JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. The aforecaptioned Crl.Appeal has been instituted by the afore bail applicant/accused, under Sec.21(4) of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008. 2. The appellant/bail applicant has been arrayed as accused No.4 in the instant Crime No.1172/2016 of Kollam West Police Station, which has been registered for offences punishable under Secs.120B, 307, 427, 324, 121 & 122 of the IPC and Sec.3(a)(iii) of the Prevention of Damage to the Public Property (PDPP) Act, 1984 and Secs.15, 16(b), 18 & 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act [UAPA], 1967. Altogether, there are four accused in the said crime, in which the appellant/applicant has been arrayed as A-4 therein. The Investigating Agency has completed the investigation and has filed final report in the said case on 08.09.2017, i.e., within the prescribed time limit. Thereafter, the Sessions Court concerned has taken cognizance of the offences, which has led to the pendency of Sessions Case, S.C No.1287/2017 on the file of the Principal Sessions Court, Kollam. Earlier, the applicant was remanded to judicial custody, in relation to his involvement in the instant crime, and his plea for regular bail under Sec.439 of the Cr.P.C, has been rejected as per the impugned Annexure-A2 order dated 16.07.2022 rendered by the Prl.Sessions Court, Kollam in Crl.M.C No.1293/2022 in S.C No.1287/2017. Being aggrieved by the rejection of regular bail, the applicant has preferred the instant Crl.Appeal under Sec.21(4) of the NIA Act, as above. 3. Heard Sri.T.K.Kunhabdulla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/applicant/A4 and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondent (State of Kerala). 4. The gist of the prosecution case in the above crime is that, for the purpose of wrecking vengeance, on account of the killing of one Smt.Israth Jahan and three others in Gujarat and with the intention of disrupting the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India, the four accused persons in the above crime (A-1 to A-4) had hatched the criminal conspiracy and in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy, blasted a bomb on 15.06.2016, at about 10.45 a.m., in the compound of the Kollam Collectorate. That, the said bomb explosion damaged a Government Jeep, bearing registration No.KL 01/G-603, which is owned by the Labour Department of the State Government, which was then lying at the premises of the Kollam Collectorate and that, one person, named Sri.Sabu, who was standing nearby, also sustained injuries. That, the said bomb explosion damaged a Government Jeep, bearing registration No.KL 01/G-603, which is owned by the Labour Department of the State Government, which was then lying at the premises of the Kollam Collectorate and that, one person, named Sri.Sabu, who was standing nearby, also sustained injuries. That, thereby the accused persons have committed the aforementioned offences, as per the IPC, PDPP Act & UAPA, as mentioned above. 5. The appellant would urge that earlier, he was in judicial custody from 29.11.2016, on account of his involvement in a connected crime incident and that, he was granted bail in all the cases subsequently registered to the instant crime, viz., Crime No.48/2016 of Chittoor Police Station, Andhra Pradesh and Crime No.239/2016 of Nelloor Town Police Station. Further that, in the instant case, final report, by way of charge sheet, was filed by the Investigation Agency in the instant Crime No.1172/2016 of Kollam West Police Station on 08.09.2017, which was done within the statutorily stipulated time limit of 180 days. Hence, the appellant could not secure default bail in the instant case. The final report was initially filed under Sec.173(2) of the Cr.P.C on 08.09.2017. The learned Prosecutor has stated that later, an additional/supplementary final report was also filed in the instant case on 24.10.2017 under Sec.173(8) Cr.P.C. 6. The Sessions Court has rejected the bail application, as per the impugned Annexure-A2 order, mainly on the ground that the restrictive parameters envisaged by the Union Legislature, as per the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) of the UAPA, has to be strictly adhered to by the bail courts and that, going by the parameters therein, as laid down by the Apex Court rulings, if, after perusal of the materials arising out of the case diary as well as the final report filed under Sec.173(8) of the Cr.P.C, the court finds that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons, in respect of offences alleged as per Chapters IV & VI of the UAPA, then bail is not to be granted. On the other hand, if, after the above process, there are no reasonable grounds for the bail court to believe that such a prima facie case is made out as against the accused, for the abovesaid offences in question, then grant of bail could be considered, etc. On the other hand, if, after the above process, there are no reasonable grounds for the bail court to believe that such a prima facie case is made out as against the accused, for the abovesaid offences in question, then grant of bail could be considered, etc. That, in the instant case, the case diary materials, etc., have disclosed a strong prima facie case against the accused, in regard to his involvement in the offences alleged against him, as per Chapter IV of the UAPA, viz., offences as per Sec.15 punishable by Sec.16, Sec.18 & Sec.20 of the UAPA, which are all included in Chapter IV of the UAPA, etc. 7. The learned counsel for the applicant has urged that such a prima facie case is not made out and the case sought to be made out against the appellant (A-4) is only on the basis of a Sec.164 Cr.P.C statement made by A-5, who was subsequently made approver, which, according to the applicant, is purely hearsay version and therefore, inadmissible in evidence, etc. That apart, from the same, there are no materials to connect the appellant in any manner with the instant crime and that therefore, the appellant can successfully overcome the restrictive conditions envisaged in the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) of the UAPA and the impugned order of the Sessions Court, refusing to grant regular bail to the applicant, is illegal and improper and that, this Court may appropriately interfere in the matter and grant him bail, etc. 8. Per contra, the learned Prosecutor would strongly urge that the materials on record, including the Sec.164 Cr.P.C statement of the approver, would clearly make out a strong prima facie case as against the appellant, for his involvement in the offences alleged against him, in terms of Chapter IV of the UAPA and that, the judicial test in this regard have been laid down with precision by the Apex Court in decisions as in National Investigation Agency (NIA) v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], (hereinafter referred in short as 'Watali's case'), etc. 9. We have heard both sides and considered the rival contentions as well as the materials on record. 10. 9. We have heard both sides and considered the rival contentions as well as the materials on record. 10. The specific case of the prosecution is that the appellant (A-4) is one of the founding members of the terrorist outfit by name “Base Movement” and that, the appellant A-4 had in fact provided financial assistance to A-1, for procuring raw materials for making the bombs, which exploded near to Kollam Collectorate on the fateful day (15.06.2016). Further that, the statement of the approver would also indicate that not only A-1, but also A-4, are members of the terrorist gang, by name “Base Movement” and that, these materials would clearly show that due to the conspiracy hatched by the accused persons, A-4 had provided the vital financial assistance to A-1 for procuring the requisite materials for making the bomb, which is for the later use and further that, A-4 is also a member of the said terrorist gang, and that, therefore, at any rate prima facie case is made out as against A-4 in regard to his involvement in the offences, as per Sec.15 punishable as per Sec.16, Secs.18 & 20 of the UAPA. Further, the learned Public Prosecutor also urged that, even if a prima facie case is made out at least in respect of one among the alleged offences, included either in Chapter IV or Chapter VI of the UAPA, then the restrictive conditions in Sec.43-D(5) proviso would apply and the inevitable follow out is that regular bail should be refused, etc. 11. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the respondent (Investigation Agency) has initially filed a written objection/written statement dated 23.11.2022 in this case and that, later, they produced a copy of the Sec.164 Cr.P.C statement given by A-5 approver before the learned Magistrate in the instant case, along with memo dated 03.02.2023 filed by the learned Prosecutor. 12. Going by the above materials, it appears that the case of the prosecution is that, during the investigation, the petitioner was arrested on 08.03.2017, along with others, while they were in judicial custody at Nellore Central Jail, Andhra Pradesh, in connection with another crime, viz., Crime No.239/2016 of Nellore No.4, Town Police Station, Andhra Pradesh State and that the investigation in the instant case was completed and final report was filed on 08.09.2017 before the Principal Sessions Court, Kollam. Further that, necessary sanction of the competent authority has also been obtained, as per order dated 04.10.2017, for prosecuting the accused persons for the abovesaid offences in question. Further, it appears that A-5 had turned approver and he had given Sec.164 Cr.P.C before the learned Magistrate, in which it has been inter alia stated that, A-1 (Abu Ali) had informed the approver that A-4 (appellant herein) had given him funds, for procuring the materials for making the bomb in question. Further that, the said statement of the approver would also state that A-1, A-4 (appellant) and two others are also members of the terrorist gang, by name “Base Movement”, etc. The said statement also contains details of the other crimes, in which the appellant has been involved, and the same reads as follows : “1. Chittoor 1st Town PS Cr.48/16, U/s.307, 326, 448, 20(b), 121, 121(A) IPC & Sec.3,4 of Explosive Substance Act & Sec.4 & 5 of PDPP Act, Sec.3, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18 & 20 of UAP Act 1967. 2. Nellor Town 4th PS Cr.239/16, U/s.336, 286 IPC & Sec.3, 4 of Explosive Substance Act & Sec 4 & 5 of PDPP Act. 3. Malappuram PS Cr.693/16, U/s 120(b), 121, 121(A) IPC, Sec.3, 10, 15, 16, 18 & 20 of UAP Act 1967 & Sec.3(a) of Explosive Substance Act. 4. Ernakulam Central PS Cr.2506/16, U/s.124A, 153A, 153B, 506(1) IPC & Sec.120(o) of KP Act 2011 & Sec 2(o) r/w 13 of UAP Act, 1967.” 13. Before we proceed to examine the relevant materials, in the light of the legal parameters enshrined in the proviso to Sec.43-D (5) of the UAPA, it may be pertinent to refer to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ]. The Apex Court in Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], has dealt with the legal principles for the bail courts to deal with regular bail applications in regard to accused persons, who are facing allegations for offences included in Chapters IV & VI of the UAPA and that the restrictive conditions in Sec.43-D (5) proviso of the UAPA, will have to be strictly complied with. It may be pertinent to refer to paras 23 to 27 of the decision of the Apex Court in Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], which reads as follows : “23. It may be pertinent to refer to paras 23 to 27 of the decision of the Apex Court in Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], which reads as follows : “23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless, we may take guidance from the exposition in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paras 36 to 38, the Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 316-17) “36. Does this statute require that before a person is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it necessary for the court to record such a finding? Would there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever? 37. Such findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on record only for grant of bail and for no other purpose. 38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail should not be pushed too far. If the court, having regard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. … What would further be necessary on the part of the court is to see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or indirectly. … What would further be necessary on the part of the court is to see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or indirectly. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea.” And again in paras 44 to 48, the Court observed : (SCC pp. 318-20) “44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. 45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail. 46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. 46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby. 47. In [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 537-38, para 18) ‘18. We agree that a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by both the sides is not expected of the court considering a bail application. Still one should not forget, as observed by this Court in [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC(Cri) 1124] : (SCC p. 344, para 8) “8. … Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be undertaken. … That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.” We respectfully agree with the above dictum of this Court. We also feel that such expression of prima facie reasons for granting bail is a requirement of law in cases where such orders on bail application are appealable, more so because of the fact that the appellate court has every right to know the basis for granting the bail. We also feel that such expression of prima facie reasons for granting bail is a requirement of law in cases where such orders on bail application are appealable, more so because of the fact that the appellate court has every right to know the basis for granting the bail. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the accused that the High Court was not expected even to indicate a prima facie finding on all points urged before it while granting bail, more so in the background of the facts of this case where on facts it is established that a large number of witnesses who were examined after the respondent was enlarged on bail had turned hostile and there are complaints made to the court as to the threats administered by the respondent or his supporters to witnesses in the case. In such circumstances, the court was duty-bound to apply its mind to the allegations put forth by the investigating agency and ought to have given at least a prima facie finding in regard to these allegations because they go to the very root of the right of the accused to seek bail. The non-consideration of these vital facts as to the allegations of threat or inducement made to the witnesses by the respondent during the period he was on bail has vitiated the conclusions arrived at by the High Court while granting bail to the respondent. The other ground apart from the ground of incarceration which appealed to the High Court to grant bail was the fact that a large number of witnesses are yet to be examined and there is no likelihood of the trial coming to an end in the near future. As stated hereinabove, this ground on the facts of this case is also not sufficient either individually or coupled with the period of incarceration to release the respondent on bail because of the serious allegations of tampering with the witnesses made against the respondent.’ 48. In [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 481] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16) ‘16. In [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 481] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16) ‘16. … The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by this Court in [State v. Jagjit Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 622 : AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 215] and [Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they are — the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.’” 24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. 25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185] , it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation. 26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge-sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case. 27. For that, the totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance. In any case, the question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible. For, the issue of admissibility of the document/evidence would be a matter for trial. The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is.” 14. A reading of the said decision of the Apex Court in Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], would clearly indicate that the bail courts be it the original courts or the appellate courts, are under the duty to examine the issues in the light of the restrictive conditions envisaged in the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) supra and the materials emanating from the case diary as well as the final report/charge sheet, etc., will have to be taken as it is, without getting into the issues of , admissibility of the documents and evidence and also regarding the probabilities of the alleged incidents and then, may assess as to whether, taking these materials as it is, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations made against the accused person, who is alleged to have committed offences, as per Chapters IV & VI of the UAPA, are prima facie true. If, by applying such criteria, it is found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the said accusations are prima facie true, then bail is to be refused. On the other hand, if the above examination by the court leads to the scenario that the court has no good grounds to believe that the accusations are not prima facie true, then the grant of bail is to be considered. 15. Further, it has to be borne in mind that Sec.43-D(6) of the UAPA has clearly mandated that restrictions for grant of bail specified in Sec.43-D(5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail. In other words, the courts will also have to give due regard to the parameters and principles regulating the grant of regular bail, as envisaged in Sec.439, i.e., the other parameters based on the likelihood of the accused being available for co-operating with the investigation and being available for trial and the likelihood of his absconding, etc., and fleeing away from the long arms of the law, etc., likelihood of threatening and endangering the witnesses, etc., all will still have to be taken into account. 16. Further, in para 27 of Watali's case supra [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court has clearly held that issues relating to admissibilities of documents and evidence are not matters of concern at that stage of consideration of bail for those all are issues of matters of trial. It has also been held by the Apex Court in the said case that it is not proper for the courts to examine issues of probabilities of the alleged events and incidents and should take the materials as it is and then undertake the process of examining the materials and ascertaining as to whether the restrictive parameters in the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) of the UAPA, etc., would apply. 17. Of course, such a scenario of denial of bail, based on the aforesaid restrictive conditions envisaged in the UAPA, may not be the end of the road for a person who is remanded to judicial custody for such offences. 17. Of course, such a scenario of denial of bail, based on the aforesaid restrictive conditions envisaged in the UAPA, may not be the end of the road for a person who is remanded to judicial custody for such offences. A Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [ (2021) 3 SCC 713 ], has categorically held that despite the abovesaid restrictions contained in Sec.43-D(5) proviso of the UAPA, if in a case, the remanded accused is to face long incarceration due to unreasonable delay in the conclusion of the trial, etc., then the facets of violation of Article 21, based on equal access to justice and right to speedy trial, etc., would be involved. In such a case, where serious issues of long and unreasonable delay in the finalisation of the trial, etc., are involved, then Constitutional Courts, like the High Courts and the Apex Court, will have the discretion to consider the grant of bail in such scenarios, notwithstanding the restrictions contained in Sec.43-D(5) proviso. 18. We are not concerned with such a scenario and the task before this Court is mainly to examine as to the applicability of the restrictive conditions envisaged in the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) of the UAPA and also as to whether the view taken by the Sessions court concerned in that regard is reasonable and proper or whether it is unreasonable and perverse, etc. 19. A copy of the Sec.164 Cr.P.C. statement given by A-5 approver, has been produced as Annexure-R1(a) along with the memo dated 03.02.2023, filed by the learned Public Prosecutor in this case. A perusal of the said Sec.164 Cr.P.C. statement, tendered by the approver to the accused, would indicate that the approver is a young person aged 24 years, who is working as a Manager of a multi-national company. 20. The Magistrate has specifically noted that the approver has been made aware of the consequences of his disclosure and that the Magistrate has reasons to believe that the said statement has been made by the approver voluntarily, etc. 21. 20. The Magistrate has specifically noted that the approver has been made aware of the consequences of his disclosure and that the Magistrate has reasons to believe that the said statement has been made by the approver voluntarily, etc. 21. Further, he would state that he was initially innocently acquainted with A-1 and he had met A-1 in a Masjid and A-1 had deliberately befriended him and started taking freedoms with him and that A-1 started talking freely with him and that A-1 had informed him about the existence of an organisation, by name “Base Movement” and A-1 had given a white paper to the approver to write down his application to join in the said organisation. That, the approver had filled up the said application, supplied to him by A-1 and had thus joined the organisation. At that time, he was not aware that the said organisation was an illegal organisation. That, in July 2016, when his family members had left his residence to visit their relative and A-1, coming to know of it, had come to his residence with one Carton Box and with some tools and when the approver enquired about it, A-1 got highly irritated and suddenly became very angry, etc., and A-1 commanded him to co-operate with him. Later, A-1 had forced A-5 to enter his room and locked it up and he stated that he would open the room when he completed his work. Later, when the approver asked A-1 as to what he was doing at night, A-1 told him that he had made a bomb. A-1 had also told him that in June, 2016 he (A-1) had made a bomb and handed it over to another accused in this case and A-1 further told the approver that the said other co-accused had planted the bomb in the Kollam court premises, which is said to be near the Kollam Collectorate, on 15.06.2016. That, the raw-materials for making the bomb were purchased by another co-accused, etc. We need not get into the further details in this statement, except to note the crucial part of it, wherein the approver would state that A-1 had informed the approver that A-4 herein (appellant) had given funds for making the abovesaid bomb in question. That, the raw-materials for making the bomb were purchased by another co-accused, etc. We need not get into the further details in this statement, except to note the crucial part of it, wherein the approver would state that A-1 had informed the approver that A-4 herein (appellant) had given funds for making the abovesaid bomb in question. When the approver had asked him the purpose of planting such bombs, he became very angry and threatened him that, in the event of disclosure, he would kill him and his family members. Further, the approver has also clearly stated that the aforementioned accused persons, including A-1 and appellant A-4 are members of the aforesaid organisation (Base Movement). Further, there are graphic descriptions about the planting of bombs in other five places by A-1. The approver has also stated that he was also made to watch the video of a bomb blast held in three places, etc. He has also inter-alia stated that A-1 is a very bold person, who is not subject to any weaknesses, etc. 22. Going by the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case in Watali’s case supra [ AIR 2019 (SC) 1734 ], it is not right and proper for this appellate bail court or for that matter, the original bail court to enter into the issues of admissibility of documents/evidence, etc. Hence, we are of the view that, if the abovesaid materials are taken as it is, then a strong prima facie case is made against the appellant herein, for the abovesaid offences alleged against him, which are included in Chapter IV of the UAPA. Hence, there are reasonable grounds for this Court to believe that the accusations against the appellant, going by these materials as it is, are prima facie true, as envisaged in the proviso to Sec.43-D(5) of the UAPA. Hence, the impugned order of the Sessions Court concerned, in refusing regular bail to the applicant, in view of these aspects, cannot be said to be illegal or unreasonable. Further, we note that the appellant is the accused in similar offences in three or four other crimes and he could secure default bail in some other crimes only on account of the non-completion of the investigation within the statutory outer time limit or the extended time limit. Further, we note that the appellant is the accused in similar offences in three or four other crimes and he could secure default bail in some other crimes only on account of the non-completion of the investigation within the statutory outer time limit or the extended time limit. Further, going by the graphic description of the various incidents and events and since the approver is involved in this case, there is force in the plea of the learned Prosecutor that there could be serious to life and security of the approver, if the accused is let out on bail and further that, there are strong possibilities of the appellant/accused absconding or fleeing from justice, if he is released on bail, etc. Hence, for the totality of these reasons, we find that there is force in the abovesaid pleas of the prosecution. Hence, having a cumulative regard to all these aspects, we are of the view that this Court is not in a position to set aside the impugned order refusing to grant regular bail to the applicant herein. In other words, the appeal fails and accordingly, the above Crl.Appeal will stand dismissed.