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2023 DIGILAW 342 (TS)

Shaik Nazeer Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2023-04-27

G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, M.LAXMAN

body2023
JUDGMENT G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J. - This Criminal Appeal is preferred against the judgment and sentence of imprisonment, in S.C.No.463 of 2009, dtd. 29/10/2013, on the file of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, wherein the sole accused/appellant found guilty for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and shall pay a fine of Rs.10, 000.00 for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of IPC and in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. Further, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and also shall pay a fine of Rs.5, 000.00 for the offence punishable under Sec. 380 of IPC and in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. 2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution are that the deceased G.Babu Rao as well as the accused were working as sweepers in Railway Mail Service situated in II floor of General Post Office, JN Road, Abids, Hyderabad. While so, on the intervening night of 2/3/2/2009, the accused murdered the deceased Babu Rao in the premises of the office and committed theft of net cash of Rs.9, 90, 655.00 from the cash chest. It is the further case of the prosecution that on the next day, when P.W.2/sweeper went to sweep the office prior to office hours, she found the dead body of the deceased and intimated the same to P.W.1, who inturn came to the office, noticed the dead body of the deceased and found cash of Rs.9, 90, 655.00 missing from the cash chest and further he preferred Ex.P-1 report to the Police. Basing on the said report, the Police have registered a case vide Crime No.42 of 2009, on the file of Abids Police Station for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC against the unknown offender. 3. During the course of investigation, the Inspector of Police recorded the statements of witnesses, conducted scene observation panchanama, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and observed scene of offence, prepared crime detail report in the presence of the panchayatdars and later forwarded the dead body of the deceased for post mortem examination. 3. During the course of investigation, the Inspector of Police recorded the statements of witnesses, conducted scene observation panchanama, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and observed scene of offence, prepared crime detail report in the presence of the panchayatdars and later forwarded the dead body of the deceased for post mortem examination. The Investigating Officer has also secured presence of Forensic Expert to lift chance prints from the scene of offence and accordingly Finger Prints Expert lifted four chance prints. On the same day afternoon, the Investigating Officer rushed to house of the accused, searched the house of the accused and found cash worth of Rs.8, 25, 620.00, and the same was seized. Further, on interrogation, the accused confessed that he has sent an amount of Rs.1, 65, 039.00 to one Satish Goud through his father-in-law. Basing on his confession, the Police have gone to the house of T.Satish Goud and recovered the balance amount. Further, one of the chance prints developed from the scene of offence tallied with the specimen Finger Print of the accused. Later, the accused was arrested and produced before the Court for judicial remand. After collecting medical reports and other relevant documents and on completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid charge sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC. 4. The trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC for which the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. On behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 11 were examined and Exs.P-1 to P-22 and M.Os.1 to 12 were marked. On completion of prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Sec. 313 of Cr.P.C. and he denied incriminating evidence of prosecution witnesses and reported no defence evidence. 6. Basing on the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court has framed the following point for consideration:- "Whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused for the charge under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC beyond all reasonable doubt?" 7. Considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court found the accused/appellant guilty for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the present appeal was preferred by the appellant. 9. 302 and 380 of IPC beyond all reasonable doubt?" 7. Considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court found the accused/appellant guilty for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the present appeal was preferred by the appellant. 9. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no direct evidence to convict the accused for the aforesaid charges and entire investigation has been completed within a day, which is highly suspicious. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the confession made by the accused to the Police is hit by Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Though confession leading to discovery of material objects is admissible under Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the accused have not lead them to the place of material objects i.e., to collect the cash from the house of one Satish Goud. Therefore, the evidence as alleged by the prosecution under Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act itself is not admissible and prayed to set aside the judgment of the trial Court and to acquit the accused/appellant by extending benefit of doubt. 10. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the trial Court has proved the guilt of the appellant/accused beyond reasonable doubt and that there is no error or irregularity in the orders passed by the trial Court and therefore, prayed to confirm the judgment. 11. The points that arose for consideration is "whether the trial Court is proper in convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC? and whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?" 12. It is relevant to mention that the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence and there is no direct eye witness to the incident. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that basing on the confession of the accused, the Police have recovered the cash at his house as well as in the house of one T.Satish Goud. 13. In order to have better appreciation of facts, it is necessary to discuss about the witnesses, who testified before the trial Court. 14. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that basing on the confession of the accused, the Police have recovered the cash at his house as well as in the house of one T.Satish Goud. 13. In order to have better appreciation of facts, it is necessary to discuss about the witnesses, who testified before the trial Court. 14. P.W.1 is the Head Record Officer working in General Post Office, Abids, Hyderabad who gave Ex.P.1 report to the Police. P.W.2 is the Sweeper working in General Post Office, Abids, Hyderabad. P.W.3 is the Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices, Tirumalgiri, who was informed about the death of the deceased by P.W.2. P.W.4 is the father-in-law of the accused, who turned hostile. Ex.P.2 is the statement of P.W.4 recorded under Sec. 161 Cr.P.C. P.W.5 is one T.Satish Gound who was cited to speak about the amount paid to him through the father-in-law of the accused on 3/2/2009. He turned hostile. Ex.P.3 is the statement of P.W.5 recorded under Sec. 161 of Cr.P.C. P.W.6 is the owner of the hardware shop, who deposed that the accused has purchased the equipment from his shop, in order to commit robbery. M.Os.3 to 6 were marked through him. P.W.7 is one of the employee of General Post Office who acted as panch witness to the scene of offence, as well as, to the inquest of the dead body. Exs.P.4 and P.5 are the crime detail form and inquest panchanama respectively. The Police have seized material objects M.Os.8 and 9 i.e., locks from the scene of offence. P.W.8 is one of the Office Assistant of the same office who acted as panch witness for the confession of the accused, M.Os.3, 6, 10 and 11 have been marked through him. The entire confession statement of the accused was marked, however, the judgment reveals that only admissible portion of the confession has been marked as Ex.P.6. The trial Court ought not have marked the confession statement as it is hit by Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. P.W.9 is the Doctor, who conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, on 3/2/2009 and found 9 ante-mortem injuries. The post mortem report of the deceased is Ex.P.7. Further, P.W.9 opined that all the injuries can be caused by throwing M.O.1/granite stone. P.W.10 is the Inspector of Police who has registered the case and filed charge sheet. The post mortem report of the deceased is Ex.P.7. Further, P.W.9 opined that all the injuries can be caused by throwing M.O.1/granite stone. P.W.10 is the Inspector of Police who has registered the case and filed charge sheet. Exs.P.8 to 22 were marked through him. Ex.P.8 is the FIR and Ex.P.10 is the seizure report signed by P.W.10 himself. The left over witness i.e. P.W.11/ Deputy Superintendent of Police who developed the chance prints from the scene of offence and compared it with the finger prints of the deceased as well as the chance prints of the accused and gave a report stating that one of the chance print from the scene of offence is matching with the middle finger print of the accused. 15. In order to avoid repetition of facts, the extent evidence which is necessary for appreciation will only be discussed. 16. As stated supra, the entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. In a case of homicide, it is for the prosecution to prove that the accused has inflicted injury on the deceased with intention and knowledge that such injury inflicted is likely to cause death of the deceased. 17. In the present case, the charges framed are under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC and case of the prosecution is that the murder was committed for gain. The accused being the employee of the Post Office, hacked the night watchman, who was on duty, caused murder of the deceased and looted the GPO for gain of Rs.9, 90, 659.00 from the cash chest. P.Ws.1 to 11 were examined in this case. But none of the witnesses testified that the accused has either committed robbery or committed murder of the deceased. Further, none of the witnesses i.e., employees of GPO testified that they have seen the accused and the deceased last together prior to the offence. 18. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the entire chain of evidence must be complete and the conclusions which are arrived after examining the chain of evidence must point towards the culpability of the accused and to no other conclusion. This, however, is clearly missing from the case of the prosecution. None of the witnesses have seen the deceased and the accused together prior to the death of the deceased. The last seen theory is also not established in this case. This, however, is clearly missing from the case of the prosecution. None of the witnesses have seen the deceased and the accused together prior to the death of the deceased. The last seen theory is also not established in this case. The entire case of the prosecution is based on the confession statement alleged to have been given by the accused/appellant. But, the panch witness to the confession statement i.e., P.W.8 clearly deposed that the accused denied the offence. However, the Police have searched the house of the accused and found an amount of Rs.8, 25, 000.00 inside the rice bag. His evidence further disclose that after recovery of the said amount, the accused has confessed that he had paid remaining amount of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 to his financier i.e., P.W.5/Satish Goud towards discharge of loan borrowed from him. 19. The alleged offence took place on the intervening night of 2/3/2/2009. Ex.P-1/complaint was preferred at about 10:45 a.m. on 3/2/2009. The record reveals that entire investigation was completed in a single day i.e., Police reaching the scene of offence basing on the complaint given by P.W.1, registering the case, proceeding to the house of the accused i.e., Quarter No.M- 41, Chikkadpally, along with panch witness i.e. P.W.-8, recovering of money from the house of the accused to a tune of Rs.8, 75, 000.00 and from there, mediators and the Police officers going to a village named Mailardevpally, Rajendranagar Mandal, which is approximately 40 k.ms away from Hyderabad, where the Police have recovered and seized an amount of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 from P.W.5 and later effecting the arrest of the accused and remanding him to judicial custody. 20. As per the evidence of P.W.11/Finger Print Expert on 3/2/2009 at about 11:30 a.m., he received a call from P.W.10 i.e., Investigating Officer requesting him to come to the scene of offence to develop the chance prints. His evidence further disclose that after reaching the scene of offence, he developed one chance print on the back of the main door of the chambers and also found one iron safe with latches, but could not notice any finger prints on the said iron safe. He also noticed a small aluminum box and found two chance prints on the said box and developed them. He also noticed a small aluminum box and found two chance prints on the said box and developed them. His evidence clearly disclose that he has marked four chance prints as 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D', from the scene of offence and found 'A', 'C', and 'D', are unfit for comparison. When chance print 'B' was compared with finger print in Ex.P.20, he found that the right middle finger print is identical and matching with it. His evidence further disclose that he found iron safe in an open condition and in his presence, nothing was removed from the iron safe and further noticed that the hook of the aluminum box was cut which was placed on a separate table. Ex.P.20 is marked through the Investigating Officer. However, the evidence of P.W.10 clearly disclose that he obtained thumb impressions of the accused in order to send them for comparison with that of chance prints. But, surprisingly, Ex.P.20 contains entire finger prints of the accused and on comparison, P.W.11 testified that only middle finger is matching. It is not at all explained by the prosecution as to how the middle finger print of the accused is matching with one of the chance prints 'B', when the Investigating Officer/P.W.10 has not obtained the entire finger prints of the accused and when the thumb impression of the accused was only obtained. 21. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.1 clearly reveal that the accused was working as sweeper and as the regular watchman was on medical leave, till the end of December, an 'Office Order' has been issued directing the accused to work as night watchman. But for the best reasons known to the prosecution, the said 'Office Order' was not been marked as Exhibit before the trial Court. Admittedly, P.W.1 is not the Superintendent of the Office. It is specifically testified by P.W.1 that on 3/2/2009 at about 9:40 a.m., he received a call from the Inspector, Sathaiah/P.W.3, who informed that the deceased who was discharging the duties of night watchman on 2/2/2009 in the place of the accused was found in a pool of blood. Admittedly, P.W.1 is not the Superintendent of the Office. It is specifically testified by P.W.1 that on 3/2/2009 at about 9:40 a.m., he received a call from the Inspector, Sathaiah/P.W.3, who informed that the deceased who was discharging the duties of night watchman on 2/2/2009 in the place of the accused was found in a pool of blood. On that, P.W.1 went to the office at 10:05 a.m., where he noticed the dead body of the deceased in a pool of blood and noticed M.O, .1/granite stone lying in the said room and also found cash of Rs.9, 90, 659.00 missing which was kept in the cash chest on the previous night (2/2/2009). 22. In the cross-examination, P.W.1 specifically testified that the Police have not collected any record, as to the long leave of the accused and also about the 'Office Order' or of posting the accused as night watchman, in place of regular watchman or about the leave obtained by the accused on the date of incident. It is the specific evidence of P.W.1 that he was incharge of cash chest along with the cashier and the cashier was one P.V.Rao as on the date of incident. Neither the Register nor the cashier was not examined to prove about the total amount of cash that was missing from the cash chest. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.1 clearly disclose that he was not Superintendent of the Office. Neither the Superintendent nor Mr.P.V.Rao, who was the cashier at that particular point of time were examined before the Court. The importance of examination of Mr.P.V.Rao is that P.W.1 is joint custodian of the cash chest along with the cashier and without having the two keys, the cash chest cannot be opened/closed. 23. P.W.2 is the Sweeper, who testified that on 3/2/2009 at about 8:15 a.m., when she went to sweep the recreation club room of the office, she found the dead body of the deceased lying in the pool of blood and informed the same to the Inspector, Sathaiah/P.W.3. 24. P.W.3 is the Inspector, who initially received information from P.W.2 at 8:30 a.m. and further informed the same to P.W.1. 24. P.W.3 is the Inspector, who initially received information from P.W.2 at 8:30 a.m. and further informed the same to P.W.1. His evidence clearly disclose that when he along with P.W.1 went into the chamber, they found the latch of the main door cut and after unlocking the door, they entered into the chamber and found the hooks of the cash chest cut and the locks kept aside. 25. As per the evidence of P.W.3, the door of the chamber was cut. Then what is the necessity to unlock the door? The evidence of P.W.3 is self contradictory. On one hand, P.W.3 states that he found that latch of the main door cut and on the other hand, he states that they have unlocked the door, which is not at all believable. 26. P.W.4 is the father-in-law of the accused. He was cited to speak about the amount received from the accused and handing over the same to P.W.5., i.e., to the borrower. 27. As stated supra, the distance between Mailardevpally Village and Hyderabad is approximately 40 k.ms. The incident took place on the intervening night of 2/3/2/2009. It is not explained by the prosecution as to how the accused has reached the above said village, handed over the money to his father-in-law, asking him to handover the same to P.W.5 and the accused returned to Hyderabad and the mode of transport used by the accused for travelling from Hyderabad to Mailardevpally and from Mailardevpally to Hyderabad. 28. It is the specific case of the prosecution that they have recovered an amount of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 from the house of P.W.5 but P.W.5 did not support the case of the prosecution. As stated earlier, confession to the police officer is not to be proved. Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, clearly envisages that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly reveals that "fact discovered" should be there in the "information" received from an accused person while in the custody of the police officer. It is this "information" which gets confirmed by subsequent recovery. In the present case, the evidence of P.W.8 clearly disclose that when police have reached the house of the accused with panchas including him, the accused denied the commission of offence. It is this "information" which gets confirmed by subsequent recovery. In the present case, the evidence of P.W.8 clearly disclose that when police have reached the house of the accused with panchas including him, the accused denied the commission of offence. The police have searched the house of the accused and recovered cash of Rs.8, 25, 000.00. It is the further evidence of P.W.8 that the accused on interrogation confessed that he paid remaining amount of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 to his financier Satish Goud towards discharge of loan amount and that he committed the offence using the material objects i.e., M.O.3/angle grinder, M.O.4/10 mm electric drill, M.O.5/hammer and M.O.6/chenni, which were purchased from the shop of P.W.6. As per Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, after information being collected, it is for the accused to lead the Police in order to discover any material objects subsequent to his confession. The evidence of P.W.8 and the Investigating Officer/P.W.10 clearly disclose that after receiving information from the accused, the police and the mediators have rushed to Mailardevpally village, to the house of P.W.5 and seized an amount of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 from the said house. The accused have not lead them to the said place. Therefore, recovery of cash of Rs.1, 65, 000.00 from the house of P.W.5 do not fall under Sec. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 29. Admittedly, as per the evidence of P.W.9/Doctor, the deceased died due to the crush injury to the head which can be caused by a granite. The death of the deceased can be treated as homicide. However, the police failed to connect the crime with that of the appellant. 30. It is relevant to mention that Ex.P.6 is marked admissible portion of the confession, but the entire confession has been marked which is hit by Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement given by the accused to the police under Sec. 161 Cr.P.C. is also not admissible. As noted above, there is no discovery of material object as per Sec. 27 of Indian Evidence Act. The recovery of stolen cash (M.O.1) from the accused and P.W.5 is highly doubtful. Except the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.10, there is no other evidence on record to connect the accused with that of the crime and therefore, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. The recovery of stolen cash (M.O.1) from the accused and P.W.5 is highly doubtful. Except the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.10, there is no other evidence on record to connect the accused with that of the crime and therefore, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. Moreover, the entire investigation was concluded within a day by the Police, even in the absence of suspicion against the appellant. 31. It is very surprising as to how the Investigating Officer can complete investigation within a short span of time? The case of the prosecution is that P.W.1 preferred the complaint at 10:45 a.m., but P.W.10 reached the house of the accused by 1:30 p.m. and recovered cash from P.W.5 by evening i.e., in a jet speed time. 32. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the Apex Court judgment reported in Munikrishna alias Krishna vs. State by Ulsoor1, wherein it is held as under:- "In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused. In other words, a very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. As early as in 1952, this Court in its seminal judgment of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 SCC online Sc 1449. had laid down the parameters under which the case of circumstantial evidence is to be evaluated. It states: - "... It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused..." In Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh dtd. 28/1/2010, this Court while discussing the nature of circumstantial evidence and the burden of proof of prosecution stated as under: - "39. In a case of circumstantial evidence, one must look for complete chain of circumstances and not on snapped and scattered links which do not make a complete sequence. This Court finds that this case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a cautious approach as circumstantial evidence is "inferential evidence" and proof in such a case is derivable by inference from circumstances. 40. Chief Justice Fletcher Moulton once observed that "proof does not mean rigid mathematical formula" since "that is impossible". However, proof must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a definite conclusion. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, has been compared by Lord Coleridge "like a gossamer thread, light and as unsubstantial as the air itself and may vanish with the merest of touches". The learned Judge also observed that such evidence may be strong in parts but it may also leave great gaps and rents through which the accused may escape. Therefore, certain rules have been judicially evolved for appreciation of circumstantial evidence. 41. To my mind, the first rule is that the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference from circumstantial evidence must be clearly proved beyond any reasonable doubt. If conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, it must create a network from which there is no escape for the accused. The facts evolving out of such circumstantial evidence must be such as not to admit of any inference except that of guilt of the accused. (See Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70). 42. The facts evolving out of such circumstantial evidence must be such as not to admit of any inference except that of guilt of the accused. (See Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70). 42. The second principle is that all the links in the chain of evidence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and they must exclude the evidence of guilt of any other person than the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 642 : 1992 Cri LJ 3693, SCC p. 309, Para 20) 43. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, we must remember the principle laid down in Ashraf Ali v. King Emperor, 21 CWN 1152 : 43 IC 241 (IC at para 14) that when in a criminal case there is conflict between presumption of innocence and any other presumption, the former must prevail. 44. The next principle is that in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and are incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis except his guilt. 45. When a murder charge is to be proved solely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, presumption of innocence of the accused must have a dominant role. In Nibaran Chandra Roy v. King Emperor, 11 CWN 1085 it was held that the fact that an accused person was found with a gun in his hand immediately after a gun was fired and a man was killed on the spot from which the gun was fired may be strong circumstantial evidence against the accused, but it is an error of law to hold that the burden of proving innocence lies upon the accused under such circumstances. It seems, therefore, to follow that whatever force a presumption arising under Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act may have in civil or in less serious criminal cases, in a trial for murder it is extremely weak in comparison with the dominant presumption of innocence. 46. It seems, therefore, to follow that whatever force a presumption arising under Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act may have in civil or in less serious criminal cases, in a trial for murder it is extremely weak in comparison with the dominant presumption of innocence. 46. The same principles have been followed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Govinda Reddy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 29 : 1960 Cri LJ 137 where the learned Judges quoted the principles laid down in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ 129 The ratio in Govind [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] quoted in AIR para 5, p. 30 of the Report in Govinda Reddy [ AIR 1960 SC 29 : 1960 Cri LJ 137] are: "5. ... 10. ... in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances [which lead to the conclusion of guilt should be in the first instance] fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be [shown] that within all human probability the act must have been [committed] by the accused.' [ As observed in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 343 at pp. 345-46, para 10." The same principle has also been followed by this Court in Mohan Lal Pangasa v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 607 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 643." 33. The above case law squarely applies to the present facts and circumstances of the case. As stated supra, in a case of circumstantial evidence, it is for the prosecution to prove that the chain of events is complete. But in the present case, there are many missing links. Therefore, the benefit of doubt can be extended to the accused herein. The above case law squarely applies to the present facts and circumstances of the case. As stated supra, in a case of circumstantial evidence, it is for the prosecution to prove that the chain of events is complete. But in the present case, there are many missing links. Therefore, the benefit of doubt can be extended to the accused herein. It can be construed that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant for the aforesaid charges and the trial Court is not proper in convicting the accused. 34. In view of the above discussion, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The appellant is found not guilty for the offences punishable under Ss. 302 and 380 of IPC, and accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant vide Judgment dtd. 29/10/2013 in S.C.No.463 of 2009 on the file of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charged offence. Consequently, the Superintendent, Central Prison, Cherlapally, is directed to release the appellant forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.