ORDER : 1. Heard Mr.Pawan Kesharwani, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr.Shashank Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.2/State. 2. The present petition under Section 482 of the CrPC has been filed by the petitioners seeking for quashment of the complaint filed by respondent No.1 and set aside the order dated 10.04.2015 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Special Judge, Raigarh in Revision Case No.61/2014 and also set aside the order dated 10.01.2014 registering the Criminal Complaint Case No.588/2014 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh (Annexure P-2) and further prayed for quashment of entire criminal proceedings arising out of the Criminal Complaint No.588/2014 against the petitioner. 3. The undisputed facts of the case are that respondent No.1 filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) alleging in it that the petitioner is the Director and the whole sole Manager of M/s United Engineering Company and takes care of the entire business and the same is being run under his control. Respondent No.1/complainant had given a contract for construction of dormitory housing blocks B-1 at Punjipatra site for which work order No. 4513504969, dated 23.12.2010 amounting to Rs.52.51 lacs, which has been subsequently revised by work order No.4513505582 dated 28.03.2011 amounting to Rs.12.74 Crores and the entire construction work of 6 blocks was given and to this effect an agreement was also entered on 28.03.2011. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner had to complete the construction of first block by 30.09.2011, but the same was completed after a delay of 3½ months and the second block which was to be completed by 30.12.2011, the same could not be completed and the petitioner left the work. It is further alleged in the complaint that as per the terms of agreement, the amount which was due towards the complainant for that the petitioner on 31.07.2013 given a cheque bearing No.000992/831013011/00007913 amounting to Rs.1,27,43,817/- with an assurance that the same will be honored when deposited in bank. The complainant deposited the same on 31.07.2013 in the State Bank of India, Raigarh and on 01.08.2013 the complainant received the Cheque Return Memo informing that the cheque was dishonoured because of ‘insufficient fund’. The complainant deposited the same on 31.07.2013 in the State Bank of India, Raigarh and on 01.08.2013 the complainant received the Cheque Return Memo informing that the cheque was dishonoured because of ‘insufficient fund’. Thereafter the complainant issued legal notice through its advocate on 14.08.2013 for payment of the amount mentioned in the cheque within a period of 15 days. 4. Considering the allegations made in the complaint and the statement of the complainant, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh registered the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and issued notice to the petitioner vide order dated 10.01.2014. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order preferred a revision before the learned Special Judge, Raigarh, however, the same was rejected vide order dated 10.04.2015 stating the grounds to be raised at the time of framing of charge. Hence, this CrMP. 5. Mr.Pawan Kesharwani, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned lower revisional Court failed to consider the fact that there was no debt and the cheque was issued by way of security as per the terms of contract. Learned lower revisional Court committed error in ignoring the settled position of law where if any cheque is issued for security, the same would not come within the purview of Section 138 of the NI Act. He would further submit that learned lower revisional Court failed to consider that the signed undated cheque was issued as a security at the time of entering into a contract. As such, on the date when the cheque was handed over, there was no legally enforceable debt or other liability as the same was only given as a security. He would also submit that institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioner amounts to abuse of process of court and to secure the ends of justice, the impugned proceedings deserves to be quashed. 6. On the other hand, Mr.Shashank Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and submit that unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that the negotiable instruments (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. 6. On the other hand, Mr.Shashank Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and submit that unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that the negotiable instruments (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. He would further submit that under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Court has to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. He would also submit that in complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that the cheque has not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. As such, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. In the matter of K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 458 , it is observed and held by the Supreme Court that under Section 118 of the NI Act, unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that the negotiable instruments (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. It is further observed and held that under Section 139, the Court has to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. It is further observed that thus in complaints under Section 138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that the cheque has not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused. 9. In the matter of Rangappa v. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441 again, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the presumption of existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. 9. In the matter of Rangappa v. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441 again, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the presumption of existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. In the aforesaid decision, after considering other decisions of the Supreme Court on Section 118(a) and 139 of NI Act, it is observed and held that there exists a presumption which favours the complainant. It is further observed that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein there is existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. In para 27, the Supreme Court observed and has held as under: “27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof.” 10. In the matter of Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda reported in (2018) 8 SCC 165 after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 , it is observed and held that the accused may adduce evidence to rebut the presumption, but mere denial regarding existence of debt shall not serve any purpose. The Supreme Court in para 19 of that judgment considered paras 14, 15, 18 & 19 of the decision in Kumar Exports (Supra) as under: 19. This Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (supra), had considered the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court in para 19 of that judgment considered paras 14, 15, 18 & 19 of the decision in Kumar Exports (Supra) as under: 19. This Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (supra), had considered the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well the Evidence Act. Referring to Section 139, this Court laid down the following in paras 14, 15, 18 and 19: “14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) “may presume” (rebuttable), (2) “shall presume” (rebuttable), and (3) “conclusive presumptions” (irrebuttable). The term “presumption” is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of a fact, conveniently called the “presumed fact” drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means “taking as true without examination or proof”. * * * 18. Applying the definition of the word “proved” in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 19. The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of “may presume” and “shall presume” as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over.” 11. In the matter of APS Forex Services Private Limited v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers and others reported in (2020) 12 SCC 724 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption the accused was required to lead the evidence that full amount due and payable to the complainant has been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. Of course such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption the accused was required to lead the evidence that full amount due and payable to the complainant has been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption and more particularly the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both, the Learned Trial Court as well as the High Court, have committed error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence. ” 12. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), I do not find any good ground for interference in the present case. Accordingly, the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is dismissed. Interim relief granted on 24.06.2015 stands vacated. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned trial Court for necessary compliance and follow up action, if so required.