JUDGMENT : SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM, J. 1. The captioned first appeal is filed by the defendant No. 1 questioning the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance wherein plaintiff’s suit is decreed declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner of the suit schedule property. Consequently, defendant No. 1 is directed to handover possession of the suit schedule property. The trial Court has also ordered for separate enquiry for mesne profits. 2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the Court below. 3. The original plaintiff namely Rachappa @ Rachaiah who is the father of defendant No. 2 instituted suit seeking relief of declaration of title and possession of the suit schedule property. The original plaintiff contended that defendant No. 2 is the son and suit item No. 1 bearing Sy. No. 56/1 measuring 50 guntas was purchased by plaintiff under registered sale deed dated 08.06.1957. Therefore, plaintiff claimed that item No. 1 is his self acquired property. Plaintiff further pleaded that defendant No. 2 who is the son managed to get his name mutated to the revenue records in 1987-88 and based on mutation, his son i.e. defendant No. 2 sold item No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 under registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988. The original plaintiff claimed that there is no partition between himself and his son i.e. defendant No. 2 and further pleaded that his son taking undue advantage of his illiteracy has alienated item Nos.1 and 2 under registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988. The plaintiff also specifically pleaded that he was dispossessed by defendant No. 1 and hence, sought relief of declaration to declare sale deed dated 24.03.1988 executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 as an invalid document and not binding on plaintiff. 4. On receipt of summons, defendant No. 1 contested the proceedings and filed written statement. Defendant No. 2 failed to contest the proceedings and was placed ex-parte. The defendant No. 1 stoutly denied the claim of original plaintiff Rachappa that item No. 1 was self acquisition of original plaintiff. Admitting the relationship of original plaintiff and defendant No. 2, defendant No. 1 claimed that plaintiff had no independent earning and therefore, he purchased item No. 1 by utilizing joint family funds. The defendant No. 1 stoutly denied the claim of original plaintiff Rachappa that item No. 1 was self acquisition of original plaintiff. Admitting the relationship of original plaintiff and defendant No. 2, defendant No. 1 claimed that plaintiff had no independent earning and therefore, he purchased item No. 1 by utilizing joint family funds. Defendant No. 1 on the contrary claimed that plaintiff had agreed to sell his lands under agreement to sell dated 13.05.1987 and had received part consideration and it was only after due deliberation between deceased plaintiff and defendant No. 2, the extent in Sy. No. 57/2 was altered and thereafter defendant No. 2 on authorization from deceased plaintiff has sold two items under registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988. The defendant No. 1 further claimed that pursuant to alienation, he got his name mutated to the revenue records and the same is never challenged by the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 further contended that execution of sale deed by defendant No. 2 and its registration was never disputed by the deceased plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 further contended that plaintiff and defendant No. 2 having alienated the property for valuable sale consideration cannot seek possession from defendant No. 1 who has acquired valid right and title. Defendant No. 1 also specifically pleaded that suit is barred by limitation and a plea of adverse possession was also set up by plaintiff. On these set of defence, defendant No. 1 sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 to substantiate their respective claim led oral and documentary evidence. 6. The trial Court based on rival pleadings, formulated the following issues: “(1) Whether plaintiff proves that suit schedule property item No. 1 is his self acquired property and item No. 2 is joint family property? (2) Whether plaintiff proves that the sale deed executed by 2nd defendant in favour of 1st defendant on 24.03.1988 is not binding? (3) Whether defendant No. 1 proves that suit is barred by limitation? (4) Whether defendant No. 1 proves that he is in possession adverse to the title of plaintiff and thereby perfected his right by way of adverse possession? (5) Whether plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits? (6) Whether plaintiff is entitled for relief sought for? (7) What order?” 7. (3) Whether defendant No. 1 proves that suit is barred by limitation? (4) Whether defendant No. 1 proves that he is in possession adverse to the title of plaintiff and thereby perfected his right by way of adverse possession? (5) Whether plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits? (6) Whether plaintiff is entitled for relief sought for? (7) What order?” 7. The trial Court after examining the pleadings of the parties and having assessed oral and documentary evidence let in by both the parties, though held that suit item No. 1 is also ancestral property, however, while answering issue No. 2 in the affirmative, held that defendant No. 2 had no authority to sell the suit schedule property when his father (deceased plaintiff) was alive. The trial Court was of the view that defendant No. 1 has not made due enquiry and therefore, he being a stranger purchaser has not filed a suit for general partition. The trial Court referring to agreement to sell executed by deceased plaintiff vide Ex.D-2, found that agreement was in respect of some other survey number while under the sale deed, the defendant No. 2 has virtually sold some other properties. The trial Court further drew adverse inference in regard to sale deed vide Ex.P-9 on the ground that it does not refer to the agreement of sale. It is in this background, the trial Court proceeded to hold that defendant No. 1 has failed to prove that sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 would bind the deceased plaintiff. The trial Court was of the view that defendant No. 2 could have alienated his share and not his fathers share under the sale deed dated 24.03.1988 vide Ex.P-9. The trial Court while answering issue No. 4 in the negative, proceeded to hold that suit property being joint family ancestral property, deceased plaintiff is entitled to secure possession of the properties. Consequently, suit is decreed. 8. The said judgment and decree is under challenge at the instance of defendant No. 1. 9. The trial Court while answering issue No. 4 in the negative, proceeded to hold that suit property being joint family ancestral property, deceased plaintiff is entitled to secure possession of the properties. Consequently, suit is decreed. 8. The said judgment and decree is under challenge at the instance of defendant No. 1. 9. Shri Y.K. Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1 reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memo would vehemently argue and contend that original plaintiff himself offered to sell the ancestral properties by executing an agreement of sale on 13.05.1987 in favour of defendant No. 1 vide Ex.D-2 and this fact was not at all disputed either by plaintiffs or by defendant No. 2. He would further point out that evidence on record would clearly demonstrate that defendant No. 2 under authorization has alienated the properties. He would further point out that on account of death of original plaintiff, the rights of defendant No. 1 are protected under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, ought to have dismissed the suit as the present suit is filed only in respect of alienated properties. Therefore, he would contend that the proper course was to relegate the legal heirs of deceased plaintiff to file a suit for partition. 10. Referring to the date of sale deed, he would contend that the fact that deceased plaintiff has admitted in unequivocal terms that he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988, the fact that deceased plaintiff kept quite for 13-14 years, the suit is barred by limitation and this aspect is not rightly dealt with by the trial Court. He would further point out that the entire transaction entered into by the defendant No. 2 was on behalf of family and the said fact can be gathered from agreement of sale executed by deceased plaintiff vide Ex.D-2 which is dated 13.05.1987. Therefore, referring to Ex.D-2 coupled with permission taken by the defendant No. 2 on the basis of sale agreement vide Ex.D-2, there is valid transfer of title under registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988 vide Ex.P-9. He would also vehemently argue and contend that plaintiff was not dispossessed on 24.03.1988. The said pleadings in the plaint in regard to dispossession are factually incorrect. Referring to recitals in Ex.D-2, he would contend that possession was handed over under agreement to sell dated 13.05.1987. He would also vehemently argue and contend that plaintiff was not dispossessed on 24.03.1988. The said pleadings in the plaint in regard to dispossession are factually incorrect. Referring to recitals in Ex.D-2, he would contend that possession was handed over under agreement to sell dated 13.05.1987. Therefore, he would contend that the finding of the trial Court that suit is in time is perverse, palpably erroneous and therefore, he would contend that the suit filed beyond 12 years is not at all maintainable. He would further point out that defendant No. 1 is a bona-fide purchaser and after purchase, he has developed the land and his rights are crystallized and this aspect is not dealt with by the trial Court. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs supporting the reasons assigned by the trial Court would vehemently argue and contend that suit property admittedly are ancestral properties as rightly held by the trial Court. Therefore, he would contend that the declaration granted by the trial Court thereby declaring sale deed dated 24.03.1988 executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 as an invalid document and not binding on plaintiff is in accordance with law. Taking this Court through the findings recorded by the trial Court, he would point out that the evidence on record clearly indicates that suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties and therefore, defendant No. 2 had no absolute right to alienate the suit schedule lands to defendant No. 1 without the consent of plaintiff. On these set of defences, he would contend that the regular first appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 12. Heard learned counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1 and learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs. Perused the records. The following points would arise for consideration: (1) Whether the trial Court erred in granting relief of declaration declaring the sale deed dated 24.03.1988 executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 as invalid document and therefore, same is not binding on the original plaintiff? (2) Whether trial Court could have granted relief as prayed in the plaint in absence of further relief being sought by the plaintiff? (2) Whether trial Court could have granted relief as prayed in the plaint in absence of further relief being sought by the plaintiff? (3) Whether the finding of the trial Court that suit is in time is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to the averments made in Para-7 of the plaint wherein original plaintiff admitted that he was dispossessed from the suit schedule properties on 24.03.1988 coupled with Ex.D2 (agreement to sell) which indicates possession was delivered on 13.05.1987? Regarding Point Nos. 1 and 2: 13. The original plaintiff namely Rachappa @ Rachaiah is the father of defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 2 sold the suit lands to defendant No. 1 under registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988. The plaintiff at Para 7 has admitted that he was dispossessed from the suit schedule properties on 24.03.1988. It would be useful for this Court to cull out Para 7 of the plaint which reads as under: “7. By virtue of the said sale deed, the first defendant has dispossessed the plaintiff from the schedule properties. Thus the plaintiff has been put out of physical possession of the schedule properties with effect from 24.03.1988. However, the plaintiff continues to be in de jure possession having lawful title to the schedule properties. The plaintiff has lost actual possession of the schedule lands because of the wrongful dispossession. The plaintiff has a better title than the first defendant and the plaintiff’s title to the schedule properties is lawful, whereas the title set up by the first defendant is unlawful.” 14. On bare reading of the averments made in Para-7 of the plaint supra, plaintiff was dispossessed on 24.03.1988. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ganapati Santaram Bhosale vs. Ramachandra Subbarao Kulkarni, ILR 1985 Kar. 1115 while examining alienation by a karta or a guardian was of the view that in a suit for partition by Hindu co-parcener, it is not necessary for him to seek setting aside of the sale. The Division Bench held that it is sufficient if he seeks for a share in the joint family ancestral property and he be put in possession thereof and for a declaration that he is not bound by alienations or interest created in ancestral properties. The Division Bench held that it is sufficient if he seeks for a share in the joint family ancestral property and he be put in possession thereof and for a declaration that he is not bound by alienations or interest created in ancestral properties. Therefore, in the light of the principles laid down by the Division Bench, the question that needs to be examined by this Court is whether trial Court could have entertained the suit seeking relief of declaration declaring the sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 as an invalid document without seeking relief of partition as plaintiff has admitted unequivocally that he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988. 15. It is a trite law that where a decree has an effect of giving present relief along with declaratory reliefs, the power to make it will be governed by general principles of Section 9 and Order VII Rule 7 of CPC and not only under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the question that needs to be examined by this Court is whether original plaintiff who is the father of defendant No. 2 could have simply maintained a suit seeking relief of declaration that sale deed is not binding on him without seeking comprehensive relief of partition and separate possession when he was physically dispossessed on 24.03.1988 as per his own version. 16. In the light of the principles laid down by the Division Bench in the judgment cited supra, what emerges is that non-alienating co-parcener need not seek setting aside the alienations. The Division Bench was of the view that it is sufficient if he seeks his share and possession thereof with a declaration that the sale is not binding on him. If plaintiff was dispossessed in 1988, this Court is unable to understand as to how he could have kept quite till 2000 as alienation by defendant No. 2 was the best cause of action for him to seek partition by filing a partition suit. Therefore, this Court is of the view that plaintiff was not entitled to seek a relief of declaration to declare the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 as invalid document as he has not further sought relief of partition and separate possession. Therefore, this Court is of the view that plaintiff was not entitled to seek a relief of declaration to declare the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 as invalid document as he has not further sought relief of partition and separate possession. In that view of the matter, the finding of the trial Court that plaintiff is entitled for relief of declaration and consequent decree granted by the trial Court declaring the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 is an invalid document suffers from serious perversity. The relief of declaration granted by the trial Court virtually prejudice the rights acquired by defendant No. 1 which stood crystallized by passage of time. 17. There is no bar for a co-parcener to alienate his undivided share. The fact that defendant No. 1 is in exclusive possession of the suit lands and there are pleadings in the written statement indicating that he has developed and improved the land by investing money, the relief of declaration cannot be granted in the present case on hand as equitable rights of a purchaser or transferee are virtually taken away as original plaintiff did not seek further relief of partition. Therefore, this Court is of the view that plaintiff was not at all entitled for the reliefs. Code of Civil Procedure, as observed, has a liberal codification principles of natural justice to be applied to civil litigation. If the cause of action is found to be illusory, Court should be cautious in granting reliefs. 18. Granting of declaration is discretionary and court should not grant declaration more particularly when there is alienation of a joint family ancestral property. This Court has to examine whether a father who is indirectly connected to the present alienation made by his son i.e. defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 could maintain a bare declaration suit. The plaintiff in the plaint has admitted that he is dispossessed pursuant to sale deed executed by defendant No. 2. Therefore, the suit filed in 2000 by merely seeking a declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 is invalid is not at all maintainable. 19. This is a clear case where one of the coparcener dealt with the ancestral property and therefore, Section 34 clearly forbids suit for a pure declaration without further relief. 19. This is a clear case where one of the coparcener dealt with the ancestral property and therefore, Section 34 clearly forbids suit for a pure declaration without further relief. There is no reason why plaintiff should not be driven to seek partition in the present case. The facts and circumstances of the case obviously would compel the present plaintiff to sue for all the reliefs which could possibly be granted. The law regarding alienation of an undivided interest is no more res integra in the judgment cited supra. The Division Bench of this Court has held that in case of alienation of undivided interest, the non-alienating coparcener has to maintain a suit for partition, and has to seek relief of formal declaration that alienation made by one of the family member does not bind on his legitimate share. In the present case at hand, plaintiff who is the father has in fact executed an agreement which is produced and marked vide Ex.D-2 and the same clearly demonstrates that father and son together decided to sell ancestral properties. If the original plaintiff was aware of alienation and if defendant No. 1 has proved that the plaintiff had executed an agreement in 1987, plaintiff cannot sit at home, and just ignore it. If plaintiff wants any assistance of the court, he has to come to Court within limitation prescribed for a suit according to the nature of the relief claimed. 20. It would be also useful to refer to recitals in Ex.D2: 21. On perusal of Ex.D-2, this Court would find that original plaintiff Rachappa in fact offered to sell Sy. No. 57/2 i.e. item No. 2 totally measuring 2 acres. This agreement is dated 13.05.1987 and the sale consideration is fixed at Rs. 50,000/- and original plaintiff received Rs. 26,000/-. The case of defendant No. 1 is that there was some hurdle in completing the transaction and therefore, it is on account of oral consent by original plaintiff, defendant No. 2 sold two lands totally measuring 92 guntas as against the original transaction wherein original plaintiff had agreed to sell 2 acres in Sy. No. 57/2. Under Ex.D-2, the land bearing Sy. No. 57/2 was in fact offered to defendant No. 1. The recitals relating to parting with possession is also found in the agreement of sale vide Ex.D-2 which is culled out supra. 22. No. 57/2. Under Ex.D-2, the land bearing Sy. No. 57/2 was in fact offered to defendant No. 1. The recitals relating to parting with possession is also found in the agreement of sale vide Ex.D-2 which is culled out supra. 22. Therefore, the allegation that possession was lost in 1988 is factually incorrect. Sy. No. 57/2 was in fact handed over to defendant No. 1 on 13.05.1987 and not on 24.03.1988 as alleged in Para 7 of the plaint. All these significant details are not properly appreciated by the trial Court. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court , this Court is of the view that after lapse of 12 years 9 months 29 days, plaintiff could not have maintained the present suit by seeking a mere declaration that sale deed is invalid document. Such a relief also could not have been granted as defendant No. 2 admittedly had half share in the suit properties. Therefore, trial Court erred in holding that sale deed is invalid. Therefore, the said finding recorded by the trial Court is patently erroneous and suffers from serious perversity. Accordingly, point No. 1 formulated above is answered in the affirmative and point No. 2 is answered in the negative. Regarding Point No. 3: 23. The defendant No. 1 has specifically contended that the present suit is barred by limitation. The present suit is filed seeking relief of declaration and the suit is filed on 10.03.2000. At Para-7 of the plaint, the original plaintiff has admitted that he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988 while rebuttal evidence vide Ex.D-2 clearly demonstrates that Sy. No. 57/2 which was the subject matter of agreement for sale executed by original plaintiff, possession was delivered to defendant No. 1 on 13.05.1987. Even otherwise, this Court taking cognizance of pleadings at Para 7 of the plaint, is of the view that relief of declaration should have been sought within 3 years when the right to sue first accrued to the original plaintiff. If he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988, he ought to have filed a suit for declaration in terms of Article 58 of Limitation Act within three years. If he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988, he ought to have filed a suit for declaration in terms of Article 58 of Limitation Act within three years. Therefore, the suit on admitted pleadings at Para 7 of the plaint, was hopelessly barred and therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the trial Court to exercise jurisdiction conferred on the trial Court under Section 3 of Limitation Act. If the original plaintiff was dispossessed in 1988, the relief of declaration questioning the sale deed as invalid document in 2000 was not at all maintainable as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 24. The plaintiff has filed the present suit alleging that he was dispossessed on account of sale made by his son i.e. defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 in 1988. Having regard to the settled proposition of law in regard to alienation of undivided interest in ancestral property, the question that needs consideration at the hands of this Court is whether the plaintiff after lapse of 12 years could maintain a suit for declaration questioning the sale deed executed by his son i.e. defendant No. 2. The question that also needs to be examined is whether trial Court could have granted relief of possession having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 25. Plaintiff’s assertion that he was dispossessed in 1988 is totally misconceived and factually incorrect and also contrary to the agreement to sell executed by the deceased plaintiff in 1987. Under the agreement to sell vide Ex.D-2, plaintiff offered to sell Sy. No. 57. In continuation and in furtherance of agreement to sell, the plaintiff and his son i.e. defendant No. 2 have concluded the transaction by executing a registered sale deed vide Ex.P-9. Therefore, the second defendant's possession cannot be deemed to be only tentative, and therefore the plaintiff could not have maintained a suit for declaration and therefore, was also not entitled to seek possession of the suit land after lapse of 12 years. 26. In these circumstances, it is not ideal to suggest that the present suit is not barred by limitation as deceased plaintiff offered to sell suit land vide Ex.D-2 and sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 which is in fact in furtherance of the agreement to sell executed by deceased plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1. 26. In these circumstances, it is not ideal to suggest that the present suit is not barred by limitation as deceased plaintiff offered to sell suit land vide Ex.D-2 and sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 which is in fact in furtherance of the agreement to sell executed by deceased plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1. The contention of defendant that there was some difficulty for plaintiff and defendant No. 2 to alienate entire extent in Sy. No. 57 and therefore, father and son after effecting mutation in the name of defendant No. 2, transaction was completed by alienating two bits of lands appears to be probable and the said narrative set up by defendant No. 1 appears to be genuine. In absence of any contrary evidence and evidence let in by the legal heirs of deceased plaintiff, if present suit is filed after lapse of 12 years, it was incumbent on the part of Court to examine under Section 3 of Limitation Act, as to whether the present suit is in time and the relief sought in the plaint can be entertained. These significant details are not dealt by the trial Court. Therefore, point No. 3 formulated above is answered in the affirmative. 27. Therefore, my conclusions are as under: (1) The original plaintiff who has filed the present suit seeking relief of declaration that he is the absolute owner of item No. 1 property and that item No. 2 is a joint family property is not at all maintainable. A non-alienating coparcener cannot maintain a simple suit for declaration when he was capable of seeking further reliefs and he has consciously and deliberately omitted to do so and this aspect is not dealt with by the trial Court and therefore, the relief of declaration granted by the trial Court suffers from serious perversity. (2) The plaintiff was in a position to ask for further reliefs consequential upon the declaration sought in the present case and the same is not done and therefore, the trial Court failed to note that suit itself is not maintainable and therefore, cause of action is found to be totally illusory as plaintiff himself has admitted in unequivocal terms that he was dispossessed on 24.03.1988. Therefore, the discretion exercised by the trial Court in granting relief of declaration that suit was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act suffers from serious infirmity and therefore, warrants interference at the hands of this Court. (3) The trial Court has not examined the pleadings in the plaint and has failed to take note of the fact that plaintiff who is the father of defendant No. 2 who has alienated the suit properties in favour of defendant No. 1 should have sought for relief of partition and separate possession with a formal declaration that sale deed is not binding. Therefore, the relief of declaration should have been a consequential relief which is connected with the alleged cause of action as narrated in the plaint. Therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to ask for a mere declaration without asking the main relief of partition and separate possession. (4) The trial Court has also not examined the nature of transaction in the present case on hand. The defendant No. 2 who is the son of original plaintiff is silently supporting by not contesting the suit. Therefore, the trial Court ought to have examined as to whether plaintiff has deliberately not asked further reliefs with reference to the facts and circumstances in the present case on hand. The original plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant No. 1 which is forthcoming from Ex.D-2. Only Sy. No. 57/2 was the subject matter of agreement and thereafter, the original plaintiff alters the nature of transaction and sells it through defendant No. 2. The evidence placed on record in that regard by the defendant No. 1 stands probabalized that plaintiff and defendant No. 2 together have entered into a transaction. Though defendant No. 2 alone is a signatory to the sale deed, but there is sufficient tangible evidence indicating concurrence of plaintiff and therefore, trial Court should have considered the overall material on record to find out the truth and as to whether the present suit filed is a genuine suit or it is set up by defendant No. 2 only to nullify a valid sale transaction. (5) Therefore, the relief of declaration sought in the present case on hand is found to be ineffectual and therefore, trial Court had the discretion to refuse the relief sought in the plaint. (5) Therefore, the relief of declaration sought in the present case on hand is found to be ineffectual and therefore, trial Court had the discretion to refuse the relief sought in the plaint. The trial Court has casually entertained a frivolous suit without ascertaining the true intention in filing the present suit. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the trial Court erred in granting relief of declaration in declaring the sale deed dated 24.03.1988 as an invalid document. (6) The finding of the trial Court that suit is in time is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to the averments made in Para 7 of the plaint coupled with rebuttal evidence let in by the defendant No. 1 vide Ex.D-2 which is an agreement to sell executed by the plaintiff himself in favour of defendant No. 1 where possession is delivered on 13.05.1987 and therefore, the present suit, even otherwise, is hopelessly barred by limitation as suit is instituted after expiry of 12 years. 28. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following: ORDER: (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The judgment and decree dated 03.01.2006 passed in O.S. No. 456/2000 is set aside. Consequently, suit is dismissed. (iii) The pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and stand disposed of.