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2023 DIGILAW 304 (BOM)

Santana Rodrigues v. Francisco Xavier

2023-01-25

B.P.COLABAWALLA

body2023
JUDGMENT 1. This Writ Petition was originally ordered to be heard along with Writ Petition No.1389 of 2021 (F) as the parties were the same. However, all parties have agreed that Writ Petition No.1947 of 2021 (F) be heard first and disposed of and thereafter Writ Petition No.1389 of 2021 (F) be taken up. Accordingly, Rule is issued in the above Writ Petition. With the consent of parties, Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally. 2. Writ Petition No.1947 of 2021 (F) [the above Writ Petition] was originally disposed of by a Judgment and Order dtd. 3/8/2022. After this order was passed, the Petitioner herein, preferred a Review Application to review/set aside the said order inter alia on the ground that the said order did not take into consideration the binding decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [ (2015) 7 SCC 58 ], and neither did it consider or deal with the arguments canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner [on the basis of the said Judgment]. This Court, after hearing the parties, by its order dtd. 10/1/2023, allowed the Review Application and set aside the order dtd. 3/8/2022. Consequently, it was directed that the Writ Petition be placed on board for admission once again. This is how the matter has come up before me today. 3. The above Writ Petition is filed challenging the order dtd. 25/8/2021 [for short the "impugned order"] passed by Respondent No. 3, which is Appellate Authority under Sec. 7 of The Goa Regularization of Unauthorized Construction Act, 2016, (for short the 'Act of 2016'). The short point involved in this Writ Petition is whether Respondent No.3, while exercising appellate powers under Sec. 7 of the Act of 2016, has the power to condone the delay in case the Appeal is filed beyond the period sixty days from the date the Authorized Officer passed his order [under Sec. 3 of the Act]. 4. Since this is the limited issue raised in this Writ Petition, very few facts need to be noted. In the Writ Petition it is stated that the Predecessor of the Petitioner filed a complaint dtd. 13/9/2006 with Respondent No. 5 against the illegal construction of a RCC structure carried out by Respondent No.1 on property bearing Survey No. 166/1 of Village Borim of Ponda. In the Writ Petition it is stated that the Predecessor of the Petitioner filed a complaint dtd. 13/9/2006 with Respondent No. 5 against the illegal construction of a RCC structure carried out by Respondent No.1 on property bearing Survey No. 166/1 of Village Borim of Ponda. It was the case of the Petitioner that Respondent No.1 illegally constructed the RCC structure under the garb of repairs. 5. Due to the inaction of Respondent No.5, the Petitioner filed an Application [dtd. 3/10/2006] under Sec. 66(5) of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 before the Deputy Director of Panchayats. The Deputy Director of Panchayats, by his order dtd. 19/7/2010, allowed the Application and directed Respondent No.1 to demolish the illegal construction, failing which, Respondent No. 5 was directed to demolish the illegal structure and file a compliance report. 6. It appears that thereafter, there were several cross litigations between the parties [as set out in the Petition], but which are not really germane for the purpose of deciding the issue raised in the present Petition. Suffice it to state, that on 16/10/2018, Respondent No.1 filed an application for regularization under the Act of 2016 before Respondent No.4. The said application was filed under Sec. 3(1) of the Act of 2016. On 6/12/2018, Respondent No.4 rejected the application filed by Respondent No.1 [dtd. 16/10/2018] seeking regularization. It is to challenge this order of Respondent No.4 that Respondent No.1 filed an Appeal before Respondent No.3 under Sec. 7 of the said Act of 2016. This Appeal was filed on 22/3/2021 i.e. after a delay of approximately two years and four months from the date of the order passed by Respondent No.4 on 6/12/2018. This Appeal was entertained by Respondent No.3 and the impugned order came to be passed, which is challenged in this Petition. 7. In this factual backdrop, Mr. Gaonkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submitted that Respondent No.1 filed an application seeking regularization of the unauthorized construction on 16/10/2018 under Sec. 3(1) of the Act of 2016. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that the Authorized Officer - Deputy Collector and S.D.O. (Respondent No.4), declined to regularize the unauthorized construction and informed Respondent No.1 vide his order dtd. 6/12/2018. Mr. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that the Authorized Officer - Deputy Collector and S.D.O. (Respondent No.4), declined to regularize the unauthorized construction and informed Respondent No.1 vide his order dtd. 6/12/2018. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that under the Act of 2016, if any person is aggrieved by an order passed by the Authorized Officer [under Sec. 3], he can file an Appeal before the Government, and which Appeal must be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of passing of such order. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that the Act of 2016 does not empower the Appellate Authority [Respondent No.3] to condone the delay in filing the Appeal if it is preferred beyond the period of sixty days. Mr. Gaonkar submitted that this is apart from the fact that the Appeal was entertained by Respondent No.3 without there being any application seeking condonation of delay. 8. The aforesaid submissions of Mr. Gaonkar were based on the premise that Respondent No.3, not being a Court, and further, in the absence of any power to condone the delay in the Act of 2016, Respondent No.3 could not have assumed jurisdiction to entertain and thereafter dispose of the Appeal filed by Respondent No.1. He submitted that the power of Respondent No.3 to condone delay flows from the provisions of the relevant law. If the relevant law specifies a period of limitation, then the power to condone delay under the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be called in aid. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by Respondent No.3 was wholly without jurisdiction and must be set aside. In support of the aforesaid proposition, Mr. Gaonkar placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra). 9. On the other hand, Mr. Rodrigues, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1, supported the impugned order contending that the Appeal filed against the decision of the Authorized Officer, may be filed within sixty days from the decision, but this is not a rule of limitation as understood by the Limitation Act in general. Mr. Rodrigues argued that the statutory scheme of the Act of 2016, does not suggest that an Appeal cannot be preferred and entertained beyond the period of sixty days. Mr. Mr. Rodrigues argued that the statutory scheme of the Act of 2016, does not suggest that an Appeal cannot be preferred and entertained beyond the period of sixty days. Mr. Rodrigues submitted that since the consequence of filing an Appeal beyond the prescribed period not being provided in the Act of 2016, it is possible to hold that an Appeal, even if filed beyond the period of sixty days, can be dealt with or decided by Respondent No.3 by invoking and/or resorting to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In support of this proposition, Mr. Rodrigues relied upon a Judgment of this Court in the case of Sangitabai w/o. Vasudeo Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2017 (6) Mh. L.J. 841] and a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Sarathy vs. State Bank of India [ (2000) 5 SCC 355 ]. 10. Mr. Rodrigues thereafter submitted that the Act of 2016 is a local law prescribing a period of limitation for filing an Appeal, and which is different from the period prescribed in the Limitation Act. This being the case, Mr. Rodrigues relied upon the provisions contained in Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and submitted that, therefore, the Appeal entertained by Respondent No.3 against the order passed by the Respondent No.4 beyond the period of sixty days, cannot be faulted. Consequently, he submitted that Respondent No. 3 was well within his jurisdiction in entertaining the Appeal under Sec. 7 of the Act of 2016 and hence, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is warranted. 11. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and I have also perused the papers and proceedings in the above Writ Petition. As mentioned earlier, the short and narrow point to be decided in the facts of the present case is whether Respondent No.3, whilst entertaining an Appeal filed by Respondent No.1 under Sec. 7 of the Act of 2016, had the power to condone the delay. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then certainly no interference is called for in the impugned order passed by Respondent No.3. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then certainly no interference is called for in the impugned order passed by Respondent No.3. On the other hand, if he had no power to condone the delay, then, consequently, the impugned order passed by Respondent No.3 would be without jurisdiction and would have to be set aside under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. To my mind, the issue raised in this Petition is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra). In this decision, the Supreme Court has in no uncertain terms, held that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to Courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies and Tribunals. As far as the Application of the provisions of Sec. 29(2) is concerned, the Supreme Court has clearly held that a bare reading of the said Sec. shows that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court opined that this would necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the Schedule. The Supreme Court further clarified that such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the Schedule are only to Courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. The Supreme Court therefore went on to hold that where a suit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule, is to be filed in a Court under a special or local law, that the provisions of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act would come into play. To come to this conclusion, the Supreme Court also took aid of what is stipulated in Sec. 29(3) of the Limitation Act and opined that this was another important pointer to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation Act, including Sec. 29(2), would apply to only three kinds of proceedings mentioned, all of which are to be filed in Courts. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra), reads thus: "21. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra), reads thus: "21. Under our constitutional scheme of things, the judiciary is dealt with in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI. Chapter IV of Part V deals with the Supreme Court and Chapter V of Part VI deals with the High Courts and courts subordinate thereto. When the Constitution uses the expression "court", it refers to this Court system. As opposed to this court system is a system of quasi-judicial bodies called Tribunals. Thus, Articles 136 and 227 refer to "courts" as distinct from "tribunals". The question in this case is whether the Limitation Act extends beyond the court system mentioned above and embraces within its scope quasi-judicial bodies as well? 22. A series of decisions of this Court have clearly held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and does not apply to quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Town Municipal Council, Athaniv. Presiding Officer [ (1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51 ], a question arose as to what applications are covered under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It was argued that an application made under the Industrial Disputes Act to a Labour Court was covered by the said article. This Court negatived the said plea in the following terms: (SCC pp. 882- 83, para 12) 12. "This point, in our opinion, may be looked at from another angle also. When this Court earlier held that all the articles in the Third Division to the Schedule, including Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, governed applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only, it clearly implied that the applications must be presented to a court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Even the applications under the Arbitration Act that were included within the Third Division by amendment of Articles 158 and 178 were to be presented to courts whose proceedings were governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. At best, the further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the Third Division of the Schedule so as also to include some applications presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. At best, the further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the Third Division of the Schedule so as also to include some applications presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. One factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications must be to courts to be governed by the articles in this Division. The scope of the various articles in this Division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. The alterations made in the article and in the new Act cannot, in our opinion, justify the interpretation that even applications presented to bodies, other than courts, are now to be governed for purposes of limitation by Article 137." Similarly, in Nityananda, M. Joshi vS. LIC [ (1969) 2 SCC 199 ], this Court followed the judgment in Athani case [ (1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51 ] and turned down a plea that an application made to a Labour Court would be covered under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. This Court emphatically stated that Article 137 only contemplates applications to courts in the following terms: (Nityananda, M. Joshi case [ (1969) 2 SCC 199 ], SCC p. 200, para 3) 3. "In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications to courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. Further Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is 'when the court is closed'. Again under Sec. 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. Again under Sec. 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Limitation Act, 1963." 23. In Kerala SEB vS. T.P. Kunhaliumma [ (1976) 4 SCC 634 ], a three-Judge Bench of this Court followed the aforesaid two judgments and stated: (SCC p. 639, para 22) 22. "The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case [ (1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51 ] and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act." This judgment is an authoritative pronouncement by a three- Judge Bench that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to quasi-judicial tribunals. Athani case [ (1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51 ] was dissented from on a different proposition- that Article 137 is not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure alone. So long as an application is made under any statute to a civil court, such application will be covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. ************** 28. Two other judgments of this Court need to be dealt with at this stage. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Sec. 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. This was done by applying the provision of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the Limitation Act would apply to the appellate authority constituted under Sec. 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. This was done by applying the provision of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Despite referring to various earlier judgments of this Court which held that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals, this Court in this case held to the contrary. In distinguishing the Parson Tools case [ (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743 ], which is a three-Judge Bench binding on the Court that decided Mukri Gopalan case [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], the Court held: (Mukri Gopalan case [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], SCC p. 23, para 18) 18. "... If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither Sec. 29(2) nor Sec. 14(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before him. But so far as this Court is concerned it did not go into the question whether Sec. 29(2) would not get attracted because the U.P. Sales Tax Act Judge (Revisions) was not a court but it took the view that because of the express provision in Sec. 10(3-B) applicability of Sec. 14(2) of the Sales Tax Act was ruled out. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that but for such an express conflict or contrary intention emanating from Sec. 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act which was a special law, Sec. 29(2) would have brought in Sec. 14(2) of the Limitation Act even for governing period of limitation for such revision applications. In any case, the scope of Sec. 29(2) was not considered by the aforesaid decision of the three learned Judges and consequently it cannot be held to be an authority for the proposition that in revisional proceedings before the Sales Tax Authorities functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act Sec. 29(2) cannot apply as Mr Nariman would like to have it." It then went on to follow the judgment in CST v. Madan Lal Das and Sons [ (1976) 4 SCC 464 : 1977 SCC (Tax) 27], which, as has been pointed out earlier, is not an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals. In fact, Mukri Gopalan case [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ] was distinguished in OmPrakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [ (2010) 9 SCC 183 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 648], at para 22 as follows: (Om Prakash case [ (2010) 9 SCC 183 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 648], SCC p. 188) 22. "The decision in Mukri Gopalan case [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ] relied upon by Mr Ujjal Singh is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the facts of the said case, it was the District Judges who were discharging the functions of the appellate authority and being a court, it was held that the District Judge, functioning as the appellate authority, was a court and not persona designata and was, therefore, entitled to resort to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. That is not so in the instant case where the Rent Controller appointed by the State Government is a member of the Punjab Civil Services and, therefore, a persona designata who would not be entitled to apply the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as in the other case." The fact that the District Judge himself also happened to be the appellate authority under the Rent Act would have been sufficient on the facts of the case for the Limitation Act to apply without going into the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to tribunals. ************ 33. The sheet anchor in Mukri Gopalan [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ] was Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Sec. 29(2) states: "29. Savings.- (1)*** (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." A bare reading of this Sec. would show that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule. This would necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the Schedule. We have already held that such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the Schedule are only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule is to be filed in a court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted. This is made even clearer by a reading of Sec. 29(3). Sec. 29(3) states: "29. Savings.-(1)-(2)*** (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law." When it comes to the law of marriage and divorce, the Sec. speaks not only of suits but other proceedings as well. Such proceedings may be proceedings which are neither appeals nor applications thus making it clear that the laws relating to marriage and divorce, unlike the law of limitation, may contain proceedings other than suits, appeals or applications filed in courts. This again is an important pointer to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation Act including Sec. 29(2) would apply only to the three kinds of proceedings mentioned all of which are to be filed in courts." (Emphasis supplied) 13. After the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra), this proposition has once again been reiterated in the case of Ganesan vs. T. N. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board [ (2019) 7 SCC 108 ]. In this decision also, the Supreme Court has once again opined that the suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a Court. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, are not suits, appeals and applications, which are to be filed before a statutory authority. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, are not suits, appeals and applications, which are to be filed before a statutory authority. The Supreme Court has opined that the operation of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Court and not before the statutory authorities. It has however opined that the special law or local law, vide its statutory scheme, can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act, or exclude the applicability of any provision thereof, which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of that particular special or local law. In other words, what the Supreme Court has held is that the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sec. 5, can very well be applied in deciding an appeal by a statutory authority which is not a Court provided the same falls within the statutory scheme of the special or local law. The relevant portion of this decision, reads thus: "35. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji [Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 ], needs to be noticed. In the above case the question was as to whether delay in filing an appeal before the court under Sec. 19 is condonable under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This Court held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasijudicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. In para 3 the following has been laid down : (SCC pp. 592-93) "3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah case [Kandula Venkaiah v. Kolli Venkateswara Rao, 1977 SCC OnLine AP 146 : (1977) 2 AP LJ 382] is perfectly correct and sound. 592-93) "3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah case [Kandula Venkaiah v. Kolli Venkateswara Rao, 1977 SCC OnLine AP 146 : (1977) 2 AP LJ 382] is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court [Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, (1969) 1 SCC 873 ], Nityananda, M. Joshi v. LIC [Nityananda, M. Joshi v. LIC, (1969) 2 SCC 199 ] and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad [Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361 ] that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Sec. 90 of the Act not being a court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him." 36. This Court in Sakuru case [Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 ], however, further held that the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, to extend the prescribed period of limitation which needs to be examined looking to the scheme of the special statute. Sec. 93 of the Act was a provision pertaining to the applicability of the Limitation Act. Referring to the said provision this Court held that the 1958 Act does not indicate that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. The following was further laid down in para 3 : (Sakuru case [Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 ], SCC p. 593) "3. ... But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. ... But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is Sec. 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms: '93. Limitations.-Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period.' On a plain reading of the Sec. it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to "computation of the period of limitation". The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Ss. 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sec. 5 is not a provision dealing with "computation of the period of limitation". It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Sec. 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah case [Kandula Venkaiah v. Kolli Venkateswara Rao, 1977 SCC OnLine AP 146 : (1977) 2 AP LJ 382] that Sec. 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector." ************* 43. The most elaborate judgment holding that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to the tribunals is the judgment of this Court in M.P. Steel Corpn. The most elaborate judgment holding that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to the tribunals is the judgment of this Court in M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE [M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510]. Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. speaking for the Court reviewed all the earlier judgments of two-Judge and three-Judge Benches of this Court. In paras 11 to 35 all the earlier judgments have been considered. In the above case, the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appeal is barred by time and the Commissioner (Appeals) had no power to condone the delay beyond the period specified in Sec. 128 of the Customs Act. In the above case, benefit of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act was sought. It was contended before this Court that while Sec. 2 of the Limitation Act, Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act was also applied to criminal, special or local law. This Court noticed the ingredients of applicability of Sec. 14. The two- Judge Bench has held relying on earlier judgments of this Court that provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable only to suits, appeals and applications filed in courts. Sec. 29(2) was also considered by this Court and the following was laid down in para 33 : (M.P. Steel Corpn. case [M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510], SCC pp. 85-86) "33. ... Sec. 29(2) states: '29. Savings.- (1) * * * (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.' A bare reading of this Sec. would show that the special or local law described therein should prescribe for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule. This would necessarily mean that such special or local law would have to lay down that the suit, appeal or application to be instituted under it should be a suit, appeal or application of the nature described in the Schedule. We have already held that such suits, appeals or applications as are referred to in the Schedule are only to courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. It is clear, therefore, that only when a suit, appeal or application of the description in the Schedule is to be filed in a court under a special or local law that the provision gets attracted. This is made even clearer by a reading of Sec. 29(3). Sec. 29(3) states: '29. Savings.- (1)-(2) * * * (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.' When it comes to the law of marriage and divorce, the Sec. speaks not only of suits but other proceedings as well. Such proceedings may be proceedings which are neither appeals nor applications thus making it clear that the laws relating to marriage and divorce, unlike the law of limitation, may contain proceedings other than suits, appeals or applications filed in courts. This again is an important pointer to the fact that the entirety of the Limitation Act including Sec. 29(2) would apply only to the three kinds of proceedings mentioned all of which are to be filed in courts." 44. The two-Judge Bench in M.P. Steel Corpn. [M.P. Steel Corpn. vS. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510], however, held that the provisions of Sec. 14 would certainly apply. We in the present case are concerned only with applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. ************* 59. The ratio which can be culled from the abovenoted judgments, especially judgments of three-Judge Benches, as noted above, is as follows: 59.1. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a court. 59.2. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.3. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a court. 59.2. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.3. Operation of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.4. However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law. 60. We, thus, answer Questions (2) and (3) in the following manner: 60.1. The applicability of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a court. 60.2. Sec. 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. The Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Sec. 69 of the 1959 Act is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Sec. 5 shall not be attracted by strength of Sec. 29(2) of the Act. Question (4) 61. A special or local law can very well provide for applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act. The provisions of the Limitation Act including Sec. 5 can very well be applied in deciding an appeal by statutory authority which is not a court by the statutory scheme of special or local law. We, thus, need to notice the provisions of the 1959 Act as to whether the scheme under the 1959 Act shows that enactment intended to apply Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. 62. Sec. 110 provides for procedure and powers at inquiries under Chapters V and VI. The Commissioner hears appeals under Sec. 69 which is under Chapter V of the Act. Sec. 110 of the Act is as follows: "110. 62. Sec. 110 provides for procedure and powers at inquiries under Chapters V and VI. The Commissioner hears appeals under Sec. 69 which is under Chapter V of the Act. Sec. 110 of the Act is as follows: "110. Procedure and powers at inquiries under Chapters V and VI.- (1) Where a Commissioner or a Joint Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner makes an inquiry or hears an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI, the inquiry shall be made and the appeal shall be heard, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) to the trial of suits or the hearing of appeals, as the case may be. (2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Central Act 1 of 1872) and the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (Central Act 10 of 1873), shall apply to such inquiries and appeals. (3) The Commissioner or a Joint Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner holding such inquiry or hearing such an appeal shall be deemed to be a person acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 (Central Act 18 of 1850)." 63. The mere fact that a statutory authority is empowered to follow the procedure as nearly as may be in accordance with procedure under CPC to the trial of suits or hearing of appeals, the statutory authority shall not become a court. There is nothing under Sec. 110 which indicates that the Limitation Act is also made applicable in hearing of the appeal. 64. Sec. 115 deals with limitation. It only provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed under the 1959 Act for any proceeding, suit, appeal or application for revision against any order or decree passed under this Act, the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of such order or decree shall be excluded. 65. The provision of Sec. 69 of the 1959 Act also indicates that legislature never contemplated applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in proceedings before the Commissioner. Sec. 69(2) noted above provides that any order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may, in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in sub-sec. Sec. 69(2) noted above provides that any order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may, in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in sub-sec. (1) may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine the records of the proceedings to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be. 66. Thus, Sec. 69(2) gives suo motu power to the Commissioner to call for and examine the records of the proceedings of Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in sub-sec. (1). Thus, in case appeal is not filed within 60 days against the order of Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner is vested with suo motu power to call for and examine the records. The suo motu power has been given to the Commissioner to correct the orders of Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner even if no appeal has been filed within 60 days. Giving of suo motu power to the Commissioner is with the object to ensure that an order passed by the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner may be corrected when an appeal is not filed within time under Sec. 69(1). The scheme of Sec. 69 especially sub-sec. (2) also reinforces our conclusion that the legislature never contemplated applicability of Sec. 5 in Sec. 69(1) for condoning the delay in filing an appeal by applying Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act." (Emphasis supplied) 14. Since these are the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I will now examine whether the statutory scheme of the Act of 2016 provides for the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act including Sec. 5 thereof. The Act of 2016 comprises of ten Ss. . Sec. 2 sets out the definitions and Sec. 3 deals with regularization of unauthorized construction. It inter alia stipulates that any person who has carried out unauthorized construction in the property specified therein before 28/2/2014, may make an application for regularization to the Officer authorized by the Government within a period of 210 days from the date of coming into force of the said Act. It inter alia stipulates that any person who has carried out unauthorized construction in the property specified therein before 28/2/2014, may make an application for regularization to the Officer authorized by the Government within a period of 210 days from the date of coming into force of the said Act. Sec. 4 talks about amendments of the Schedules to the said Act and Sec. 5 deals with grants to local Authorities. Sec. 6 deals with duties of Officers under the Act and Sec. 7 deals with Appeals. Sec. 7 reads as under: "7. Appeals. - Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the authorized officer may prefer an appeal to the Government within a period of sixty days from the date of passing of such order." 15. As can be seen from this Sec., any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Authorized Officer, may prefer an Appeal to the Government (Respondent No.3 in the present case) within a period of sixty days from the date of passing of such order. This Sec. does not give any power to Respondent No.3 to condone the delay in filing an Appeal beyond the period of sixty days. After carefully going through the various provisions of the Act of 2016, including all its Ss., I do not find that the Act of 2016, within its statutory scheme, provides for the applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act, including Sec. 5, which would empower Respondent No.3 to condone the delay in filing the Appeal. Once this is the case, then clearly, Respondent No. 3 could not have entertained the Appeal filed by Respondent no.1 herein beyond statutory period of sixty days. This is clearly an error apparent on the face of the record which would require interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Having said this, it would only be fair to deal with the decisions relied upon by Mr. Rodrigues. The first decision relied upon by Mr. Rodrigues was the decision of Sangitabai w/o. Vasudeo Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra). The facts of this case were that Sangitabai had contested the Gram Panchayat elections. After she was elected, a dispute was filed before the Additional Collector to the effect that she was disqualified, since her third child was born after the cut-off date i.e. 12/9/2001. (supra). The facts of this case were that Sangitabai had contested the Gram Panchayat elections. After she was elected, a dispute was filed before the Additional Collector to the effect that she was disqualified, since her third child was born after the cut-off date i.e. 12/9/2001. Upon holding inquiry, the Additional Collector held that the Petitioner had earned disqualification. Being aggrieved by this, she filed an Appeal before the Additional Divisional Commissioner along with an application for condonation of delay. The Additional Divisional Commissioner rejected the application for condonation of delay. That Order was challenged by Sangitabai in Writ Petition No 2658 of 2018. In the context of these given facts, it was argued that Sec. 16(2) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1958, is unconstitutional to the extent it restricts the period of limitation, which begins to run from the date of passing the the order and not from the date of its knowledge. In Sangitabai w/o. Vasudeo Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), the Division Bench of this Court referred to the Judgment in the case of Maruti Vasant Kashid vs. Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division and Ors. (Writ Petition No. 1213 of 2011 decided on 8/7/2011) wherein a view was taken that the words used in the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act is "appeal to the State Government" and does not contemplate "filing of appeal". In other words, a person aggrieved may appeal to the State Government in contra distinction in filing an Appeal or preferring an Appeal to the State Government. Sangitabai w/o. Vasudeo Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) is, therefore, not a proposition for the argument that an Authority other than a Court has the power to condone the delay by resorting to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act even though no such specific power to condone the delay is granted by the statute. In any event, even if the Judgment in Sangitabai w/o. Vasudeo Rajput vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) was to be read as laying down a proposition that Sec. 5 can be invoked by a quasi-judicial Authority and/or a Tribunal, without anything more, the same would be directly contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court in M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) and Ganesan vs. T. N. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board (supra). I, therefore, find that the reliance placed on this decision is wholly misplaced and is of no assistance to Mr. Rodrigues. 17. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Rodrigues is a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Sarathy vs. State Bank of India [ (2000) 5 SCC 355 ]. The facts of this case would reveal that the Appellant before the Supreme Court instituted a Regular Civil Suit in the City Civil Court at Madras for a declaration that the removal of the Appellant was illegal, ultra vires and invalid. In order to bring the suit within the period of limitation, the Appellant claimed benefit of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that he had represented to the Local Board and, thereafter, filed an Appeal under Sec. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 and was prosecuting those proceedings with due diligence. It was contended by the opposite party that the Appellate Authority under Sec. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops Establishments Act, 1947 is not a Court and the benefit under Sec. 14 could not be legally given to the Appellant whose suit had been rightly held to be beyond time by the Trial Court as also by the High Court. It is in these facts, that the Supreme Court observed that Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a Civil Court but speaks only of a Court. The Supreme Court opined that it is not necessary that the Court spoken of in Sec. 14 should be a Civil Court. Any Authority or Tribunal having the trappings of a Court would be a Court within the meaning of the said Sec. . This decision is not for the proposition that the limitation in its entirety will apply to quasi-judicial Bodies and/or Tribunals. In fact, this Judgment has been considered by the Supreme Court in its decision in M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has once again stated that it must be remembered that the word 'Court' refers only to a proceeding which proves to be abortive and, in this context, for Sec. 14 to apply, two conditions have to be met. First, the primary proceeding must be a suit, appeal or application filed in a Civil Court; and Second, it is only when it comes to excluding time in an abortive proceeding that the word "court" has been expanded to include proceedings before Tribunals. Paragraph 34 of M. P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) reads thus: "34. It now remains to consider the decision of a two-Judge Bench in P. Sarathy v. SBI [ (2000) 5 SCC 355 : 2000 SCC (L &S) 699]. This judgment has held that an abortive proceeding before the appellate authority under Sec. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 would attract the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as the appellant in this case had been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding before the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, which appeal was dismissed on the ground that the said Act was not applicable to the nationalised banks and that, therefore, such appeal would not be maintainable. This Court made a distinction between "civil court" and "court" and expanded the scope of Sec. 14 stating that any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a "court" within the meaning of Sec. 14. It must be remembered that the word "court" refers only to a proceeding which proves to be abortive. In this context, for Sec. 14 to apply, two conditions have to be met. First, the primary proceeding must be a suit, appeal or application filed in a civil court. Second, it is only when it comes to excluding time in an abortive proceeding that the word "court" has been expanded to include proceedings before tribunals." (Emphasis supplied) 18. This being the case, I find that even the decision relied upon by Mr. Rodrigues in the case of P. Sarathy vs. State Bank of India (supra), is of no assistance to him. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am clearly of the view that Respondent No.3 had no power to condone the delay beyond the period of sixty days [as stipulated in Sec. 7 of the Act of 2016] in the Appeal filed before him by Respondent No.1. The impugned order dtd. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am clearly of the view that Respondent No.3 had no power to condone the delay beyond the period of sixty days [as stipulated in Sec. 7 of the Act of 2016] in the Appeal filed before him by Respondent No.1. The impugned order dtd. 25/8/2021 passed by Respondent No. 3, therefore, clearly suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record, and hence, is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms and the Writ Petition is also disposed of in terms thereof. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 20. This Judgment will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.