JUDGMENT : G. CHANDRASEKHARAN, J. Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree, dated 29.06.2010 in A.S. No. 224 of 2005 on the file of the Additional Sub-Judge, Dindigul, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 23.06.2005 in O.S. No. 769 of 2004 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif Court, Dindigul. 1. Challenge is made to the concurrent judgments in A.S. No. 224 of 2005 on the file of the Additional Sub-Judge, Dindigul, dated 29.06.2010, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 23.06.2005 in O.S. No. 769 of 2004 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif Court, Dindigul. 2. The first respondent/plaintiff filed a suit in O.S. No. 769 of 2004 for the relief of permanent injunction that the first respondent should be restrained from selling and encumbering the suit properties belong to the plaintiff temple; that the second and third defendants should be restrained from registering any deed intending to encumber the suit properties; and for costs. 3. The case of the plaintiff/first respondent in brief is that the suit properties belonged to (1) Sa. Ve. Palsamy Chettiar, (2) Sa. Ve. Krishnasamy Chettiar, (3) Sa. Ve. Padmanathan Chettiar (4) Sa. Ve. Umapathy Chettiar, who are the sons of one Saaranga Venkatachalam Chettiar. They have executed a settlement deed(trust deed) on 21st January, 1905, for the purpose of performing the religious obligations during Chitra Pournami Mandakapadi of the plaintiff temple. The suit properties were dedicated for the purpose of performing religious obligations. The object of the trust is to perform the religious obligations during Chitra Pournami festival at plaintiff temple by using the revenue from the properties dedicated to the trust. The trust is to be maintained by the male heirs. They are entitled for temple honours. In their absence, the female heirs and then, the properties to vest with the plaintiff temple. There was also supplementary settlement deed on 01.08.1923. In both the deeds, it is specifically mentioned that the trustees and their heirs are to perform only the religious obligations from the income of the trust and they do not have any powers of alienation/encroachment in respect of the trust properties. In the said circumstances, the first defendant is trying to sell the suit properties to the third parties. First defendant has no right to sell or encumber the suit properties. In the said circumstances, the first defendant is trying to sell the suit properties to the third parties. First defendant has no right to sell or encumber the suit properties. He is also trying to interfere with the enjoyment of the suit properties by the temple. Thus, the suit is filed. 4. The first defendant filed a written statement stating that as per the obligations in the settlement deed (trust deed), the religious ceremonies are being performed till date. In the absence of male heirs, female heirs are entitled to perform the religious obligations. Till date, there are male legal heirs and they are performing the trust obligations. The allegation that the first defendant is trying to sell the suit property is not correct. The suit properties are not vested with the temple. Only the income from the suit properties is to be used for performing religious obligations. It is decided in W.P. No. 19908 of 1999 that there was no proof that the suit properties belong to the temple. The cause of action pleaded in the plaint is not correct. Thus, the first defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial: “(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction prayed for, against the first defendant? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction prayed for against defendants 2 and 3? (iii) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled for?” 6. During the trial before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiff, PW-1 was examined and Ex.A1 to A4 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DW-1 was examined and no document was marked. 7. On the basis of oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge found that as per Exs.A1 & A2 documents, the trustees or their legal heirs, have no right to sell or encumber the suit properties. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit as prayed for. 8. In appeal filed by the first defendant/appellant, the learned First Appellate Judge concurred with the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Thus, this second appeal is filed by the first defendant/appellant. 9. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit as prayed for. 8. In appeal filed by the first defendant/appellant, the learned First Appellate Judge concurred with the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Thus, this second appeal is filed by the first defendant/appellant. 9. In this appeal, the appellant raised the following substantial questions of law and additional substantial questions of law: Substantial questions of law: “(1) Whether a beneficiary of income arising from properties ordained for religious purpose, is entitled to maintain a suit for permanent injunction against alienation of the same by the Manager/Trustees, when its right is only that of a “charge holder” and when the plaintiff has only a contingent right of management that may or may not accrue at a future date? (2) Is the plaintiff temple entitled for a decree of permanent injunction against alienation, despite its own admission that the 1st defendant is performing and supporting all the religious and charitable activities as ordained in the basic documents creating benefit in favour of the temple, without fail? (3) Whether the Courts below are right and justified in decreeing the suit when there is no cause of action for the plaintiff temple and the plaintiff temple has no clear right to sue? (4) Whether the Courts below are correct and justified in granting a decree for injunction against defendants 2 and 3 who are independent authorities under the Registration Act, 1908 with quasi-judicial powers, as the same is barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, when the charge holder can enforce the charge?” Additional substantial questions of law: (1) Is not the Court below wrong in decreeing the suit when the executive officer of the plaintiff temple is not autorized by letter of appointment to institute the suit proceedings and in the light of the ratio laid down by this Court reported in 2003 (1) LW 86? (2) Whether the Court below has jurisdiction to entertain the suit with regard to the administration of the trust when the said subject matter exclusively falls under the purview and ambit of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and only the District Court have got jurisdiction to decide any such dispute? (2) Whether the Court below has jurisdiction to entertain the suit with regard to the administration of the trust when the said subject matter exclusively falls under the purview and ambit of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and only the District Court have got jurisdiction to decide any such dispute? (3) Is not the Court in granting the relief prayed for in the suit which falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code? 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the right of management of trust properties would come to the hands of the plaintiff temple only if there are no legal heirs in the family of the settlors. When there are legal heirs, there is no vested or immediate right available to the plaintiff, to file the suit. There is no permanent or absolute dedication of the suit properties by the settlors in favour of the plaintiff temple. Only some “kattalais” are to be performed and offerings to be made, out of the income of the suit properties. The Courts below have come to the conclusion on the misconception that the suit properties belonged to the plaintiff temple. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that there is no case made out either with regard to the non-performance of obligations by the trustees of the first defendant or there is any case of mismanagement of trust properties reported. The Courts below have failed to consider that the trust properties can be sold in case of legal necessity and when it is non-remuneratory. There cannot be a permanent injunction restraining the alienation of the properties, more so when the plaintiff has no title or vested right over the trust properties. 12. Further, there is no positive evidence on the side of the plaintiff to show that the suit properties are the properties of the plaintiff temple or under the control of HR&CE Department. No declaratory relief is sought for in respect of the title. The settlement deed(trust deed) shows that it is only a private trust. The Executive Officer has no right to file the suit. There is no agricultural operation being carried out in the suit properties and there are encroachers. No declaratory relief is sought for in respect of the title. The settlement deed(trust deed) shows that it is only a private trust. The Executive Officer has no right to file the suit. There is no agricultural operation being carried out in the suit properties and there are encroachers. If the property is sold and invested or certain revenue earning properties are purchased, it would help the management of the trust and trust properties. In the absence of the sufficient income, the trustees have to use their personal funds to meet out the trust obligations. Plaintiff has failed to prove that there are no legal heirs to carry on the trust obligations. Without considering all these aspects, the Courts below have wrongly decreed the suit. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Arthanareeswarar vs. T.M. Muthusamy Padayachi, decided on 15th August, 2002, for the proposition that the Executive Officer is not the competent authority to initiate the legal proceedings, wherein it is held as follows: “21......From the above it is clear that the Executive Officer is not the authority competent to initiate legal proceedings and that he had not been assigned with the power of filing a suit. It is only the Board of Trustees in existence at that time which was competent to initiate the legal proceedings. The trustees are not made parties to the suit and therefore, the finding insofar as the Executive Officer’s suit is concerned, that it is filed without authority has to be upheld.” Thus, he submitted and prayed that the judgment of the Courts below are to be set aside and the suit is to be dismissed. 14. In reply to the submissions, the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted that the suit is filed for the limited prayer for permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from alienating or encumbering the suit properties and restraining the second and third defendants not to register any alienation or the encumbrance made by the first defendant. The plaintiff reliably learnt that the first defendant has taken hectic efforts to sell the suit properties. The plaintiff and the public in general are the beneficiaries under the settlement deed (trust deed). If the suit properties are permitted to be sold or alienated, the object of the trust would be rendered nugatory. The plaintiff reliably learnt that the first defendant has taken hectic efforts to sell the suit properties. The plaintiff and the public in general are the beneficiaries under the settlement deed (trust deed). If the suit properties are permitted to be sold or alienated, the object of the trust would be rendered nugatory. The recitals made in the settlement deed made it clear that the object of the trust is for public purpose. That is to benefit the public at large during the performance of trust obligations. 15. The learned counsel for the first respondent further submitted that it is seen from the evidence of PW-1 that some portion of the trust properties were already sold. The Rules framed under the Indian Trusts Acts, 1882, permits initiation of the suit and defence of the suit by the Executive Officer to safeguard the trust property. Not only that, the plaintiff filed the suit in its capacity as beneficiary as well. Any beneficiary under the trust can maintain the suit. When the cause-title of the plaint shows that the suit is filed by the Executive Officer as a beneficiary, the first defendant should have specifically denied that the plaintiff is not a beneficiary. There is no specific denial in the plaint. There is no such ground taken in the appeal and in the second appeal. Therefore, it is not open to the appellant now to contend that the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit. 16. He produced the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Represented by its Executive Officer, Joint Commissioner, (2020) 17 SCC 96 , to bring it to the notice of this Court the distinction between the public trust and the private trust. 17. He relied on the judgment in A.A. Gopalakrishnan vs. Cochin Devaswom Board and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 482 , for the proposition that it is the duty of the Courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable trust from wrongful claim and misappropriation. 18. The judgment of this Court in Durgai Lakshmi Kalyana Mandapam, a Specific Endowment to Arulmigu Siddhi Ganesar Nataraj Perumal Durgaiamman Group Temples, Represented by K. Jeevanandham and Another vs. Idols of Arulmigu Siddhi Ganesar Nataraja Perumal Durgaiamman Group Temples, Rep. 18. The judgment of this Court in Durgai Lakshmi Kalyana Mandapam, a Specific Endowment to Arulmigu Siddhi Ganesar Nataraj Perumal Durgaiamman Group Temples, Represented by K. Jeevanandham and Another vs. Idols of Arulmigu Siddhi Ganesar Nataraja Perumal Durgaiamman Group Temples, Rep. by its Executive Officer and Others, 2023 (3) LW 801 , is pressed into service wherein it is observed that in A.N. Kumar vs. Arulmighu Arunachaleswarar Devasthanam, Thiruvannamalai, Rep. by its Executive Officer (Asst. Commissioner), Thiruvannamalai and Others, 2011 (2) LW 1 , this Court held that it is the duty of the Executive Officer to file the suit to protect the property of the temple. The aforesaid judgment is relied by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment reported in 2023 (3) LW 801 . Therefore, the learned counsel for the first respondent prayed for confirming the judgment of the Courts below and for dismissal of this appeal. 19. In reply to the submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the HR & CE Rules permit the Executive Officer to file a suit after obtaining permissions from the competent authority. No such permission was granted to the first respondent/plaintiff. Therefore, the suit filed by the first respondent/plaintiff is not maintainable. Question of law can be taken even without pleadings. If the trust is a public trust as claimed by the first respondent, then Section 92 of C.P.C. will come into play. As per Section 92 of C.P.C. the suit should have been filed only by the Advocate General or two or more persons who are having interest in the trust and having obtained leave of the Court and not otherwise. 20. In response to this submissions, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that scope of Section 92 of C.P.C. is different from the nature of the suit filed. The suit is filed only to prevent, the first defendant by prohibitory injunction, from alienating or encumbering the suit properties. Therefore, the suit is not barred. 21. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the records. 22. From the pleadings, evidence, submissions and judgments of the Courts below, it is not in dispute that the suit properties originally belonged to (1) Sa. Ve. Palsamy Chettiar, (2) Sa. Ve. Krishnasamy Chettiar, (3) Sa. Ve. Padmanathan Chettiar (4) Sa. Ve. Umapathy Chettiar and they executed Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 settlement deeds(trust deeds). 22. From the pleadings, evidence, submissions and judgments of the Courts below, it is not in dispute that the suit properties originally belonged to (1) Sa. Ve. Palsamy Chettiar, (2) Sa. Ve. Krishnasamy Chettiar, (3) Sa. Ve. Padmanathan Chettiar (4) Sa. Ve. Umapathy Chettiar and they executed Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 settlement deeds(trust deeds). To understand the nature of the trust, it is useful to extract certain portions of these documents. It is recited in Ex.A1 as follows: 23. Ex.A2 reads as follows: 24. Reading of Ex.A1 shows that the properties under the deed were dedicated for the purpose of religious ceremonies during Chitra Pournami of Arulmigu Soundararaja Perumal Temple, Thadicombu. Apart from religious ceremonies, there are obligations to give “Annadhanam” to the poor public and for the stay of devotees. There is a recital that the trustees and their legal heirs can take part in the religious ceremonies, they are entitled to temple honours with adorning of “parivattam.” There is a specific recital that trustees or the legal heirs should not alienate or encumber the properties. 25. Similar recitals are made in Ex.A2 as well. The trustees are given permission for purchasing other properties in favour of the trust by selling shares and not otherwise. At best, they can take Rs. 5,000/- from the properties dedicated. It is reiterated that the trustees or the legal heirs are not entitled to encumber the properties and if they do so, it will not bind the trust. 26. In the judgment reported in (2020) 17 SCC 96 (cited supra), it is held as follows: “18. The distinction between a public and private charity was set out by a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Ram Saroop Dasji vs. S.P. Sahi. In that case, the Court had to determine whether the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (1 of 1951) applied to both public as well as private trusts. It described the difference between public and private charities as follows: “6....it is necessary to state first the distinction in Hindu law between religious endowments which are public and those which are private. In that case, the Court had to determine whether the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (1 of 1951) applied to both public as well as private trusts. It described the difference between public and private charities as follows: “6....it is necessary to state first the distinction in Hindu law between religious endowments which are public and those which are private. To put it briefly, the essential distinction is that in a public trust the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description; in a private trust the beneficiaries are definite and ascertained individuals or who within a definite time can be definitely ascertained. The fact that the uncertain and fluctuating body of persons is a section of the public following a particular religious faith or is only a sect of persons of a certain religious persuasion would not make any difference in the matter and would not make the trust a private trust....” 27. The properties are dedicated for certain religious obligations during Chitra Pournami at Arulmigu Soundararaja Perumal temple, Thadicombu, with a direction to offer free food (Annadhanam) to the poor public and for the stay of devotees. There is no doubt that the properties are dedicated for the benefit of public also. What is important here is that there is repeated reiteration in both Ex.A1 and A2 that the trustees or the legal heirs have no right to alienate/encumber the suit properties. If they do so, it will not bind the trust. 28. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the evidence of DW-1. DW-1 during the course of cross-examination admitted that he is a trustee from 1993. There are three trustees. The trust has 21 acres of land. They used to conduct the Mandakapadi during Chitra Pournami festival at Arulmigu Soundararaja Perumal temple, Thadicombu. He candidly admitted that out of 21 acres of land, 1 acre 60 cents were sold in 1997. It is his further evidence that this 1 acre 60 cents were plotted out and sold for the benefit of the trust. Before effecting sale, no permission was obtained from the Court. 29. He candidly admitted that out of 21 acres of land, 1 acre 60 cents were sold in 1997. It is his further evidence that this 1 acre 60 cents were plotted out and sold for the benefit of the trust. Before effecting sale, no permission was obtained from the Court. 29. Thus, from the evidence of DW-1, it is evident that without obtaining any permission from the Court, the first defendant and other trustees have sold 1 acre 60 cents of lands of the trust property. It is seen from Exs.A1 and A2 that the object of the trust is to perform certain religious obligations when deity comes during Chitra Pournami festival. There must be offering of food during the religious ceremonies. If there are no male or female heirs, the properties are to be vested with the plaintiff temple. The ultimate beneficiary of the trust and trust properties are the deity, temple and general public. Trustees are entitled only for temple honours. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the appellant in Sri Arthanareeswarar vs. T.M. Muthusamy Padayachi decided on 05th August, 2002, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The reason is that a subsequent judgment of the Division Bench in 2011 (2) LW 1 (referred to supra), it was clearly held that the Executive officer, being an Officer appointed by a competent authority, is duty bound to protect the property of the temple. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to file a suit and protect the right of the temple. 30. It is pertinent to refer to paragraphs 11, 15 to 18 of the judgment in Durgai Lakhsmi Kalyana Mandapam Represented by K. Jeevanandam and Another vs. Idols of Aruligu Siddhi Ganesar Nataraja Perumal Durgaiamman Group Temples Rep. by its Executive Officer and Others, 2023 (3) LW 801 , as follows: “11. This apart, he would submit that the Government of Tamil Nadu had subsequently framed rules namely, The Conditions for Appointment of Executive Officers Rules, 2015, in and by which, the Executive Officer has been expressly authorised to represent and also file suits for and on behalf of the temple. The constitutional validity of the said rules came to be challenged in M/s. Temple Worshippers Society Rep. The constitutional validity of the said rules came to be challenged in M/s. Temple Worshippers Society Rep. by its President T.R. Ramesh vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and the Division Bench upheld the validity of the said rules. In view thereof, it cannot be contended that the suit by the Executive Officer was not maintainable. The learned Counsel also relied upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mohammed Rafiq and Others vs. Arulmigu Pasupatheeswarar Swamy Koil Avoor, whereunder, the suit filed by the Executive Officer was held to be maintainable on the ground that any person interested (which includes a devotee) can set the law in motion as per the scheme of the Act. ..... 15. It is in this context, by considering Sections 6 & 45 of The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, when the powers and duties are to be defined by the Commissioner at the time of appointment of the Executive Officer, it is held that unless the Commissioner expressly authorises the filing of the suit by the Executive Officer, the suit is not maintainable. 16. It is in this context, the march of law has to be understood when the later Division Bench of this Court, in the year 2011, in A.N. Kumar vs. Arulmighu Arunachaleswarar Devasthanam Thiruvannamali Rep. by its Executive Officer (Asst. Commissioner) Thiruvannamalai and Others (cited supra) while resolving the question as to whether the temple has to resort to eviction proceedings under Sections 78 and 79 of The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 or whether it can file the suit, while deciding that the temple can resort to either of the proceedings, also held that it is the duty of the Executive Officer to file a suit. It is useful to extract paragraph No. 32 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “32......................The Executive officer, being an Officer appointed by a competent authority, is duty bound to protect the property of the temple. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to file a suit and protect the right of the temple.” 17. This paradigm shift from ‘power’ to ‘duty’ has to be noted. Always the march of law has to be seen with reference to the social transformation and in tune with societal concerns. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to file a suit and protect the right of the temple.” 17. This paradigm shift from ‘power’ to ‘duty’ has to be noted. Always the march of law has to be seen with reference to the social transformation and in tune with societal concerns. It could be seen that there were times when people were donating their properties to Temples. Temple properties were not earning great income and quite often Trustees in their discretion permitted persons to occupy or cultivate the same. Many a times if they default to pay the meagre rent, still action was not taken considering their economic background or their services to the temple. Generally people had a sentiment/fear not to exploit the temple property. However, with the population growth and urbanisation, this sentiment has vanished in thin air and the properties of the temple, be it residential plots or commercial buildings or agricultural lands are encroached upon without any guilt and the temple is divested of the income. Thus, the ‘power’ to file a suit has transformed into a ‘duty’ to file a suit. When the law has been laid down that it is the duty of the Executive Officer to protect the property and it is incumbent upon him to file the suit, then Section 45 can no more be read as requiring an express authorisation to file a suit as the very appointment enjoins the said duty. 18. The second reason is that under Section 6 (15) of The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, where under, a person having interest is defined, in which, a devotee/worshiper will also be having interest and the suit filed by them in case of mismanagement is maintainable. Even in the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Arthanaeeswarar (cited supra), it is held that a suit filed by a devotee in case of mismanagement would be maintainable. It is in this context, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mohammed Rafiq and Others vs. Arulmigu Pasupatheeswarar Swamy Koil Avoor (cited supra) held that when a devotee can set the law in motion, Executive Officer certainly will be entitled to do so. It is useful to extract paragraph No. 15 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “15. It is useful to extract paragraph No. 15 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “15. There can be no doubt over the ownership of the suit property and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession from the trespasser. In the absence of proof that the temple land was taken away and assigned to third parties after paying due compensation to the temple. The Division Bench judgment of this Court, where the defendants have questioned the locus of the Executive Officer, who has laid the suit at the inception does not akin to the facts of the case in hand. Any person, who are interested in the temple, is entitled to initiate law into motion. Further, the Court itself as parens patriae is bound to protect the interest of idol. In this case, when no plea was taken regarding locus of the Executive Officer for filing suit for mandatory injunction and no opportunity given to Executive Officer to show that he, on authorisation from the Commissioner initiate the legal proceedings, it is to be presumed that he had been authorised by the Commissioner to initiate proceedings.” This Court is the parens patriae and is therefore has to protect the properties of the temple. Useful reference in this regard can be made to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Joint Commissioner, HR&CE, Admn. Deptt. vs. Jayaraman. The Court being the parens patriae in respect of the Temple and its properties, the Executive Officer only sets the law in motion by filing the suit. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the suit filed by the Executive Officer is maintainable and accordingly, I answer this question. 31. In Paragraph No. 10 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2007) 7 SCC 482 (referred to supra), it is observed as follows: “10. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees/Archaks/Sebaits/employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of ‘fences eating the crops’ should be dealt with sternly. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of ‘fences eating the crops’ should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.” 32. It is stated in this judgment that the Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation. 33. From the evidence of DW-1, it is evident that 1 acre 60 cents of the properties dedicated to the trust were sold. It is nothing but misappropriation of trust properties. The suit is filed by the plaintiff not only as Executive Officer but also as a beneficiary of the temple. This claim of the plaintiff is not specifically denied by the defendant. 34. Therefore, in view of the development in law as discussed above, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to file the suit. When it is manifested by the own admission of DW-1 that 1 acre 60 cents of trust land had been sold by the first defendant, then it is just and appropriate that the defendants should be restrained from alienating or encumbering the suit properties in favour of anybody. 35. With regard to applicability of Section 92 of C.P.C. this Court finds that Section 92 of C.P.C. has no application in this case in the light of the prayer asked in this case. Section 92 of C.P.C. applies only when, the suit is filed for: “(a) removing any trustee. (b) appointing a new trustee. (c) vesting any property in a trustee. (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property. (d) directing accounts and inquiries. (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust. (d) directing accounts and inquiries. (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust. (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged. (g) settling a scheme. (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. 36. However, this case is filed only seeking prohibitory injunction restraining the first defendant from encumbering/alienating the trust properties. As found already, the first defendant had sold 1 acre 60 cents of the trust property. In the said circumstances, the suit for injunction filed before the District Munsif Court is maintainable. 37. This Court finds that the Courts below have properly analysed the evidences and rightly decreed the suit. There is no case made out for interference. 38. In view of the discussions recorded above, this Court answers that: (i) the plaintiff as a beneficiary under the trust is entitled to maintain a suit for permanent injunction, for substantial question of law No. 1. (ii) When there is a clear evidence to show that one of the trustees has sold a portion of the trust properties, against the terms of the trust settlement deed, despite the performance of religious and charitable obligations by the trustees, the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction, for substantial question of law Nos. 2, 3. (iii) When already a portion of the trust properties was sold, it is required that permanent injunction should be passed against defendants 2 and 3 not to register any document intended to create alienation or encumbrance in respect of the trust properties, for substantial question of law No. 4. (iv) It was discussed and held that the Executive Officer has the duty to safeguard the temple property and therefore, the Executive Officer has a right to file a suit, for additional substantial question of law No. 1. (v) In view of the nature of the relief sought i.e. preventive injunction and when there is evidence to show that one of the trustees has sold a portion of the trust properties, the suit filed on the file of the District Munsif Court, is maintainable and it is not necessary to file a suit before the District Court, for additional substantial question of law Nos. 2 and 3. 39. 2 and 3. 39. In fine, the judgment of the Courts below are confirmed. This second appeal is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.