JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 08/10/2021 passed by learned Single Judge in WP227 No. 632/2015 (M/s Krishna Builders and Developers v. Shiv Narayan Jaiswal (died) through LRs. & Ors.) whereby revisional order dated 03/07/2015 passed by the Board of Revenue has been set aside and the order dated 02/07/2012 passed by the Collector, Raigarh has been confirmed. 2. The challenge in the present appeal has been made on the following factual backdrop :- 2.1. Appellant's father Late Shiv Narayan Jaiswal sold 1.36 acres of land by way of registered sale deed dated 21/04/2004 in favour of respondent No. 1 firm and thereafter, the name of the said firm was duly mutated in the revenue records and since the said piece of land was agricultural land, for the purpose of plotting and for commercial use, the same was required to be diverted under the provisions of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter, referred to as “the Code”). An application for diversion was made by the respondent No. 1 firm, before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Raigarh and the same was registered as Revenue Case No. 244/A-2/2003-04 and vide order dated 07/06/2004, the said application for diversion was allowed and it is the case of respondent No. 1 herein (writ petitioner) that appellant's land was also diverted. 2.2. Thereafter, appellant's father Late Shiv Narayan Jaiswal and his family members also executed a number of sale deeds in favour of different persons on 30/11/2004 and received sale considerations as per diverted land. On 30/11/2004, appellant's father also executed an affidavit admitting to the passing of diversion order. 2.3. Ultimately, on 29/10/2010, appellant's father filed an application before the Sub-divisional Officer, Raigarh for review of diversion order dated 07/06/2004 alleging that his signature has been forged on the application of diversion and his statement has been recorded by impersonating a third person as him and therefore, the diversion order is illegal. However, the said application was rejected by the Sub-divisional Officer as time-barred vide order dated 24/11/2011 holding that the said application was filed after lapse of about six years from the date of diversion order and no such sufficient cause has been shown for filing the application with a delay of six years. 2.4. However, the said application was rejected by the Sub-divisional Officer as time-barred vide order dated 24/11/2011 holding that the said application was filed after lapse of about six years from the date of diversion order and no such sufficient cause has been shown for filing the application with a delay of six years. 2.4. Thereafter, appellant's father preferred an appeal before the Collector, Raigarh questioning the order dated 24/11/2011 passed by the Sub-divisional Officer but it was also rejected vide order dated 02/07/2012 against which revision petition was preferred by him before the Board of Revenue and vide order dated 03/07/2015, the Board of Revenue allowed the revision petition and set aside the orders passed by the Collector, Raigarh and the Sub-divisional Officer, Raigarh and also condoned the delay of 6 years in filing the review application. 2.5. Feeling aggrieved with the order passed by the Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1 firm preferred writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court bearing No. WP227/632/2015 whereby preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1/appellant herein that the writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable and writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would lie in light of the decision rendered by this Court (Single Bench) in the matter of Dr. Ram Sharan Lal Tripathi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2015 SCC Online Chh 1521 : AIR 2016 Chh 17 and on merits, it was also contended that the delay of six years in filing the review application has rightly been condoned by the Board of Revenue taking a liberal view of the matter in light of various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in which it has been held that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally. 2.6. By impugned order dated 08/10/2021, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was maintainable and further holding that no sufficient cause has been shown for the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the review application and set aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue and restored the order of the Collector and Sub-divisional Officer, thereby, rejecting the application for condonation of delay against which the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that so far as the maintainability of writ petition under Article 227 is concerned, learned Single Judge is absolutely unjustified in holding that the writ petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 firm under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was maintainable against the order passed by the Board of Revenue in view of the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Dr. Ram Sharan Lal Tripathi (supra) as well as the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kishorilal v. Sales Officer, District Land Development Bank, (2006) 7 SCC 496 . Learned senior counsel would further submit that the signature of appellant's father were obtained in the diversion application by forgery and the delay in filing the review application had rightly been condoned by the Board of Revenue as sufficient cause was shown for the same, therefore, learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order condoning the delay and granting the review application passed by the Board of Revenue and ought to have construed sufficient cause liberally as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decisions of State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 , LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 , Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 , Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu, (2002) 7 SCC 559 and Commissioner of Customs v. Candid Enterprises, (2002) 9 SCC 764 . Thus, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, Mr. Thus, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, Mr. Ankit Singhal, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 firm, would submit that learned Single Judge has rightly held that writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India was maintainable against the order of Board of Revenue in light of the provision contained under Section 31 of the Land Revenue Code which confers the status of Court to the Board of Revenue and Revenue Officers and Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code which is akin to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of S.K. Sarkar Member, Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow v. Vinay Chandra Mishra, AIR 1981 SC 723 and the decision rendered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dangalia and others v. Deshraj and others, 1973 MPLJ 796 . On merits, he would submit that in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, learned Single Judge has rightly recorded a categorical finding that appellant's father Shiv Narayan Jaiswal was aware of the diversion order dated 07/06/2004 and the subsequent sale deeds executed by him thereafter and the statement made by him by way of an affidavit would clearly show that he was aware of the diversion proceeding and therefore, he was required to submit sufficient explanation for the delay and latches caused in filing review application, which the appellant has utterly failed to do. He would further submit that in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao and Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 695 , learned Single Judge has rightly declined to condone the delay as during the intervening delay, third party rights have also been created and no sufficient cause has been shown for the said delay in filing the review application. As such, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 6. As such, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 6. In this writ appeal, two questions arise for consideration, firstly, maintainability of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the revisional order passed by the Board of Revenue and secondly, whether the Board of Revenue was unjustified in condoning the delay of six years in filing the review application. We shall consider both the questions in sereatim. Consideration on maintainability of the writ petition :- 7. Admittedly, respondent No. 1 firm filed writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court questioning the revisional order dated 03/07/2015 passed by the Board of Revenue under Section 50 of the Code. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant provisions of the Code under which Board of Revenue is constituted. 8. Chapter II of the Code deals with Board of Revenue and Section 3 provides for constitution of Board of Revenue. It states that there shall be a Board of Revenue for the State of Chhattisgarh having a President and in addition to the President, the State Government may appoint as many members as it may deem fit. Section 4 provides for Principal Seat and other places of sittings of Board of Revenue and Section 7 provides for jurisdiction of the Board. 9. Chapter III of the Code deals with Revenue Officers, their classes and powers and Section 11 provides for a list of Revenue Officers. A careful perusal of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of the Code would show that Board of Revenue or its members are not Revenue Officers within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code. 10. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 31 of the Land Revenue Code, which confers status of Courts upon the Board of Revenue and Revenue Officers, provides as under :- “31. 10. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 31 of the Land Revenue Code, which confers status of Courts upon the Board of Revenue and Revenue Officers, provides as under :- “31. Conferral of status of Courts on Board and Revenue Officers – The Board or a Revenue Officer, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court.” 11. The aforesaid provision confers status of Courts on the Revenue Board and the Revenue Officers stating that that the Revenue Officer or Board, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court. 12. When a question arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from quasi judicial Tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a Court. In this connection, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 , Virinder Kumar v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 and G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corpn., AIR 1959 SC 308 may be noticed profitably. Considering the principle of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments and having regard to the provisions of the Code particularly Section 31 of the Code, the only irresistible conclusion that can be drawn is that the Revenue Courts possess all the attributes of a Court and they are also conferred status of Courts by virtue of Section 31 of the Code. 13. In the matter of Dangalia (supra), the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has clearly held that the provisions of the Code not only constitute Revenue Officers as full-fledged Courts, which would be governed by the special provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, and in the absence of such provisions, they are to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, if they do not come in conflict with the former. Paragraph 7 of the report states as under :- “7. … Section 31 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959, confers status of Courts on the Revenue Board and the Revenue Officers. It provides that the Board or the Revenue Officer, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court. Section 32 of the Code provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Section 33 of the Code states that subject to the provisions of Sections 132 and 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, and to rules made under Section 41, every Revenue Officer acting as a Revenue Court shall have power to take evidence, to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to be examined as a party or to give evidence as a witness or to produce any document for the purposes of any inquiry or case arising under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force. Section 43 of the Code further provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in this Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 shall, so far as may be, be followed in all proceedings under this Code. Further on, we may note Section 55 of the Code which provides that for avoidance of doubt it is 'hereby declared that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Code, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to:-- (a) all orders passed by any Revenue Officer before the date of coming into force of this Code and against which no appeal or revision proceedings are pending before such date; and, (b) all proceedings before Revenue Officers, notwithstanding that they were instituted or commenced or arose out of proceedings instituted or commenced before the corning into force of this Code.” 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of S.K. Sarkar (supra), while dealing with the issue as to whether the Revenue Board is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has clearly held that the Court of Revenue Board is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Act. Paragraph 15 of the report provides as under :- “15. … The provision in Section 10 is but a replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The phrase “courts subordinate to it” used in Section 10 is wide enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even though administrative control over them under Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunal throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a court “subordinate to the High Court” within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Act.” 15. Not only this, Section 32 of the Code also confers inherent power upon the Revenue Courts which is akin and analogous to the provision contained under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides as under :- “32. Inherent power of Revenue Courts. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” 16. As such, by virtue of Section 32 of the Code, inherent powers are vested in the Revenue Courts to pass necessary orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court which is also vested with the Civil Courts by virtue of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, we have no iota of doubt that Revenue Court includes Board of Revenue and its members which are Courts for all the practical purposes. 17. Therefore, we have no iota of doubt that Revenue Court includes Board of Revenue and its members which are Courts for all the practical purposes. 17. In the matter of Surya Devi v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by observing in paragraph 19 as under :- “19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 18. The correctness of the principles of law laid down in Surya Devi Rai (supra) was questioned in the matter of Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 423 and the matter was referred to larger Bench (three judges) of the Supreme Court for consideration that whether an order of the civil court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the issue and categorically held that judicial orders do not infringe the fundamental rights or legal rights and therefore cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and observed in paragraphs 18, 21 and 27 finally, answered the issue in paragraph 29 as under :- “18. While the above judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could violate a fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not by way of a writ under Article 226 and 32. * * * 21. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by this Court that an order of the civil court could be challenged under Article 227 and not under Article 226. * * * 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view 25 of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view 25 of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. * * * 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: 29.1. Judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226. 29.3. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” 19. The proposition of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) would clearly show that judicial orders of the civil court are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and judicial orders of the civil court can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. The Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Shailendra Kumar v. Divisional Forest Officer and another, AIR 2018 MP 120 , where the question was, “whether an intra-Court appeal under Section 2(1) of the M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 would be maintainable against an order passed by learned Single Judge assailing an Award passed by the Labour Court ?”, held that the orders passed by the Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters when challenged in proceeding before the High Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and observed in paragraph 18 of the report as under :- “18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters when challenged in proceedings before the High Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus no intra Court appeal would be maintainable against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of an order passed by Judicial Courts, may be civil or criminal proceedings.” 21. Thus no intra Court appeal would be maintainable against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of an order passed by Judicial Courts, may be civil or criminal proceedings.” 21. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that an order framing a charge can only be challenged either under revisional power of High Court or under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution and observed in paragraphs 27 & 28 as under :- “27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 CrPC, the principle laid down in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 still holds the field. Order framing charge may not held to be purely an interlocutory order and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2) CrPC or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation. 22. The Supreme Court in the matter of Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh and others, (2015) 7 SCC 373 , has held that in a writ petition filed against the order passed by the Registrar and revisional authority under the provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1972, writ petition under supervisory jurisdiction (Article 227 of the Constitution of India) would lie and observed in paragraphs 16 and 17 as under :- “16. The scope and extent of power of the writ court in a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Radhey Shyam (supra). This Court observed that the writ of certiorari under Article 226 through directed against the orders of an inferior court would be distinct and separate from the challenge to an order of an inferior court under Article 227 of the Constitution. This Court observed that the writ of certiorari under Article 226 through directed against the orders of an inferior court would be distinct and separate from the challenge to an order of an inferior court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The supervisory jurisdiction comes into play in the latter case and it is only when the scope and ambit of the remedy sought for does not fall in the purview of the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 could be invoked. 17. In the present case, what was challenged by the members of the Society was an order passed by the Registrar and the Revisional Authority under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Even if the said petition(s) were styled as a petition under Article 226, the content and the prayers thereunder being ones requiring exercise of supervisory jurisdiction only, could be treated as petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution only.” 23. Returning to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal position, it is quite vivid that the Board of Revenue allowed the revision petition preferred by the appellant herein in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of the Code against which the respondent No. 1 firm filed a writ petition before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As discussed herein-above, it is quite vivid that the Board of Revenue has been conferred with the status of Court by virtue of Section 31 of the Code and furthermore, the Board of Revenue has also been conferred with the inherent jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Code which is akin to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code which is a power conferred upon the Civil Court. In that view of the matter, against the order of Board of Revenue in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction only and only a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable and the decision relied upon by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the matter of Dr. In that view of the matter, against the order of Board of Revenue in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction only and only a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable and the decision relied upon by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the matter of Dr. Ram Sharan Lal Tripathi (supra) in which learned Single Judge has held that Board of Revenue is not a Civil Court, it is a revenue authority established under the Code, cannot be held to be laying down good and correct law in view of the discussion made herein and in view of Sections 31 and 32 of the Code which confer status of a Civil Court upon the Board of Revenue. Similarly, the decision relied upon by learned Senior counsel in Kishorilal (supra) is also clearly distinguishable in light of the discussion made herein-above and in light of Sections 31 and 32 of the Code. In that view of the matter, the writ petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 firm against the revisional order of Board of Revenue under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable which has rightly been held by learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding recorded by learned Single Judge. Consideration on merits :- 24. Ordinarily, since we have already held that writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable against the revisional order passed by the Board of Revenue, therefore, by virtue of Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, this writ appeal would not be maintainable and it is the appellants themselves who have taken objection, but since the writ petition was also argued on merits, therefore, we proceed to consider the appeal on merits. 25. It is not in dispute that application for diversion filed by the respondent No. 1 firm was allowed by the Sub-divisional Officer vide order dated 07/06/2004 and thereafter, on 30/11/2004, appellant's father executed sale deeds in favour of different persons and in which these lands have been shown to be diverted. 25. It is not in dispute that application for diversion filed by the respondent No. 1 firm was allowed by the Sub-divisional Officer vide order dated 07/06/2004 and thereafter, on 30/11/2004, appellant's father executed sale deeds in favour of different persons and in which these lands have been shown to be diverted. Now, it was the case of appellant's father that his signature on the diversion application has been forged and some other person impersonated him and gave his statement and thereafter, he preferred an application for review of the diversion order before the Sub-divisional Officer but that review application stood dismissed vide order dated 24/11/2011 holding it to be time barred as the said review application had been preferred after 6 years from the date of diversion order. Against the appeal preferred by appellant's father, the Collector affirmed the order of the Sub-divisional Officer and declined to interfere against which appellant's father then preferred revision petition before the Board of Revenue whereby vide order dated 03/07/2015, the revision petition was allowed and delay in filing the revision was condoned. However, in the writ petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 firm against the order of Board of Revenue, learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 08/10/2021, set aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue and confirmed the orders passed by the Collector and the Sub-divisional Officer finding that appellant's father was aware of the diversion proceedings and subsequently, sale deed has been executed by him and furthermore, no sufficient cause has been shown by him for the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the review application. 26. Admittedly, diversion order was passed by the Sub-divisional Officer on 07/06/2004 and application for review of that order was filed by appellant's father on 29/10/2010 i.e. with a delay of 6 years, in fact, the application for review was filed in shape of a complaint made to the Sub-divisional Officer. A copy of the said application for review filed by the appellant's father was not brought on record by the parties to the writ petition or the writ appeal. However, in original records called by this Court, a copy of the said review application is available which would show it was only filed in the shape of a complaint made to the competent authority (Sub-divisional Officer). However, in original records called by this Court, a copy of the said review application is available which would show it was only filed in the shape of a complaint made to the competent authority (Sub-divisional Officer). It was neither an application for review nor any application for condonation of delay was filed along with the said complaint/application and it did not even contain any prayer for condoning the delay of 6 years, as such, the said application for review was hopelessly barred by limitation. No doubt, it is fairly well-established that “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally, however, a delay of 6 years in filing the review application for which neither an application for condonation of delay nor any “sufficient cause” was shown for such inordinate delay of six years, in the considered opinion of this Court, it is too much on the part of the Board of Revenue to condone the delay holding that delay has to be construed liberally, ignoring the fact that the review application filed by appellant's father was hopelessly barred by limitation and no such prayer for condonation of delay was even made by him in the review application, much less, assigning sufficient cause for the said delay of six years. 27. Furthermore, as we have already noticed herein-above, it is well-settled law that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various decisions noticed herein-above but creation of third party rights cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight in light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy (supra), which states as under :- “31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions of transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless certainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.” In the aforesaid judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that creation of third party rights in the intervening period has to be respected and the revisional power has to be exercised with caution. 28. Finally reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal discussion, it is quite vivid that writ petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 firm under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the revisional order of Board of Revenue passed under Section 50 of the Code was maintainable and learned Single Judge is absolutely justified in holding that no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant herein for the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the review application. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is absolutely in accordance with law. We do not find any merit in this appeal. 29. Accordingly, this writ appeal stands dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).