JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri H. G. S Parihar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Meenakshi Singh Parihar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vinod Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents State. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “(i) A writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari thereby quashing of the impugned order dated 17.02.2011 passed by Additional director of General Police/Director Traffic U.P./opposite party No.2, order dated 30.04.2010 passed by opposite party No.3 and order dated 12.10.2009 passed by Superintendent of Police, Hardoi/opposite party No.5 as contained in Annexure No.1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition. (ii) A writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite parties to allow the petitioner to work on the post of constable and pay him salary regularly.” 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Constable in U.P. Police on 20.11.1976 and on 9.5.2006 the petitioner while posted at Reserve Police Line, Hardoi, was given custody of an accused to be produced before the Sessions Court at Hardoi. The petitioner had gone to Court of Sessions at Hardoi along with the accused Sunder Lal alias Sundariya on 9.5.2006. The accused Sunder Lal alias Sundariya had ran away from the custody of the petitioner. An FIR was lodged in case crime No.665 of 2006 under Section 224 IPC at PS Kotwali Sadar, district Hardoi against the accused Sunder Lal alias Sundariya. The petitioner was served the order dated 12.5.2006 by which the punishment order was passed under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Rank (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1991 and by the said order, the services of the petitioner were dismissed. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed on 10.8.2006. 4. The petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.8113 (S/S) of 2009 challenging the dismissal order dated 12.5.2006 whish was dismissed vide order dated 21.9.2006 on the alternative remedy of revision. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred revision before the O.P. No.3 which was dismissed. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed on 10.8.2006. 4. The petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.8113 (S/S) of 2009 challenging the dismissal order dated 12.5.2006 whish was dismissed vide order dated 21.9.2006 on the alternative remedy of revision. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred revision before the O.P. No.3 which was dismissed. The petitioner filed another Writ Petition No.861 (S/S) of 2007 challenging the order of dismissal, appellate order and revisional order and the petition was allowed on 7.1.2009 by this Court and direction was issued that the fresh departmental proceedings may be completed if so desired, by the answering respondents. 5. In pursuance of the order dated 9.2.2009, the petitioner was reinstated in service. The chargesheet was served on 28.2.2009 on the petitioner to which the petitioner submitted his reply on 18.3.2009. The Inquiry Officer submitted inquiry report on 24.3.2009. In pursuance of the inquiry report, a show cause notice was issued on 12.6.2009 and the petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 9.7.2009 denying charges. The disciplinary authority passed dismissal order on 12.10.2009 which was challenged by way of the Writ Petition No.157 (S/S) of 2010 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 13.1.2010 on the ground of alternative remedy. The petitioner preferred appeal against the order of dismissal which was dismissed on 30.4.2010 and thereafter, the petition has preferred revision against the said order dated 30.4.2010 which was dismissed by the competent authority on 17.2.2011. Hence the present petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken a specific stand in the petition that while passing the orders impugned, there is violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and opportunity of hearing has not been provided because the Inquiry Officer did not fix date, time and place and no evidence was adduced by the Inquiry Officer. Necessary averments have been made in paragraph 21 and 34 of the petition. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that while filing counter affidavit, there is no specific denial of paragraph-21 of the petition which is replied in paragraph-12 of the counter affidavit. He has submitted that it is thus, clear that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The documents were not proved and without providing oral opportunity, the order has been passed. He has submitted that it is thus, clear that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The documents were not proved and without providing oral opportunity, the order has been passed. In paragraph-34 of the petition, reply has been given in paragraph-20 of the counter affidavit wherein, it has been stated that the order has been passed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8 (4) (a) of the Rules, 1991. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the petitioner has never accepted charges rather, he has submitted before the authority that he should be pardoned and looking into his family responsibility, he should be reinstated. He has further submitted that acceptance to the extent that the charges are accepted, does not mean that the petitioner has accepted charges. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State Sri Vinod Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the order has been passed in consonance with the Rule 8 (4) (a) of Rules, 1991. He has submitted that the punishment order has been passed in Appendix-I of Rules, 1991 and he has further submitted that since the petitioner had accepted the charges, therefore, the order was passed in consonance with the Rules, 1991 and therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of dismissal passed against the petitioner. 8. Sri H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on several judgments of Apex Court in the case of Chamoli District Cooperative Bank Limited and another. Vs. Raghunath Sigh Rana and others, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 204 ; State of Uttar Pradesh and others. Vs. Szaroj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 ; Roop Singh Negi. Vs. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 ; State of Uttaranchal and others. Vs. Kharak Singh, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 ; Dinesh Kumar Sharma. Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in [2018 (Suppl.) ADJ 123 (DB)]; The Chairman. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd.,Lucknow and another. Vs. Subhash Pratap Bagri and others., reported in [2019 (37) LCD 2855]; Parasu Ram Singh. Vs. Secretary of Agriculture, U.P. Lucknow and others, reported in [2008 (26) LCD 1522]; Radhey Kant Khare. Vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd., reported in [2003 (21) LCD 610]; Radhey Shyam Singh. Vs. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd.,Lucknow and another. Vs. Subhash Pratap Bagri and others., reported in [2019 (37) LCD 2855]; Parasu Ram Singh. Vs. Secretary of Agriculture, U.P. Lucknow and others, reported in [2008 (26) LCD 1522]; Radhey Kant Khare. Vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd., reported in [2003 (21) LCD 610]; Radhey Shyam Singh. Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in [ 2018 (8) ADJ 82 (LB). 9. In the case of Chamoli District Cooperative Bank Limited (supra), Supreme Court has held that principle of natural justice should be followed while departmental inquiry is conducted. If no reasonable opportunity is provided such inquiry is vitiated. Relevant portion of paragraph 20 and 21 are quoted below:- “20. The Apex Court again in SBI v. R.K. Jain and Ors., reported in (1972) 4 SCC 304 held that if an inquiry is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to the delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. In para 23, the following was laid down:-(SCC pp. 316-17) “23. ......As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601 , the termination of an employee's service must be preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, it is evident that if the inquiry is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to a delinquent to place his defence, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice...…” 21. The Apex Court in State of Uttranchal & Ors. Vs. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 had occasion to examine various contours of natural justice which need to be specified in a departmental inquiry. The Apex Court noticed earlier judgments where principles were laid down as to how inquiry is to be conducted. It is useful to refer paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15, which are to the following effect:-(SCC pp 240-44) “9. … Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 10. It is useful to refer paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15, which are to the following effect:-(SCC pp 240-44) “9. … Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 10. The following observations and principles laid down by this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Anr. [1964] 3 SCR 652 are relevant: "... ... In the present case, the first serious infirmity from which the enquiry suffers proceeds from the fact that the three enquiry officers claimed that they themselves had witnessed the alleged misconduct of Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would not disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are not prepared to accept this argument. If an officer himself sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who does not claim to be an eye-witness of the impugned incident. As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. If an officer claims that he had himself seen the misconduct alleged against an employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. How the knowledge claimed by the enquiry officer can vitiate the entire proceedings of the enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry itself. ... ..… ..... It is necessary to emphasise that in domestic enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that the course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another infirmity in this enquiry." 11) In ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 , it was held: "(1) Where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. ** * Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article 311(2) in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 12) In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State, Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Another, (1999) 2 SCC 2, it was held: "34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee --even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases." 13) In Syndicate Bank and Others vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati , (2006) 3 SCC 150 , the following conclusion is relevant: "18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice, being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of the delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice." 15. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any. (emphasis in original)” 10. Similar controversy arose before Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The relevant paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the said judgment are quoted below:- “28. (emphasis in original)” 10. Similar controversy arose before Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The relevant paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the said judgment are quoted below:- “28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 28. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the employee. 29. When a department enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.” Supreme Court has rendered the judgment and law has been declared to the extent that the Inquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority. The Inquiry Officer is not supposed to be a representative of the department rather, he has to act in judicious manner by giving full opportunity to the delinquent employee. 11. The case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) has also been considered by the Supreme Court in regard to the present controversy. Relevant paragraph-14 of the said judgment is quoted below:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. 11. The case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) has also been considered by the Supreme Court in regard to the present controversy. Relevant paragraph-14 of the said judgment is quoted below:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.” 12. Similar controversy has been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Parasu Ram Singh (supra). Relevant paragraph6 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “6. It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner was placed under suspension and thereafter a charge sheet dated 19.5.1984 was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner was allowed to inspect the documents by the Enquiry Officer n 19.1.1985 and thereafter he submitted reply to the charge sheet before the Enquiry Officer on 21.1.1985. The Enquuiry Officer on the basis of the charges levelled in the charge sheet and the reply submitted by the petitioner, submitted the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority who passed the impugned dismissal order on 26.8.1985. It is admitted case of the parties that after filing of the charge sheet and submission of reply by the petitioner to the charge sheet, no oral enquiry was held in the matter. The Department has also not examined any witness to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge sheet. This Court has already held that after the charge sheet is given to a delinquent employee an oral enquiry is must, whether the employee requests for it or not. The Department has also not examined any witness to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge sheet. This Court has already held that after the charge sheet is given to a delinquent employee an oral enquiry is must, whether the employee requests for it or not. The record which has been produced before us reveals that after submission of reply to the charge sheet, no date or time was fixed by the Enquiry Officer for recording of evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the Department to prove the charges as also for the defence witnesses for holding the enquiry. We are of the view that the petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing and no oral enquiry as required by law was held. The case law relied upon by the learned Standinig Counsel in Regional Manager U.P. SRTC, Etawah and others v Hoti Lal and another, reported in (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 605 and Sahadeo Singh and others v. Union of India and others, JT 2003 (10) SC 665 are not applicable to the facts of the present case as in the instant case, before passing the dismissal order no enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and no witness was examined by the opposite parties to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner. The impugned dismissal order is legally not sustainable.” 13. On the other hand, Sri Vinod Kumar Singh learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law of the Appendix-I issued under Rule 14 (1) of the Rules, 1991 and it has been submitted that since the charges were accepted by the petitioner, there was no requirement to call for any witness because the petitioner had submitted that he has to say nothing and requested to conclude the departmental proceedings on the basis of his statement. It has been submitted that since the charges were admitted, the Inquiry Officer has dispensed with the procedure to summon the witnesses and submitted inquiry report on the basis of the reply of the petitioner. He has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Bhamra. Vs. Bank of India & others, reported in 2016 (4) SCC 204 . 14. Heard parties and perused the record. 15. He has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Bhamra. Vs. Bank of India & others, reported in 2016 (4) SCC 204 . 14. Heard parties and perused the record. 15. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is necessary to be looked into in relation to the present controversy. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is quoted below:- "311. Vs. Bank of India & others, reported in 2016 (4) SCC 204 . 14. Heard parties and perused the record. 15. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is necessary to be looked into in relation to the present controversy. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is quoted below:- "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by a authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank ins satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause ( 2 ), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." Sub-clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India provides that delinquent employee should be given reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges and further it is mentioned that penalty will be imposed on the basis of evidence adduced during the inquiry. 16. In the present case, it is apparent that no such oral inquiry was conducted, witnesses were not called, nor date, time and place was fixed and the petitioner was also not crossed examined. Only on the premise that he had accepted his charges, the Inquiry Officer forwarded the inquiry report. Thus, the inquiry is vitiated because, unless the witnesses are called and the documents are proved by providing opportunity of hearing, it would not be justified on the part of the Inquiry Officer to dispense with the procedure only on the basis of admission of the petitioner. 17. The Inquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority and his responsibility is just to act like an adjudicator. Even in absence of the delinquent employee, it has to be seen by him whether the evidence are sufficient to hold that charges are proved. Unless witnesses are called, documents are proved, the Inquiry Officer cannot hold that the inquiry is complete and only on the basis of the reply of the delinquent employee he would forward the report to the disciplinary authority. The object of the principles of natural justice is to ensure that the Government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment. 18. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the State counsel Sri Vinod Kumar Singh is overruled because the inquiry has not been done in accordance with principles of natural justice and it is violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The argument that the inquiry has been done in consonance with the Rule 14 (1) Appendix-I of the Rules, 1991, is not sustainable because the Inquiry Officer has not fixed date, time and place for inquiry and witnesses have not been summoned and documents have not been proved. In absence of such procedure, the inquiry is vitiated. Therefore, the impugned order cannot survive in the eyes of law. The appellate authority and revisional authority have also not looked into the aforesaid legal proposition. Therefore, the orders passed by them also suffer from illegality. 19. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. In absence of such procedure, the inquiry is vitiated. Therefore, the impugned order cannot survive in the eyes of law. The appellate authority and revisional authority have also not looked into the aforesaid legal proposition. Therefore, the orders passed by them also suffer from illegality. 19. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. The orders dated 17.2.2011 passed by the O.P. No.2, Additional Director General of Police/Director Traffic U.P., Lucknow, the order dated 30.4.2010 passed by the O.P. No.3, Inspector General of Police, Lucknow Range, Lucknow and the order dated 12.10.2009 passed by the O.P. No.5, Superintendent of Police, Hardoi contained in Annexure No.1, 2 and 3 respectively to the writ petition, are quashed. The disciplinary authority is directed to complete the inquiry within five months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The reinstatement and back wages if any, will be subject to final orders passed by the disciplinary authority.