ORDER : 1. Order dated October 14, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge has been challenged by filing the present intra-Court appeal. 2. It is a case in which respondent no.1, who was a regular employee working with U.P. Textile Technology Institute, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘Institute’) as a Professor, was appointed as the Director of the Indian Institute of Carpet Technology (hereinafter referred to as ‘IICT’) vide order dated November 15, 2018. It was for a period of three years or on his attaining age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. Respondent no.1 accepting the terms of the appointment, joined on the post and worked till the expiry of three years. Thereafter, vide letter dated April 1, 2022, he was granted extension for a period of six months i.e. upto September 30, 2022. A writ petition was filed in this Court for quashing the advertisement dated August 19, 2022 published for selection to the post of Director, IICT; order dated July 6, 2022 vide which direction was issued for initiating process of selection of new Director of IICT, Bhadohi; order dated July 26, 2022 vide which request was made for publishing advertisement for the post of Director, IICT in the employment newspaper and for allowing respondent no.1 to continue on the post, till he attains the age of superannuation. 3. Learned Single Judge while quashing the orders dated July 6 and July 27, 2022 and also the advertisement dated August 19, 2022 declared that the respondent no.1 is entitled to work on the post of Director, IICT, till he attains the age of superannuation in terms of Rule 8.2 of the General Service Rule falling under Chapter-II of IICT Service Rules, 2016 i.e. 65 years. 4. The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that in pursuance of the advertisement issued, respondent no.1, working with the Institute as a Professor, applied for the post. He was selected and appointed on purely temporary basis for a period of three years or on his attaining age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. Further extension was to be considered by the Executive Committee depending upon his performance and suitability for the post. Respondent no.1 had consciously and unconditionally accepted the terms of appointment and joined. Respondent no. 1 is a well educated person and the case does not involve unequal bargaining power. Further extension was to be considered by the Executive Committee depending upon his performance and suitability for the post. Respondent no.1 had consciously and unconditionally accepted the terms of appointment and joined. Respondent no. 1 is a well educated person and the case does not involve unequal bargaining power. Respondent no.1, having accepted the terms of appointment, continued working without raising any issue for a period of three years. As process for regular selection to the post of Director got delayed, he was granted extension for a period of six months vide letter dated April 1, 2022, which was to expire on September 30, 2022. Before expiry of aforesaid period, an advertisement was issued on August 19, 2022 for selection to the post of Director, IICT. It was at this stage that respondent no.1 filed writ petition, which was too late and barred by principles of acquiescence and estoppel. In fact, after expiry of the extension granted to respondent no.1, he had handed over charge of the post on September 30, 2022 and thereafter he had joined his parent Department i.e. U.P. Textile Technology Institute, Kanpur. At this stage, this is too late for respondent no.1 to have claimed that he should be allowed to continue as the Director of the Institute. The Institute is merely a society. The rules or instructions issued by it as such have no force of law as these are not framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The appointment of respondent no.1 being temporary, as it was specifically mentioned in the appointment letter, will not confer any right on him for treating him a Director appointed on regular basis. In support of the arguments, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others, [ (2022) 2 SCC 25 ]. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no.1 submitted that as the advertisement did not mention that appointment of respondent no.1 will be on temporary basis for a fixed tenure, the condition put in the appointment letter was totally illegal. The fact that even the probation period was mentioned in the appointment letter shows that the intention of the appointing authority was to offer regular appointment to respondent no.1, otherwise in a tenure post probation period is never mentioned. The fact that even the probation period was mentioned in the appointment letter shows that the intention of the appointing authority was to offer regular appointment to respondent no.1, otherwise in a tenure post probation period is never mentioned. In support of argument, reliance has been placed on judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Somesh Thapliyal vs. Vice Chancellor, H.N.B. Garhwal University, [ (2021) 10 SCC 116 ] and in Krishna Rai and others vs. Banaras Hindu University and others, [ AIR 2022 SC 2924 ]. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. 7. What emerges from the facts on record are that respondent no. 1 was working as a Professor in the Institute. An advertisement was issued by IICT for appointment as Director of IICT on November 15, 2018. Respondent no.1 being successful was appointed. The letter of appointment clearly stated that the same was on purely temporary basis for a tenure of three years, which may be extended, in case, his work is found to be satisfactory. 8. The terms of appointment also provided that there would be probation of two years. Respondent no.1 specifically accepting the terms on which he was offered appointment, joined on the post and worked for three years. As the process of recruitment could not be initiated, respondent no.1 was granted extension for a period of six months on April 1, 2022. The same was to expire on September 30, 2022. Still without raising any finger, respondent no.1 continued on the post accepting the terms for extension of service. An advertisement was issued in Employment News, August 13-19, 2022 for recruitment to the post of Director, IICT. It was at this stage that respondent no.1 approached this Court raising the issue that his appointment at the initial stage should have been treated as regular appointment and not temporary or one for a fixed tenure. As on date, the fact remains that after expiry of extended period of six months on September 30, 2022, respondent no.1 had already relinquished his charge as Director of IICT and has returned back to his parent cadre in the Institute and joined there. Respondent no.1 had consciously accepted the terms of appointment and joined. It may be out of place, if not mentioned here, that respondent no.1 is not an illiterate employee where bargaining power was not there. Respondent no.1 had consciously accepted the terms of appointment and joined. It may be out of place, if not mentioned here, that respondent no.1 is not an illiterate employee where bargaining power was not there. He is a well educated person, who was already working in the Institute as a Professor and was offered appointment as Director of IICT. His case is not of unequal bargaining power. 9. The facts of the present case are identical to the case of N.Murugesan and others’ case (supra). In the aforesaid case before Hon’ble the Supreme Court, an advertisement was made to fill up the post of Director General of Central Power Research Institute (CRPI), either by direct recruitment or on deputation as per the Rules. The respondent therein applied for the post on direct recruitment. An order of appointment was issued by the Ministry of Power, which was accepted by the respondent. The respondent went on performing his part of duties without any demur. On finding his tenure coming to an end, he submitted a representation taking a stand that since his appointment was made by way of direct recruitment, he should be treated as regular employee and, therefore, is entitled to continue till the date of his superannuation. However, the extension of term of respondent was not found in the interest of the Institute and another person was recruited and selected as the new Director General. Aggrieved, the respondent filed two writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka questioning the relieving order given to him and also to the advertisement issued for recruitment of new Director General. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches. The appeals filed by the respondent before the Division Bench was allowed without granting an order of reinstatement by compensating the respondent. The other relief sought by the respondent was also not considered and granted. The said order of the Division Bench was the bone of contention before Hon’ble the Supreme Court. While dismissing the appeal, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in N.Murugesan and others’ case (supra) opined that such cases are governed by principles of delay, laches, acquiescence followed by approbation and reprobation. Relevant paragraphs 25, 26, 37 and 38 are being reproduced hereinbelow : “25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. Relevant paragraphs 25, 26, 37 and 38 are being reproduced hereinbelow : “25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis. 26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally. xxxx 37. We have already dealt with the principles of law that may have a bearing on this case. There is no element of an unequal bargaining power involved. Nobody has forced the respondent to enter into a contract. He indeed was an employee of the society for 23 years. We do not wish to go into the question as to whether it is a case of re-employment or not, as the fact remains that the respondent wanted the job, which is why there was an unexplained and studied reluctance to raise the issue of him being a permanent/regular employee, but only at the fag end of his tenure. 38. The first of the representations was made on 30.12.2014, followed by others. The conduct speaks for itself. Hence, on the principle governing delay, laches and acquiescence, followed by approbation and reprobation, respondent no. 1 ought not to have been granted any relief by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the interpretation of the rules, we have already discussed that there is no prohibition in law for a tenure appointment. We are dealing with a post that stands at the top realm of the administration. There is an intended object and rationale attached to the post. It is the incumbent of the post who has to carry forward the object and vision in the field of research. As noted earlier, there is certainly an overwhelming public interest involved. The employer, has a load of discretion available. In the absence of any arbitrariness, one cannot question its wisdom. After all, a decision has been taken at the highest level. We cannot infer that materials have not been placed before taking the decision. The Division Bench was not right in holding that the highest constitutional authority on the executive side was misled by the lower officials. We find no place for such an inference. A conscious decision has been made to go for a tenure appointment in the interest of society. Similarly, a conscious decision was also made to go for a fresh recruitment.” 10. We find no place for such an inference. A conscious decision has been made to go for a tenure appointment in the interest of society. Similarly, a conscious decision was also made to go for a fresh recruitment.” 10. In the case in hand, respondent no.1 accepted the terms of his appointment and thereafter joined as Director, hence, he cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Even no issue was raised by him immediately after joining as Director with reference to his terms of appointment. The issue was not raised even till the completion of his initial term of appointment i.e. three years which expired on March 31, 2022. Six months’ extension was granted. Even at that stage, no issue was raised. It is only when fresh advertisement for recruitment on the post of Director was published, respondent no.1 raised the issue, hence, the petition filed by respondent no.1 was barred on account of delay and laches also. 11. None of the Rules cited by respondent no.1 will confer any right on him as there is no bar therein for appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed tenure. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in N.Murugesan and others’ case (supra) has held in paragraph 32 as follows : “32. The Rules per se do not prohibit a tenure appointment. The definition of direct recruitment would mean recruitment through a process stipulated under the Rules. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination, one can interpret that all direct recruitments are to be made by regular employment. Therefore, direct recruitment can also be made for filling up the post on a tenure basis. Hence, in the absence of any statutory bar under the Rules, a tenure appointment made through direct recruitment by following the due procedure cannot be termed as contrary to law. In a direct recruitment, the appointment on a regular or tenure basis is the discretion of the employer, especially when the Rules do not prohibit. Rule 48 speaks of the age of superannuation for a regular employee, which will be the completion of sixty years. There is no difficulty in appreciating the said rule, which deals with a regular employee alone and therefore can have no application while dealing with an appointment made on a tenure basis. Rule 48 speaks of the age of superannuation for a regular employee, which will be the completion of sixty years. There is no difficulty in appreciating the said rule, which deals with a regular employee alone and therefore can have no application while dealing with an appointment made on a tenure basis. After all, a court of law cannot give a different status to an employee than the one which was conferred and accepted especially when the same is not prohibited under the Rules.” 12. As far as judgment in Somesh Thapliyal’s case (supra) is concerned, the same has been considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in N.Murugesan and others’ case (supra). The concept of bargaining power applied by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Somesh Thapliyal’s case (supra) is also missing in the present case. As far as judgment in Krishna Rai’s case (supra) is concerned, it was reiterated that there can be no estoppel against law. The said case was with respect to interpretation of statutory Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, there are no such Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and, as such, the theory of no estoppel against statute is not applicable. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, in our view, the impugned order dated October 14, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be legally sustained. The same is hereby set aside and as a consequence, the writ petition filed by respondent no.1 is dismissed. 14. The Special Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.