ORDER : (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) I.A No. 7417 of 2022 This application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 90 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. The State has raised no objection. For the reasons stated in the application, I.A No. 7417 of 2022 is allowed and delay of 90 days in filing this present Letters Patent Appeal is condoned. L.P.A No. 316 of 2022 The appellant has questioned legality of the order dated 29th March 2022 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4336 of 2007, on the ground that the mandatory procedure under section 22-C of the Legal Services Authorities Act (in short, Legal Services Act) has not been followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat in P.L.A Case No. 77 of 2006. 2. In the first place, we intend to indicate that to support this plea the appellant was required to produce the entire proceedings in P.L.A Case No. 77 of 2006 which step he did not take either before the writ Court or in the present proceeding. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of this case are that the appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle bearing no. CG-04A/8394 which he had transferred to the respondent no.3 through an agreement for sale dated 12th April 2004. According to the appellant, by virtue of the said agreement for sale he was indemnified from all liabilities arising from or of the aforesaid motor vehicle. On 2nd September 2004, the said vehicle was involved in a motor accident near Tube Company Gate in which the husband of the respondent no.2 has suffered fatal injuries and died. Accordingly, Burma Mines P.S Case No. 139 of 2004 was registered into the said incident. The respondent no.2 has simultaneously filed an application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for payment of compensation and the said case was registered as P.L.A Case No. 77 of 2006. By an order dated 14th June 2007, the appellant was directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.1,54,500/-to the respondent no.2 with interest at the rate of 14% per annum from the date of application. 4. Mr. By an order dated 14th June 2007, the appellant was directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.1,54,500/-to the respondent no.2 with interest at the rate of 14% per annum from the date of application. 4. Mr. Ashish Kumar Shekhar, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the decision in “Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama” (2022) 7 SCC 776 to submit that no award can be made by the Permanent Lok Adalat without following the procedure laid down under section 22-C of the Legal Services Act. 5. In paragraph nos. 35 and 36 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “35. Such an interpretation is also supported by the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Bar Council of India, where the constitutionality of Chapter VI-A of the LSA Act was upheld. Speaking for the Bench, R.M. Lodha, J. highlighted that the Permanent Lok Adalats would proceed to adjudication of a dispute on its merits only after attempting and failing to generate a settlement between the parties : (SCC pp. 254-56, paras 22-23 & 26) “22. Chapter VI-A inserted by the 2002 Amendment Act in the 1987 Act, as its title suggests, provides for pre-litigation conciliation and settlement procedure. …The disputes in relation to public utility service need urgent attention with focus on their resolution at the threshold by conciliation and settlement and if for any reason such effort fails, then to have such disputes adjudicated through an appropriate mechanism as early as may be possible. … 23. The Statement of Objects and Reasons itself spells out the salient features of Chapter VI-A. By bringing in this law, the litigation concerning public utility service is sought to be nipped in the bud by first affording the parties to such dispute an opportunity to settle their dispute through the endeavours of the Permanent Lok Adalat and if such effort fails then to have the dispute between the parties adjudicated through the decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat. … *** 26. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes relating to public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent Lok Adalats only if the process of conciliation and settlement fails. The emphasis is on settlement in respect of disputes concerning public utility services through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat. … *** 26. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes relating to public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent Lok Adalats only if the process of conciliation and settlement fails. The emphasis is on settlement in respect of disputes concerning public utility services through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat. It is for this reason that sub-section (1) of Section 22-C states in no unambiguous terms that any party to a dispute may before the dispute is brought before any court make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of dispute. Thus, settlement of dispute between the parties in matters of public utility services is the main theme. However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the parties is not through and the parties are required to have their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication of disputes relating to public utility services, Parliament has intervened and conferred power of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat.” “36. The appellant's argument, however, is that if the opposite party does not appear before the Permanent Lok Adalat, it can dispense with the conciliation proceedings and straightaway adjudicate the dispute under Section 22-C(8). We are unable to accept this submission. Even if the opposite party does not appear, the Permanent Lok Adalat is still bound to follow the step-by-step procedure laid down by Section 22-C. Under Section 22-C(3), it would require the party before it to file their submissions and documents, and make the best efforts to communicate them to the opposite party for their response. If it is satisfied that no response is forthcoming from the absent opposite party, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall still attempt to settle the dispute through settlement under Section 22-C(4). It is important to remember that Section 22-C(5) imposes a duty upon the Permanent Lok Adalat to be independent and impartial in attempting to amicably settle the dispute, while Section 22-C(6) imposes a duty upon the party present before the Permanent Lok Adalat to cooperate in good faith and assist the Permanent Lok Adalat. Thereafter, the Permanent Lok Adalat, based on the materials before it, shall propose terms of settlement and communicate them to both parties, regardless of whether they participated in the proceedings. Thereafter, the Permanent Lok Adalat, based on the materials before it, shall propose terms of settlement and communicate them to both parties, regardless of whether they participated in the proceedings. If the party present before the Permanent Lok Adalat does not agree or if the absent party does not respond in a sufficient period of time, only then can the Permanent Lok Adalat adjudicate the dispute on its merits under Section 22-C(8). Keeping in mind the principles enshrined in Section 22-D, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall once again notify the absent party of its decision to adjudicate the dispute on its merits, in case it wishes to join the proceedings at that stage.” 6. On the question of liability of the appellant, the judgments in “Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam & Anr.” (2014) 14 SCC 142 and “Balwant Singh and Sons v. National Insurance Company Limited & Anr.” (2020) 11 SCC 745 have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the respondent no.3 by virtue of sale of the offending vehicle must be held liable for payment of compensation. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Godavari Finance Company v. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.” (2008) 5 SCC 107 : “12. Section 2 of the Act provides for interpretation of various terms enumerated therein. It starts with the phrase “Unless the context otherwise requires”. The definition of “owner” is a comprehensive one. The interpretation clause itself states that the vehicle which is the subject-matter of a hire-purchase agreement, the person in possession of vehicle under that agreement shall be the owner. Thus, the name of financer in the registration certificate would not be decisive for determination as to who was the owner of the vehicle. We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily the person in whose name the registration certificate stands should be presumed to be the owner but such a presumption can be drawn only in the absence of any other material brought on record or unless the context otherwise requires.” 8. We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily the person in whose name the registration certificate stands should be presumed to be the owner but such a presumption can be drawn only in the absence of any other material brought on record or unless the context otherwise requires.” 8. In “Purnya Kala Devi”, the interpretation of section 5(1) of the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act, 1968 fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was the discussion in paragraph no.16 on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed heavy reliance. On a mere glance at section 5(1) of the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act and section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act which defines the expression “owner”, the remarkable difference in both the defining sections are apparent. In “Balwant Singh and Sons”, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even the incidents of transfer of ownership of the vehicle would not absolve the person in whose name the vehicle stands in the registration certificate. 9. Before that, in Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar & Ors.” (2018) 3 SCC 1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in the context of definition of “owner” in section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as under : “13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the “owner”. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the first respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.” 10. While the aforesaid is the legal position as regards liability of the registered owner in cases of motor accident, we find no substance in the ground raised by the appellant that the mandatory procedure under section 22-C(3) to (8) has not been followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat. If at all we have to accept the submissions made at Bar that without inviting the opposite party for conciliation and mediation the Permanent Lok Adalat could not have made an award the issue would now be confined only to the quantum of compensation. We have in our mind the sufferings of the family of late Ram Naresh Bhagat who met with unfortunate untimely death on 2nd September 2004. The amount of compensation which is to the tune of Rs. 1,54,500/-is also bearing in the minds of the Court for not interfering in this matter, for the Courts do not take cognizance of the trivials. 11. Accordingly, L.P.A No. 316 of 2022 is dismissed. 12. I.A No. 7993 of 2022 stands disposed of.