JUDGMENT : 1. Through the medium of this petition, the petitioner-State seeks setting-aside of the Order dated 19th October 2010, passed by the court of Principal District & Sessions Judge, Kupwara (for short “Trial Court”) on the grounds made mention of therein. 2. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 3. Perusal of the file reveals that on 28th November 2009, one Alam Din Khan S/o Noor ud din Khan R/o Dragad, lodged a written complaint in police station Tangdar, alleging that Shireena Begum D/o Sharief Din R/o Dragad, his Niece, was married to accused about two years back but the accused had been giving beating to her every day and that in view of beating given to her she left for her parental house on 25th November 2009, but on the next day she was made to go back to her matrimonial house but on 26th November 2009 the accused beat here. On 28th November 2009, the accused again gave beating to her and caused her death. This resulted in registration of case FIR no.42/2009 under Section 302 RPC. 4. During investigation, as prosecution would contend, dead body of deceased was subjected to post-mortem examination and the viscera was sent to FSL, Srinagar, for chemical analysis. Police also caused seizure of wearing garments of deceased. Site map was prepared and beddings and nylon rope from the house of the accused was seized. Statement of witnesses was recorded. While the report about viscera was awaited and on the basis of investigation conducted, the offence under Section 302 RPC was found made out against accused, who was arrested on 24th December 2009. An incomplete Challan was presented on 22nd October 2010 in the court of JMIC, Kupwara, who committed the case for trial to the Trial Court. 5. According to counsel for petitioner, the Trial Court has not only admitted the accused/respondent to bail in a heinous offence, like 302 RPC, but has also discharged him without following the procedure made out prima facie in the charge sheet produced before the court under Section 173 Cr.P.C. It is also contended that since certain documents were awaited and the prosecution has power under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. to submit further report in respect of the evidence collected which too has not been appreciated but instead the accused stands let off in a most mechanical manner. He also avers that medical evidence also suggests death of wife of accused has been caused because of cardio respiratory arrest and it was to be established by prosecution that the rope has been used for strangulation of wife of accused which chance, however, has not been afforded to prosecution. It is also contended by counsel for petitioner that the Trial Court, at the stage of charge, without appreciating the law on the point which was pari materia to the facts and circumstances of the case, discharged accused/ respondent on the count that post mortem report which reflects that the death has been caused due to cardio respiratory arrest, which post mortem report though being confronted by evidence on record as also by the evidence to be deposed by the prosecution witnesses more particularly the experts who have conducted the post mortem examination at the threshold that too of a very heinous offence under Section 302 RPC. He also states that the Trial Court while admitting that the actual cause of death can be ascertained from the FSL report, which is yet to be examined by the Trial Court as the same has not been produced before the Trial Court, when the accused came to be discharged of heinous offence under Section 302 RPC, virtually of no material. 6. Counsel for petitioner also submits that prosecution has not been provided a chance to adduce evidence in support of their charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. but the Trial Court on a cursory look, on the report of post mortem, has not only opined to decide the case of a dowry death without following the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. It is also contention of counsel for petitioner that the Trial Court on a technical point without applying judicial mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected by prosecution as well as law produced before the Trial Court by prosecution, has not been considered but instead on a flimsy report that postmortem report suggests cause of death as cardio respiratory arrest discharged the accused of a very heinous offence under Section 302 RPC committed by accused because of demand of dowry. 8. 8. He also contends that Trial Court has exercised jurisdiction of discharge irrationally, illegally without appreciating the material on record and converted the dowry death involving Section 302 RPC into Section 498-A and 323 RPC when the death has occurred, as such, the offence under Section 302 RPC cannot be converted into the aforesaid provision of law. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions of parties, it may be noticed that Section 268 and 269 of the J&K Code of Criminal Procedure [which are pari materia to Section 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Central)] pertain to trial of cases before the courts of Sessions. It is also to be seen whether a prima facie case is made out to frame charge or not. It is, thus, appropriate to reproduce Section 268 and 269 Cr.P.C. hereunder: “268. Discharges: If upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 269. Framing of charge: (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which - a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, he may frame charge against the accused and by order, transfer the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any Judicial Magistrate competent to try the case, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any Judicial Magistrate to whom a case may have been transferred shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure provided for the trial or warrant cases instituted on police report, b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub section (1) the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 10. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub section (1) the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 10. A conjoint reading of Sections 268 and 269 Cr.P.C. provides that upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted, if a Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against accused, he shall discharge accused and if after such consideration and hearing, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that accused has committed offence, he may frame charges against accused or transfer the case to CJM or Judicial Magistrate if he is of the opinion that offence made out against accused is triable by a Magistrate. At the initial stage if there is strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against accused. The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 269 Cr.P.C., has the undoubted power to sift and weigh evidence for limited purpose to find out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused is made out. The law on the subject laid down by the Supreme Court in this respect is discussed as herein below. 11. It is no longer res integra that the Court while considering question of framing charge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. is not a to act as a mere post office or mouthpiece of prosecution but has to apply its judicial mind to the materials on record and has to consider broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of evidence and documents produced before the Court and any basic infirmities appearing in the case. It the power to sift and weigh the evidence for limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against accused has been made out and where material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge. 12. It the power to sift and weigh the evidence for limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against accused has been made out and where material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge. 12. In case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in AIR 2013 SC 52 , the Supreme Court held as under: - “12. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court from earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, 1977 Cri.LJ 1125; State of Maharashtra and others v. Som Nath Thapa and others, 1996 Cri. LJ 2448; and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, 2000 Cri.LJ 3504. In Som Nath’s case (supra) the legal position was summed up as under: “if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution have to be accepted as true at that stage.” 13. So also in Mohanlal’s case (supra) this Court referred to several previous decisions and held that the judicial opinion regarding the approach to be adopted for framing of charge is that such charges should be framed if the Court prima facie finds that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the material produced was sufficient to convict the accused. The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal’s case (supra) is in this regard apposite: “8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal’s case (supra) is in this regard apposite: “8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 14. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 , this Court was considering whether the trial Court can at the time of framing of charges consider material filed by the accused. The question was answered in the negative by this Court in the following words: “18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced...Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well- settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression 'hearing the submissions of the accused' cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the state of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police... xx xx xx xx 23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material...” (emphasis supplied) 15. Even in Smt Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364 , reliance whereupon was placed by counsel for the appellants the tests to be applied at the stage of discharge of the accused person under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C., were found to be no different. Far from readily encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a strong suspicion in regard to the commission of the offence would be sufficient to justify framing of charges. The Court observed: "While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code, it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall sub serve the requirements of law. 16. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another (1979) 3 SCC 4 , where this Court was examining a similar question in the context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legal position was summed up as under: “10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: 1. The legal position was summed up as under: “10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: 1. That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out: 2. Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. 3. The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. 4. That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouth- piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” 13. The powers of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., which is pari materia to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Central) are partly administrative and partly judicial. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Muniswami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 , has held that Section 482 Cr.P.C. envisages three circumstances, in which inherent jurisdiction can be exercised, namely, to give effect to an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure, to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and to secure the ends of justice. 14. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Muniswami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 , has held that Section 482 Cr.P.C. envisages three circumstances, in which inherent jurisdiction can be exercised, namely, to give effect to an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure, to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and to secure the ends of justice. 14. The object of conferring such powers on the High Court is to clothe the highest court in a State with a jurisdiction of general supervision and superintendence in order to correct grave failure or miscarriage of justice arising from erroneous or defective orders. The inherent powers of the High Court are, thus, to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that subordinate criminal courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse the powers vested in them by the Code. The High Court can exercise its powers suo moto or on any petition of any aggrieved party or even on the application of any person. Cases where there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is manifest error on point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice, the power can be exercised. The exercise of inherent powers is justified only to set right grave injustice not merely to rectify every error however inconsequential. Inherent powers confer jurisdiction on the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court. The object of the inherent powers is to confer upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions of apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. 15. 15. Now coming to the present case, from the perusal of prosecution case, it is evident that on 28 November 2009, Alam Din Khan S/o Noor ud din Khan R/o Dragad lodged a written complaint in police station Tangdar against accused alleging therein that Shireena Begum D/o Sharief din R/o Dragad, his niece, was married to accused about two years back but accused had been giving beating and teasing her every day and that on 28th November 09, accused again gave a beating to her and caused her death. FIR no.42/09 under Section 302 RPC was lodged. During investigation the dead body of the deceased was subjected to post-mortem examination and the viscera was sent to FSL Srinagar for chemical analysis. It is apparent from perusal of order impugned that incomplete Challan was produced on 22nd October 2010 in the court of JMIC, Kpuwara, who committed the case for trial to the Trial Court. It is also evident from perusal of order impugned that opinion of FSL, Srinagar, was yet to be received when the order impugned came to be passed by the Trial Court. While considering and writing down the submissions of counsel for parties, the counsel appearing for accused stated that even if it is assumed that death of victim was caused due to beating given by accused-husband, yet it could not be said that accused intended to cause her death and that at the most the accused could be charged for offence punishable under Section 304 Part II RPC. Perusal of order impugned reveals that post-mortem examination report in clear cut manner mentions that “keeping the post-mortem findings in view it is presumed that the apparent cause of death is Cardio Respiratory Arrest, precipitated by gangrene of the gut sent to FSL. However, the definite cause of death will be established only after the FSL report of the different viscera is received”. The Trial Court has admitted that FSL report of the viscera has not been placed on file. The Trial Court has even mentioned that on the basis of the witnesses examined by prosecution it is prima facie made out that Mst Shireena happened to be wife of accused, and he would often beat her and on the day of occurrence, the accused slapped her and also kicked her abdomen and thereafter on the same day she died. The Trial Court has even mentioned that on the basis of the witnesses examined by prosecution it is prima facie made out that Mst Shireena happened to be wife of accused, and he would often beat her and on the day of occurrence, the accused slapped her and also kicked her abdomen and thereafter on the same day she died. This important aspect of the matter has been grossly ignored by the Trial Court while passing order impugned, discharging the accused of offence punishable under Section 302 RPC and charged him for commission of offences punishable under Section 498A and 323 RPC. As can be seen from impugned order, the Trial Court has mentioned that the witnesses examined by prosecution have prima facie made out that Mst Shireena happed to be wife of accused and accused had been given often beating to her and even on the day of occurrence, accused slapped her and kicked her abdomen and subsequently on the same day she died. How she died was yet to come to surface in unequivocal terms as FSL report was yet to be produced before the Trial Court. Without waiting for the FSL report, the Trial Court discharged accused of offence punishable under Section 302 RPC and charged him with the commission of offences punishable under Section 498A and 323 RPC. Therefore, the Trial Court without waiting for the report/opinion of FSL, Srinagar, has passed order impugned, which when looked into from all, reflects miscarriage of justice, which needs to be prevented. 16. The Trial Court has misdirected itself in discharging the accused of commission of offence punishable under Section 302 RPC. As already held that at the time of framing of charge, court has to form an opinion as to whether there is sufficient material to frame charge or not; but at the time of passing final judgment, the court has to form opinion as to whether prosecution has proved his case beyond reasonable doubts or not. The court is not required to conduct mini trial while passing the order of charge or discharge. As already held the court has to come to the conclusion as to whether accused might have committed offence or not. In present case the Trial Court has ignored the fact that FSL report/opinion was yet to be received when impugned order came to be passed by it. 17. As already held the court has to come to the conclusion as to whether accused might have committed offence or not. In present case the Trial Court has ignored the fact that FSL report/opinion was yet to be received when impugned order came to be passed by it. 17. In view of above, I am of the considered opinion that order impugned is illegal, incorrect and is not according to cardinal principles of law governing the subject. Therefore, this petition is allowed and Order impugned dated 19th October 2010, passed by the court of Principal District & Sessions Judge, Kupwara, is set-aside. The Trial Court is directed that it may proceed in the matter and frame the charges only after going through the report/opinion of FSL, Srinagar. 18. Copy of this order be sent to court below for compliance.