ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The petitioners herein seek to challenge the constitutional validity of the amendment made in the Chhattisgarh State University Service Rules, 1982 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1982’) by which the percentage of quota for the posts of Registrar & Deputy Registrar has been fixed amending the earlier rules on the ground that it is violative of sub-section (3) of Section 15-C of the Chhattisgarh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short, ‘the Act of 1973’) and also violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, as well. 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop: - 3. The petitioners are holding the substantive post of Assistant Registrar under the cadre of State University Service constituted under Section 15-C(1) of the Act of 1973 and they are posted in the State University. It is their case that their services are governed by the Rules of 1982 enacted under sub-section (2) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 and the post of Assistant Registrar, which they are holding, is the feeder cadre post for the post of Deputy Registrar and the post of Deputy Registrar is the feeder cadre post for the post of Registrar in the State University Service. It is their further case that under the Rules of 1982, the candidate who has completed five years of service as Assistant Registrar is entitled to be considered for promotion on the post of Deputy Registrar and prior to the impugned amendment, the post of Deputy Registrar was 100% promotional post which is to be filled through promotion from the post of Assistant Registrar. In the Principal Rules of 1982, there was no provision for direct recruitment on the post of Deputy Registrar, however, by the impugned amendment/notification in the Rules of 1982, the respondent State has fixed the percentage of promotion quota and only 25% posts of Deputy Registrar is prescribed as promotional post from the post of Assistant Registrar and remaining 75% posts have been fixed for direct recruitment. Similarly, 25% posts of Registrar have been prescribed for promotion from the post of Deputy Registrar and 75% has been prescribed for direct recruitment. Similarly, 25% posts of Registrar have been prescribed for promotion from the post of Deputy Registrar and 75% has been prescribed for direct recruitment. As such, the State has reduced the promotional quota for the posts of Deputy Registrar & Registrar to the extent of 25% and while amending the Rules, sub-section (3) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 has not been complied with and the impugned amendment so made in the Rules by notification dated 27-12-2011 has not been laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly, therefore, it is unconstitutional and liable to be declared ultra vires. Furthermore, due to reduction of 75% quota for the promotional post of Deputy Registrar, chances of promotion of the petitioners is badly affected and is considerably reduced which is violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, as such, it is liable to be quashed. 4. Respondent No.1/State has filed its reply opposing the writ petition stating inter alia that the rules so framed are in accordance with law and it is already in vogue for last 12 years and the amendment which was brought by way of notification dated 27-12-2011 is more goal oriented so as to provide opportunity of timely enhancement/up-gradation to a senior cadre. It has further been pleaded that considering the difficulty faced by the competent authority, decision to fix promotional quota for the post of Deputy Registrar to the extent of 25% by promotion and 75% by direct recruitment under Section 15-A of the Act of 1973 has been taken by the competent authority which is strictly in accordance with law and it is in vogue for a considerable long time and catering the need of the University. Petitioners No.1 & 2 were appointed on 12-5-2017 and petitioner No.3 was appointed on 26-2-2016 under the Rules of 1982 read with the amendment so made by the impugned notification and the provision contained in Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973 is directory in nature and therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Mr. Petitioners No.1 & 2 were appointed on 12-5-2017 and petitioner No.3 was appointed on 26-2-2016 under the Rules of 1982 read with the amendment so made by the impugned notification and the provision contained in Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973 is directory in nature and therefore the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Mr. Neeraj Choubey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would contend that non-laying of the Rules i.e. the impugned notification/amendment made in the Rules of 1982 before the State Legislative Assembly under sub-section (3) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 makes the rule unconstitutional and unenforceable and thus, the impugned amendment/notification is liable to be declared unconstitutional and ultra vires to the provisions contained in Section 15-C of the Act of 1973. Furthermore, due to reduction of 75% quota of promotion on the post of Deputy Registrar from the post of Assistant Registrar, chances of promotion of the petitioners is badly affected as well as considerably reduced which is ultra vires being violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. As such, the impugned amendment made by way of notification dated 27-12- 2011 be declared ultra vires. 6. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/respondent No.1, would submit that sub-section (3) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 is only a simple laying clause and it is not mandatory in nature, mere non-laying of the rule before the table of the State Legislative Assembly which is not mandatory in nature, will not render the rule/notification invalid. Validity of the rules so enacted by way of the Act of 1973 is not affected at all. Furthermore, chances of promotion is not the condition of service, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. The Chhattisgarh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Universities and to make better provision for the organisation and administration of Universities in Chhattisgarh. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. The Chhattisgarh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Universities and to make better provision for the organisation and administration of Universities in Chhattisgarh. Section 15-C(1) of the Act of 1973 provides for constitution of State University Service for the purpose of providing officers to all the Universities in the State and the State University Service shall consist of the cadre of Registrars and such cadres of other officer concerned under clause (vi) of Section 11 as the State Government may, by notification specify. Sub-section (2) of Section 15-C authorises the State Government to make rules for regulating the recruitment and the conditions of Service of persons appointed to the State University Service and it states as under: - “15-C. State University Service.—(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) The State Government may make rules for regulating the recruitment and the conditions of Service of persons appointed to the State University Service : Provided that until the State University Service is constituted under sub-section (1) and the rules are made under this sub-section, appointments to the posts of Registrars vacant on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh) Vishwavidyalaya (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 or to the posts of other officers specified in the notification under sub-section (1) vacant on the date of publication of notification specifying the cadres of officers, as the case may be, shall be filled in by the Kuladhipati by securing the services of suitable officers on deputation.” 9. Sub-section (3) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 requires that all the rules made under this section shall be laid before the State Legislative Assembly and it states as under: - “(3) All the rules made under this section shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly.” 10. Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973 is a “laying clause”. The object of any requirement of laying provided in enabling Acts is to subject the subordinate law making authority to the vigilance and control of the Legislature. A compliance with the laying requirement, however, does not confer any validity to the subordinate legislation if it is in excess of the power conferred by the enabling Act. The object of any requirement of laying provided in enabling Acts is to subject the subordinate law making authority to the vigilance and control of the Legislature. A compliance with the laying requirement, however, does not confer any validity to the subordinate legislation if it is in excess of the power conferred by the enabling Act. Laying clauses may be expressed in different forms depending upon the degree of control which the Legislature wants to keep in its hands. Broadly, these clauses are of three varieties providing—(1) laying which requires no further procedure, (2) laying allied with an affirmative procedure, and, (3) laying allied with negative procedure. When a Parliamentary enactment confers power on the State Government to make rules in respect of certain matters, it may provide that the rules so made be laid before the State Legislature. All the varieties of laying clauses are a check upon the rule making authority and negative the objection of excessive delegation. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition 2010, by Justice G.P. Singh – page 1039, also see the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hukamchand v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 601 and further followed by the M.P. High Court in the matter of Mathura Prasad Yadava v. Inspector General, Rly. Protection Force, Railway Board, New Delhi and others, 1974 MPLJ 373 .) 11. Laying clause/requirement of laying before the Legislature is a subject matter of discussion by various judgments rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The Constitution Bench judgment in this regard is Jan Mohammad Noor Mohamad Bagban v. The State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1966 SC 385 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that since the Act under which the Rules are framed does not prescribe that the Rules will acquire validity from the date of tabling the Rules before the Legislature, the impugned Rules are valid. It has been observed in paragraph 18 of the report as under: - “(18) … Section 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under S. 26(1). It has been observed in paragraph 18 of the report as under: - “(18) … Section 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under S. 26(1). It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of Sub-s. (5) of S. 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that Sub-s. (5) of S. 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory. The rules have been in operation since the year 1941 and by virtue of S. 64 of the Gujarat Act 20 of 1964 they continue to remain in operation.” 12. The question relating to the effect of non-laying in contravention of a laying clause was elaborately discussed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court [in a three-Judge Bench decision] in the matter of M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and others v. The State of Haryana, (1979) 2 SCC 196 while dealing with the non-compliance with sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which provides that every order made under the section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be, after it is made. It was held after noticing the earlier judgments that non-compliance with the Laying Clause did not affect the validity of the order and make it void. It was observed in paragraph 21 of the report as under: - “21. Now, the policy and object underlying the provisions relating to laying the delegated legislation made by the subordinate law making authorities or orders passed by subordinate executive instrumentalities before both Houses of Parliament being to keep supervision and control over the aforesaid authorities and instrumentalities, the "laying clauses" assume different forms depending on the degree of control which the legislature may like to exercise. As evident from the observations made at pages 305 to 307 of the 7th Edition of Craies on Statute Law and noticed with approval in Hukam Chand v. Union of India, there are three kinds of laying which are generally used by the Legislature. These three kinds of laying are described and dealt with in Craies on Statute Law (supra) as under : (i) Laying without further procedure, (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution, (iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. (i) Simple laying.–The most obvious example is in Section 10(2) of the 1946 Act. In earlier days, before the idea of laying in draft had been introduced, there was a provision for laying rules, etc, for a period during which time they were not in operation and could be thrown out without ever having come into operation (compare Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, Section 417 ; Inebriates Act, 1898, Section 21) but this is not used now. (ii) Negative resolution.–Instruments so laid have immediate operative effect but are subject to annulment within forty days without prejudice to a new instrument being made. The phraseology generally used is "subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament." This is by far the commonest form of laying. It acts mostly as a deterrent and sometimes forces a Minister (in Sir Cecil Carr's phrase) to "buy off opposition" by promising some modification. (iii) Affirmative resolution.–The phraseology here is normally "no order shall be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. Normally, no time limit is fixed for obtaining approval – none is necessary because the Government will naturally take the earliest opportunity of bringing it up for approval – but section 16(3) of the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1946 did impose a limit of forty days. An old form (not much used nowadays) provided for an order to be made but not to become operative until a resolution of both Houses of Parliament had been obtained. This form was used in Section 10(4) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 [cf. Road Traffic Act, 1960, Section 19(3)]. … The affirmative resolution procedure necessitates a debate in every case. This means that one object of delegation of legislation (viz. saving the time of Parliament) is to some extent defeated. This form was used in Section 10(4) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 [cf. Road Traffic Act, 1960, Section 19(3)]. … The affirmative resolution procedure necessitates a debate in every case. This means that one object of delegation of legislation (viz. saving the time of Parliament) is to some extent defeated. The procedure therefore is sparingly used and is more or less reserved to cases where the order almost amounts to an Act, by effecting changes which approximate to true legislation (e.g. where the order is the meat of the matter, the enabling Act merely outlining the general purpose) or where the order replaces local Acts or provisional orders and, most important of all, where the spending, etc. of public money is affected. xxx xxx xxx” 13. The principle of law laid down in M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. (supra) was followed with approval in the matter of The Quarry Owners Association v. The State of Bihar and others, (2000) 8 SCC 655 where rules and notifications made by the State Government under Sections 15 and 15A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and required to be laid by a simple laying requirement, providing no affirmative procedure, before the State Legislature under Section 28(3) were not so laid. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the annual administrative report submitted to the Legislature by the Department containing reference to notifications increasing the rate of royalty on minor minerals did not comply with the requirement of laying, still as the requirement of laying was directory, so omission to comply with it did not affect the validity of the notifications and their coming into force. 14. Thereafter, in the matter of Prohibition & Excise Supdt., A.P. and others v. Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally and others, (2003) 12 SCC 738 (paragraph 24), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that laying down of a subordinate legislation before both Houses of the legislature is directory in nature. 15. 14. Thereafter, in the matter of Prohibition & Excise Supdt., A.P. and others v. Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally and others, (2003) 12 SCC 738 (paragraph 24), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that laying down of a subordinate legislation before both Houses of the legislature is directory in nature. 15. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the laying clause provided in Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973 and its object and considering the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court highlighting the requirement of laying clause and further considering the effect of noncompliance of the laying clause with reference to Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973, it is quite vivid that the aforesaid provision though requires that the amendment to the Rules so made under Section 15-C(2) has to be tabled before the Legislative Assembly, but the laying clause so contained in Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973 is a simple laying clause without providing for further procedure and it nowhere prescribes an affirmative procedure and the rule continues subject to any modification that the Legislative Assembly may choose to make and in other words, the consequence on account of non-laying is not provided in Section 15-C(3) or it nowhere states that the rule will not come into force unless and until the rule is confirmed or approved with modification pursuant to its laying. As such, laying of the impugned rule before the Legislative Assembly is only directory in nature. Therefore, the impugned rule amending notification dated 27-12-2011 cannot be held to be unconstitutional and arbitrary in absence of its laying before the Legislative Assembly under Section 15-C(3) of the Act of 1973. 16. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that prior to coming into force of the impugned notification/amendment, 100% of the posts of Deputy Registrar was to be filled by way of promotion from amongst the Assistant Registrars, but now, by way of the impugned amendment, 75% posts of Deputy Registrar have to be filled through direct recruitment and only 25% posts of Deputy Registrar are to be filled by promotion from amongst the Assistant Registrars, as such, chance of promotion is considerably reduced and therefore the impugned amendment/notification is constitutionally invalid. 17. 17. It is well settled law that although an employee has no right to be promoted, he has a right to be considered for promotion. This right to be considered for promotion is one of the matters relating to employment or appointment within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the Constitution (see General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36). Although a candidate has a fundamental right to be considered for promotion (Article 16), it will be available only if he falls within the prescribed zone of consideration. Article 16(1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration a fundamental right to be considered for promotion. If such a person is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right under Article 16(1) (see Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 ). However, the power of judicial review does not extend to interfering with a policy providing for avenues of promotion and to direct what avenues the authority should provide for its various employees, although the court will interfere if there is arbitrariness or resultant discrimination (see Union of India v. Syed Mohd. Raza Kazmi, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 534). However, since it is a matter of policy, the courts should not direct the Government to frame or reframe a promotional scheme in a particular manner in exercise of the power of judicial review and interfere with the channels of promotion to officers working in different departments and offices of the Government (see Govt. of Tamil Nadu v. S. Arumugham, (1998) 2 SCC 198 ). 18. It is also well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries it with the power to amend or alter the said rules. Any rules which affects the right of person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, although mere chance of promotion may not. The authority competent to lay down criteria is also competent to change the criteria. 19. Any rules which affects the right of person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, although mere chance of promotion may not. The authority competent to lay down criteria is also competent to change the criteria. 19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra and another v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 have held that “mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not”. 20. Similarly, in the matter of Air Commodore Naveen Jain v. Union of India and others, (2019) 10 SCC 34 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have affirmed the view relying on its various judicial precedents that policy of the State affecting chances of promotion cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory so as to attract the violation of either Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution and observed as under: - “13. In State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753 (SC), this Court held that a right to be considered for promotion, is a condition of service but mere chances of promotion are not. The rule which merely affects the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. The said judgment was quoted with approval in later judgment reported as Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 , wherein this Court held as under: (SCC p. 329, para 15) “15. … All that happened as a result of making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collectors division wise and limiting such promotions to 50 per cent of the total number of vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector was to reduce the chances of promotion available to the petitioners. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753 (SC), that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753 (SC), that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. In Purohit case the district wise seniority of sanitary inspectors was changed to Statewise seniority, and as a result of this change the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their chances of promotion which were protected under the proviso to Section 115, subsection (7). This contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of this Court observed: (SLR para 10) ‘10. … It is said on behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.’ ” 14. In Dwarka Prasad v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 535 , the argument examined was that the promotion opportunities have to be provided in ratio with the strength of the feeder cadre. It was held as under: (SCC p. 542, para 16) “16. Fixation of quotas or different avenues and ladders for promotion in favour of various categories of posts in feeder cadres based upon the structure and pattern of the Department is a prerogative of the employer, mainly pertaining to the policy-making field. The relevant considerations in fixing a particular quota for a particular post are various such as the cadre strength in the feeder quota, suitability more or less of the holders in the feeder post, their nature of duties, experience and the channels of promotion available to the holders of posts in the feeder cadres. Most important of them all is the requirement of the promoting authority for manning the post on promotion with suitable candidates. Thus, fixation of quota for various categories of posts in the feeder cadres requires consideration of various relevant factors, a few amongst them have been mentioned for illustration. Most important of them all is the requirement of the promoting authority for manning the post on promotion with suitable candidates. Thus, fixation of quota for various categories of posts in the feeder cadres requires consideration of various relevant factors, a few amongst them have been mentioned for illustration. Mere cadre strength of a particular post in the feeder cadre cannot be a sole criterion or basis to claim parity in the chances of promotion by various holders of posts in feeder categories.” 21. In the matter of A. Satyanarayana v. S. Purushotham, (2008) 5 SCC 416 , the Supreme Court has held that it is for the State to fix the quota keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in a given case and observed in paragraphs 23 to 26 as under: - “23. We, however, are of the opinion that the validity or otherwise of a quota rule cannot be determined on surmises and conjectures. Whereas the power of the State to fix the quota keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in a given case must be conceded, the same, however, cannot be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a policy decision and, in particular, legislative policy should not ordinarily be interfered with and the superior courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, shall not consider as to whether such policy decision has been taken mala fide or not. But where a policy decision as reflected in a statutory rule pertains to the field of subordinate legislation, indisputably, the same would be amenable to judicial review, inter alia, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753 and State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365 .) 24. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was not wholly correct when it opined that a policy decision cannot be a subject matter of judicial review. If the State has the power to fix a quota, the Rule underlying the legislative policy must stop at that and the necessary consequences thereof must ensue. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was not wholly correct when it opined that a policy decision cannot be a subject matter of judicial review. If the State has the power to fix a quota, the Rule underlying the legislative policy must stop at that and the necessary consequences thereof must ensue. Indisputably, again although the State was entitled to provide for quota as also a guideline as to how the roster should work out itself, but thereby it cannot be permitted to put a cap on promotion for the entire service period. 25. While saying so, we are not unmindful of the legal principle that nobody has a right to be promoted; his right being confined to right to be considered therefor. 26. Similarly, the power of the State to take a policy decision as a result whereof an employee's chance of promotion is diminished cannot be a subject-matter of judicial review as no legal right is infringed thereby.” 22. Returning to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down, it is quite vivid that right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, but mere chance of promotion is not. The impugned notification/amendment came into force with effect from 27-12-2011 and thereafter, the petitioners under the same rule were appointed on 26-2-2016 & 12-5-2017 in accordance with the new amended rules. The rule remained in force for more than ten years and the petitioners thereafter filed writ petition on 8-2-2021. It is not the case that promotional avenues have not been provided in the rules, only reduction in chances of promotion is not the condition of service as held by the Supreme Court in Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni’s case (supra) and G.B. Purohit’s case (supra). Merely because an employee’s chance of promotion is diminished, the quota prescribed by the competent authority/employer cannot be struck down as arbitrary or unconstitutional. 23. In that view of the matter, we are unable to hold that the impugned rules/notification promulgated by the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 15-C of the Act of 1973 is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition sans merit and deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).