ORDER : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) 1. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the writ petitioner herein has filed this writ petition calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 22nd January, 2020 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Circuit Sitting at Bilaspur, by which petitioner's application for condonation of delay in filing application under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (herein after referred as “the Act, 1985”) has been rejected and consequently, the original application has also been dismissed. 2. Petitioner's husband late Shri N. Laxman Rao was working with respondent – Railway as a Gate Keeper. He was subjected to disciplinary proceeding for his misconduct, whereas, in disciplinary proceedings, by order dated 30.11.2010 he was inflicted with the penalty of compulsory retirement and ultimately by order dated 10.12.2010 he was compulsorily retired. Against the order of compulsory retirement he filed the appeal before the Appellate Authority and the same was dismissed by order dated 28.06.2011 against which he preferred the revision petition before the Revisional Authority and before his revision could be disposed off finally, he left for heavenly abode on 13.09.2011. Thereafter, on 09.11.2011 his revision was dismissed by the Revisional Authority and the Revisional Authority directed vide Annexure P/4 that revisional order be informed to the family members of the deceased employee. In the meanwhile, the petitioner herein (wife of railway servant) left Chhattisgarh and started living with her parents at Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh with two minor sons finding financial crisis and having no accommodation of her own in Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh and she could not be served with the revisional order. In the month of February, 2018 she came back to Raipur, Chhattisgarh and collected some documents and made representation to the Divisional Railway Manager (for short 'DRM'), Raipur (Annexure P/6) on 17.02.2018 and claimed all retiral benefits which was rejected by DRM by order dated 14.06.2018 (Annexure P/7) and thereafter, petitioner preferred Original Application with application for condonation of delay under Section 21(3) of the Act, 1985 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which was rejected by the impugned order relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India & Ors. vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 , holding that the dead and stale claim cannot be entertained by the Tribunals. 3. vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 , holding that the dead and stale claim cannot be entertained by the Tribunals. 3. Feeling aggrieved against the order of Tribunal, the petitioner herein filed this writ petition stating that tenor and texture of order dated 09.11.2011, she was never served with the revisional order, anyhow she came back to Bilaspur and filed the application and explained the delay which the Tribunal did not consider it favourably and rejected the application by recording a finding perverse to the record. 4. Detailed reply has been filed, opposing the writ petition stating inter alia that the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay has rightly been rejected and consequently, the original application has also been rejected as no sufficient cause was shown for deliberate delay of 8 years in filing the original application before the Tribunal, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Mr. D.K. Swain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the Tribunal has erred in holding that there is inordinate delay in filing the original application. Revisional order 09.11.2011 (Annexure P/4) itself would show that it was directed to be served to family members of late N. Laxman Rao which was never served and when she came back to Raipur in February, 2018 from Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, then she inquired the matter and got the copy of the documents and then she filed the representation before the DRM, Raipur, which was rejected vide order dated 14.06.2018 (Annexure P/7). Thereafter, she preferred original application and, as such, sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner for condoning the delay in filing the application, therefore, impugned order deserves to be set aside. 6. Ms. Anmol Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the Tribunal is absolutely justified in rejecting the application finding no merit as there is inordinate delay of 8 years which has not been explained by the petitioner herein, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. Section 20 of the Act, 1985 provides that the application under the Act, 1985 not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted and Section 20(1) of the Act purports to give effect to the Disciplinary Rules and exhaustion of remedies available thereunder is a condition precedent for maintaining of claims under the Act, 1985 and by virtue of Section 20(2) of the Act, 1985, the cause of action in filing the application under the Act, 1985 shall be taken to arise not from the date of original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months’ period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. [ See : S. S. Rathore v. State of M.P., AIR 1990 SC 10 ]. 9. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub-section (3). 10. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 21(1) to (3), which state as under:- 21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where — (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 11. A careful perusal of the aforesaid Section would show that subsection (1) of Section 21 provides for limitation for redressal of the grievances in clauses (a) and (b) and specifies the period of one year. Sub-section (2) amplifies the limitation of one year in respect of grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) and an outer limit of six months in respect of grievances covered by subsection (2) is provided. Sub-section (3) postulates that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or subsection (2), if the applicants satisfy the Tribunal that they had sufficient case for not making the applications within such period enumerated in sub-sections (1) and (2) from the date of application, the Tribunal has been given power to condone the delay, on satisfying itself that the applicants have satisfactorily explained the delay in filing the applications for redressal of their grievances. 12. 12. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in the matter of State of Karnataka and Others vs. S.M. Kotrayya and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 267 , has held that sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 has given power for making application within one year in respect of grievance covered under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 and the outer limit of six months in respect of grievances covered by sub-section (2) has been provided. There is no need for applicants to give any explanation to the delay having occurred in that period and they are entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for redressal of their grievances and if the applications come to be filed beyond that period, then the need to give satisfactory explanation for the delay caused till the date of filing of the application and then the question of satisfaction of Tribunal in that behalf would arise. It was further held by their Lordships that sub-section (3) starts with non obstante clause which rubs out the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 and need thereby arises to give satisfactory explanation for delay which has been occasioned after the expiry of period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof. Their Lordships in para 9 has held as under :-. 9. Thus considered, we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents should give an explanation for the delay which occasioned for the period mentioned in subsections (1) or (2) of Section 21, but they should give explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should be required to satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper explanation. In this case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under subsections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is wholly unjustified in condoning the delay. 13. What was required of them to explain under subsections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is wholly unjustified in condoning the delay. 13. Returning to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that on 28.06.2011 the appeal preferred by the petitioner's husband against the order of compulsory retirement was dismissed and his revision before the Competent Authority/Revisional Authority was pending consideration, meanwhile on 13.09.2011 the petitioner's husband Shri. N. Laxman Rao passed away and admittedly on 09.11.2011 his revision was dismissed upholding the order of Appellate Authority in absence of the petitioner's husband and the Revisional Authority had directed to communicate the revisional order to the family members of the petitioner's husband but, it is the case of the petitioner herein that she was not communicated with the revisional order and she came to know only in February, 2018 leading to representation vide memo dated 17.02.2018 (Annexure P/6), which was rejected on 14.06.2018 (Annexure P/7) and immediately she filed original application along with application for condonation of delay on 15.07.2019, as evident from Annexure P/4 but, it is nowhere apparent from the record, whether the copy of the revisional order was ever served to the petitioner herein, and it has been pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that she could not come to know about said order dated 09.11.2011 and in the month of February, 2018 when she came back to Raipur, Chhattisgarh, she collected documents and made representation before the DRM, Raipur (Annexure P/6) and claimed all retiral benefits which was rejected by DRM, Raipur, by order dated 14.06.2018 (Annexure P/7) and thereafter, she preferred Original Application along with application for condonation of delay under Section 21(3) of the Act, 1985 before the Central Administrative Tribunal on 15.07.2019, which was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of M.K. Sarkar (supra). Once petitioner's husband died before the revisional order was passed, it was duty of respondents/Revisional Authorities to ensure the service of the revisional order to the petitioner herein within reasonable time so that she may avail the remedy against that order, but that was not done and the original application filed by the petitioner before the Central Administrative Tribunal has been dismissed on the ground of delay of 8 years. 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of S.M. Kortrayya (supra) has held that proper explanation has to be offered for delay which has occasioned after the expiry of period prescribed in subsections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985, as in the instant case period specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 has already expired. It is case of the petitioner that she did not know about the impugned order dated 09.11.2011 and the service of impugned order dated 09.11.2011 to the widow of the deceased railway servant/petitioner herein has also not been clearly pleaded and established on behalf of the respondents, as such, immediately after rejection of her representation vide Annexure P/7 on 14.06.2018, the petitioner herein has filed the original application along with the application for condonation of delay before the Tribunal on 15.07.2019. Since the revisional order itself was not served for the reasons that before the revisional order could be passed petitioner's husband passed away and thereafter, wife of the railway servant/petitioner herein left Chhattisgarh and was staying along with her parents at Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, and the revisional order could not be served to her. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the proper and satisfactory explanation has been offered by the petitioner herein for not filing the application within the period of limitation prescribed under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1985. However, the Tribunal did not consider the application in its right perspective and rejected the application summarily relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of M.K. Sarkar (supra) which held that the original application claiming with regard to the 'stale or dead' issues have not to be entertained, which is not the case here as the petitioner had questioned the order of compulsory retirement and order of Appellate and Revisional Authority confirming the order of compulsory retirement. 15. 15. In that view of the matter, we are unable to uphold the order of Central Administrative Tribunal dated 22nd January, 2020 rejecting the application for condonation of delay. Accordingly, application for condonation of delay is allowed and delay in filing Original Application No.203/00579/2019 is hereby set aside Original Application No.203/00579/2019 is restored for hearing in Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur, Circuit Sitting Bilaspur, in accordance with law. Since the issue relates to compulsory retirement of the petitioner's husband who had retired compulsorily on 30.11.2010, the Central Administrative Tribunal is requested to ensure that the Original Application is decided expeditiously. 16. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein above. No order as to cost(s).