JUDGMENT : Hemant M. Prachchhak, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 07.11.1996 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No.76 of 1996 whereby the accused – respondents herein came to be acquitted from the charge of the offences punishable under Sections 304(B), 306, 34 etc. the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”), the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”). 2. Briefly stated, the complainant – Ajitsinh Parshottamdas Thakor registered complaint with Vadodara J. P. Road Police Station, Vadodara inter alia stating that he was doing agricultural work and he was also a social worker. It is alleged that elder daughter of complainant Nitaben was married with accused – Ramesh and she was residing along with her father-in-law and mother-in-law and her sister-in-laws namely Niranjanaben and Sangitaben were also residing along with them. It is alleged that Nitaben came to her parental house and often and often she told the complainant that the accused persons demanded dowry and they harassed her mentally and physically and, thereafter, the complainant after understanding sent her to the matrimonial house. It is further alleged that on 08.02.1996 at about 4.00 p.m., when the complainant was at the office of Taluka Panchayat at that time he received a phone call from Mangalmurti Society that he reached at the house of the accused immediately. It is also alleged that the complainant reached at the house of the accused and saw that the accused were present at the house and Nitaben was lying on surface in straight condition and the complainant asked about happening with Nitaben, but none had given any reply. It is alleged that the complainant checked Nitaben, thereupon, he knew that Nitaben was died. 3. Pursuant to the FIR lodged by the complainant, investigating agency carried out the investigation and recorded statements of the prosecution witnesses, drawn various panchanamas and collected relevant expert evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. After having found sufficient material against the respondents herein, charge-sheet came to be filed before the concerned Magistrate Court. Since the case was exclusively triable by Sessions Court, concerned Magistrate Court committed the case to the Sessions Court as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. After having found sufficient material against the respondents herein, charge-sheet came to be filed before the concerned Magistrate Court. Since the case was exclusively triable by Sessions Court, concerned Magistrate Court committed the case to the Sessions Court as provided under section 209 of the Code. 4. Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court learned Sessions Judge framed charge at Exhibit 3 on 25.07.1996 against the accused - respondents herein for the aforesaid offence. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined 12 prosecution witnesses and also produced documentary evidence before the learned trial Court, which is as under :- Oral evidence: Sr.No Name of witnesses Exhibit 1 Ajitsinh Parshottamdas Thakor-complainant and father of the deceased 11 2 Madhuben wife of Ajitsinh Thakor-mother of the deceased 14 3 Dilavarsinh Bhailalbhai Vaghela-brother-in-law of the accused 15 4 Sushilaben Dilavarsinh Vaghela-sister-in-law of the accused 16 5 Kalpnaben Jayeshbhai Solanki-first wife of accused no.3 20 6 Tarlikaben Tulsibhai Solanki-Neighbour 23 7 Ilaben Ajitbhai Thakor-sister of the deceased 24 8 Suvarnaben Dineshchandra Mehta-Neighbour 25 9 Ramchandra Prabhatsinh Barot-PSI 26 10 Bhaskarrao Ramdas Simpi-Investigating Officer 27 11 Mahendrabhai Malubhai Patel-Panch witness 36 12 Nayanbhai Meshubhai Modi-Medical officer 37 Documentary Evidence: Sr.No Documents Exhibit 1 Complaint 12 2 Letter written by the complainant to the Police Commissioner 13 3 Inquest panchnama 17 4 Panchnama of the scene of offence 18 5 Postmortem report of the deceased Nitaben 19 6 Copy of the application for maintenance filed by earlier wife of accused - Rameshbhai 21 7 Divorce deed of Rameshbhai 22 8 Application of temporary bail of accused Maniben 29 9 Application of temporary bail of accused Rameshbhai 31 10 Application of extension of temporary bail filed by the accused 33 6. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial Court recorded further statements of respondents as provided under Section 313 of the Code, wherein, the respondents herein denied their involvement in the offence and stated that false case has been filed against them. After hearing both the sides and after appreciating evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned Additional Judge acquitted the respondents herein from the charge of offence under Sections 304(B), 306, 34 etc. the Indian Penal Code. 7. After hearing both the sides and after appreciating evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned Additional Judge acquitted the respondents herein from the charge of offence under Sections 304(B), 306, 34 etc. the Indian Penal Code. 7. We have heard Mr.Chintan Dave, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat and Mr.M. B. Gohil, learned advocate for respondents and minutely examined the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced before the learned Trial Court discussed at great length in the impugned judgment itself. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State of Gujarat has mainly referred to and relied upon the depositions given by P.W.1 Ajitsinh Parshottamdas Thakor at Exhibit 11, P.W. 2 Madhuben Ajitsinh Thakor at Exhibit 14, P.W.3 Dilavarsinh Bhailalbhai Vaghela at Exhibit 15 and P.W.6 Tarlikaben Tulsibhai Solanki at Exhibit 23. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the said witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution and the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of those witnesses in its true spirit. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has, while referring to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, submitted that as per Section 113-A, the presumption ought to have been drawn against the accused persons as the death of the deceased was after eight months from the date of marriage and, therefore, the respondents – accused are required to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498(A) of the IPC. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further submitted that the suicidal death is proved and the ill-treatment was given to the deceased and from the evidence of the said witnesses, it transpires that the accused have given mental torture and cruelty to the deceased and instigated the deceased to commit suicide. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has urged to hold the accused guilty and convict them for the alleged offence. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 9. Per contra, learned advocate appearing for the respondents – accused has submitted that the version of the witnesses before the Trial Court does not inspire any confidence and there is material contradiction and even there is also contradiction in the depositions of the father and mother of the deceased. 9. Per contra, learned advocate appearing for the respondents – accused has submitted that the version of the witnesses before the Trial Court does not inspire any confidence and there is material contradiction and even there is also contradiction in the depositions of the father and mother of the deceased. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents that as per the case of the prosecution, the witnesses have tried to improve their version before the Court which they have not stated before the concerned police at the relevant time and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of those witnesses while passing the impugned judgment and order. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents that there is no any evidence worth the name with regard to the demand of dowry or any ill-treatment given by the accused to the deceased for the demand and dowry. Learned advocate for the respondents has submitted that from the deposition of the sister of the deceased namely Ilaben, it clearly transpires that there was no any ill-treatment or demand with regard to the dowry. Learned advocate for the respondents has submitted that mere death of the deceased after eight months from the date of marriage, the presumption cannot be drawn as per the provision of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. Learned advocate for the respondents has submitted that there is no iota of evidence to connect the accused with the alleged crime. He has prayed to confirm the impugned judgment and dismiss the present appeal. Learned advocate for the respondents has relied upon the following decisions:- (1) Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2021) 2 SCC 427 more particularly paragraphs no.25 to 58; (2) State of Gujarat Vs. Raval Deepakkumar Shankerchand rendered in Criminal Appeal No.1125 of 1995 dated 21.03.2022 by this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice S. H. Vora and Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sandeep N. Bhatt); (3) Mariano Anto Bruno and another Vs. Inspector of Police reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1387; 10. In the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraph No.51 as under:- “51. Inspector of Police reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1387; 10. In the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraph No.51 as under:- “51. The Court noted that before a person may be said to have abetted the commission of suicide, they "must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide". Instigation, as this Court held in Kishori Lal Vs. State of M. P., (2007) 10 SCC 797 , "literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do anything". In S. S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari, observed: (SCC p. 197, para - 25) "25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide." 11. In the case of Mariano Anto Bruno and another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs No.27 and 48 as under:- “27. Abetment is defined under Section 107 of IPC which reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing:- A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. 48. It is well settled that the Courts ought to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. Reference may be made to the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, wherein this Court set-aside the conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 306 IPC as ingredients of Section 306 IPC were not satisfactorily proved. It was observed as under :- “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 21. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr. this Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. this Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” (emphasis supplied) 12. We have appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record before us. We have appreciated the evidence of P.W.1 Ajitsinh Parshottamdas Thakor at Exhibit 11, P.W. 2 Madhuben Ajitsinh Thakor at Exhibit 14, P.W.3 Dilavarsinh Bhailalbhai Vaghela at Exhibit 15 and P.W.6 Tarlikaben Tulsibhai Solanki at Exhibit 23 and closely examined the depositions of the said witnesses. From perusal of the evidence of those witnesses, it appears that they have improvised their versions before the Trial Court. On bare perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, it appears that there is material contradictions in their depositions. We have also considered the written arguments made by learned advocates for both the sides. 13. It is worthwhile to refer to Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as under:- “[113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. – When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]” 14. Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]” 14. While considering the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangat Ram Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 214 SC 1782. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraph No.26 as under:- “26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Hans Raj V/s. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257 , wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and held that, unlike Section 113B of the Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. This Court held that, under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are established, the Court is not bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 113A, therefore, gives discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word cruelty in Section 498-A IPC.” 15. It is now abundantly clear that without there being any cogent and convincing evidence the presumption cannot be drawn for the offence under Section 498A or under the Dowry Prohibition Act. From the bare perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 and more particularly Exhibit 12 and 13 in the form of FIR and the application made to the Commissioner of Police, the complainant himself admitted before the Trial Court that he has not stated anything with regard to the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased nor he has stated with regard to the demand of dowry by the accused. It also appears from the evidence of these witnesses that the articles which came to be given to the deceased at the time of marriage, are lying in the house of the respondents as it is and, therefore, the say of the witnesses with regard to the demand of dowry itself is nullified the case of the prosecution. In view of the discrepancy in the evidence of witnesses, the Trial Court, after appreciating evidence, found it appropriate to extend benefit of doubt to the respondents. On our re-assessment and re-appreciation of entire evidence, we do not find that there is any infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by the learned Trial Court. Under the circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and we also endorse the view/finding of the Trial Court leading to the acquittal. 16. Under the circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and we also endorse the view/finding of the Trial Court leading to the acquittal. 16. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 17. In the case of Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280 , Supreme Court has held as under: “The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal." 18. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another Vs. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 19. For the foregoing reasons, we do not deem it safe to place reliance on the testimony of P.W.1 Ajitsinh Parshottamdas Thakor at Exhibit 11, P.W. 2 Madhuben Ajitsinh Thakor at Exhibit 14, P.W.3 Dilavarsinh Bhailalbhai Vaghela at Exhibit 15 and P.W.6 Tarlikaben Tulsibhai Solanki. 20. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 21. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 22. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 . The relevant paragraph of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa (supra) reads as under:- “The following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 23. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 24. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 07.11.1996 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No.76 of 1996 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be transmitted back to the concerned Court forthwith.