ORDER : (Ramesh Sinha, J.) 1. Heard Mr. M.K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned Dy. Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents and Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 5. 2. By way of present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s): “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to call for the entire records in connection of the petitioner’s cases. 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court be further pleased to quash the impugned order dated 01.04.17 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Respondent No.2 granting sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. 10.3 That the Hon’ble Court be further pleased to issue writ of mandamus directing the Respondent authorities not to take any action against the petitioner, as there are no materials on record. 10.4 Any other order that the Hon’ble Court deems fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case be also passed. 10.5 That the cost of the petition be also awarded to the petitioners.” 3. It is stated in the writ petition that while the petitioner was working under respondent No.2/Managing Director as Chief Executive Officer, Zila Antyawasayi Sahkari Vikas Samiti Maryadit, Mahasamund, on 2.1.2016 respondent No.5 made a complaint to the police regarding registration of FIR against the petitioner and others as on the basis of forged certificates/documents, loan was provided from the said Samiti to the scavengers under the scheme of Safai Kamgar. However, the petitioner obtained anticipatory bail from this Court vide order dated 11.5.2006 passed in MCRC No.823/2006. Thereafter, in the year 2009, the petitioner filed a writ petition i.e. WPCR No.2627/2009 before this Court for quashing the complaint dated 2.1.2006 and vide order dated 27.7.2009, the said petition was disposed of with a direction that if no action is taken on the letter, it is expedient that respondent No.1/CG State Antyavyavasayi Cooperative Finance and Development Corporation, Raipur may hear the petitioner before taking any decision on the letter. 4. On 17.8.2009 the petitioner submitted application to respondent No.2 as per direction of this Court stating that the enquiry report was issued in reference to the letter on 3.1.2006 by the Collector, Durg, which was not clear and complete, so the Managing Director returned the report for sending clear and detailed report on 10.1.2006. Shri. J.D. Banerjee, the then Chief Executive Officer was suspended on 3.1.2006 and therefore, Mr. Shri. J.D. Banerjee, the then Chief Executive Officer was suspended on 3.1.2006 and therefore, Mr. Banerjee made a complaint against the petitioner for registration of FIR. Though the petitioner requested the Managing Director for withdrawing the FIR lodged against him vide his representation dated 17.8.2009 (Annexure P/6), however, on 15.9.2009 respondent No.2/Managing Director issued a letter to respondent No.3/Collector, Durg regarding the complaint made to the police for registration of FIR and for taking appropriate action in the matter. On 30.11.2009 the petitioner submitted an application to the police for closure of the FIR registered against him. 5. On 23.3.2013 the Deputy Director (Prosecution), Durg issued a letter to respondent No.2 stating that there is no material and evidence against the petitioner which could prima facie show his involvement in the crime and as such, the prosecution would not be able to prove its case against the petitioner. On 8.4.2013 respondent No.2 wrote a letter to respondent No.4/Superintendent of Police, Durg stating that there is no material based on which sanction for prosecution of the petitioner in Crime No.107/2006 for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 34 of IPC could be given. However, after a lapse of about four years, on 1.4.2017, without there being any material and without there being any fresh application for grant of sanction, respondent No.2 granted sanction for prosecution against the petitioner which has been challenged in this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that impugned sanction order passed by respondent No.2 is per se illegal, arbitrary and has been passed with a malafide intention. There is nothing on record to show that any new material was placed before respondent No.2 which was made the basis for granting sanction when it was earlier refused by the same authority. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nishant Sareen reported in 2011 AIR (SC) 404 and Gopikant Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar and others, (2000) 9 SCC 53 . 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 5 submits that respondent No.2 granted sanction invoking power and authority conferred on him in accordance with law on the basis of material and evidence produced before him. State of Bihar and others, (2000) 9 SCC 53 . 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 5 submits that respondent No.2 granted sanction invoking power and authority conferred on him in accordance with law on the basis of material and evidence produced before him. True it is that earlier respondent No.2 had refused sanction, however, there is no express provision preventing the authority from reviewing the sanction. He submits that the concerned trial Court while framing charges against the co-accused persons noticed that under the guidance and meeting of mind with the petitioner, the co-accused submitted forged applications in the name of Ajay seeking benefits of loan and got the loan sanctioned. This judicial notice itself amount to sufficient material on record for reviewing the earlier order whereby sanction was refused. In these circumstances, the instant petition being without any substance is liable to be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the State also supports the impugned order and submits that the same has been passed after taking into consideration all the relevant aspects of the matter in light of overall material placed before the sanctioning authority. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. In the matter of Nishant Sareen (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme while dealing with identical issue observed as under: “12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It seems to us sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course. 13. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the appellant that fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or for review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. As a matter of fact, from the perusal of the subsequent order dated March 15, 2008 it is clear that on the same materials, the sanctioning authority has changed its opinion and ordered sanction to prosecute the respondent which, in our opinion, is clearly impermissible.” 11. In the present case, on being asked from learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 5 as to what fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction, he could not point out any such material. 12. In the present case, on being asked from learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 5 as to what fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction, he could not point out any such material. 12. Thus, considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the manner in which the sanction was accorded for prosecution of the petitioner by respondent No.2/Managing Director, keeping in mind the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nishant Sareen (supra) for reconsideration as to grant of sanction, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 1.4.2017 (Annexure P/1) is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned order is hereby set aside. However, the sanctioning authority is at liberty to pass a fresh sanction order in accordance with law if an occasion so arises. 13. With the aforesaid observations, the instant petition stands allowed.