JUDGMENT : Atul Sreedharan, J. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants who are aggrieved by the order/judgment dated 6th December 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 1020/2015, dismissing a petition under Article 226 filed by the appellants praying therein for two reliefs, one being the quashment of FIR bearing No.16/2014 registered at Police Station VOK, Srinagar, under the provisions of the PC Act and the IPC, and if the Court was not amenable to the same, it be pleased to direct the registration or inclusion of the Respondent No.4 in the writ petition as an accused, in the same case where the appellant is an accused. Respondent No. 4 in the Writ Petition is also Respondent No.4 in this appeal. 2. A preliminary objection was taken by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of this appeal, as the impugned order has been passed in a writ petition which has the colour of a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and as an order passed under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be taken up by the Division Bench of the same Court under the LPA jurisdiction, the present appeal is not maintainable. It was also urged on the part of Respondent No. 4 that the matter is no longer res integra and has been decided by the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji vs State of Haryana & Ors - 2017 (5) SCC 533 , where the Supreme Court held that an order of a single judge of the High Court disposing of a petition under Article 226, which is in the nature of quash petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C, cannot thereafter be challenged before the Division Bench of the same Court in Letters Patent Appeal. Interestingly, this judgment has also been relied upon by Mr. M.A. Qayoom, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, with specific reference to paragraphs 17 to 26. We shall advert to the facts and circumstances of the said case elsewhere in this judgment. It was also pointed out to us by the Ld. Interestingly, this judgment has also been relied upon by Mr. M.A. Qayoom, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, with specific reference to paragraphs 17 to 26. We shall advert to the facts and circumstances of the said case elsewhere in this judgment. It was also pointed out to us by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondents that a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 16th August 2021 passed in LPA No. 80/202; CrlM No. 343/2020 and LPA No. 84/2021; CM No. 4348/2021, has dealt with a similar matter, whereby it held that a Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge while deciding a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not maintainable. We shall deal with the said judgment also at the appropriate place in this judgment. 3. Though the facts of this case have been elaborately dealt with by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order/judgment, we feel it essential to briefly refer to the same herein. The Appellant No. 1 is the Managing Director of the State Forest Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘SFC’) and he retired on 29th February 2012, while the Appellant No. 2 is the Range Officer of the SFC, who retired on 30th June 2013. They have been charged with making illegal appointments of twelve Grading Attendants, which according to them was already gone into by a learned Single Judge of this Court in SWP No. 352/2012 and SWP No. 354/2012, wherein it was held that there was no violation of any law while making engagements/appointments, and that the Chairman of the SFC had himself in a fair manner accorded the approval on the basis of material placed before him by the Competent Authority, who was Managing Director of the SFC (Appellant No. 1). 4. However, an FIR was nonetheless registered against them under the aforementioned provisions on a prima facie disclosure of them having employed their close relatives for extraneous and underhand considerations. It was to quash the said FIR that the Writ Petition was filed by the appellants before this Court in which the learned Singe Judge vide judgment/ order dated 6th December 2022, dismissed the petition. 5. Before dealing with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, it would be essential to give a brief background of that case. 5. Before dealing with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, it would be essential to give a brief background of that case. Ram Kishan Fauji was the accused in the FIR. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana made a reference to the Lokayukta, Haryana to enquire into the allegations of bribery, prima facie established by material on an alleged Compact Disc (CD) and to ascertain its veracity and whether the change in the land use/license that was granted pursuant to these allegations were illegal. Acting on the reference made by the Chief Secretary, the Lokayukta issued a public notice calling for information from public in general regarding the subject matter of the case, which were the allegations contained in the Compact Disc (CD). The Lokayukta recommended the registration of an FIR for offences under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the same to be investigated by a Senior Officer who was competent and of impeccable integrity. The appellant Ram Kishan Fauji filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of a writ of Certiorari for quashing the impugned orders dated 20th January 2014 and 11th February 2014 passed by the Respondent No. 2 therein, whereby the registration of FIR was recommended. An additional prayer was also made in the writ petition to prevent the respondents from initiating any consequential proceedings on the basis of the impugned orders. The learned Single Judge in that case, quashed the FIR. Against the order of learned Single Judge, the State of Haryana preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench, which without even issuing notice to the respondent Ram Kishan Fauji, condoned the delay of 85 days and stayed the operation of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. It was this order of the Division Bench of the High Court that was challenged before the Supreme Court by way of a petition under Article 136, in which the judgment was passed. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention to Paragraph 17 of the judgment in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, wherein Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (as applicable to the erstwhile Punjab & Lahore High Courts) was considered by the Supreme Court, and which was reproduced in the said paragraph. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention to Paragraph 17 of the judgment in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, wherein Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (as applicable to the erstwhile Punjab & Lahore High Courts) was considered by the Supreme Court, and which was reproduced in the said paragraph. The relevant portion of the same is “And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said high court of judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act….”. In Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, the Supreme Court was examining if an LPA could be entertained by the Division Bench of the High Court against an order passed by a Single Judge in a Writ Petition bearing the colour of a petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to this Court. Same reads here as under: 8. We have also heard Mr. Salih Pirzada, learned counsel, whose case LPAOW No. 123/2015 raises a similar issue and is listed on 24th August 2023. As the issue raised is a legal question and as the present appeal is pending since the year 2022, we are not inclined to adjourn or grant any further time to decide this point of law. According to Ld. Counsel Mr. Salih Pirzada, the Letters Patent provides for an appeal which is equivalent to an appeal under a statutory provision. As the issue raised is a legal question and as the present appeal is pending since the year 2022, we are not inclined to adjourn or grant any further time to decide this point of law. According to Ld. Counsel Mr. Salih Pirzada, the Letters Patent provides for an appeal which is equivalent to an appeal under a statutory provision. In order to buttress his argument, he has referred to the provisions of Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that there shall be no right of appeal other than as provide under the Code or any other law. Thus, he has impressed upon us that the powers of this Court under Letters Patent enable us to entertain an appeal from an order of the learned Single judge as the same is covered under Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the expression “in any other law”. We shall deal with this proposition at the appropriate place in this judgment. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case, where the Supreme Court held after examining other judgments passed by it earlier, that where an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court is not excluded, an appeal under the Letters Patent would lie to the Division Bench if the Legislature has not in a manner, express or implied, prohibited that right of appeal under the Letters Patent. Ld. Counsel submits that this finding of the Supreme Court supports his case to maintain this appeal as the right of appeal against the order passed by a learned Single Judge in criminal jurisdiction has not been prohibited by the Letters Patent as applicable to this Court. He has further submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is perfunctory and does not take the submissions or the pleadings in the petition into account and the alternate prayer has not even been reflected to fleetingly and, therefore, the same is bad in law. 10. Mr. Z.A. Shah, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3 on the other hand has argued that whether the petition was under Article 226 or under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be seen from the prayer in the petition which would ultimately decide its nature. 10. Mr. Z.A. Shah, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3 on the other hand has argued that whether the petition was under Article 226 or under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be seen from the prayer in the petition which would ultimately decide its nature. Thus, where the prayer is for quashment of an FIR or a pending criminal case, even though filed under Article 226, it would still be an order/judgment under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the same is not amenable to the appellate powers of this Court under the Letters Patent. In this regard, he has also taken us through the judgment of this Court passed in case titled as Shamshada Akhter vs Aijaz Parvaiz Shah in LPA No. 80/2020, where a Coordinate Bench of this Court elaborately considered various aspects of the case and dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellants on the ground of maintainability. It must be mentioned herein that the fact differentiating the case of Shamshada Akther and the present appellants, is, that in Shamshada Akther’s case, the appeals were filed against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The finding of the Coordinate Bench has also been questioned by Mr. Salih Pirzada, learned counsel. 11. The issue raised in the preliminary objection before this Court is whether a Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained in a case arising from a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, decided by a Single Judge, where the prayer is akin to a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Salih Pirzada, learned counsel submits that the appeal can be entertained. His main contention is, that what has consciously been omitted in the Letters Patent, cannot be read into it to deprive a party the benefit of an appeal to the Division Bench only because there have been judgments passed by the Supreme Court and the High Courts that once a petition under Section 482 CrPC is dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, a Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable before the Division Bench. Both the learned counsels for the appellants have submitted so, as the Letters Patent applicable to this Court, specifically omits the prohibition of an LPA where the order has been passed under the criminal jurisdiction by a Single Judge of this Court which was not a fact circumstance in Ram Kishan Fauji’s case where the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh had specifically barred a Letters Patent Appeal from an order passed by a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction. 12. The question that poses itself before us is why the consistent law held by the Supreme Court and the various High Courts that once a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code or under Article 226 has been decided by the High Court, an appeal against that cannot be preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court under the Letters Patent? 13. In our endeavour to find a reason for the same, we examined Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which reads as hereunder: 14. In this regard, it would be beneficial to refer to the opinion of the Supreme Court about the jurisdiction of the Division Bench under the Letters Patent. It held, “…….Against the orders of the trial court, first appeal lay before the High Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the internal working of the High Court which splits it into different ‘Benches’ and yet the court remains one. A Letters Patent Appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language….”[ (1996) 3 SCC 52 - Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple – paragraph 2]. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, acts as the Single Judge exercising jurisdiction only as a “Court of Correction” and it does not act as an appellate authority scrutinising the correctness of the order passed by a court of subordinate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, acts as the Single Judge exercising jurisdiction only as a “Court of Correction” and it does not act as an appellate authority scrutinising the correctness of the order passed by a court of subordinate jurisdiction. This throws up another question if the Division Bench of the High Court, under the Letters Patent, is in effect reviewing the order passed by the single judge as a “Court of Correction”? “12. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being and(sic) order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court and that notwithstanding anything herein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of “one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of” any Division Court, a consistently with the provisions of the civil procedure code, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of the judges of the said High Court or of such division court shall be to us, our Heirs or Successors and be heard by our Board of Judicial Advisers for report to us.” The learned counsel for the appellants submits that though the Letters Patent applicable to this Court was largely in pari materia to the Letters Patent as applicable to the High Court of Punjab and Lahore, there existed one difference. While in the Letters Patent applicable to the Punjab and Lahore High Courts, Clause 10 therein provided for an exclusion of the appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent where the order was passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction. Similar provision in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to this Court is conspicuous by the absence of such a provision. On that basis, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that as long as Clause 12 does not specifically bar the maintainability of an appeal from an order passed by a single judge under the criminal jurisdiction, the same is maintainable before the Division Bench of this Court in the exercise of its powers under the Letters Patent. S. 362 Court not to alter judgment. - Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. (emphasis added) Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibits the review of any judgment passed by a court which attains finality and that the same is amenable only to an appeal before a superior court. The bar of review under section 362 Cr.P.C is on the Court and not on the judge passing the order. The appeal provided under the Letters Patent is starkly distinct from an appeal which is provided as a first appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure or as a criminal appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the Appellate Court can examine threadbare the correctness of the order passed by the Trial Court, re-examining the evidence and going into the reasoning given by the Trial Court. However, it is trite law that the Division Bench while exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent, does not act as an Appellate Court per se. It is not to carry out a roving inquiry into the order passed by the learned Single Judge in order to ascertain its correctness but to see if an error apparent on the face of record is established. The Division Bench exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent can only examine the order and set it aside if it is downright perverse. The Division Bench exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent can only examine the order and set it aside if it is downright perverse. It cannot in that endeavour, re-examine the correctness of the finding of the learned Single Judge beyond the limited extent mentioned hereinabove and it would err in law if it set aside an order passed by the single judge only because a different or a better view was possible. 15. The power of review is only available where provided by statute. The Supreme Court held that “Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice…….. Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality”[1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 - S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka – paragraph 19]. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the order of rectification stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all, is to be approached with caution. Justice is an amorphous word, fraught with subjectivity, and what the Supreme Court meant is that the power of review must only be exercised where manifest injustice is apparent as per the jus scriptum and common law. However, it is clear that the power of review is only to “correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice”. 16. When the judgments of the Supreme Court in Baddula Lakshmaih and S. Nagaraj are seen in juxtaposition, we find that the Division Bench under the Letters Patent jurisdiction is a “court of correction” while the power of review is to “correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice”. This leads us to the inescapable inference that the Division Bench of the High Court in its Letters Patent jurisdiction merely reviews the order passed by the single judge to assess if there is any error apparent on the face of the record that it must correct. 17. This leads us to the inescapable inference that the Division Bench of the High Court in its Letters Patent jurisdiction merely reviews the order passed by the single judge to assess if there is any error apparent on the face of the record that it must correct. 17. Thus, we hold that the absence of a bar on an appeal before the Division Bench under the Letters Patent applicable to this Court, from an order passed by a single judge under the writ jurisdiction, disposing finally a criminal case, the same would still be prohibited in view of the specific bar of s. 362 Cr.P.C, precluding the review of a judgment disposing a criminal case, in view of what we have held hereinabove that the Division Bench under the Letters Patent only reviews the order of the single judge as a “Court of Correction”, and a review of an order disposing a criminal case is prohibited by s. 362 Cr.P.C. Holding otherwise, it would militate against the rule of law enshrined in the maxim Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum or, that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. If the proposition of the Ld. Counsels for the appellants are accepted, it would render the bar of s. 362 Cr.P.C otiose. Such was never the intention of the legislature which in its wisdom felt that once a criminal court had finally disposed a case, the same Court must not revisit it in review. 18. The submission of Mr. Saleh Peerzada that u/s.482 Cr.P.C, a review of the order was still possible notwithstanding the bar of s. 362 Cr.P.C is, with the utmost respect to him, incorrect. Review is barred u/s. 362 Cr.P.C. Recall of an order is permitted where the order has been procured through fraud played upon the Court as fraus omnia vitiat or fraud vitiates everything or where the petition under s. 482 Cr.P.C has been dismissed for non-appearance of counsel or party. Else, the power to review an order finally disposing a case, passed by a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, is limited to the extent provided u/s. 362 Cr.P.C i.e., to correct a clerical or mathematical error, and no more. 19. Mr. Else, the power to review an order finally disposing a case, passed by a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, is limited to the extent provided u/s. 362 Cr.P.C i.e., to correct a clerical or mathematical error, and no more. 19. Mr. Salih Peerzada had also submitted, with reference to s. 372 Cr.P.C, that the right to prefer an appeal from the order of the single judge to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent is a statutory right when read with the provisions of s. 372 Cr.P.C. The said section provides for appeals from a judgment or order passed by a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction as provided under the Cr.P.C or “any other law for the time being in force”. His argument is that “any other law” would include the appeal before the Division Bench of this Court under the Letters Patent. We are in respectful disagreement with the said proposition. Section 372 falls in Chapter XXIX of the Code and it relates to appeals. All the appeals therein are maintainable before the Court which is superior to the Court which has passed the judgment and order sought to be appealed from. Thus, the “any other law for the time being in force”, must also be such which provides for an appeal to the superior court from the order passed by an inferior Court. However, under the Letters Patent, the Court remains the same as held by the Supreme Court in Baddula Lakshmaih’s case in paragraph 15 supra. Therefore, the argument is not acceptable. 20. In view of what has been argued, considered and held by us hereinabove, the appeal stands dismissed as not maintainable.