JUDGMENT Mrs. Lisa Gill, J. All the abovesaid writ petitions, details of which are tabulated in the schedule attached at the foot of the order, are taken up for hearing together at request and with consent of learned counsel for the parties as it is agreed that a common preliminary question arises for consideration in all these petitions i.e. "Whether jurisdiction should be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court for setting aside Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest proceedings ('for short SARFAESI Proceedings') on the ground of violation of Reserve Bank of India Circular (RBI) dated 17.03.2016 and whether the matter is within the realm of consideration by learned Debt Recovery Tribunal?" 2. Petitioners, in all the abovesaid writ petitions, claiming to be MSME's have challenged proceedings under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest, Act 2002 (for short 'SARFAESI Act') initiated against them. Learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that in majority of these writ petitions, notice(s) under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of SARFAESI Act stand issued after declaration of account as Non Performing Asset (NPA) on account of financial indiscipline. In some of the cases, order under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act has also been passed by learned District Magistrate. Learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that in majority of these writ petitions, notice(s) under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of SARFAESI Act stand issued after declaration of account as Non Performing Asset (NPA) on account of financial indiscipline. In some of the cases, order under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act has also been passed by learned District Magistrate. Details thereof as stated in respective writ petitions are reproduced as under:- Sr No CWP No. Date of declaration of account as NPA Notice u/S 13(2) of SARFAESI Act Notice u/S 13(4) of SARFAESI Act Objections 1 14638/2023 2/11/2022 30/11/22 27/02/2023, 15/02/2023 5/05/2023 23/01/2023 2 7538/2021 8/05/2018 06/06/2018 11/10/2018 18/10/2018 30/06/2018 3 19268/2023 31/03/2023 26/05/2023 NM 2/08/2023 4 3700/2023 alongwith 5/5/2022 15/7/2021 22/7/2021 23/01/2023 NM 5 3707/2023 01/08/2022 6/9/2022 6 28992/2022 Not Mentioned (NM) Allegedly Never Served 25/07/2022 Not Mentioned, if filed (NM) 7 28268/2022 31/03/22 2/5/22 14/9/22 NM 8 23676/2019 31/03/2015 21/09/2016 09/12/2016 NM 9 7478/2022 NM 30/03/2021 9/3/2022 NM 10 6685/2022 15/04/2021 21/02/2022 11/03/2022 NM 11 8509/2023 31/10/2021 26/11/2021 NM NM 12 8229/2023 31/07/2021 21/09/2022 NM NM 13 18042/2023 1/05/2019 1/06/2019 28/08/2019 12/10/2020, 04/01/2021, 07/09/2021 6/08/2019 14 22114/2022 23/05/2021 21/09/2021 26/08/2022 NM 15 26687/2022 14/07/2022 16/07/2022 27/10/2022 NM 16 23673/2022 03/04/2022 19/04/2022 08/08/2022 25/05/22 17 13692/2023 22/11/2022 04/01/2023 30/05/2023 1/06/2023 18/01/2023 18 22778/2022 15/04/2022 25/05/2022 03/08/2022 NM 19 21854/2022 04/05/2022 06/05/2022 09/08/2022 23/08/2022 5/07/22 20 2127/2021 29/06/2019 27/12/2019 09/03/2020 NM 21 21249/2022 29/10/2017 26/02/2018 NM NM 22 21044/2022 30/09/2021 14/10/2021 NM NM 23 20970/2022 30/04/2021 05/08/2021 24/03/2022 NM 24 19865/2022 29/04/2021 30/04/2021 11/02/2022 20/06/2022 NM 25 17853/2022 28/02/2020 13/04/2021 02/07/2022 NM 18/05/2021 24/04/2021 26 11941/2022 27/09/2019 31/12/2019 04/06/2022 28/02/2020 27 8039/2022 27/11/2017 29/09/2019 01/01/2018 14/01/2019 NM NM 28 26459/2022 11/08/2022 12/08/2022 NM NM 29 27163/2022 28/10/2019 20/12/2019 04/06/2020 NM 30 27150/2022 28/10/2019 20/12/2019 04/06/2020 18/02/2020 31 28572/2022 15/10/2019 07/11/2019 NM NM 32 21657/2022 NM 16/04/2022 24/08/2022 16/04/2020 33 22406/2022 04/05/2022 06/05/2022 10/08/2022 23/08/2022 05/07/2022 34 1997/2022 25/06/2020 03/11/2021 11/01/2022 29/12/2021 35 2329/2023 27/02/2022 04/03/2022 18/05/2022 NM 36 652/2023 26/02/2020 02/12/2020 17/02/2022 NM 37 21128/2022 30/03/2022 31/03/2022 NM 15/05/2022 09/07/2022 38 7570/2023 31/08/2022 09/12/2022 24/02/2023 27/01/2023 39 105543707/2023 29.01.2022 03.02.2022 23.05.2022 NM 40 27731/2019 04.11.2014 21.09.2016 09.12.2016 NM 41 12447/2023 06.09.2022 15.09.2022 24.03.2023 NM 42 26/2023 16.04.2023 18.04.2023 05.07.2023 06.07.2023 02.05.2023 43 17717/2023 31.03.2021 05.04.2022 13.03.2023 NM 44 26404/2022 31.03.2021 14.06.2021 11.05.2022 18.08.2022 NM 45 29890/2022 22.09.2022 23.09.2022 10.04.2023 21.11.2022 46 29922/2022 28.09.2022 04.10.2022 NM 21/11/2022 47 28349/2022 26.04.2021 15.11.2021 04.06.2022 NM 48 29749/2022 26.04.2021 15.11.2021 04.06.2022 NM 49 19165/2022 30.04.2021 27.05.2021 06.10.2021 24/07/2021 50 21597/2023 29.05.2023 07.08.2023 Allegedly Not Issued At The Time Of Filing Writ Petition 03/09.2023 51 10093/2023 12/05/2023 NM NM NM 52 29461/2022 01/05/2022 05/05/2022 19/07/2022 04/07/2022 53 22857/2021 30/06/2021 05/07/2021 04/10/2021 NM 54 29765/2022 NM 29/11/2019 27/10/2020 10/11/2020 55 17184/2022 31/03/2021 08/04/2021 04/06/2022 29/10/2021 56 20061/2023 07/04/2023 17/04/2023 25/07/2023 07.06.2023 08/06/2023 57 15584/2022 03/01/2022 02/03/2022 06/06/2022 16/04/2022 58 23941/2022 26/06/2022 08/07/2022 15/09/2022 NM 59 23159/2022 NM 25/08/2020 04/03/2021 NM 60 21661/2022 07/05/2019 16/08/2019 NM 11/10/2019 61 30358/2018 28/10/2016 29/10/2016 12/07/2018 NM 62 29345/2022 NM 11/10/2021 14/10/2022 NM 63 394/2022 31/03/2018 15/06/2018 04/01/2019, 16/05/2019, 16/08/2019 02/11/2019 26/08/2019 64 17076/2022 31/03/2021 09/04/2021 24/02/2022 18/06/2021 65 29642/2022 16/09/2022 23/09/2022 09/12/2022 NM 66 21870/2022 22/06/2022 24/06/2022 09/09/2022 28/08/2022 67 21602/2022 26/06/2022 27/06/2022 09/09/2022 25/08/2022 68 33352/2019 22/02/2018 14/11/2018 24.05.2019 NM 69 16156/2022 31/08/2020 21/06/2021 9/11/2021 NM 70 22177/2023 28/12/2022 24/01/2023 17/07/2023 03/05/2023 71 22132/2023 28/12/2022 08/02/2023 17/02/2023 17/07/2023 03/05/2023 72 16645/2022 29/12/2021 03/01/2022 03/06/2022 17/02/2023 73 13710/2021 30/09/2020 12/04/2021 NM 10/06/2023 74 20674/2022 30/03/2021 20/04/2021 05/05/2021 12/11/2021 28/02/2022 NM 75 153/2022 29/06/2021 04/10/2021 NM 06/11/2021 76 19463/2022 30/10/2021 13/12/2021 NM NM 77 6745/2023 28/09/2022 30/11/2022 NM 23/12/2022 14/03/2023 78 28892/2022 29/05/2019 31/05/2019 06/08/2019 26/08/2019 29/07/2019 79 11814/2020 28/11/2019 29/11/2019 20/02/2020 NM 07/01/2020 80 26312/2022 21/10/2021 21/02/2022 08/06/2022 NM 81 25595/2022 30/04/2022 10/05/2022 23/08/2022 NM 82 23554/2022 04/01/2022 25/01/2022 28/09/2022 17/03/2022 83 26071/2022 NM NM NM NM 84 22447/2022 31/03/2021 26/04/2021 NM NM 85 17718/2023 31/03/2021 15/06/2021 22/02/2023 NM 86 16152/2023 04/11/2022 14/03/2023 15/06/2023 02/06/2023 87 6018/2023 31/03/2021 24/02/2022 27/07/2022 02/07/2022 16/12/2022 NM 88 18306/2023 28/09/2022 22/11/2022 03/02/2023 NM 89 11275/2023 09/06/2021 26/04/2021 NM NM 90 10945/2023 09/06/2021 14/06/2021 NM NM 91 9879/2023 31/01/2022 14/03/2022 NM 28/03/2022 92 7740/2023 09/12/2016 18/09/2017 NM NM 93 15272/2022 30/09/2019 11/12/2018 14/10/2019, 06/12/2021 19/09/2020 Objections Filed, Date NM 94 20407/2022 31/03/2018 10/12/2018 11/12/2018 14/10/2019, 06/12/2021 19/09/2020 Objections Filed, Date NM 95 29625/2022 03/08/2020 17/04/2021 07/03/2021 11/06/2021 96 29512/2022 27/01/2022 19/09/2022 12/12/2022 19/10/2022 97 12358/2022 31/03/2021 25/05/2021 12/04/2022 NM 3. Primary ground raised in all the writ petitions is that declaration of account of respective petitioners NPA is illegal and arbitrary being in violation of the mandate contained in guidelines dated 17.03.2016 issued by RBI providing "Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)". It is the case of petitioners that in order to facilitate promotion and development of MSMEs, Ministry of MSME Government of India vide Gazette Notification dated 29.05.2015 notified 'Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs'. Certain changes were thereafter carried out in the same framework to make it compatible with existing regulatory guidelines on 'Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to Advances' issued to the Banks by RBI. 4. In all writ petitions at hand, petitioners have challenged proceedings initiated against them under SARFAESI Act while raising various grounds, but the common thread which runs through all writ petitions is that proceedings so initiated are illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction because petitioners being MSMEs, their accounts could not have been declared NPA without mandatorily referring their cases to the Designated Committee in terms of Circular dated 17.03.2016 issued by RBI providing Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs. 5. With consent of learned counsel for parties all writ petitions were ultimately consolidated and it was agreed that first and foremost, basic question to be addressed in all said petitions is as to whether jurisdiction should be exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for setting aside SARFAESI proceedings on the ground of violation of RBI Circular dated 17.03.2016. This is so recorded in consolidated order dated 16.08.2023 in CWP-21657-2022 and connected petitions. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances as above, reference is not being made to facts of each individual case at this stage except to note that in all cases, availing of loan facility from various financial facility institutions as well as declaration of accounts as NPA on account of financial indiscipline by the petitioners and subsequent initiation of proceedings under SARFAESI Act is admitted and a matter of record. 6. Arguments on behalf of petitioners were addressed by Mr. Anand Chhibar, Senior Advocate, Mr. D.S. Patwalia, Senior Advocate, Mr. V.K. Sachdeva, Advocate, Mr. Aalok Jagga, Advocate, Mr. Rohit Suri, Advocate, Mr. Harsh Chopra, Advocate, Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Advocate, Mr. Akhilesh Vyas, Advocate, Mr. Brijesh Nandan, Advocate, Ms. Jyoti Sareen, Advocate, Mr. 6. Arguments on behalf of petitioners were addressed by Mr. Anand Chhibar, Senior Advocate, Mr. D.S. Patwalia, Senior Advocate, Mr. V.K. Sachdeva, Advocate, Mr. Aalok Jagga, Advocate, Mr. Rohit Suri, Advocate, Mr. Harsh Chopra, Advocate, Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Advocate, Mr. Akhilesh Vyas, Advocate, Mr. Brijesh Nandan, Advocate, Ms. Jyoti Sareen, Advocate, Mr. Sahil Khunger, Advocate and the same adopted by others. Sum and substance of arguments addressed is collectively narrated in following paras. 7. Learned counsel for respective petitioners vehemently argued that respondent-Bank/Financial Institutions have erroneously classified the accounts in question NPA. Petitioners, who were registered under the MSME Act, are entitled to benefits granted thereunder and specifically as granted in terms of RBI Circular dated 17.03.2016. It was argued on behalf of petitioners that it is pure question of law which is involved for consideration in these writ petitions, therefore, present writ petitions should be entertained. Moreover, learned DRT does not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question of compliance with RBI Circulars and cannot direct compliance thereof. It was contended that there is a clear cut mandate as per Circular dated 17.03.2016 to respondent-Banks/Financial Institutions to refer the matter to Designated Committee for rectification, restructuring or recovery of the account(s) in question and it is only if rectification and reconstruction is not found feasible that steps for recovery can be taken, including declaration of the account NPA. 8. It was further contended that at that stage there is no forum or platform available to petitioners for redressal of their grievance except by way of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was reiterated that power and jurisdiction of a Tribunal was circumscribed by provisions of SARFAESI Act and question sought to be raised in these writ petitions does not fall within the realm of consideration of DRT i.e. as to whether a borrower is entitled to benefit provided under regulations issued by RBI. Furthermore, a borrower, it was contended would not have any remedy before action under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act is initiated, thus, if initial action is illegal i.e., declaration of account as NPA is itself illegal, litigant should not be made to wait till action is taken under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act for availing its remedy. Furthermore, a borrower, it was contended would not have any remedy before action under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act is initiated, thus, if initial action is illegal i.e., declaration of account as NPA is itself illegal, litigant should not be made to wait till action is taken under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act for availing its remedy. It was asserted that declaration of an account as NPA in a correct and proper manner is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings under SARFAESI Act. It was also contended by learned counsel for petitioners that Circular dated 17.03.2016, keeping in view the letter and spirit of MSME Act provides an opportunity for revival of MSMEs in question. As rights of petitioners under MSME Act are violated by declaration of an account NPA incorrectly in violation of RBI circulars, writ petition in this respect should be entertained. 9. It was vehemently argued by learned counsel for petitioners that learned DRT can not exercise jurisdiction in the sphere in question i.e. protection of interest of MSME. SARFAESI Act, it was contended operates in a separate field which is concerned only with recovery and has no truck with rehabilitation or revival. Sole objective of SARFAESI Act is speedy recovery of money. Therefore, objective of revival can necessarily not be within the realm of consideration by learned DRT. Moreover, jurisdiction of learned DRT cannot be invoked at a stage prior to action being taken under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act. Reference was made by learned counsel for petitioners to Clause 10 of Circular dated 17.03.2016 issued by RBI to submit that it is antithesis to the stand of respondents. Comparison was also drawn by learned counsel for petitioners between provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (for short TBC') and SARFAESI Act to urge that learned DRT is not vested with any power for reconstruction or revival, therefore, there is no room for casting an obligation upon learned DRT to look into the aspect of revival or reconstruction. Learned DRT, it was contended cannot reverse the SARFAESI proceedings to the stage of NPA being declared illegal, in violation of Circular dated 17.03.2016. Learned DRT, it was contended cannot reverse the SARFAESI proceedings to the stage of NPA being declared illegal, in violation of Circular dated 17.03.2016. It was also contended on behalf of petitioners that Banks/Financial Institutions indulge in a policy of pick and choose inasmuch as a uniform yardstick is not adopted for placing respective cases of MSMEs before the Designated Committee and that once discrimination is writ large, writ petition in this respect should be entertained. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for petitioners on judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India, (2004) SCC 311, Transcore v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 125 , M/s Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others, 2023 AIR (Supreme Court) 781, Small Industries Development Bank of India v. M/s Sibco Investment Private Limited, 2022 (3) SCC 56 , M/s Sardar Associates and others v. Punjab and Sind Bank and others, 2009 (8) SCC 257 , M/s Magadh Sugar And Energy Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, 2021 (11) Scale 350 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1999 (1) RCR (Civil) 220 and judgment of this High Court in M/s Amar Alloys Private Limited (Regd.) v. State Bank of India, 2019 (3) PLR 81, Amrik Singh v. DCB Bank Limited and another, 2022 (2) RCR (Civil) 791. It was thus prayed that all these writ petitions should be entertained and thereafter heard individually for determination of the grievance(s) as raised. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently refuted the arguments as raised on behalf of the petitioners. Arguments were addressed by Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate, Mr. Gaurav Goel, Advocate, Mr. C.S. Pasricha, Advocate, Ms. Madhu Dayal, Advocate, Mr. Manish Jain, Advocate, Mr. Abhinav Sood, Advocate, Mr. Chandeep Singh, Advocate, Mr. Rakesh Gupta, Advocate, Mr. R.S. Bhatia, Advoate, Mr. Vivek Thakral, Advocate, Ms. Puneeta Sethi, Advocate, Mr. Vivek Sethi, Advocate, Mr. I.P. Singh, Advocate, Ms. Manjari Joshi, Advocate, Mr. Shekhar Verma, Advocate, Mr. Aditya Grover, Advocate and Mr. G.S. Anand, Advocate and the same adopted by others. It was argued by learned counsel for respondents that all these writ petitions challenging action taken under SARFAESI Act against the petitioners are not entertainable. Puneeta Sethi, Advocate, Mr. Vivek Sethi, Advocate, Mr. I.P. Singh, Advocate, Ms. Manjari Joshi, Advocate, Mr. Shekhar Verma, Advocate, Mr. Aditya Grover, Advocate and Mr. G.S. Anand, Advocate and the same adopted by others. It was argued by learned counsel for respondents that all these writ petitions challenging action taken under SARFAESI Act against the petitioners are not entertainable. Reference was made by learned counsel to various judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India (Supra), Authorized Officer of Indian Overseas Bank v. M/s Ashok Saw Mill, 2010 (8) RCR (Civil) 2954, Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another v. Mathew K.C, 2018 (2) RCR (Civil) 1, Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon and others, 2010 (8) SCC 110 , M/s South Indian Bank Limited and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and another, 2023 (2) RCR (Civil) 771, to submit that SARFAESI Act is a complete Code in itself providing for specific remedies for any grievance which anyone may have in respect to action taken thereunder. It was further argued that SARFAESI Act is not subservient to MSME Act. Moreover, there is no mandate in the MSME Act to the effect that no action can be taken by respondent-Banks/ Financial Institutions for recovery of the amount as due, under provisions of SARFAESI Act qua MSME's. Furthermore, while denying any violation of Circular dated 17.03.2016 issued by RBI, it was submitted that there is no discernible imperative mandate upon the Banks/Financial Institutions in the said circular to the effect that in all cases without exception, if a matter is not referred to Designated Committee before declaring the account of MSME as NPA, said proceedings are illegal or irregular. It was strenuously urged that apart from a pecuniary limit which is prescribed in Circular dated 17.03.2016, there are certain conditions which have to be existing for referral of a case to the Designated Committee. There is no provision for automatic referral of all cases across the board. Therefore, in each and every case, it would have to be decided as to whether MSME in question was entitled to referral or not. Therefore, it is not a pure question of law which is involved for adjudication in these writ petitions. 11. There is no provision for automatic referral of all cases across the board. Therefore, in each and every case, it would have to be decided as to whether MSME in question was entitled to referral or not. Therefore, it is not a pure question of law which is involved for adjudication in these writ petitions. 11. Serious objection has been raised in some of the cases that mere registration (UDYAM registration) as MSME by itself is not conclusive proof of the unit being an MSME. Moreover, in a number of writ petitions, the unit has been registered as MSME after declaration of the account in question to be NPA. Furthermore, as per Circular dated 07.07.2021 issued by RBI, entities engaged in trading cannot avail of MSME facility. 12. Learned counsel for respondents also argued that insofar as present writ petitions are concerned, none of the petitioners except about two or so have approached the Court at an initial stage and that writ petitions have been filed well after initiation of proceedings under SARFAESI Act. Furthermore, even at the initial stage, declaration of an account as NPA, cannot be subject to judicial scrutiny keeping in view the scheme of SARFAESI Act. Learned counsel for respondents in addition to earlier judgments as mentioned have also relied upon judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in judgment dated 08.07.2015 of Calcutta High Court in Kaaiser Oils Private Bank Limited v. Allahabad Bank, Writ Petition No. 382, judgment of Division Bench of this High Court in M/s Ranbir Textiles and another v. Reserve Bank of India and others, 2017 (5) RCR (Civil) 212, judgment of Division Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Neelkanth Yarn v. Punjab National Bank, CWP No. 4538 of 2023, decided on 02.08.2023, judgment of High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in Gaurav Lubricants Private Limited v. Tamilnadu, Mercantile Bank Limited, 2022 SCC Online TS 2771. It was contended by learned counsel for respondents that in case of any grouse qua non compliance or non adherence to guidelines issued by RBI, it is always open to aggrieved person/entity to seek redressal under the Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 2006 issued by the RBI and that there should be no intervention by Court at the initial stage as well as it would in effect amount to scuttling the process under SARFAESI Act. It was thus prayed that all these writ petitions be dismissed on the ground of entertainability itself. 13. We heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and also perused various files with assistance of learned counsel besides examining circulars of RBI referred to by them and considered the judgments relied upon by both sides. 14. As has been noted in the foregoing paras, question to be decided at the outset is that of entertainability of present writ petitions. In all the writ petitions, challenge is to proceedings initiated against petitioners claiming to be MSMEs under SARFAESI Act while in a minuscule few, rejection of petitioners' case for restructuring/revival has also been challenged. As an examplar, reference can be made to CWP-10093-2023 and CWP-26071- 2022, challenging such rejection on grounds of incompetence of decision being taken by an incompetent authority/denial of opportunity of hearing by Designated Committee. Rejection of petitioners' claim for restructuring in CWP-21657-2022 has also been challenged on various grounds. At the outset, it is useful to refer to relevant provisions of law. Section 13 of SARFAESI Act provides for enforcement of security interest. Section 13 (1) (2) (3) 3(a), 3(b) and 4 of SARFAESI Act read as under:- 13. Enforcement of security interest.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4). Provided that- (i) the requirement of classification of secured debt as non-performing asset under this sub-section shall not apply to a borrower who has raised funds through issue of debt securities; and (ii) in the event of default, the debenture trustee shall be entitled to enforce security interest in the same manner as provided under this section with such modifications as may be necessary and in accordance with the terms and conditions of security documents executed in favour of the debenture trustee. (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3A) If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower: Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A. (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:- (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt." 15. NPA as defined in Section 2 (1) (o) of SARFAESI Act reads as under:- "2(1 )(o) "non-performing asset" means an asset or account of a borrower, which has been classified by a bank or financial institution as sub-standard, 2 [doubtful or loss asset,- (a) in case such bank or financial institution is administered or regulated by any authority or body established, constituted or appointed by any law for the time being in force, in accordance with the directions or guidelines relating to assets classifications issued by such authority or body; (b) in any other case, in accordance with the directions or guidelines relating to assets classifications issued by the Reserve Bank." 16. Section 17 of SARFAESI Act provides that any person including borrower aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub Section 4 of Section 13 of SARFAESI Act taken by secured creditor or his authorized officer may file an application along with prescribed fee before concerned DRT within 45 days from the date on which such measure had been taken. 17. Section 17 (1) (2) (3) (4) and 4(a) of SARFAESI Act reads as under:- Application against measures to recover secured debts.- "xxx xxxx xxxx (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,- (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under subsection (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,- (a) has expired or stood determined; or (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; or (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act; and (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the subclause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 18. Any person aggrieved by an order passed by learned DRT is entitled to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act. 19. Petitioners have relied upon Circular dated 17.03.2016 to argue that declaration of their account(s) NPA is illegal and arbitrary. It is considered essential to refer to some of the clauses thereunder. Clause 1 of circular providing for eligibility of MSME's for benefits in terms of circular reads as under:- "1. Eligibility:- The provisions made in this framework shall be application to MSMEs having loan limits up to Rs.25 Crores, including accounts under consortium or multiple banking arrangement (MBA)." 20. Identification of incipient stress is provided for in Clause 2 of Circular dated 17.03.2016, which reads as under:- '2.1 Identification by banks or creditors - Before a loan account of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise turns into a Non-Performing Asset (NPA), banks or creditors should identify incipient stress in the account by creating three sub-categories under the Special Mention Account (SMA) category as given in the Table below: SMA Sub-categories Basis for classification SMA-0 Principal or interest payment not overdue for more than 30 days but account showing signs of incipient stress (please see Annex-1). SMA-1 Principal or interest payment overdue between 31-60 days SMA-2 Principal or interest payments overdue between 61-90 days On the basis of the above early warning signals, the branch maintaining the account should consider forwarding the stressed accounts with aggregate loan limits above Rs.10 lakh to the Committee as referred in para 3.3 within five working days for a suitable corrective action plan (CAP). Forwarding the account to the Committee for CAP will be mandatory in cases of accounts reported as SMA-2. 2.2 As regards accounts with aggregate loan limits up to Rs.10 lakh identified as SMA-2, the account should be mandatorily examined for CAP by the branch itself under the authority of the branch manager / such other official (hereinafter referred to as 'designated official') as decided by the bank in terms of their Board approved policy. Other terms and conditions, such as time limits, procedures to be followed, etc., as applicable to the cases referred to the Committee as referred in para 3.3, should be followed by the branch manager / designated official. However, the cases, where the branch/manager / designated official has decided the option of recovery under CAP instead of rectification or restructuring as mentioned in para 5.3 (a) or (b), should be referred to the Committee for their concurrence. Banks, with the approval of their Boards should frame a suitable policy in this regard as given in para 3.4. The branch manager / designated official should also examine the accounts reported as SMA-0 and SMA-1, if it is deemed necessary. 2.3 Identification by the Borrower Enterprise - Any MSME borrower may voluntarily initiate proceedings under this Framework, if the enterprise reasonably apprehends failure of its business or its inability or likely inability to pay debts or there is erosion in the net worth due to accumulated losses to the extent of 50% of its net worth during the previous accounting year, by making an application to the branch or directly to the Committee as referred in para 3.3, wherever applicable.. When such a request is received by lender, the account with aggregate loan limits above Rs.10 lakh should be referred to the Committee. The Committee should convene its meeting at the earliest but not later than five working days from the receipt of the application, to examine the account for a suitable CAP. When such a request is received by lender, the account with aggregate loan limits above Rs.10 lakh should be referred to the Committee. The Committee should convene its meeting at the earliest but not later than five working days from the receipt of the application, to examine the account for a suitable CAP. The accounts with aggregate loan limit up to Rs.10 lakh may be dealt with by the branch manager / designated official for a suitable-CAP." 21. Clause 5 of Circular dated 17.03.2016 provides for Corrective Action Plan, which includes Rectification, Restructuring and Recovery. It is provided that in case, Rectification and Restructuring are not found to be feasible, due Recovery process may be resorted. Circular dated 17.03.2016 in Clause 10 provides for Restructuring by Committee and required eligibility thereof besides Viability. Conditions relating to Restructuring are provided. Review of decision of the Committee for recovery is provided in Clause 11 of Circular dated 17.03.2016 on the grounds as are mentioned therein. Clause 5,10 and 11 of Circular dated 17.03.2016 read as under:- 5. Corrective Action Plan by the Committee 5.1 The Committee may explore various options to resolve the stress in the account. The Committee shall not endeavour to encourage a particular resolution option and may decide the CAP as per the specific requirements and position of each case. While Techno-Economic viability of each account is to be decided by the concerned lender/s before considering restructuring as CAPs, for accounts with aggregate exposure of Rs.10 crore and above, the Committee should conduct a detailed Techno-Economic Viability study before finalising the CAP. 5.2 During the period of operation of CAP, the enterprise shall be allowed to avail both secured and unsecured credit for its business operations as envisaged under the terms of CAP. 5.3 The options under CAP by the Committee may include: (a) Rectification:- Obtaining a commitment, specifying actions and timelines, from the borrower to regularise the account so that the account comes out of Special Mention Account status or does not slip into the Non-Performing Asset category and the commitment should be supported with identifiable cash flows within the required time period and without involving any loss or sacrifice on the part of the existing lenders. The rectification process should primarily be borrower driven. However, the Committee may also consider providing need based additional finance to the borrower, if considered necessary, as part of the rectification process. The rectification process should primarily be borrower driven. However, the Committee may also consider providing need based additional finance to the borrower, if considered necessary, as part of the rectification process. It should however be ensured that this need based additional finance is intended only for meeting, in exceptional cases, unavoidable increased working capital requirement. In all cases of additional finance for working capital, any diversion of funds will render the account as NPA. Further, such additional finance should ordinarily be an ad-hoc facility to be repaid or regularised within a maximum period of six months. Additional finance for any other purpose, as also any roll-over of existing facilities, or funding not in compliance with the above conditions, will tantamount to restructuring. Further, repeated rectification with funding, within the space of one year, will be treated as a restructuring and no additional finance should be sanctioned under CAP, in cases where the account has been reported as fraud by any lender. (b) Restructuring:- Consider the possibility of restructuring the account, if it is prima facie viable and the borrower is not a wilful defaulter, i.e., there is no diversion of funds, fraud or malfeasance, etc. Commitment from promoters for extending their personal guarantee along with their net worth statement supported by copies of legal titles to assets may be obtained along with a declaration that they would not undertake any transaction that would alienate assets without the permission of the Committee. Any deviation from the commitment by the borrowers affecting the security or recoverability of the loan may be treated as a valid factor for initiating recovery process. The lenders in the Committee may sign an Inter-Creditor Agreement and also require the borrower to sign the Debtor-Creditor Agreement which would provide the legal basis for any restructuring process. The IB A may prepare formats for this purpose on the lines of formats used by the Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism for Inter-Creditor Agreement and Debtor-Creditor Agreement. Further, a stand-still clause (as defined in extant guidelines on Restructuring of Advances) may be stipulated in the Debtor-Creditor Agreement to enable a smooth process of restructuring. The stand-still clause does not mean that the borrower is precluded from making payments to the lenders. The Inter-Creditor Agreement may also stipulate that both secured and unsecured creditors need to agree to the final resolution. The stand-still clause does not mean that the borrower is precluded from making payments to the lenders. The Inter-Creditor Agreement may also stipulate that both secured and unsecured creditors need to agree to the final resolution. (c) Recovery:- Once the first two options at (a) and (b) above are seen as not feasible, due recovery process may be resorted to. The Committee may decide the best recovery process to be followed, among the various legal and other recovery options available, with a view to optimizing the efforts and results. 10. Restructuring by the Committee 10.1 Eligibility (a) Restructuring cases shall be taken up by the Committee only in respect of assets reported as Standard, Special Mention Account or Sub-Standard by one or more lenders of the Committee. (b) However, the Committee may consider restructuring of the debt, where the account is doubtful with one or two lender/s but it is Standard or Sub-Standard in the books of majority of other lenders (by value). (c) Wilful defaulters shall not be eligible for restructuring. However, the Committee may review the reasons for classification of the borrower as a wilful defaulter and satisfy itself that the borrower is in a position to rectify the wilful default. The decision to restructure such cases shall have the approval of the Board of concerned bank within the Committee who has classified the borrower as wilful defaulter. (d) Cases of Frauds and Malfeasance remain ineligible for restructuring. However, in cases of fraud / malfeasance where the existing promoters are replaced by new promoters and the borrower company is totally delinked from such erstwhile promoters / management, banks and the Committee may take a view on restructuring of such accounts based on their viability, without prejudice to the continuance of criminal action against the erstwhile promoters / management. Further, such accounts may also be eligible for asset classification benefits available on refinancing after change in ownership, if such change in ownership is carried out under guidelines contained in circular DBR.BP.BC.No.41/21.04.048/2015-16 dated September 24. 2015 on "Prudential Norms on Change in Ownership of Borrowing Entities (Outside Strategic Debt Restructuring Scheme)". Each bank may formulate its policy and requirements as approved by the Board, on restructuring of such assets. 10.2. Viability (a) The viability of the account shall be determined by the Committee based on acceptable viability benchmarks determined by them. 2015 on "Prudential Norms on Change in Ownership of Borrowing Entities (Outside Strategic Debt Restructuring Scheme)". Each bank may formulate its policy and requirements as approved by the Board, on restructuring of such assets. 10.2. Viability (a) The viability of the account shall be determined by the Committee based on acceptable viability benchmarks determined by them. (b) The parameters may, inter-alia, include the Debt Equity Ratio, Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Liquidity or Current Ratio, etc. 10.3. Conditions relating to Restructuring under the Framework (1) Under this Framework, the restructuring package shall stipulate the timeline during which certain viability milestones such as improvement in certain financial ratios after a period of 6 months may be achieved. (2) The Committee shall periodically review the account for achievement / non-achievement of milestones and shall consider initiating suitable measures including recovery measures as deemed appropriate. (3) Any restructuring under this Framework shall be completed within the specified time periods. (4) The Committee shall optimally utilize the specified time periods so that the aggregate time limit is not breached under any mode of restructuring. (5) If the Committee takes a shorter time for an activity as against the prescribed limit, then it can have the discretion to utilize the saved time for other activities provided the aggregate time limit is not breached. (6) The general principle of restructuring shall be that the stakeholders bear the first loss of the enterprise rather than the lenders. In the case of a company, the Committee may consider the following options, when a loan is restructured: (a) Possibility of transferring equity of the company by promoters to the lenders to compensate for their sacrifices; (b) Promoters infusing more equity into their companies; (c) Transfer of the promoters' holdings to a security trustee or an escrow arrangement till turnaround of enterprise to enable a change in management control, if lenders favour it. (7) In case a borrower has undertaken diversification or expansion of the activities which has resulted in the stress on the core-business of the group, a clause for sale of non-core assets or other assets may be stipulated as a condition for restructuring the account, if under the Techno-Economic Viability study, the account is likely to become viable on hiving off of non-core activities and other assets. (8) For restructuring of dues in respect of listed companies, lenders may be, ab-initio, compensated for their loss or sacrifice (diminution in fair value of account in net present value terms) by way of issuance of equities of the company upfront, subject to the extant regulations and statutory requirements. (9) If the lenders' sacrifice is not fully compensated by way of issuance of equities, the right of recompense clause may be incorporated to the extent of shortfall. (10) In order to distinguish the differential security interest available to secured lenders, partially secured lenders and unsecured lenders, the Committee may consider various options, such as: (a) prior agreement in the Inter-Creditor Agreement among the above classes of lenders regarding repayments; (b) a structured agreement stipulating priority of secured creditors; (c) appropriation of repayment proceeds among secured, partially secured and unsecured lenders in certain pre-agreed proportion. (11) The Committee shall, on request by the enterprise or any creditor recognised under paragraph 4.3, provide information relating to the proceeding as requested by the enterprise or such creditor. 10.4 Prudential Norms on Asset Classification and Provisioning The extant asset classification and provisioning norms will be applicable for restructuring of accounts under this Framework. 11. Review (1) In case the Committee decides that recovery action is to be initiated against an enterprise, such enterprise may request for a review of the decision by the Committee within a period of ten working days from the date of receipt of the decision of the Committee. (2) The request for review shall be on the following grounds: (a) a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (b) discovery of new and relevant fact or information which could not be produced before the Committee earlier despite the exercise of due diligence by the enterprise. (3) A review application shall be decided by the Committee within a period of thirty days from the date of filing and if as a consequence of such review, the Committee decides to pursue a fresh corrective action plan, it may do so. ..................... 22. Argument raised on behalf of the petitioners was that once steps taken by the Bank/Financial Institution for classifying a loan account NPA, are illegal, writ petition should be entertained at that very stage itself. ..................... 22. Argument raised on behalf of the petitioners was that once steps taken by the Bank/Financial Institution for classifying a loan account NPA, are illegal, writ petition should be entertained at that very stage itself. It is to be reiterated that in the present writ petitions barring the minuscule few, petitioners have not approached at the initial stage. Majority of petitioners have approached this Court even subsequent to proceedings under Section 13(4) of SARARESI Act. It had been brought out before us that in a number of cases, objections were also not filed by petitioners after issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act and even where objections were filed, ground regarding violation of Circular dated 17.03.2016 was not raised in majority of matters. Be that as it may, in our considered opinion, incorrect classification of loan account as NPA on the ground of case of MSME not being sent/considered for restructuring/revival by Designated Committee in terms of Circular dated 17.03.2016 or alleged incorrect rejection of its case for restructuring/revival cannot be subject to judicial scrutiny by the High Court at this stage. 23. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India (Supra), wherein the vires and validity of SARFAESI Act was under challenge. Dealing with the contention of parties being rendered remediless was negated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court while holding as under:- "50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debt Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr. Salve one of the counsel for respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. Salve one of the counsel for respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debt Recovery Tribunal or appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken "or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act". That is to say the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. xx xx xx xx xx 81. In view of the discussion held in the judgment and the findings and directions contained in the preceding paragraphs, we hold that the borrowers would get a reasonably fair deal and opportunity to get the matter adjudicated upon before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The effect of some of the provisions may be a bit harsh for some of the borrowers but on that ground the impugned provisions of the Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional in view of the fact that the object of the Act is to achieve speedier recovery of the dues declared as NPAs and better availability of capital liquidity and resources to help in growth of economy of the country and welfare of the people in general which would subserve the public interest." 24. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments that interference by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be minimal and actuated only in extra-ordinary and exceptional circumstances in matters involving recovery of public money, taxes, cess, due of Banks and Financial Institutions etc. In the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon and others (Supra), it was held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as:- "17 Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 18. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order. " 25. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in M/s South Indian Bank Limited and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and another (supra) while reiterating its earlier decisions held as under: - "13 We may, however, reiterate the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. xx xx xx xx 14. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the Court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. xx xx xx xx 15. The object and reasons behind the Act 54 of 2002 are very clear as observed by this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 . While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the Court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the Court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including re-possession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression "any person", who could approach the Tribunal. xx xx xx xx 18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal." 26. We have also gone through provisions of MSME Act 2006, however, do not find any ground whatsoever which calls for interference by us in the present writ petitions. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Girnar Corrugators Private Limited, Civil Appeal No. 6662 of 2022, d/d 05.01.2023 that MSME Act does not prevail over SARFAESI Act. To the contrary provisions of SARFAESI Act have overriding effect by virtue of Section 35 thereof. Therefore, contention on behalf of petitioners that present writ petitions should be entertained on account of petitioners being MSMEs is devoid of any merit. Even, if it is accepted that all petitioners are MSMEs (an assertion which has been strongly contested in some of the cases), it cannot be held that petitioners are not amenable to provisions of SARFAESI Act or that an exception is to be carved out for MSMEs enabling them to bye-pass specific provisions of SARFAESI Act. Contention on behalf of petitioners that they would be rendered remediless in such a situation, is totally unsubstantiated, in the given factual matrix, hence rejected. 27. Contention on behalf of petitioners that they would be rendered remediless in such a situation, is totally unsubstantiated, in the given factual matrix, hence rejected. 27. We also do not find any merit in the argument raised by learned counsel for petitioners that there is a pure question of law involved in these writ petitions or that an exceptional or extraordinary circumstance is carved out which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at this stage. 28. Relationship between the respondent-Bank/Financial Institutions and petitioners is clearly governed by privity of contract between parties. Whether there has been any violation of contractual stipulation between the parties or of the RBI regulations as has been urged before us, is necessarily a mixed question of fact and law. We do not find any merit in the argument that learned DRT does not have power or jurisdiction at the appropriate time, hence this argument is also repelled. First Division Bench of this High Court in M/s Ranbir Textiles and another v. Reserve Bank of India and others (supra), while observing that assuming the Scheme and Guidelines of RBI to be mandatory and required to be implemented while adjudicating upon Debt Restructuring Scheme dated 12.09.2011 as well as Guidelines dated 01.11.2012 issued by RBI for rehabilitation of Sick Micro and Small Enterprises, held under:- "12. Assuming that the scheme and the guidelines are mandatory and to be implemented by the banks, the only question would be whether the bank concerned has assessed the proposal for reliefs/concessions/restructuring in a reasonable manner and after taking into consideration the relevant facts. If it is found that the decision of the bank has been taken after considering the relevant facts, it is not open to the Court to interfere and to substitute its view or assessment for that of the banks. These are commercial decisions which require the assessment by financial experts taking into consideration a variety of facts and factors relating to financial feasibility, the nature and quality of the unit and the equipment, the staffing pattern and the viability of the projections made. These are commercial decisions best left to the parties equipped to deal with the same. These are commercial decisions which require the assessment by financial experts taking into consideration a variety of facts and factors relating to financial feasibility, the nature and quality of the unit and the equipment, the staffing pattern and the viability of the projections made. These are commercial decisions best left to the parties equipped to deal with the same. The Courts especially while exercising their extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to substitute their judgment on such matters for that of the experts in the field. Even if we were to be so presumptuous as to assume having knowledge of the expertise to assess and judge such matters, it would not be permissible to substitute our decisions with those of the experts in the field and those concerned with the decision making process in this regard." Learned counsel for the petitioners is unable to point out any exceptional or extraordinary circumstance, which calls for interference by this Court. Further argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that with issuance of notice of motion, respondents are estopped from raising the question of maintainability/entertainability of this writ petition or that this Court is precluded from examining the same, is devoid of any merit, hence rejected. Merely due to issuance of notice of motion in writ petition without there being any specific adjudication on the issue, it cannot be presumed that hurdles of entertainability/ maintainability has been finally crossed by the litigant." 29. Division Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh while considering a similar controversy as the one at hand in case of Neelkanth Yarn v. Punjab National Bank (supra) held that judicial scrutiny of declaration of account of the petitioners therein as NPA (petitioners therein also claimed to be MSME) was not called for and it is open to learned DRT to go into all these aspects at the relevant time. In case of Neelkanth Yarn v. Punjab National Bank (supra), it was held as under:- "27. From the statutory scheme and decisions noted here-in- above, it is clear that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot go into the decision of respondent-bank in classifying the petitioner's account as NPA. If the respondent-bank proceeds further and reaches Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act stage, the petitioner-firm can file application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. From the statutory scheme and decisions noted here-in- above, it is clear that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot go into the decision of respondent-bank in classifying the petitioner's account as NPA. If the respondent-bank proceeds further and reaches Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act stage, the petitioner-firm can file application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT can go into the aspect of classifying the account as NPA and also whether RBI guidelines have been violated on any aspect leading to declaring the account as NPA and taking recourse under the SARFAESI Act. 28. It has also been repatedly held that the aspect of classifying an account as NPA is not justiciable in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution." 30. We are in agreement with the above view taken by High Court of Himachal Pradesh in abovesaid case. It is well within jurisdiction of learned DRT to adjudicate upon matters relating to validity or otherwise of proceedings undertaken by Banks/Financial Institutions under SARFAESI Act and examine whether necessary parameters have been observed and adhered to and applicable Rules and Regulations, including RBI circulars have been complied with. Any intervention by Courts at this stage would be against the avowed letter and spirit of SARFAESI Act. Issue as raked up in these writ petitions is necessarily within the realm of consideration by learned DRT, at the appropriate juncture. There cannot be a pre-emptory intervention. It was strenuously argued before us that non-intervention by this Court would lead to extremely harsh consequences for petitioners. However, the same cannot be a ground for interference as there is no escape from the provisions of law even if, harsh - 'Dura lex, sed lex' i.e. the law is harsh but it is the law. 31. It is a settled position that provisions of SARFAESI Act prevail over MSME Act with SARFAESI Act being a complete code in itself. There is no scope for interference in the present matters at this stage. It is open to petitioners to avail the remedy(ies) available to them under the statute in accordance with law and agitate all grievances before learned DRT including the question of incorrect classification or otherwise of their accounts NPA. DRT is well within its jurisdiction to consider this aspect. 32. It is open to petitioners to avail the remedy(ies) available to them under the statute in accordance with law and agitate all grievances before learned DRT including the question of incorrect classification or otherwise of their accounts NPA. DRT is well within its jurisdiction to consider this aspect. 32. It is further to be noted that relief claimed in CWP No. 7478 of 2022 and 9879 of 2023 is qua a Private Non Banking Financial Institutions. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Phoenix ARC Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharti Vidya Mandir and others, 2022 (1) RCR (Civil) 888, as under:- "Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution - ARC - appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in the cases of Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 and Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers." Therefore, the said writ petitions are also not entertainable on this account as well. 33. 33. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances as above, it is held that present writ petitions challenging proceedings initiated against them, under SARFAESI Act, alleged incorrect declaration of their accounts NPA on the ground of violation of circular dated 17.03.2016 issued by RBI, alleged incorrect rejection of petitioners' case for restructuring/revival in terms of said circular are not entertainable. Petitioners are at liberty to avail the remedy(ies) available to them in accordance with law alongwith requisite applications for exclusion of period of delay and for interim relief as may be, which would be considered in accordance with law by learned DRT without being influenced by any interim order(s) passed in present writ petitions. Needless to say parties are always at liberty to arrive at any mutually acceptable settlement as well. It is clarified that there is no expression of opinion on merits of the matter which the parties are at liberty to agitate before Appropriate Forum/Tribunal in accordance with law. 34. Keeping in view the fact that interim orders were granted in some of the writ petitions at the time of issuance of notice of motion or at a slightly later stage and said interim orders have continued since then, it is directed that said interim orders as granted in such respective petitions would continue for a period of twenty (20) working days from date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Continuation or otherwise of the interim order thereafter, shall be within the realm of consideration and adjudication by learned DRT in accordance with law. It is clarified that interim order shall not enure after the period of aforesaid 20 days in the absence of a specific order by learned DRT. 35. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances as above, all the writ petitions are dismissed with liberty as aforementioned. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. 36. Photocopy of this order be placed on the files of cases, details whereof are tabulated in the schedule attached at the foot of this order.