ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed in Criminal Revision No.401/2018 by 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur dated 03.12.2018 whereby the revision preferred by the complainant has been allowed and the order dated 01.08.2018 passed by the learned JMFC, Raipur in unregistered case filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been set aside. 2. The case, in nutshell, is that, the respondent filed a complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 420 of the IPC on the ground that cheque No.189467 was issued in discharge of liability by the petitioner on 15.12.2017 and when it was presented before the ICICI bank, Bilaspur on 18.12.2017 it got dishonoured. The complainant was informed regarding dishonour of cheque and intimation was given in this regard on 19.12.2017 and again it was dishonoured on 06.02.2018 which was presented before the bank on assurance given by the petitioner. A legal demand notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was issued on 28.02.2018 by the petitioner, but he could not receive the postal acknowledgment and thereafter, he approached the postal department thereafter the same was received by him on 22.05.2018, whereas the complaint case was filed on 30.05.2018. 3. The learned trial Court vide order dated 01.08.2018 dismissed the complaint case on the ground that though the application under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been moved, but the complainant could not disclose the fact as to when the application regarding postal acknowledgment was moved before the postal department. The complainant challenged the order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 01.08.2018 before the learned Sessions Court by filing revision and same was allowed vide order dated 03.12.2018 where the learned revisional Court held that the delay was bonafide and the complainant has explained the reason for such delay. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though there is provision for condonation of delay in the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the complainant has not explained the delay of 92 days in his application. He would submit that it is a special Act and the delay cannot be condoned by the courts while exercising the revisional power. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Econ Antri Limited Vs. He would submit that it is a special Act and the delay cannot be condoned by the courts while exercising the revisional power. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Econ Antri Limited Vs. Rom Industries Limited and another, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 769 and referred to para 6, 9, 14 and 20 of the said judgment which read as under: “6. Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under: “142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138; Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” 9. In Saketh [Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1 ] cheques dated 15/3/1995 and 16/3/1995 issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for encashment. Notices were served on the accused on 29/9/1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, the accused were required to make the payment of the said amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. on or before 14/10/1995. The accused failed to pay the amount. The cause of action, therefore, arose on 15/10/1995. According to the complainant for calculating one month’s period contemplated under Section 142(b), the date “15/10/1995” has to be excluded. The complaint filed on 15/11/1995 was, therefore, within time. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of action arose i.e. “15/10/1995” has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. The complaint filed on 15/11/1995 was, therefore, within time. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of action arose i.e. “15/10/1995” has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. The accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code) for quashing the process issued by the learned Magistrate. That petition was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal.[ (1972) 1 SCC 639 ] wherein it was held that: “5. ….the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded …... the effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day.” 14. The counsel submitted that the word “within” has been held by this Court to mean “on or before”. (Danial Latifi v. Union of India [ (2001) 7 SCC 740 ]. Therefore, the complaint under Section 142(b) should be filed on or before or within, 30 days of the date on which the cause of action under Section 138(c) arises. The counsel submitted that there is no justification to exclude the 16th day of the 15-day period under Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period under Section 142(b) as has been wrongly decided in Saketh. This would amount to exclusion of the starting date of the period. Such exclusion has been held to be against the law in SIL Import USA [SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567 ]. The counsel further submitted that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the NI Act as held by this Court in Subodh S. Salaskar [Suboth S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689 ]. The counsel pointed out that by Amending Act 55 of 2002, a proviso was added to Section 142(b) of the NI Act. It bestows discretion upon the court to accept a complaint after the period of 30 days and to condone the delay. The counsel pointed out that by Amending Act 55 of 2002, a proviso was added to Section 142(b) of the NI Act. It bestows discretion upon the court to accept a complaint after the period of 30 days and to condone the delay. This amendment signifies that prior to this amendment the courts had no discretion to condone the delay or exclude time by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act 55 of 2002 confirms the legal position that the NI Act being a special statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it. The counsel submitted that the judgment of this Court on the Arbitration Act is not applicable to this case because Section 43 of the Arbitration Act specifically makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitrations. The counsel submitted that in view of the above, it is evident that Saketh does not lay down the correct law. It is SIL Import USA which correctly analyses the provisions of law and lays down the law. The counsel urged that the reference be answered in light of his submissions. 20. The second case referred to is Cartwright v. MacCormack[ (1963) 1 WLR 18 ]. In that case, the plaintiffs met with an accident at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959. He was run into by the defendant driving a motor car. He issued his writ in this action claiming damages for personal injuries. The defendant initiated third party proceedings against the respondent insurance company, alleging the company’s liability to indemnify him under an instrument called a temporary cover note admittedly issued by the insurance company on 2/12/1959. The insurance company inter alia contended that the policy had expired before the accident happened. The insurance company succeeded on this point. On appeal the insurance company reiterated that the cover note issued by the insurance company contained the expression “fifteen days from the date of commencement of policy”. On the same note date and time were noted as 2/12/1959 and 11.45 a.m. It was argued that the fifteen days started at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the same time on 17/12/1959. The accident occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959 and, therefore, it was not covered by the insurance policy. On the same note date and time were noted as 2/12/1959 and 11.45 a.m. It was argued that the fifteen days started at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the same time on 17/12/1959. The accident occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959 and, therefore, it was not covered by the insurance policy. The Court of Appeal treated the expression “fifteen days from the commencement of the policy” as excluding the first date and the cover note was held to commence at midnight of that date. It was observed that the policy expired fifteen days from 2/12/1959 and these words on the ordinary rules of construction exclude the first date and begin at midnight on that day, therefore, the policy would cover the accident which had occurred at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959.” He would submit that the order passed by the learned revisional Court is liable to be set aside being contrary to the well settled principle of law as also to Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the learned revisional Court has exercised the power given under Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act and its proviso. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Ralli Vs. Maninder Singh Narula, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 245 and relied upon para 8, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 7. It is not in dispute that the complaint was filed by the complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and on the ground of delay alone the aforesaid was rejected. An application was filed by the complainant under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act along with the complaint case, in which he has stated that the postal receipt could not be received though the notice was issued on 28.02.2018 and later on he enquired from the postal department and obtained the postal receipt which is a necessary document to establish the fact that mandatory notice was issued to the accused. 8. 8. The judgment relied on by the petitioner does not touch the issue involved in the present case and the same is evident from para 42 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Econ Antri Limited (supra) which is as follows:- “42. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in the light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh [Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1 ] lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the NI Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import, USA [SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567 ] does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh [Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1 ] by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly.” 9. It is well settled principle of law that the case should be decided on its merits rather than technicalities. As there is provision to condone the delay, the learned revisional Court has rightly condoned the delay of 90 days caused in filing of the complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with similar issue in the case of Pawan Kumar Ralli (supra) has held as under :- 8. Even otherwise, before quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground of limitation, the High Court could have decided whether sufficient cause was made out by the appellant under the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act, and if satisfied, it could have condoned the delay. Alternatively, the High Court could have remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the issue. Alternatively, the High Court could have remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the issue. In support of his submissions, the learned amicus placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State [ (2000) 7 SCC 656 ], in which while considering the provisions of Section 473 CrPC and deciding the question whether on the ground of limitation, the accused is entitled to seek his discharge, this Court held: (SCC p. 661, para 10) "10. The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry of the period of limitation, did not entitle the accused to seek his discharge under Section 245 CrPC because the complainant has, under law, a right to seek for extension of time under Section 473 CrPC. The complainant could satisfy the Magistrate on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay was explainable which was occasioned on account of their bona fide belief to obtain the sanction for the purpose of filing the complaint." 18. We have perused the handwritten note dated 27-4-2012 (Annexure P-4) and found that it was issued within the mandatory period of thirty days of dishonour of cheques and contained (a) the subject amount of Rs.60,00,000/- given by the appellant as loan to the respondent under promissory notes; (b) the details of cheque numbers and dates of issue with amounts and particulars of bank; (c) returning of cheques by the banker dishonouring them on the ground of “stop payment” by the respondent; (d) a demand for immediate repayment of the amount; and (e) a caution to the respondent that in case of failure on the part of respondent, the appellant would initiate legal proceedings. Thus, in our opinion, the handwritten note dated 27-4-2012 fulfilled the mandatory requirements under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and could be said to be a valid “notice” in the light of this Court’s Judgment in Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms [ (1999) 8 SCC 221 ]. Moreover, this document (Annexure P-4) stands admitted by the appellant in his cross-examination also. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court has committed no error in considering the handwritten note dated 27-4-2012 as “notice” under Section 138 of the Act. 19. Moreover, this document (Annexure P-4) stands admitted by the appellant in his cross-examination also. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court has committed no error in considering the handwritten note dated 27-4-2012 as “notice” under Section 138 of the Act. 19. However, when the issue of limitation has come up for the first time before the High Court, it ought to have dealt with the same on merits as per proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act. The said proviso appended to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act was inserted by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 and the legislative intent was, no doubt, in order to overcome the technicality of limitation period. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this proviso was to provide discretion to the Court to take cognizance of offence even after expiry of the period of limitation [See MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177 ]. Only with a view to obviate the difficulties on the part of the complainant, Parliament inserted the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in the year 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the Court to condone the delay [See Subodh S. Salaskar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah (2008) 13 SCC 689 ]. 21. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, while keeping in mind the legislative intent and the specific plea of the appellant raised in the grounds for the special leave petition that he should have been allowed to move an application for condonation of delay before the trial court as the respondent has not suffered any prejudice by reason of 25 days' delay, we strongly feel that the appellant should not have been deprived of the remedy provided by the Legislature. In fact, the remedy so provided was to enable a genuine litigant to pursue his case against a defaulter by overcoming the technical difficulty of limitation. Hence, the High Court has committed an error by not considering the issue of limitation on merits. 22. In view of the settled principles of law in Rakesh Kumar Jain, MSR Leathers. In fact, the remedy so provided was to enable a genuine litigant to pursue his case against a defaulter by overcoming the technical difficulty of limitation. Hence, the High Court has committed an error by not considering the issue of limitation on merits. 22. In view of the settled principles of law in Rakesh Kumar Jain, MSR Leathers. Subodh S. Salaskar (supra) and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in quashing the complaint merely on the ground that complaint is barred by limitation, that too a plea which was taken for the first time before the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court ought to have remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding the issue of limitation. At the same time, we want to make it very clear that by this observation we are not laying down a legal proposition that without even filing an application seeking condonation of delay at an initial stage, the complainant can be given opportunity at any stage of the proceeding. As already discussed by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we have come to the irresistible conclusion, to afford an opportunity for the complainant to move an application seeking condonation of delay, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case” 10. Considering the above discussed facts and in view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Ralli (supra), I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned revisional Court. Therefore, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.