage on the redemption of which the intermediary is entitled to recover khas possession thereof; shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 7A and 7B be deemed to be settled by the State with such intermediary and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as a raiyat under the State having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall entitle an intermediary to retain possession of any naukarana land or any land recorded as chaukidari chakran or goraiti jagir or mafigoraiti in the record of right has already accrued to a raiyat before the date of vesting. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘naukarana land’ means land as a grant burdened with service in lieu of rent or held simply in lieu of wages for services to be rendered (2) If the claim of an intermediary as to khas possession over the lands referred to in sub-section (1) or as to the extent of such lands is disputed by any person prior to the determination of rent of such lands under the said sub-section the Collector shall, on application, make such inquiry into the matter as he deems fit and pass such order as may appear to be just and proper : Provided that the Collector in making such inquiry shall give due weight to the circumstances under which the area in which such lands were situated was declared to be a disturbed area under the Police Act, 1861, after the first day of November, 1946.” 45. Initially the Tata Steel laid a claim over the subject-property by virtue of the deeds of conveyance dated 19th January 1912 and 23rd September 1929 by which 15,725 acres land was acquired by the Provincial Government and handed over to the Tata Steel. On the basis of these conveyance deeds, the case set-up by the Tata Steel is that Bengal Kumhar was in permissive possession over the subject-property and this is so reflected in the old survey record of rights where Bengal Kumhar has been shown as a tenant under M/s TISCO Limited. Then by virtue of the provisions under sections 7D and 7E of the BLR Act the Tata Steel became statutory lessee under the State of Bihar which executed a deed of lease on dated 1st August 1985 in favor of the Tata Steel for a period of 40 years w.e.f. 1st January 1956. On the other hand, Bachhu Kamar and after him his wife Alomoni Kamarin and daughter Baisali Kamarin have claimed occupancy rights over the subject-property which the Transport Company has purchased through a registered sale-deed. On the other hand, Bachhu Kamar and after him his wife Alomoni Kamarin and daughter Baisali Kamarin have claimed occupancy rights over the subject-property which the Transport Company has purchased through a registered sale-deed. With reference to clause XVI of the leasedeeds, the learned Additional Advocate General has contended that there is a specific stipulation in the leasedeeds executed by the State of Bihar in the favor of the Tata Steel that the occupancy rights acquired by the agricultural tenants before the commencement of the BLR Act are not covered under the aforesaid leasedeeds even if such lands were acquired for the Tata Steel under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the leasedeed dated 1st August 1985 could not have included the subject-property all rights in respect of which had vested in the State of Bihar, except the raiyati rights of Bengal Kumhar who had become a direct tenant under the State of Bihar. 46. The consequence of the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State has been provided under section 4 with statutory bar as to any contract and non-compliance or irregular compliance of certain provisions under sections 3, 3A and 3B. In “Bhrighunath Sahay Singh”, Bhrighunath Sahay Singh v. Mohammad Md. Khalilur Rahman, (1996) 1 PLJR 65 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that wherever the proprietor or tenure-holder is found not in khas possession on the date of vesting he cannot claim any right in the law. In “Suraj Ahir”, Suraj Ahir v. Prithinath Singh, AIR 1963 SC 454 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the expression “khas possession” which occurs in various provisions of the BLR Act relates to actual or cultivating possession by the intermediary or tenure-holder, either personally or through hired labourers. On such interpretation, an intermediary was denied shelter under section 6 of the BLR Act on the ground that any other kind of constructive possession would be foreign to the definition of “khas possession” under section 2(k) of the BLR Act. Similarly, in “Ran Bijoy Singh”, Ran Bijoy Singh v. Bihari Singh, AIR 1965 SC 524 the proprietor who had brought a suit for eviction against the tenant was held to have no protection under section 6, as on the date of the BLR Act coming into force he was not in khas possession of the property. 47. The orders passed in T.A. Misc. 47. The orders passed in T.A. Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 in the proceeding of which the Tata Steel was delivered possession by the Bailiff of the lands comprised under several khatiyans do not establish that the Tata Steel came in actual physical possession over the subject-property. There is no other material produced by the Tata Steel that it was in khas possession over the subject-property at the time when the BLR Act came into force. On the contrary, by virtue of the proceeding in L.A. Case No. 11 of 1942-43 under which the subject-property was given to Garrison Engineers which paid rent to Bengal Kumhar it is established that the Tata Steel was not in khas possession over the subject-property as on the appointed date. Furthermore, Revenue Misc. Case No. 4 of 1970-71 was registered on the application filed by Bachhu Kamar under sections 5, 6 and 7 of the BLR Act which was opposed by the Tata Steel on the basis of the order passed in Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 106 of 1966-67, that the issue was already decided by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum in the previous proceeding. This objection was however rejected by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) with reference to the order dated 31st May 1971 passed in Revenue Misc. Case No. 3 of 1970-71 wherein it was held that the previous proceeding in Revenue Misc. Case No. 223 of 1965-66 was not finally concluded. In the proceeding of Revenue Misc. Case No. 223 of 1965-66, the report submitted by the Block Development Officer, Jamshedpur stated that the subject-property was under the possession of the recorded tenant and his successors and the land was fit for cultivation. There is no dispute that Bengal Kumhar exercised cultivating possessory rights over the subject-property comprised under old plot nos. 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570 and 1572 falling within Khata No. 40, now renumbered as Plot No. 6048 of new Khata No. 622 at village Khuntadih within Bistupur PS of the District of East Singhbhum admeasuring about 5.26 acres. There is also no dispute that Bengal Kumhar's name is recorded in the old survey record of rights (khatiyan) prepared during the survey years between 1934-1937. There is also no dispute that Bengal Kumhar's name is recorded in the old survey record of rights (khatiyan) prepared during the survey years between 1934-1937. Section 16 of the Tenancy Act provides that the existing occupancy rights of every raiyat shall be deemed to have continued, notwithstanding the fact that he may not have cultivated or held the land for a period of twelve years. Section 19 provides that every person who is a settled raiyat of a village within the meaning of section 17 or section 18 shall have a right of occupancy subject to the provisions of section 43. Section 22 provides a protective umbrella to the occupancy raiyats from eviction except in execution of a decree for ejectment passed on the grounds specified therein and section 23 provides that on death of a raiyat his occupancy rights shall descend in the same manner as other immovable property. And, indisputably, no evidence has been brought on record regarding dispossession of the recorded tenant in the last 12 years preceding the date of incorporation of section 2B in the BLR Act. In the aforesaid state of affairs, the writ Court has rightly refused to interfere with the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 90 of the Tenancy Act. 48. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, the learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has questioned proprietary of the Union of India and the State of Jharkhand which according to him have made submissions contrary to their pleadings. The learned senior counsel has referred to “Bachhaj Nahar”, Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that (i) what was not pleaded specifically cannot be supported through any evidence (ii) the Court cannot make out a third case contrary to what has not been pleaded by the parties, and (iii) the Court should confine its decisions to the questions raised in the pleadings. The judgment in “Arikala Narasa Reddy”, Arikala Narasa Reddy v. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari, (2014) 5 SCC 312 has also been relied upon by the Tata Steel to raise a plea that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and the Courts are bound to render judgment on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. 49. The judgment in “Arikala Narasa Reddy”, Arikala Narasa Reddy v. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari, (2014) 5 SCC 312 has also been relied upon by the Tata Steel to raise a plea that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and the Courts are bound to render judgment on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. 49. The opposition offered by the State of Jharkhand is founded on the interpretation and implication of section 4 read with sections 7D & 7E of the BLR Act. This needs no reiteration that a question in law arising in the case can be raised at any stage, even in appeal or revision. Before the writ Court, the State of Jharkhand filed an affidavit supporting the order dated 5th August 2002 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 90 of the Tenancy Act, 1908 and there is no variation in its stand taken in the present proceeding. 50. Lastly, the learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has submitted that the sale-deed executed by Alomoni Kamarin in favor of M/s Utility Transport Company during subsistence of the interim order passed by the writ Court has become void ab initio. It is submitted that wherever it is found that the initial action is not in consonance with law the subsequent proceedings cannot be sanctified. It is further submitted that in the face of the interim order passed by the writ Court which was continued in the present proceedings Alomoni Kamarin had no right to execute the sale-deed in favor of the Transport Company. So, applying the principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings the sale-deed executed in favor of the Transport Company would become inoperative and the Transport Company cannot derive any right, title and interest through such an instrument. 51. The learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has referred to “Surjit Singh”, Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh, (1995) 6 SCC 50 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause for going into the question of interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treaded by the courts below was, in our view, out of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the courts below and reject the application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC.” 52. The path treaded by the courts below was, in our view, out of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the courts below and reject the application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC.” 52. The learned senior counsel for the Tata Steel has also referred to “Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd.”, Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment.” 53. On 4th April 2006, the writ Court passed an interim order of status quo in WP(C) No. 6816 of 2005 which was extended and continued till final disposal of the writ petitions - writ petitions were dismissed on 23rd April 2012. The Letters Patent Appeals were admitted and an order of status quo was passed by this Court on 15th June 2012 which was confirmed by an order dated 9th October 2012. There is no violation of the status quo order passed by the writ Court because this is not pleaded that the nature of the subject-property has been changed. Moreover, the subject-property has been purchased by the Transport Company for a valuable consideration and it shall be bound by the lis pendens doctrine under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 54. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary and without any fetters. The High Court while sitting in the writ jurisdiction is required to consider all relevant facts to satisfy itself whether any relief can be granted and shall not be swayed away by any issue howsoever contested that may be. A host of claims have been made by the Union of India and the private respondent but none of them has been able to establish any right, title or interest and more particularly possession over the subject-property. The claim made by the Ministry of Defence is not based on any clinching evidence. A host of claims have been made by the Union of India and the private respondent but none of them has been able to establish any right, title or interest and more particularly possession over the subject-property. The claim made by the Ministry of Defence is not based on any clinching evidence. Its claim is without any substance and in part self-contradictory inasmuch as not even description of any construction over the subject-property made by the Ministry of Defence has been pleaded. What followed after the sanction of the President was intimated through letter dated 22nd July 1960 to the Tata Steel has remained a mystery and the plea of possession by raising construction over the subject-property is not supported by any material whatsoever. There is also absolutely no material on record to show that the subject-property falls within 94.535 acres land which allegedly has been taken over by the Ministry of Defence under the sanction granted by the President. The story of the Ministry of Defence having possession over 94.535 acres land including the subject-property has not been accepted by the writ Court and, on the contrary, the writ Court has approved the findings by the Assistant Settlement Officer that the Garrison Engineers, MES Tatanagar Division was tenant under Bengal Kumhar for more than a decade between 10th April 1942 to 7th August 1953. This finding by the Assistant Settlement Officer is based on the rent receipts produced by Alomoni Kamarin to show that the Bihar Regiment of Garrison Engineers paid Rs. 317 and 4 Annas on 9th September 1944 and further rents for different periods till 7th August 1953 on different dates to the recorded tenant. The Tenancy Act provides a statutory regime and is a complete code in itself. While so, the findings of fact recorded by the statutory authority under the Tenancy Act are binding on the parties except where such findings of fact are not based on legal evidence or are contrary to the records. The writ Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not embark upon an exercise to test legality of the order passed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy Act, except where the order is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The writ Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not embark upon an exercise to test legality of the order passed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy Act, except where the order is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Even so, a plea based on jurisdictional error committed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy Act may not invite exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. For, a certiorari shall not lie to correct every error of fact or law and the writ Court shall be sort of denuded of its powers to enter into any such controversy. The writ Court shall refrain from exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in a matter which necessarily does not involve infraction of a constitutional or statutory right of the aggrieved party. The limitation on powers of the writ Court to issue a writ of certiorari is that the findings of fact recorded by the inferior Court or Tribunal cannot be reopened or questioned in a writ proceeding. In “Syed Yakoob”, Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by the writ but not an error of fact howsoever grave it may appear to be, except where a finding of fact has been recorded by the inferior Court by erroneously admitting inadmissible evidence or some admissible evidence has been improperly refused. 55. Having thus examined the materials on record, we do not find any ground to interfere with the writ Court's order dated 23rd April 2012 and, therefore, LPA Nos. 227 of 2012 and 236 of 2012 are dismissed. 56. IA Nos. 1453 of 2013 and 2040 of 2017 in LPA No. 227 of 2012 and IA Nos. 2041 of 2017 and 3252 of 2017 in LPA No. 236 of 2012 filed for vacating the stay stand disposed of. IA No. 4615 of 2017 in LPA No. 236 of 2012 filed for impleading the DDC, Dhanbad stands disposed of.