JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. Aggrieved by the order dated 01.10.2010 in MVOP No. 289 of 2009 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa (for short ‘the Tribunal’) the National Insurance Company Limited Rep. by its Divisional Manager, who is 2nd respondent in MVOP preferred this appeal questioning the award passed by the Tribunal. 2. The parties will be referred to as arrayed in the MVOP for convenience. 3. The claimant had filed a petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 18.12.2007 at 05.00 PM. 4. The claimant’s case is that on 18.12.2007 at 5.00 PM, he was proceeding on his motorcycle to RIMS Hospital, Kadapa. When he reached the vicinity of the provident fund office at Yerramukkapalli, Kadapa, the oil tanker of the 1st respondent bearing No. AP-03-U-2169 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’) was driven from the opposite direction by its driver in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the claimant’s motorcycle. Due to this, he sustained a compound fracture of the left leg below the knee with the crushing of the entire area. Immediately, he was shifted to RIMS Hospital, Kadapa and from there to Kadapa Poly Clinic and Vijaya Health Care Hospital, Chennai. Several surgeries were performed on his left leg. Iron rods and screws were inserted into the injured left leg of the claimant. 5. The 1st respondent remained ex-parte. 6. The 2nd respondent filed a written statement and submitted that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the claimant. The 2nd respondent accorded permission under Section 170(b) of the MV Act to take up all defences. 7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal has formulated appropriate issues. On behalf of the claimant, PWs. 1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.26 and Ex.X1. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, RW-1 got examined and marked Exs.B1 and B2. 8. After evaluating the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver and granted compensation of Rs. 1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.26 and Ex.X1. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, RW-1 got examined and marked Exs.B1 and B2. 8. After evaluating the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver and granted compensation of Rs. 9,24,000/- under various heads together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of realization against respondents 1 and 2, making them jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, aggrieved thereby, the 2nd respondent preferred the appeal. 9. Heard both the learned counsel. Perused the record. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance company has contended that as per F.I.R. while the claimant was going on his motorcycle and when he reached P.F. office, one auto came in his opposite direction with high speed and with an intent to avert the same, he turned his motorcycle to right side and fell down, in the meanwhile the offending vehicle dashed against him, resulting the claimant sustained injuries and the claimant failed to implead the owner and driver of the auto as parties to the O.P. the Tribunal was unable to consider the contributory negligence on the part of the claimant and he has no driving licence to drive the two wheeler and it was admitted by him in his cross examination; the Tribunal ought to have seen that the claimant failed to establish his avocation, in the absence of it, awarded Rs. 1,19,000/- towards loss of income by assessing the disability cannot be sustained; the Tribunal ought to have seen that the offending vehicle’s owner violated the terms and conditions of the policy and ought not to have fixed the liability against the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the Tribunal’s findings and observations. 12. Now the points for determination are: (I) Whether the Tribunal erred in holding that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver? (II) Whether the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal just and reasonable and requires modification? POINT NO. I: 13. The claimant himself got examined as PW-1 to establish his case and prove the rash and negligent driving of the oil tanker driver and relied on a certified copy of the F.I.R. i.e. Ex.A1. (II) Whether the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal just and reasonable and requires modification? POINT NO. I: 13. The claimant himself got examined as PW-1 to establish his case and prove the rash and negligent driving of the oil tanker driver and relied on a certified copy of the F.I.R. i.e. Ex.A1. PW-1 stated in his evidence about the manner of the accident. The 2nd respondent examined G. Venkateswarlu, Administrative Officer, as RW-1. It is not the evidence of RW-1 that he witnessed the accident or that employees of the Insurance company witnessed the accident in question. It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. AP-03-U-2169. Ex.A1 report did not furnish the registration number of the oil tanker. It is the evidence of RW-1 that the vehicle is bearing Registration No. AP-03-U-2169 was insured with the 2nd respondent vide Ex.B1-copy of policy Ex.A17. However, it is the evidence of RW-1 that the vehicle is bearing Registration No. AP-03-U-2169 was an open-bodied lorry as per Ex.B2-Authenticated copy of the registration certificate. 14. It is the case of the Insurance company that the offending vehicle insured with the 2nd respondent was not an oil tanker, and it is the case of the claimant that he suffered injuries when an oil tanker hit the motorcycle. So it disproves the involvement of the offending vehicle. The 1st respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, remained ex-parte. He did not dispute the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. In the absence of evidence from the owner of the offending vehicle, it is difficult to conclude how to open-bodied lorry covered under Ex.B2 was converted into an oil tanker. In the facts of the case, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the claimant’s counsel that the lorry owner converted it into an oil tanker. There was evidence on record to entertain the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. Based on the submissions made by the insurance company, it can be concluded that the said vehicle was not involved in the accident. However, 2nd respondent did not take steps to examine the owner of the offending vehicle to prove that the lorry was not converted into an oil tanker. Based on the submissions made by the insurance company, it can be concluded that the said vehicle was not involved in the accident. However, 2nd respondent did not take steps to examine the owner of the offending vehicle to prove that the lorry was not converted into an oil tanker. In the said facts of the case, the finding of the Tribunal that the offending vehicle was an oil tanker that it bears registration No. AP-03-U-2169 cannot be found fault with. 15. On the other hand, to prove the involvement of the offending vehicle, the claimant relied on Ex.A3-certified copy of the charge sheet. As per Ex.A3-charge sheet, the accused S. Surendra, the offending vehicle’s driver, came from the Railway station side, drove the vehicle rashly and negligently and dashed against the motorcycle of PW-1, resulting which PW-1 falling and sustaining injuries. The finding of the investigation officer shows that the involvement of the oil tanker bearing No. AP-03-U-2169 in the accident. 16. The 2nd respondent placed no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet were incorrect. In a decision between K. Rajani and vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud and Others, 2015 ACJ 797 the High Court is pleased to observe that: “when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false.” 17. In the case of Bheemla Devi vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (SC) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: “It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been applied.” 18. There is nothing on record to suggest that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle without conducting a proper investigation. Also, it is difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case against the driver of the offending vehicle. 19. There is nothing on record to suggest that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle without conducting a proper investigation. Also, it is difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case against the driver of the offending vehicle. 19. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. As such, it is by now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of the happening of the accident. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence as well as the mode and manner of happening of the accident. 20. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver. When it contends that the accident occurred due to the claimant’s negligence, the 2nd respondent has to place necessary evidence before the Tribunal, based on which the Tribunal is expected to give its conclusion. The Tribunal has accepted the claimant’s case regarding the manner of the accident and also accepted the observations made by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet making the offending vehicle’s driver responsible for the accident. As already observed, the contents of the charge sheet also support the claimant’s case regarding the manner of the accident. There is no material placed by the appellant to show that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the claimant and that he contributed to the accident. 21. The offending vehicle’s driver is the best person to speak about the manner of an accident. The 2nd respondent has not taken steps to prove the manner of the accident by summoning the offending vehicle’s driver to establish that he did not drive the vehicle rashly and negligently at the time of the accident, as alleged by the claimant. 22. This Court believes that negligence or contributory negligence must be proved like any other fact. There are no different standards for proving negligence or contributory negligence. 22. This Court believes that negligence or contributory negligence must be proved like any other fact. There are no different standards for proving negligence or contributory negligence. But they cannot be decided on suspicion or surprise. The pleas taken in the counter will remain not substantiated by acceptable, relevant and legal evidence. There must be cogent evidence to prove contributory negligence. In the instant case, there is specific evidence to prove that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver. In the absence of convincing evidence to prove the plea of contributory negligence, the common law doctrine cannot be applied in the present case. There are no details of contributory negligence in the counter, and no evidence is also put forth except alleging a stray sentence in the counter. How the accident happened leaves no doubt that the offending vehicle’s driver was solely negligent in causing the said accident. While granting relief under the Act, the courts are not to be bound by mere technicalities but would adopt a liberal approach by giving the law a more comprehensive construction and meaning that would favour the victims. 23. A normal rule is for the claimant to prove the negligence. But in accident cases, hardship is caused to the claimant as the actual cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the respondent who caused it. It will then be for the respondents to establish the accident was due to some other cause than their negligence. As the respondents did not choose to examine the offending vehicle’s driver who was involved in the accident, and he did not enter into the box to explain the manner of the accident, there is no ocular evidence let in by the respondents. 24. Upon careful reading of the material on record, this Court views that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the evidence and observed that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver, which cannot be found fault with. Since the involvement of the claimant in the accident is not established. Accordingly, the Point No. I is answered. POINT NO. II: 25. To prove the injuries sustained by the claimant in the accident, he relied on an Ex.A2-wound certificate, which shows he sustained a compound crush injury of the left leg. Since the involvement of the claimant in the accident is not established. Accordingly, the Point No. I is answered. POINT NO. II: 25. To prove the injuries sustained by the claimant in the accident, he relied on an Ex.A2-wound certificate, which shows he sustained a compound crush injury of the left leg. The doctor has given the opinion that it is a grievous injury. It is the evidence of PW-1 that he sustained a permanent disability, and he is not in a position to sit cross-leg, he is not able to stand, and he is not even able to answer the calls of nature comfortably. To establish the disability sustained by the claimant, he got examined by Dr. Rajasekhar Reddy, orthopaedician, as PW-2. He stated that the claimant suffered from partial permanent disability to a tune of 55%. The claimant cannot attend to work as before, and he found that there was severe muscle loss and that the claimant continues to suffer from loss of movement of the knee. He also opined that it would be difficult for the claimant to walk with full weight over the left lower limb without support. 26. In a decision between A. Chalapathi vs. Satyanarayana N. Nuwal and Others, 2010 (4) ALD 217 wherein this Court held that: The evidence of a qualified orthopaedic surgeon can be accepted unless the Court finds evidence of a doctor not worthy of acceptance by giving cogent reasons. Opinion of a qualified doctor that the doctor who conducted surgery and treated the patient cannot be discredited. 27. In a Judgment of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar, 2011 ACJ 1 the Apex Court held that: 6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body found existing at the end of the treatment period and recuperation after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remaining life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident. However, he can perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activities. Total permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to perform any avocation or employment-related activities due to the accident. 8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability due to injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has first to decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide concerning the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed concerning any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability, then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability, it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of the permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether the such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries) do not result in loss of earning capacity. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries) do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability concerning the whole body of a person cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases where the Tribunal, based on evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal concerning the evidence in its entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. 28. After considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the functional disability of the claimant is assessed at 20%. As seen from the order of the Tribunal, it is awarded an amount of Rs. 1,19,000/- towards loss of agricultural income, and it also assessed an amount of Rs. 1,22,000/- towards partial permanent disability. Thus, the Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 2,41,000/- under the head of loss of income due to disability. 29. The claimant has relied on Ex.A23-Title deed to show that he got landed property and cultivated the lands. Ex.A23 shows that the claimant’s father possessed Ac. 13.87 cents of dry land and Ex.A25-Agriculture income certificate issued by the M.R.O. shows that the claimant’s father used to get an income of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the agricultural lands. To show that the claimant’s family holds agricultural land, Ex.A26-Adangal copy is relied on. Ex.A26 document shows that the claimant’s father was personally cultivating the land owned by him. The documents relied on by the claimant establish that his father has agricultural land to the extent of Ac. 13.87 cents. 1,50,000/- from the agricultural lands. To show that the claimant’s family holds agricultural land, Ex.A26-Adangal copy is relied on. Ex.A26 document shows that the claimant’s father was personally cultivating the land owned by him. The documents relied on by the claimant establish that his father has agricultural land to the extent of Ac. 13.87 cents. The Tribunal accepted the case of the claimant that he was assisting his father in the agricultural operations and that the claimant and his father suffered on account of incapability of the claimant and indirectly sustained a loss of Rs. 500/- per annum per acre and calculated that the claimant sustained a loss in the agricultural income of Rs. 7,000/- per month and it is multiplied with ‘17’ and awarded compensation amount of Rs. 1,19,000/-. 30. The Tribunal, by considering the fact that the claimant did not show that he was exclusively supporting his father in the cultivation of their lands and he especially considered to have separate income and he determined the notional income of the claimant at Rs. 3,000/- per month and assessed the notional income of Rs. 36,000/- per annum. 31. As far as the prospects are concerned, while considering the grant of the future prospectus for the deceased child aged about ten years, in R.K. Malik and Others vs. Kiran Paul, 2009 ACJ 1924 the Hon’ble Apex Court held, in paragraph 31, as follows: A forceful submission has been made by the learned Counsels appearing for the claimants-appellants that both the Tribunal and the High Court failed to consider the claims of the appellants concerning the prospects of the children. It has been submitted that the evidence concerning the same has been ignored by the Courts below. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find merit in the such submission that the Courts below have overlooked that aspect while granting compensation. It is well settled legal principle that in addition to awarding compensation for pecuniary losses, it must also grant compensation with regard to the prospects of the children. It is incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while awarding compensation. 32. It is held in paragraph 32 that denying compensation towards prospects seems unjustified. Accordingly, the Apex Court awarded compensation for prospects in a claim under section 163-A of the M.V. Act, 1988. 33. It is incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while awarding compensation. 32. It is held in paragraph 32 that denying compensation towards prospects seems unjustified. Accordingly, the Apex Court awarded compensation for prospects in a claim under section 163-A of the M.V. Act, 1988. 33. In Gopalappa vs. Kanduluru Sankara Reddy and Another, 2022 ACJ 1427 the High Court of Karnataka, in a case relating to disability, observed as follows: “in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pappu Deo Yadav vs. Naresh Kumar, 2020 ACJ 2695 (SC), the claimant is entitled to an addition of 40% of the assessed income towards future prospects.” 34. The finding of the Tribunal that the claimant was about 29 years at the time of the accident as per Ex.A2-wound certificate is not disputed. The Tribunal applied the multiplier ‘17’ by following the principles in Sarla Varma and Others vs. Delhi Transport, 2009 ACJ 1298 . As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, the Tribunal observed that the claimant used to earn Rs. 7,000/- per annum by way of agriculture in total, the Tribunal assessed the annual income of the claimant at Rs. 36,000/- + Rs. 7,000/- = Rs. 43,000/-. 35. In the present case, the claimant is aged about 29 years old. In National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 the Apex Court observed that to assess the future prospectus, in the case of the self-employed or those on a fixed salary, an additional 40% of the established income should be the warrant. Given the same, the annual earnings of the claimant, including a future prospectus, can be assessed at Rs. 43,000/- + 40% of Rs. 43,000/- = Rs. 60,200/-. 36. By following the principles laid down by the Apex Court, this Court considers the annual earnings, including prospects, at Rs. 60,200/-. By applying the multiplier ‘17’ and considering the disability at 20% the loss of earnings for disability would arrive at Rs. 2,04,680/- (Rs. 60,200/- x 17 x 20%) but the Tribunal granted Rs. 2,41,000/-. Thus, the Tribunal awarded an excess amount of Rs. 36,320/-. 37. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 22,000/- towards pain and suffering, but this Court views an additional amount of Rs. 8,000/- to be awarded under the head of pain and suffering. 38. The Tribunal also awarded an amount of Rs. 2,41,000/-. Thus, the Tribunal awarded an excess amount of Rs. 36,320/-. 37. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 22,000/- towards pain and suffering, but this Court views an additional amount of Rs. 8,000/- to be awarded under the head of pain and suffering. 38. The Tribunal also awarded an amount of Rs. 5,75,000/- towards medical expenses and Rs. 80,000/- towards transport charges; the Tribunal has assessed the said amounts based on the documents relied on by the claimant. In the facts of the case, this Court finds that Tribunal awarded a just and reasonable amount under those heads. 39. Upon considering the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant and treatment undergone by the claimant, this Court views that the Tribunal awarded a meagre amount of Rs. 6,000/- towards extra nourishment charges. As such, this Court considers an additional amount of Rs. 14,000/- to be awarded under the head of extra nourishment. 40. Considering the nature of injuries and treatment undergone by the claimant, this Court views that an amount of Rs. 15,000/- to be awarded under the head of attendant charges. 41. For the reasons stated above, this Court held that the Tribunal had awarded the just and reasonable compensation amount to the claimant by considering the documentary evidence on record. I do not find any substance in the appeal. I do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order in the present appeal. 42. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without costs. The order dated 01.10.2010 passed by the Tribunal in MVOP No. 289 of 2009 is confirmed. 43. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.