JUDGMENT : This C482 application has been preferred by the three applicants for their alleged involvement in the commission of the offences under sections 354, 504, 506, 420, 509 and 34 of IPC, which has been registered against them by way of a Case Crime No.572 of 2017, at Police Station Jwalapur, District Haridwar. 2. As a consequence of the investigation being carried and concluded, the Chargesheet no.379A dated 08.02.2018, was submitted by the Investigating Officer. Based on which, the cognizance has been taken by the court of CJM, Haridwar, as back as on 10.08.2018. 3. Today, the matter is being sought to be compounded by the parties on the ground, that the parties have entered into an amicable settlement, and particularly, when this Court had interacted with the complainant, the Court had specifically posed a question to her, that as to under which authority or a document, she got her religion converted from “Hindu to Muslim”. She contends, that there is no such document, which is available with her. Rather she further submits, that owing to the dispute, which had later arisen with the applicants, she has later on converted herself from “Muslim to Hindu”, and has later on also got married with a Hindu male. 4. The process of conversion from one religion to another religion cannot be on a hearsay or on a whimsical basis but it has to be based on an ethical choice, and not by virtue of the oral statement, and hence, the process of the conversion of religion cannot be orally accepted in evidence in the judicial proceedings, until and unless, the factum of the conversion is brought on record and is legally established to be by way of credible evidence. In the absence of there being any evidence on record, and coupled with the fact that the offence is said to have been commenced as back as on 07.10.2017, and the cognizance have been taken by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate on 11.01.2018, this Court doesn’t visualize, as to what was the logical justification on the part of the present applicant to sit over the proceedings, without challenging the same at an appropriate time. Filing of the C482 Application at a belated stage, after a lapse of more than five years without explaining delay, which itself smacks malice on the part of the present applicants. 5. Filing of the C482 Application at a belated stage, after a lapse of more than five years without explaining delay, which itself smacks malice on the part of the present applicants. 5. Apart from the valuable contribution which has been made by the learned counsel for the applicant on the issue about the prospective of the “conversion of the religion”, for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage, it would not be out of context to refer to the basic provisions of the Constitution, which provides for a citizen; as contained under Article 5 of the Constitution of India, as to how they could manage and exercise the liberty granted to them under Part III of the Constitution of India, particularly that as contained under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt when the basic intention of the secularism of the country, as envisaged by the Preamble of the Constitution, it has had to be logically justified in its applicability to achieve the basic democratic goal of the country, and not to be utilized as a weapon to increase the social unrest and the social activitism too, for the purposes of meeting the limited individual interest of expressing an affinity with the person of an opposite sex and that too exclusively for the purposes of conversion of religion, with that limited prospective to marry other sex of one’s choice. The secularism or freedom of the religion, and particularly, in the context of the liberty reserved by the Preamble with regards to the theory of expression of belief and faith, that has to be prudently construed, so that the unification of the country from its religious prospective is maintained, and it may not be permitted to sow the seeds of animosity amongst the persons belonging to the different caste and religion, merely because of an act of conversion of religion only for the purposes of marriage as per one’s choice. 6. 6. Article 25 of the Constitution of India, though it envisages a right of freedom to practice and propagation of the religion, but we should not leave the basic objective of the Constitution as provided, therein, that under sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution of India, the few important expressions given by the constitutional mandate, would be relevant to be dealt with the burning subject of these days, about the extent of the right, which could be bestowed to be exercised, or could be permitted to be exercised by the citizen. The right to freedom of a religion is not unfettered and the logic behind is that, this Court is of the opinion that a freedom of “conscious and free profession, practice and propagation”, which finds as to be in the headnote of the Article 25 of the Constitution, cannot be read in exclusion with the basic intention and objective contained under sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution, which provides that the right of freedom envisaged by the Constitution, it doesn’t intends to mean to override the public order and more importantly the human morality, which the framers of the Constitution that is why, have deliberately used the word under sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution, which is of a great significance so far as the rights which has been reserved for the individual to convert the religion and the right to profess. 7. According to one of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as back as in 1977 as reported in 1977 (1) SCC 677 , REV. STAINISLAUS Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. The said judgment has dealt with the implications of sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution, as to up to what extent the right of conversion of religion could be permitted to be exercised by the citizen. The said judgment has basically laid down the principles that the right to propagate one’s religion does not grant a unhindered right to convert another person to one’s own religion, and to transmit or spread the seeds of animosity amongst the followers of religions by exposition of its religion, which has to be practiced by the person belonging to the respective castes or a religion. 8. 8. This Court is of the view that if the rights enshrined by the Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution, is to be scrutinized from the said prospective where it uses the word “morality” and simultaneously proceeds to reserves the right to practice a religion. It means it has to be a contextually embedded ethical intention to change the religion, but not for the limited or sole purpose to solemnize the marriage with the person of one’s choice. Thus, seeking a conversion of the religion basically has got no moral inclination, as such, to adopt the religion, which he or she is opting for. 9. The another important aspect, which is to be seen is that the freedom of professing, practice and propagation of the religion as provided by sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution is yet again circumscribed by the provisions contained under sub-article (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution, where, the rights protected under sub-article (1) of the Article 25 of the Constitution does not restrict the State or any existing law for regulating or stricting the practices and, more particularly, the practices associated with the religion, which is creating a religious acrimony amongst the persons or which may even have a remoted possibility of creating a religious acrimony or when it is apparently found that the act of the conversion is basically limited for the purposes of individual gains and not for the gains of consciously changing the religion for its principles which he or she intends to adopt, based on one’s emotional affinity to a religion. 10. If this principle is yet again looked into from the prospective of the Article 25 of the Constitution, the freedom to manage religious affairs as provided to the various institutions/individual is yet again preceded by the same analogy as contained under sub-article (1) of Article 25 of the Constitution that is of maintaining a religious chastity and that has had to be yet again with an intention to maintain a public order, health and morality. The limit up to which, the rights envisaged under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution could be exercised by an individual or the institution which has been given a liberty to exercise their powers or the wisdom of the freedom which has been protected by the Constitution of India is yet again as already observed by this Court is not unlimited, and this is what has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment reported in 1996 (2) SCC 498 , “Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. Etc vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.” that a maintenance of the religious institution or the secular structure of functioning of the country, it still could be regulated by the Legislature as it has been provided under sub-article (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution of India. 11. In order to meet up the aforesaid objective, and in order to meet out the intention as protected for the State, for making an enactment to make out as to be a law under Article 13 of the Constitution of India, the State of Uttarakhand, had legislated a law called as “Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act 2018”, as it was enforced with effect from the date of its notification in the official gazette being Notification No.234/Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs, /2018 Dehradun, 14th May, 2018. 12. If the SOR of the said Act, is taken into consideration, it does basically intended to provide freedom of religion, but simultaneously, it also provided a prohibition of the conversion from one religion to another due to the misrepresentation, force, or under an undue influence, coercion and allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage for any matters incidental thereto. The said Act in its SOR, being conscious of the expanse of the exercise of the rights under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution, as referred to hereinabove, has observed that the conferment of right under the Constitution of India, on each individual to propagate or practice his or her religion, according to his or her consciousness, but religious consciousness cannot be extended to be construed a collective right or proselytize for a person for converting the religion exclusively for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage. 13. 13. The necessity to legislate the said Act No.28/2018, was because there had been a spurt in the cases of the religious conversion, where both the masses and the individuals had rampantly gone for the conversion for the limited prospective, without the act of religious conversion being attached with any act of the morality, but rather exclusively for the purposes to meet an individualistic objective of the solemnization of marriage, such indecent acts have frequently intimidate these days more so particularly the country like us, which is secular in nature, and the society lives harmoniously in a multi religious society. The existence of the pseudo social organization, with the hidden aims attempting to convert the weaker and vulnerable section of the society, which has become a common feature these days, where the State has felt that the necessity for legislating the Act of 2018, had been because there has been instances where, a weaker section of the society are rather misled and exploited by the people belonging to the other religion to convert them by an allurement or under an undue influence. I am of the view that this terminology of undue influence would include an influence exercised by a male upon a female or a vice versa for converting the religion exclusively only for the purposes of marriage. 14. The said vitalities of the aspect and sensitivity attached to it was recognized by the Hon’ble Apex Court which also took a judicial notice of the said incident in the case reported in SLP (Criminal) No. 5777 of 2017 “Shafin Jahan vs. Asokan K.M and others”, as well as in a Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 142 of 2016, “Aman Baig Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others” where the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed, that they have come across the incidents when there is a basic conservative motive of alluring for conversion maliciously intended to for the purposes of increasing the strength of the particular religion, by getting the people from other religion converted to their own religion, and people do marry the girls of other religion by misrepresentation of their own religion, and after getting married with such girls, they forcefully get them converted into their own religion. Such incident came to the notice before the Hon’ble Apex Court, that the people convert themselves to the other religion only for the purposes of marriage with the girls of that religion and after the marriage, the girls do get converted into their own religion, but this act, which is maliciously intended in contravention to the constitutional mandate has been deprecated by various High Courts of the country because it at time intends to give march to one religion over other in long future. Hence, the Bill, which was introduced in the State Assembly was for the following purposes:- “6. Any marriage which was done for the sole purpose of conversion by the man of one religion with the woman of another religion either by converting himself before or after marriage or by converting the woman before or after marriage may be declared null and void by the Family Court or where Family Court is not established, the Court having jurisdiction to try such case on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party of the marriage.” 15. In the elaboration to, what has been observed above, the restrictions with regards to the conversion only exclusively for the purposes of marriage has been provided under section 6 of the Act of 2018, so far its applicability pertains to the State of Uttarakhand, is concerned. Section 6 of the Act is extracted hereunder:- “6. In the elaboration to, what has been observed above, the restrictions with regards to the conversion only exclusively for the purposes of marriage has been provided under section 6 of the Act of 2018, so far its applicability pertains to the State of Uttarakhand, is concerned. Section 6 of the Act is extracted hereunder:- “6. The bill therefore, seeks to:- (i) Prohibit religious conversions which are effected through misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage by making it an offence; (ii) Provide greater punishment for such conversion in respect of the Minor, Women, Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes; (iii) Provide that the onus of proof that the conversion was not effected through misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage lies on the person converting them and the person converted; and (iv) Provide that every individual converting from one religion to another shall submit to the prescribed authority a declaration that the conversion was not effected through misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage and such authority shall make an inquiry in such cases; (v) Declare marriages null and void, which were done solely for the purpose of conversion of girls from one religion to another religion, on the complaint of girl or her parents. 16. It has observed that where the conversion of the religion is exclusively for the purposes of marrying a person, the said conversion of the religion since being in contravention to the constitutional mandate as provided under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution, may be declared as to be null and void by the family courts or where the family courts are not established by the courts having its jurisdiction. 17. The said objective has also been dealt by the Allahabad High Court in a judgment reported in 2015 (3) ALJ 322, “Smt. Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali Mishra and another Vs. 17. The said objective has also been dealt by the Allahabad High Court in a judgment reported in 2015 (3) ALJ 322, “Smt. Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali Mishra and another Vs. State of U.P. and others”, the coordinate Bench of the Allahabad High Court in its paragraph nos.42 and 43, has basically laid down that, the inherent principles of the conversion of the religion should be bona fide with an intention to adopt and practice a religion and the modalities and the ethical values, which a religion carries, has been dealt by the coordinate Bench of the Allahabad High Court in paragraph nos.36, 42 and 43, particularly while making a reference to the excerpts of “HolyKuran”, and the relevant extracts in relation to it. Paragraph nos.36, 42 and 43, is extracted hereunder:- “36. In the case of Rakeya Bibi v. Anil Kumar Mukherjee, ILR 1948 (2) Cal 119, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has observed as under: "The question, however, stiff remains whether her conversion was a bona fide one or a mere device adopted for the purpose of avoiding the marriage. Mr. Das, who appeared for her, contended on the authority of certain observations made by Ormond J. in the case of Ayesh Bibi v. Subodh chandra Chakrabariti, MANU/WB/0140/1945 : ILR (1945) 2 Cal 405) : (1897) ILR 25 Cal 537 the Privy Council, while referring to the possibility that a change of religion on the part of both the spouses might have the effect of altering rights incidental to the marriage, was careful to add the qualification that such change must be made "honestly" and "without any intent to commit a fraud upon the law" Indeed, it seems to us to be elementary that if a conversion is not inspired by religious feeling and undergone for its own sake, but is resorted to merely with the object of creating a ground for some claim of right, a court of law cannot recognise it as a good basis for such claim but must held that no lawful foundation of the claim has been proved. Where conversion gives a legal right, to go through a mock conversion and set it up as a basis of that right is to commit a fraud upon the law. Where conversion gives a legal right, to go through a mock conversion and set it up as a basis of that right is to commit a fraud upon the law. We are clearly of opinion that were a party puts forward his conversion to a new faith as creating a right in his favour to the prejudice of another, it is proper and necessary for a court of law to enquire and find whether the conversion was a bona fide one." Thus in case of a conversion there should be a change of heart and honest conviction in the tenets of new religion in lieu of tenets of the original religion. If a ceremony of conversion is gone into conscientiously after such an honest conviction, thee alone there is a conversion of faith or it can be said that a person is professing another religion. In case of conversion from one religion to another a strict proof is required and it cannot be easily interred. More so when a person converted denies even the factum of conversion. As to whether there in fact a conversion or not must depend on facts and circumstances of each case and not general rule can be laid down in that behalf." 42. In view of the above discussions, the principles of conversion of religion and bona fide conversion of religion to Islam may be briefly summarized as under: "(i) Conversion to another religion basically requires change of faith and belief of personal relations of an individual with what he regards as Cosmos, his Maker or his Creator, which he believes, regulates the existence of insentients beings and the forces of Universe. (ii) A conversion of religion by an individual to Islam can be said to be bona fide if he/she is major and of sound mind and embraces Islam of his/her own freewill and because of his/her faith and belief in the oneness of God (Allah) and prophetic character of Mahomed. If a conversion is not inspired by religion feeling and under gone for its own sake, but is resorted merely with object of creating a ground for some claim of right or as a device adopted for the purpose to avoid marriage or to achieve an object without faith and belief in the unity of God (Allah) and Mahomed to be his prophet, the conversion shall not be bonafide. (iii) In case of a religion conversion there should be a change of heart and honest conviction in the tenets of new religion in lieu of tenets of the original religion. (iv) Religion, faith or devotion are not easily interchangeable. If a person feigns to have adopted another religion just for worldly gain or benefit, it would be religious bigotry. (v) If a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the "freedom of conscience" guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike under Article 25 of the Constitution of India." 43. Applying the above noted principles as laid down in various judgments and mandate of The Holy QURAN in Sura II Ayat 221, I find that alleged conversion of petitioner No. 1, girl in each of the writ petitions cannot be said to be bona fide or valid. The religion of petitioner No. 1 in each of the writ petitions was converted at the instance of the petitioner No. 2 (boys) to marry with the girl. The petitioner girls have stated that they do not know about Islam. In the writ petition as well as in the statements on oath made before this Court, the petitioner girls have not stated that they have any real faith and belief in the unity of God and Mohamed to be prophet. They all stated that the boy got their religion converted with sole purpose to marry with her. Thus conversion of religion to Islam, in the present set of facts, of the girls without their faith and belief in Islam and at the instance of the boys, solely for the purpose of marriage, cannot be said to be a valid conversion to Islam religion. These marriages (Nikah) are against the mandate in Sura II Ayat 221 of the Holy Quran. Even in the case of Lily Thomas (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph Nos. 7, 8 and 40 that conversion of religion of a non-muslim without any real change of belief in Islam and only for marriage is void.” 18. These marriages (Nikah) are against the mandate in Sura II Ayat 221 of the Holy Quran. Even in the case of Lily Thomas (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph Nos. 7, 8 and 40 that conversion of religion of a non-muslim without any real change of belief in Islam and only for marriage is void.” 18. The coordinate Bench of the Allahabad High Court while arriving at a conclusion as extracted above by virtue of the paragraph nos.42 and 43, has quite elaborately dealt with as to what does the philosophy of the religion and religious conversion would mean for an individual. According to its interpretation given from the definition of the word “religion” as it has been derived from the latin word “Re” mean to bind people with common thought and not imposed thoughts that means to that it was a sect or a cult of living ordinarily understood to mean some culterized system of faith and practice resting on the basic idealistic ethos by creating a fictitious deity or a god whom the person believes to be capable to keep the society bound together and to practice the basic faith or the precedents laid down in relation to that particular sect, and accordingly it governs the divine faith of worship to the respective god or the supreme power to whom that particular group of the people ordinarily understand as to be the superior power to whom the trust could be vested to bind the members of a particular society together. 19. The religion in itself does not mean that it has to be bifurcated or made to excel with the practice of an immorality, in order to defame or to meet a limited objective of making efforts of its propagation at the cost of the other religion. The purpose of binding of the religion and consequentially the society, in accordance with the later philosophy, as it has dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment reported in 1996 (9) SCC 548 , “A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others”. The said judgment in paragraph no.85, deals with the expanse of the exercise of the religious freedom in order to create a togetherness amongst the particular group of people, who believe on the certain sect, religion or a faith. State of Andhra Pradesh and others”. The said judgment in paragraph no.85, deals with the expanse of the exercise of the religious freedom in order to create a togetherness amongst the particular group of people, who believe on the certain sect, religion or a faith. The said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph no.85, which has extracted hereunder:- “85. Articles 25 and 26 deal with and protect religious freedom. Religion as used in these Articles must be construed in its strict and etymological sense. Religion is that which binds a man with his Cosmos, his creator or super force. It is difficult and rather impossible to define or delimit the expressions "religion" or "matters of religion" used in Articles 25 and 26. Essentially, religion is a matter of personal faith and belief of personal relations of an individual with what he regards as Cosmos, his Maker or his Creator which he believes, regulates the existence of insentient beings and the forces of the universe. Religion is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well-known religions in India itself like Budhism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God. In India, Muslims believe in Allah and have faith in Islam; Christians in Christ and Christianity; Parsis in Zorastianism; Sikhs in Gurugranth Sahib and teachings of Gurunanak Devji, its founder, which is a facet of Hinduism like Brahamo, Samaj Aryasamaj etc.” 20. In the said judgment, it has observed that essentially the religion is a matter of the personal faith and belief of the personal relationship of an individual in what he regards as a cosmos his makers or his creators which he beliefs regulates the existence of a divine force to maintain the unanimity of a thought process amongst the group of people of a common sect or faith. 21. The coordinate Bench while further elaborating to arrive at a conclusion as extracted in paragraph nos.42 and 43, on the basis of the principles laid down in Mullahs principle of the Mohammadan Law 19th Edition Chapter 2, has defined as to what does a “Mohammadan” means and what does it professes as used in the Holy Kuran, would have its implications. Paragraph no.30 and 31, which is extracted hereunder : “30. Paragraph no.30 and 31, which is extracted hereunder : “30. Each sect governed by its law – The Mahomedan law applicable to each sect or sub-sect is to prevail as to litigants of that sect or sub-sect. 31. Change of sect- A Mahomedan male or female who has attained the age of puberty, may renounce the doctrines of the sect or sub-sect to which he or she belongs, and adopt the tenets of the other sect or any other sub-sect, and he or she will thenceforth be subject to the law of the new sect or sub-sect.” 22. If the said paragraphs are taken into consideration, it nowhere provides that the “Holy Kuran” at all at any place permits the conversion of the religion only for the limited purposes of solemnization of the marriage, but rather it has had to be an ethical conversion for the purposes of an everlasting practice of the religion being adopted, which has to come from the inner consciousness and not from the momentary emotional and intended physical relationship, which may often result into a later on complexities in life. The adoption which has envisaged by the “Holy Kuran”, it basically means that a person accepts a religion from ones soul, because of the belief of oneness of God, and prophetic character of Mohammad, who are called as “Mohammadan”, but if a court can finds the true intention behind their act of the conversion that it is a limited motive of the marriage by way of a pretence, it means that it is in contravention to the basic intention of the adoption of the philosophy and theory of the piousness of Mohammadan law, and the principles related to the muslim law. Because of that reason, the Hon’ble Apex Court way back in 1948 in the matters of “Must. Rakeya Bibi Vs. Because of that reason, the Hon’ble Apex Court way back in 1948 in the matters of “Must. Rakeya Bibi Vs. Anil Kumar Mukherjee”, has observed that in these circumstances which has become quite prevalent and rampant too these days, and where one doesn’t finds any logical reasons supporting the basic percept of the Mohammadan Law, and as per the principles laid down by the “ayats” of the “Holy Kuran”, if the court comes to the conclusion that the conversion is with the limited prospective for the purposes of only for solemnization of the marriage, which happens to be in the instant case, the Courts are not precluded to determine as to whether the conversion was bona fide or not, backed by acceptance of moral values of religion thus to be adopted. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in 1984 (2) SCC 91 , “Kailash Sonkar Vs. Smt. Maya Devi”, has marginally touched the issue about the bona fide act of the conversion of the religion but though that is in the context of an election, where the constituency was reserved for a particular caste, and factually in that case the conversion was done only for the purposes of contesting the election, but still the basic principle and the test, which has been provided, therein, for the purposes of conversion of the religion has been prescribed under paragraph no.31 and 32, of the said judgment, and which would be applicable in the present case because it was dealt with the matter of the conversion and re-conversion, which is factually applicable in the instant case. Paragraph nos.31 and 32, are extracted hereunder:- “31. In our opinion, the main test should be a genuine intention of the reconvert to abjure his new religion and completely dissociate himself from it. We must hasten to add here that this does not mean that the reconversion should be only a ruse or a pretext or a cover to gain mundane worldly benefits so that the reconversion becomes merely a show for achieving a particular purpose whereas the real intention may be shrouded in mystery. The reconvert must exhibit a clear and genuine intention to go back to his old fold and adopt the customs and practices of the said fold without any protest from members of his erstwhile caste. The reconvert must exhibit a clear and genuine intention to go back to his old fold and adopt the customs and practices of the said fold without any protest from members of his erstwhile caste. In order to judge this factor, it is not necessary that there should be a direct or conclusive proof of the expression of the views of the community of the erstwhile caste and it would be sufficient compliance of this condition if no exception or protest is lodged by the community members, in which case the caste would revive on the reconversion of the person to his old religion. 32. Another aspect which one must not forget is that when a child is born neither has he any religion nor is he capable of choosing one until he reaches the age of discretion and acquires proper understanding of the situation. Hence, the mere fact that the parents of a child, who were Christians, would in ordinary course get the usual baptism certificate and perform other ceremonies without the child knowing that is being done but after the child has grown up and becomes fully mature and able to decide his future, he ought not to be bound by what his parents may have done. Therefore, in such cases, it is the intention of the convertee which would determine the revival of the caste. If by his clear and conclusive conduct the person reconverts to his old faith and abjures the new religion in unequivocal terms, his caste automatically revives.” 24. Further in continuation to what has been dealt by this Court in the earlier paragraphs, a reference to yet another judgment reported in 2010 (9) SCC 712 “M. Chandra Vs. M. Thangamuthu and another” requires a consideration by this Court, particularly, the observations, which has been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph nos.47 and 48, which is extracted hereunder : “47. We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. It should be emphasized that the exceptions to the rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party. 48. In the instant case, it is the specific case of the appellant that in the year 1994 that is much before the Assembly elections which was held in the year 2006, she had undergone all the rituals in Arya Samaj only for the purpose of reaffirmation of Hindu faith and the conversion certificate issued by Arya Samaj was received and acknowledged by her uncle Santnakumar who had accompanied her. It is also her specific case that she did not take back the certificate from her uncle, since she was of the view the same may not be required for her purpose. It is only when the election petition was filed, it order to proof her case of reaffirmation of her faith in Hinduism, she came to know that her uncle has lost the certificate, which necessitated her to obtain a duplicate copy of conversion certificate from Arya Samaj, Madurai. This part of her evidence is not even challenged by the petitioner. In fact the contents of the documents would clearly establish that it was issued for the second time on the request made by the appellant, after she was told by her uncle Santnakumar that the original certificate received by him in the year 1994 is lost by him. In our view, a perusal of the conversion certificate (Ex. R13) would amply demonstrate that the appellant has successfully proved her claim of re-affirmation of Hindu faith by undergoing rituals of conversion in the Arya Samaj, Madurai.” 25. In our view, a perusal of the conversion certificate (Ex. R13) would amply demonstrate that the appellant has successfully proved her claim of re-affirmation of Hindu faith by undergoing rituals of conversion in the Arya Samaj, Madurai.” 25. As per the aforesaid guidelines framed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it provides that the admissibility of the documents by way of the secondary evidence could only be acceptable when a duplicate copy or by an oral evidence the said document is authenticated, and is foundationed by an evidence, which is being laid in support thereto, and is acceptable under law. 26. In paragraph no.48, the Court has specifically observed that the factum of the conversion of the religion for the exclusively for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage doesn’t reposes the sensitivity or emotional attachment towards the religion to be adopted, and consequently it has been observed that the rituals of the Arya Samaj, only for the purposes of reaffirmation of the Hindu faith and the conversion certificate issued, thus, by the said society cannot be accepted, as to be a valid document, which could justify the conversion of the religion or an acceptance of the religion for the purposes of solemnization of marriage. 27. Though, the said judgment was rendered in the context of the election, where there was a conversion of the religion made by the party to the proceedings for the purposes to enable him to contest the seat, which was otherwise reserved for the reserved category candidate. 27. Though, the said judgment was rendered in the context of the election, where there was a conversion of the religion made by the party to the proceedings for the purposes to enable him to contest the seat, which was otherwise reserved for the reserved category candidate. The said conversion was observed that the conversion of the religion with the particular unethical motive to gain an advantage in personal relationship or in the social relationship for the purposes of contesting an election cannot be accepted to be a valid conversion, until and unless, there happens to be a conscious mental bent of an applicant, thus, seeking a conversion of the religion to be adopted in his or her day to day practice, and that is why by the State Act, the implications of which has already been dealt with above, and also in the light of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the conversion of the religion is exclusively for the purposes of marriage has not been accepted to be a valid conversion, and hence, such a conversion could not be reckoned in the eyes of law to justify the marriage, which is otherwise prohibited by the respective religious law as applicable to the parties to the matrimony. 28. The Delhi High Court in the judgment reported in 2011 (123) DRJ 554 , “Faheem Ahmed Vs. Maviya @ Luxmi”, was almost dealing with an akin situation, where a similar nature of the conversion of the religion has taken place by persuading a female to convert her religion in order to adopt Islam and particularly when it was only for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage for the purposes to take the benefit of section 24 (2) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and for the purposes of registration of the marriages, thus, declared as to be valid, would not be a valid conversion and the said principles has been laid down by the Delhi High Court in paragraph no.15 and 16, of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- 15. The issue of religious conversion has come before the Apex Court and various High Courts time and again and the courts have tried to evolve judicial principles for discerning the genuine conversions from the feigned ones. The issue of religious conversion has come before the Apex Court and various High Courts time and again and the courts have tried to evolve judicial principles for discerning the genuine conversions from the feigned ones. It would be useful to refer to some of the landmark decisions in this regard here, one of the earliest being the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dr. Abdur Rahim Undre v. Smt. Padma Abdur Rahim Undre AIR 1982 Bombay 341, which was also referred to by the learned trial court wherein it was held that: 27. It is a well known principle of civil law that a person born into or following one religion continues to belong to such religion subject to conversion to another religion. Conversion to another religion basically requires change of faith. To say the least it is a matter of conviction. According to Mulla's Principle of Mohammedan Law any person who professes Mohammedan religion that is, he acknowledges that there is but one God and that Mohammad is his prophet is a Mohammedan. Such a person may be a Mohammedan by birth or he may be a Mohammedan by conversion. It is not necessary that he should observe any particular rites or ceremony to be an orthodox believer in the religion, no Court can test or gauge sincerity of religious belief. It is sufficient if he professes Mohammedan religion in the sense that he accepts prophetic grant of Mohammedan (section 19, Chapter 2, page 19 of Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law). Thus the real test is of professing Mohammedan religion. As to when is the true import of the term profess fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Punjab Rao V. D.P. Meshram of the said decision the Supreme Court has observed as under: 13. What Clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 contemplates is that for a person to be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled Caste within the meaning of that Order he must be one who professes either Hindu or Sikh religion. What Clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 contemplates is that for a person to be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled Caste within the meaning of that Order he must be one who professes either Hindu or Sikh religion. The High Court, following its earlier decision in Narayan Waktu v. Punjabrao,: has said that the meaning of the phrase "professes a religion" in the aforementioned provision is "to enter publicly in to a religious state" and that for this purpose a mere declaration by a person that he has ceased to belong to a particular religion and embraced another religion would not be sufficient. The meanings of the word "profess" have been given thus in Webster's New World Dictionary: " to avow publicly, to make an open declaration of...to declare one's belief in: as to profess Christ. To accept into a religious order" The meanings given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary are more or less the same. It seems to us that the meaning 'to declare one's belief in: as to profess Christ' is one which we have to bear in mind while construing the aforesaid order because it is this which bears upon religious belief and consequently also upon a change in religious belief. It would thus follow that a declaration of one's belief must necessarily mean a declaration in such a way that it would be known to those whom it may interest. Therefore if a public declaration is made by a person that he has ceased to belong to his old religion and has accepted another religion he will be taken as professing the other religion. In the face of such an open declaration it would be idle to enquire further as to whether the conversion to another religion was efficacious. The word 'profess' in the Presidential Order appears to have been used in the sense an open declaration or practice by a person of the Hindu for the Sikh religion. Where, therefore, a person says, on the contrary that he has ceased to be Hindu he cannot derive any benefit from the order. Thus it appears that for a conversion there should be a declaration of one's belief and the said declaration should be in such a way that is should be known to those whom it may interest. Where, therefore, a person says, on the contrary that he has ceased to be Hindu he cannot derive any benefit from the order. Thus it appears that for a conversion there should be a declaration of one's belief and the said declaration should be in such a way that is should be known to those whom it may interest. If a public declaration is made by a person that he has ceased to belong to one religion and is accepting another religion, he will be taken as professing the other religion. The learned trial court also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India wherein while dealing with the issue of feigned conversion by a Hindu to Islam religion, the court observed that: 39. Religion is a matter of faith stemming from the depth of the heart and mind. Religion is a belief which binds the spiritual nature of man to a super-natural being; it is an object of conscientious devotion, faith and pietism. Devotion in its fullest sense is a consecration and denotes an act of worship. Faith in the strict sense constitutes firm reliance on the truth of religious doctrines in every system of religion. Religion, faith or devotion are not easily interchangeable. If the person feigns to have adopted another religion just for some worldly gain or benefit, it would be religious bigotry. Looked at from this angle, a person who mockingly adopts another religion where plurality of marriage is permitted so as to renounce the previous marriage and desert the wife, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his exploitation as religion is not a commodity to be exploited. The institution of marriage under every personal law is a sacred institution. Under Hindu Law, Marriage is a sacrament. Both have to be preserved. In Perumal Nadar (dead) by Legal Representative v. Ponnuswami Nadar (minor), AIR 1971 SC 2352 it was by the Apex Court as under: A person may be a Hindu by birth or by conversion. A mere theoretical allegiance to the Hindu faith by a person born in another faith does not convert him into a Hindu, nor is a bare declaration that he is a Hindu sufficient to convert him to Hinduism. A mere theoretical allegiance to the Hindu faith by a person born in another faith does not convert him into a Hindu, nor is a bare declaration that he is a Hindu sufficient to convert him to Hinduism. But a bona fide intention to be converted to the Hindu faith, accompanied by conduct unequivocally expressing that intention may be sufficient evidence of conversion. No formal ceremony of purification or expiation is necessary to effectuate conversion. In Kailash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi, AIR 1984 SC 600 reiterating the same approach even for re-conversion, the Apex Court observed that: In our opinion, the main test should be a genuine intention of the reconvert to abjure his new religion and completely dissociate himself from it. We must hasten to add here that this does not mean that the reconversion should be only a ruse or a pretext or a cover to gain mundane worldly benefits so that the reconversion becomes merely a show for achieving a particular purpose whereas the real intention may be shrouded in mystery. The reconvert must exhibit a clear and genuine intention to go back to his old fold and adopt the customs and practices of the said fold without any protest from members of his erstwhile caste. In order to judge this factor, it is not necessary that there should be a direct or conclusive proof of the expression of the views of the community of the erstwhile caste and it would be sufficient compliance of this condition if no exception or protest is lodged by the community members, in which case the caste would revive on the reconversion of the person to his old religion. 16. In Rakheya Bibi v. Anil Kumar ILR 1948 Calcutta 119 the Calcutta High Court held that it is open for the Court to go into the question whether the conversion was a bonafide one or a mere pretence. In a recent case of M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu and Anr., the Supreme Court laid down the following test to prove conversion: It is a settled principle of law that to prove a conversion from one religion to another, two elements need to be satisfied. First, there has to be a conversion and second, acceptance into the community to which the person converted. It is obvious that the need of a conversion cannot be altogether done away with. 29. First, there has to be a conversion and second, acceptance into the community to which the person converted. It is obvious that the need of a conversion cannot be altogether done away with. 29. In fact the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court in paragraph no.15, was based upon yet another judgment of the Bombay High Court as reported in “Dr. Abdur Rahim Undre Vs. Smt. Padma Abdur Rahim Undre”, AIR 1982 Bombay 341, where it was observed that the issue of the religious conversion has come for the judicial consideration before the different High Courts, including the Hon’ble Apex Court, and in order to evolve a judicial principle for discerning the genuineness of the conversion for being a motivated conversion only for the purposes of marriage, the same has been deprecated, and particularly, in the context of the paragraph 27 of the judgment of “Dr. Abdur Rahim Undre Vs. Smt. Padma Abdur Rahim Undre”, wherein it has been observed that in accordance with the Mohammadan Law, any person who professes Mohammadan religion, that is he acknowledges that there is one god and that Mohammadan is his prophet is a Mohammadan, such a person may be reckoned as to be a Muslim from his birth or may be a Mohammadan by conversion, by accepting the same by performing the rites and the rituals and the ceremony as prescribed under the Mohammadan Law, and the covenants provided under section 19 Chapter 2 page 19 of the Mullah principles of Mohammadan law, and in the absence of the same, the reckoning of the principle of the adoption of the religion for the purposes of the marriage, cannot accepted as to be a valid conversion. 30. More authentically the aforesaid prospective is also to be considered that, what would be the real test of conversion of the religion, which came up for consideration in the matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Punjab Rao Vs. 30. More authentically the aforesaid prospective is also to be considered that, what would be the real test of conversion of the religion, which came up for consideration in the matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Punjab Rao Vs. D.P. Meshram and Ors., where the Hon’ble Apex Court, way back in 1965, in a judgment reported in 1965 (1) SCR 849 has discerned that the conversion of the religion as per the constitutional mandate has had to be with an emotional attachment and after performance of the religious rituals provided under the Mohammadan Law, and not only by way of the purposes of a formal ceremony, which is normally relied by the parties who are entering into a matrimonial relationship, after conversion of the religion. The Hon’ble Apex Court in yet another judgment in the matters of “Lily Thomas and others Vs. Union of India and others”, as reported in 2000 (6) SCC 224 , has almost laid down the aforesaid principles in paragraph no.39, of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- “39. I also respectfully agree with Brother Sethi, J. that in the present case, we are not concerned with the status of the second wife or the children born out of that wedlock as in the instant case we are considering the effect of the second marriage qua the first subsisting marriage in spite of the husband having converted to 'Islam'.” 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court has deliberated upon that the religion is a matter of faith, streaming from the depth of the heart and mind. Religion is a belief, which binds the spiritual nature of the man, who are supernatural being, it is an objected of continuous devotion, faith and pietis. If there is a conversion of the religion locked from the angle that the person, who adopts another religion, where plurality of the marriage is permitted, first to renounce the previous marriage and desert the wife or exclusively for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage is not to be permitted in accordance with law. 32. If there is a conversion of the religion locked from the angle that the person, who adopts another religion, where plurality of the marriage is permitted, first to renounce the previous marriage and desert the wife or exclusively for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage is not to be permitted in accordance with law. 32. Almost akin principles has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph no.17, of the judgment as reported in 2010 (9) SCC 712 , “M. Chandra vs. M. Thangamuthu and Ors.” which has provided that, it is a settled principle of law that to prove the conversion from one religion to another, two basic elements are required to be satisfied before a person could be treated to have adopted or has converted religion. First there has to be a conversion. Secondly the acceptance of the conversion has to be by the community to which a person has got herself or himself converted. A conversion cannot be altogether done in a sketchy way by adoption of the principles as it has been normally found to be adopted by the young boys and girls to get their marriage justified by conversion of the religion with the person belonging to the another sect. The aforesaid principles has been observed in paragraph no.17, of the judgment of M. Chandra, which is extracted hereunder:- “17. The learned Counsel also contends that the appellant having been issued with a Community Certificate in due course in accordance with law, which is not yet cancelled by any competent authority, it was not open to the High Court to ignore the same. It is also submitted that the judgment and order passed by the High Court requires to be set aside for ignoring relevant evidence, and for wrongly construing the evidence on record contrary to settled principles. It is submitted that the High Court was not justified in disbelieving the certificate issued by Arya Samaj and further ought not to have come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove that there was conversion from Christianity to Hindu faith.” 33. It is submitted that the High Court was not justified in disbelieving the certificate issued by Arya Samaj and further ought not to have come to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove that there was conversion from Christianity to Hindu faith.” 33. Owing to the aforesaid reasons and for the reasons, which has already been dealt with in the context of the Statute, as it has been legislated by the State, exclusive conversion for the purposes of solemnization of the marriage in the absence of there being any actual faith in the religion, which should have a mental bent of mind with the heart and its adoption in the true sense to practice the same throughout the life, a conversion to meet objective of marriage and its legislation cannot be a said to be a valid conversion and that has been deprecated in the catena of judgments, which has already been observed as above. 34. Hence, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the C482 application or in the compounding application, which has been filed in support thereto. 35. The C482 application would accordingly stands rejected.