ORDER : 1. The petitioner filed this Interlocutory Application under Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. seeking review of the order dated 25.10.2019 passed in W.P. No. 46248 of 2016, wherein and whereby this Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus declaring G.O.Ms. No. 9, Education [(SE:Vig.I(1)] Department, dated 16.04.2014 issued by the 3rd respondent i.e. the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Principal Secretary, Education Department sanctioning prosecution of the petitioner by exercising power conferred by Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13 (1)(d) of the Act and for any other cognate offence under the provisions of law for the time being in force. 2. The brief facts of the case are that when the petitioner was working as a District Educational Officer in Guntur District during the year 2007, one Mr. Chandra Sekhar Reddy, the Correspondent of Aravinda High School, Kunchavapalli Village made a complaint to the Anti Corruption Bureau against the petitioner stating that he demanded Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) for forwarding supplementary Nominal Rolls of one candidate and for doing official favour to process and to recommend for the up-gradation of VI to X Class. Pursuant there to, Crime No. 12/TCT-ACB-VJA/2007 was registered against the petitioner under Section 7 of the Act by the ACB. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent ACB officials laid a trap successfully on 13.11.2007. The 2nd respondent moved the Government for sanction for prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The Government ordered the District Secretary to submit a Final report on 12.01.2009. The Government vide Memo No. 18195/SE-Vig.1(1)/2007-7, dated 25.03.2011, after carefully considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, decided that initiation of departmental enquiry is sufficient to probe the matter in detail instead of prosecution in a Court of law and also passed orders on 28.05.2011. Thereafter, on 25.08.2011 the 2nd respondent had furnished Articles of charges in respect of trap case. The request of the 2nd respondent for sanction of prosecution of petitioner under Section 19 was not accorded by the Government in various proceedings: 1. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 28.09.2010 2. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 29.09.2010 3. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated Dec. Thereafter, on 25.08.2011 the 2nd respondent had furnished Articles of charges in respect of trap case. The request of the 2nd respondent for sanction of prosecution of petitioner under Section 19 was not accorded by the Government in various proceedings: 1. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 28.09.2010 2. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 29.09.2010 3. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated Dec. 2010 4. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 28.01.2011 5. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 07.05.2011 6. Rc. No. 219/RCT-VGT/2007-S.17, dated 18.06.2011 Instead of prosecution, the Government preferred the departmental enquiry. The 2nd respondent’s request for closure of the case before the Special Court was dismissed in RCs. No. 2 of 2012. On persuasion of the 2nd respondent, the Government issued impugned G.O.Ms. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 granting sanction for prosecution of the petitioner under Section 19 of the Act, the same was modified on some technical defects and issued another G.O.Ms. No. 14, dated 06.05.2014, according sanction to prosecute the petitioner for the offence under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act for taking cognizance of the said offence by the Court of competent jurisdiction. Thereafter, the charge sheet was filed on 05.06.2014. The Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada had taken the case on file and numbered the same as C.C. No. 11 of 2014. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Crl. Pet. No. 5459 of 2014 for quashing the G.O.Ms. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The same was disposed of giving liberty to the petitioner to move appropriate petition in view of filing of the charge sheet and taking cognizance of the same by the Court. Hence, filed this writ petition to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 issued by the 3rd respondent as illegal and consequently set aside the same on the ground that the Government has no authority to review its earlier orders and to grant sanction for prosecution through G.O.Ms. Nos. 9 and 14 issued on 16.04.2014 and 06.05.2014 respectively. 3. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 issued by the 3rd respondent as illegal and consequently set aside the same on the ground that the Government has no authority to review its earlier orders and to grant sanction for prosecution through G.O.Ms. Nos. 9 and 14 issued on 16.04.2014 and 06.05.2014 respectively. 3. The grounds which led to filing of the present review application are as under: (i) The first ground is that the Memo No. 18195/SE-Vig.I(1)/2007-7, dated 25.03.2011 was issued only after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and instead of prosecuting the case in the court of law, the Government had decided to conduct Departmental Enquiry, which was within the powers of the Government. (ii) The second ground is that the Anti Corruption Bureau requested for closure of the case, which was filed only upon refusal by the Government for prosecuting the accused and therefore, the Court below had no jurisdiction to direct the Government to prosecute the petitioner’s case in the Court. (iii) The third ground is that the agency requested for reconsideration of the decision taken earlier i.e. on 28.09.2010, 29.09.2010, 12.10.2010 and 28.01.2011, after considering the final report of the agency which was refused by the Government and reiterated its earlier order. The Agency subsequently filed R.C.S. No. 2/2013 for closure of case as required sanction was not granted. Therefore, the Court below should have closed the case and ought not to have given further directions. (iv) The fourth ground is that later to the orders dated 25.09.2013 of Special Judge for SPE/ACB Cases at Vijayawada, a request was made for sanction afresh and for decision without jurisdiction. Any decision by incompetent authority is unauthorized and illegal and non est. (v) The fifth ground is that the ACB’s proposals were examined and reasons were recorded for not granting sanction for prosecution as per the instructions and the same could not have been reviewed and the order dated 25.10.2019 is non est in law, which the Hon’ble Court ought to have considered. (vi) The last ground is that the law laid down in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527 , wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Government can only exercise power of review once that too on fresh materials and cannot review the power of sanction otherwise. (vi) The last ground is that the law laid down in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527 , wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Government can only exercise power of review once that too on fresh materials and cannot review the power of sanction otherwise. If the Agency had legitimate grievance about order refusing sanction when the Government proposed departmental action, the investigation agency did not challenge the orders dated 28.09.2010, 29.09.2010, 12.10.2010, 28.01.2011, 25.03.2011, 07.05.2011 and 18.06.2011, and therefore, they now cannot ask to review the earlier order. The reasoning of the Court in dismissing the Writ Petition No. 46248 of 2016 is contrary to law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and needs to be reviewed in view of law laid down in a case of State of Punjab and Another vs. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92 and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, 2010 (14) SCC 527 . 4. Heard Sri W.B. Srinivas, Senior Counsel appearing for Sri P. Srinivasulu, advocate on record for the petitioner, Ms. A. Gayathri Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 and the learned Government Pleader for Education. 5. Sri W.B. Srinivasulu, learned Senior Counsel, while reiterating the grounds of review petition, would contend that the 3rd respondent Government while initiating departmental enquiry through G.O.Rt. No. 517, dated 04.09.2010, dropped the prosecution on 25.03.2011. Hence, the prosecuting agency filed RCs. No. 2/2013 for closure of the case as the sanction order was not issued by the competent authority. The special Court for SPE & ACB cases dismissed the said petition on 25.09.2013 and directed the agency to make a request to the competent authority and also suggested the competent authority to examine the ACB’s request for sanction afresh and take a decision based on the material by the agency. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent-Government issued impugned G.O.Ms. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 granting sanction of prosecution and trial, but as there were some technical defects in the said G.O., the authority issued G.O.Ms. No. 14, dated 05.05.2014 and a charge sheet was also filed in the case and the same was numbered as C.C. No. 11 of 2014 by the Special Court. No. 9, dated 16.04.2014 granting sanction of prosecution and trial, but as there were some technical defects in the said G.O., the authority issued G.O.Ms. No. 14, dated 05.05.2014 and a charge sheet was also filed in the case and the same was numbered as C.C. No. 11 of 2014 by the Special Court. The 3rd respondent-Sanctioning Authority, without application of mind in issuing the impugned sanction order by reviewing the earlier order for which the sanction authority has no power under the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, without there being any fresh material placed by the prosecution agency for sanction, is illegal. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen, 2010 (14) SCC 527 and State of Punjab and Another vs. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92 . 6. The sanction is barred by limitation, according to the provisions of the Section 19 of the Act, the sanction is required to be granted within 60 days from the date of registering the crime, hence the sanction of prosecution by impugned order is bad in law, it could not be construed as a valid sanction. The said ground is not specifically pleaded and argued. He has taken this Court to the various orders passed by the 3rd respondent in refusing to sanction prosecution and record available before this Court and said order cannot be equated to that of the order passed under Section 19 of the Act. In the absence of any material, sanction of prosecution under Section 19 of the Act is illegal. This Court, without considering the said aspects of the case, dismissed the writ petition and hence, the same is liable to be set aside by allowing the review application. 7. Learned Government Pleader for Education has taken this Court through the provisions of Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. and states that there is no error apparent on the face of the record to review the order passed by this Court. The review petition is devoid of any merits and is liable to be dismissed. 8. It is profitable to extract the provisions of Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. which reads as follows: “114. The review petition is devoid of any merits and is liable to be dismissed. 8. It is profitable to extract the provisions of Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. which reads as follows: “114. Review Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code. (c) by a decision on a reference from a court of small causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” “ORDER XLVII - REVIEW Application for review of judgment (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation: The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” 9. Explanation: The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” 9. The review petition can be allowed in a few circumstances as enumerated under the provisions stated above. In the review application, no circumstances as envisaged under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. are brought to the notice of this Court except contending that the 3rd respondent-Sanctioning Authority has no power to review the earlier orders passed, rejecting the prosecution without there being any fresh material to review and pass impugned sanction orders and that sanction is passed beyond the limitation period. This Court, having considered all the aspects elaborately, adverting to the said contentions and placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of K. Rama Krishna Raju vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2011 CJ (AP) 643 and K. Srinivasulu S/o Sri K. Subba Reddy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2010 CJ (AP) 550, passed the judgment under review. Hence, this Court felt that there is no error apparent on the face of the record to exercise power of review by Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. Therefore, the contention of the review petitioner is hereby rejected. 10. Hence, this Court felt that there is no error apparent on the face of the record to exercise power of review by Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. Therefore, the contention of the review petitioner is hereby rejected. 10. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, 1994 Law Suit (SC) 1039 (dated 16.11.1994), held thus: “It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 of C.P.C. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order 47, Rule 1 of C.P.C. while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 , speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations (Para 3): “It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of Plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.” “Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably the two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 , wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J. speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: “An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ.” 11. The grounds raised in the review application are good grounds for the appeal but not grounds for review under Order 41 Rule 1 read with Section 114 of C.P.C. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the review application is devoid of any merits and is liable to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, the review I.A. No. 1 of 2020 in W.P. No. 46248 of 2016 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 13. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.