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2023 DIGILAW 345 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Jagdihsbhai Dhirajlal Jogi

2023-02-20

HEMANT M.PRACHCHHAK, VIPUL M.PANCHOLI

body2023
JUDGMENT : VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’ for short) challenging the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.03.1997 rendered by the Additional City Sessions Judge, Court No.5, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No.431 of 1995, whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent - accused for the offences under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short). 2. The brief case of the prosecution is as under, 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that the respondent - accused himself disclosed the fact that he has killed his wife and her dead body is lying in Avkar Guest House, Nr. ST Bus Stand and, therefore on the basis of the said information given by the respondent - accused, FIR came to be registered. 2.2 On registration of the aforesaid FIR, the Investigating Officer carried out investigation and on conclusion of it, the chargesheet came to be filed against the respondent - accused before the concerned Magistrate Court. 2.5 As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the concerned Magistrate committed the case under Section 209 of the Code to the concerned Sessions Court, where it has been registered as Sessions Case No.431/1995. 2.6 During the course of the trial, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses and also produced documentary evidence. 2.5 After the prosecution evidence was over, further statement of the accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code and thereafter the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment and order whereby the respondent – accused was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the State has preferred present appeal. 3. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. S.V. Borisa for the respondent – accused. 4. Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri has at the outset referred to the deposition given by PW No.1, Dr. Vinayakrao Vasudevrao Patel, Exh.11, who had performed the postmortem of the deceased as well as postmortem note and contended that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt before the trial court that the death of the deceased was homicidal death. 5. 4. Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri has at the outset referred to the deposition given by PW No.1, Dr. Vinayakrao Vasudevrao Patel, Exh.11, who had performed the postmortem of the deceased as well as postmortem note and contended that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt before the trial court that the death of the deceased was homicidal death. 5. Learned APP, thereafter, referred to the deposition given by PW No.5, Vidyaben Manharlal, Exh.37 and submitted that the said witness was the neighbour of the maternal uncle of the deceased and the said witness has lastly seen the respondent - accused in company of the deceased when both of them came to the house of maternal uncle of the deceased, however as the maternal uncle of the deceased was not available, both of them have left the place. Thus, it is submitted that the prosecution has established before the trial court that the deceased was lastly found in company of the respondent - accused. 6. At this stage, learned APP has referred to the deposition given by PW No.2, Laxman Bhurabhai Vaghela (Manager of the Avkar Guest House), Exh.13, PW No.3, Rajesh Keshavlal Vaghela (Waiter of Avkar Guest House), Exh.34 and PW No.4, Dhanjibhai Mulabhai Vaghela (Waiter of the Guest House), Exh.35. It is submitted that the Manager of the Guest House has deposed before the Court that in the register of the guest house, entry was made in the name of the respondent - accused and initially Room No.29 was allotted, thereafter, they were shifted to Room No.8 and the dead body of the deceased was found from Room No.8. However, learned APP has fairly submitted that thereafter, the Manager and Waiters have not supported the case of the prosecution and PW Nos.3 and 4 were declared hostile. Learned APP, thereafter, referred to the deposition given by PW No.10, Ravindrakumar Patel (IO), Exh.47, who has carried out the investigation and filed chargesheet against the respondent - accused. Learned APP submits that though it is a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has proved the case against the respondent - accused beyond reasonable doubt, inspite of that, the learned trial court has passed impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondent - accused and thereby committed an error. Learned APP, therefore, urged that the impugned judgment and order be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned APP, therefore, urged that the impugned judgment and order be quashed and set aside. 7. At this stage, learned APP also submitted that the prosecution has also proved motive on the part of the respondent - accused to commit alleged crime as the respondent - accused was required to pay Rs.50,000/- by way of maintenance to the deceased and the disputes started because of that during night hours in Avkar Guest House and, therefore, the respondent - accused committed the aforesaid offence and, thereafter, he himself had informed the concerned Police Officer about the incident in question and, therefore on the basis of the information given by the respondent - accused, FIR came to be registered and the respondent - accused was arrested. Learned APP, therefore, urged that this appeal be allowed. 8. On the other hand, learned advocate, Mr. Borisa for the respondent - accused has opposed this appeal. Learned advocate referred to the reasoning recorded by the trial court and, thereafter, submitted that the trial court has discussed in detail about the case of the prosecution and also discussed the deposition given by the prosecution witnesses, thereafter, the trial court has rightly recorded the acquittal of the respondent - accused. 9. Learned advocate mainly contended that the present case is based on circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the incident in question. It is submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the respondent - accused was lastly in company of the deceased. It is submitted that all three employees working in Avkar Guest House have not identified the respondent - accused and they have not supported the case of the prosecution and even TI parade was also not conducted by the Investigating Officer. Learned advocate further submits that so-called FIR given by the accused is not even exhibited as it was a confession made by the respondent - accused before the Police Officer and, therefore, it was hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Learned advocate would thereafter submit that from the deposition given by the prosecution witnesses, it is revealed that the respondent - accused had shown willingness to deposit Rs.50,000/- in the name of the deceased as well as their children and, therefore, there was no question of committing alleged offences by the respondent - accused. Learned advocate would thereafter submit that from the deposition given by the prosecution witnesses, it is revealed that the respondent - accused had shown willingness to deposit Rs.50,000/- in the name of the deceased as well as their children and, therefore, there was no question of committing alleged offences by the respondent - accused. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove motive on the part of the respondent to commit alleged offence. It is also contended that in case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important role. 10. Learned advocate for the respondent further submits that the Investigating Officer has specifically admitted in the cross-examination that he did not take specimen signature of the accused and the register of the guest house was also not seized nor same was sent for opinion of the handwriting expert and, therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that the respondent - accused stayed at Avkar Guest House with the deceased. 11. It is also pointed out from the record that Room No.28 of Avkar Guest House was booked in the name of Jagdishbhai and Jagrutiben as per the case of the prosecution, however, the same was booked by one Ghanshyam D. Nagrecha at 04:00 p.m. on 11.10.1995 and Room No.8, wherein the incident in question had taken place, was already occupied by another person viz., Bharatsinh Patil and Chandresh Patel at about 01:00 p.m. on 11.10.1995. Thus, the IO has not carried out investigation that on the day of alleged incident i.e. on 11.10.1995, Room No.8 was vacant or not. Learned advocate for the respondent, therefore, urged that no error is committed by the trial court while passing impugned judgment and order of acquittal in favour of the respondent - accused. Learned advocate further submits that even otherwise, on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution before the trial court, if two views are possible and one is adopted by the trial court, ordinary same would not be interfered with while examining the case of the appellant in an appeal filed under Section 378 of the Code. 12. Learned advocate for the respondent has placed reliance upon following decision, (1) judgment in case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 ; (2) judgment in case of State of Gujarat Vs. 12. Learned advocate for the respondent has placed reliance upon following decision, (1) judgment in case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 ; (2) judgment in case of State of Gujarat Vs. Kantilal Ghelabhai Patel, reported in 1999 (1) GCD 812 ; (3) judgment in case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 ; (4) judgment in case of State of Gujarat Vs. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 735 ; 13. Learned advocate for the respondent, therefore, urged that this appeal be dismissed. 14. We have considered the submissions canvassed by learned advocates for the parties. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court. We have also considered the decisions upon which reliance is placed by learned advocates. 15. From the evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial court, it would emerge that it is the case of the prosecution that the respondent - accused himself gave information to the Officer Incharge of the Police Station that he has committed murder of his wife and the dead body was lying in Room No.8 of Avkar Guest House and on the basis of the said information given by the accused, the Investigating Officer has recorded the FIR and, thereafter, arrested the respondent - accused and visited the place of incident. It is further revealed that the prosecution has examined PW No.1, Dr. Vinayakrao V. Patil, Exh.11, who had performed the postmortem of the deceased, Pushpaben. From the deposition given by the said witness and the postmortem report of the deceased, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has proved the case as homicidal death of the deceased and the respondent - accused has not disputed the said fact. 16. However the question before the trial court was as to whether the respondent - accused had committed murder of his wife or not. With a view to prove that the respondent - accused has killed his wife, the prosecution has examined PW No.2, Laxman Bhurabhai Vaghela (Manager of the Avkar Guest House), Exh.13, PW No.3, Rajesh Keshavlal vaghela (Waiter of Avkar Guest House), Exh.34 and PW No.4, Dhanjibhai Mulabhai Vaghela (Waiter of the Guest House), Exh.35. With a view to prove that the respondent - accused has killed his wife, the prosecution has examined PW No.2, Laxman Bhurabhai Vaghela (Manager of the Avkar Guest House), Exh.13, PW No.3, Rajesh Keshavlal vaghela (Waiter of Avkar Guest House), Exh.34 and PW No.4, Dhanjibhai Mulabhai Vaghela (Waiter of the Guest House), Exh.35. We have gone through the depositions given by the aforesaid witnesses, however, PW Nos.3 and 4 did not support the case of the prosecution and, therefore, they were declared hostile. It is further relevant to note that so far as PW No.2, Laxman Bhurabhai Vaghela, Exh.13 is concerned, the said witness did not identify the respondent - accused in the Court. The Investigating Officer has also not conducted TI parade. Thus, when the said witness had not identified the accused, who was sitting in the court, learned APP was permitted to ask leading question to him. From the deposition of the said witness, it is further revealed that so far as entry made in the register at Page No.104 is concerned, Room No.28 was allotted on 11.10.1995 at 04:00 p.m. to one Ghanshyam D. Nagrecha. The said witness has specifically admitted that the said room was not vacant when it was allotted to one Jagdishbhai and Jagrutiben at 05:00 p.m. Similarly, so far as Room No.8 is concerned, the said witness produced the entry register at Page No.140 and it is revealed that Room No.8 was allotted on 11.10.1995 at 01:00 p.m. to Bharatsinh Patil and Chandresh Patel. The said document is produced vide Exh.33. The said witness has also admitted that Room No.8 was not vacant at 05:00 p.m. on 11.10.1995. Thus from the deposition of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution could not establish beyond reasonable doubt before the trial court that the respondent - accused was in company with the deceased, Pushpaben in Avakar Guest House on the date of incident. Further even in the register of Avkar Guest House, with the name of the respondent - accused, the name of one Jagrutiben was written and not Pushpaben. 17. The prosecution has also examined PW No.5, Vidyaben Manharlal, Exh.37. From the deposition of the said witness, the prosecution had tried to prove the theory of last seen together. Further even in the register of Avkar Guest House, with the name of the respondent - accused, the name of one Jagrutiben was written and not Pushpaben. 17. The prosecution has also examined PW No.5, Vidyaben Manharlal, Exh.37. From the deposition of the said witness, the prosecution had tried to prove the theory of last seen together. It is the case of the prosecution that the said witness had lastly seen the respondent - accused in company of the deceased, Pushpaben when both of them have visited the house of maternal uncle of the deceased. The said witness is neighbour of the maternal uncle, Bipinbhai. In the examination-inchief of the said witness, the said witness has stated that at 04:00 p.m., when she was sitting on her otla, Pushpaben (the deceased) and Jagdishbhai (the accused) came on scooter and inquired about the maternal aunt of Pushpaben. However, it is pertinent to note that during the crossexamination of the said witness, she has specifically stated that when the statement was given by her before the Police, she has stated that one person aged about 40 years came with Pushpaben on the date of incident. Thus from the said cross-examination, it is clear that Vidyaben did not give name of the accused to the police and only stated that one person aged about 40 years came with Pushpaben. Even if the case of the prosecution is believed even then, both of them were found in company with each other at 04:00 p.m., whereas the incident had taken place between 02:00 a.m. to 03:00 a.m. during night hours. Thus from the deposition of said witness also, the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent - accused that he was lastly in company of the deceased. It is pertinent to note that the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the scene of offence and the arrest panchnama have also not supported the case of the prosecution and have turned hostile. 18. It is pertinent to note that the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the scene of offence and the arrest panchnama have also not supported the case of the prosecution and have turned hostile. 18. Now so far as the motive on the part of the respondent - accused for commission of alleged offence is concerned, it is the case of the prosecution that the respondent - accused was required to deposit Rs.50,000/- by way of maintenance in the name of the deceased and the deceased was insisting to deposit the said amount, as a result of which, scuffle took place during night hours between the husband and wife and in the said incident, the respondent - accused committed alleged offences. However, it is pertinent to note that from the deposition of PW No.6, Gunvantiben Naginbhai, Exh.38, it is revealed that the said witness has specifically admitted in his cross-examination that Pushpaben had asked Jagdishbhai (accused) to deposit Rs.50,000/- and the accused was ready and willing to deposit the said amount in the name of Pushpaben (deceased) and her children. Thus, when the respondent - accused had shown willingness to deposit entire amount of Rs.50,000/- as demanded by the deceased, there is no question on the part of the respondent - accused to kill the wife. Thus, we are of the view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove motive on the part of the respondent - accused to commit alleged offences. 19. In case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda (supra), this Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph Nos.150, 152 and 162 as under, "150.It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is only this: where various links in a chain are in themselves complete than a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a Court. 152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (') where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 162. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. 162. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, this Court made the following observations: "Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence." 20. In case of Kantilal Ghelabhai Patel (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has observed in Paragraph No.41 as under, "14. In view of the above discussion, the woman who entered Sunil Guest House in the evening of 13th September, 1995 as entered in the register of that Guest House was Manjulaben daughter of Hira Puja, PW. 5 and wife of the accused. The question in person with whom she entered to Guest House was the accused or someone else. Manjulaben entered the Guest House with a person who has given his name as Ramesh Veljibhai of Mota Ankadia, Taluka Kukavav, District Amreli coming from Surat and going to Mota Ankadia, Whether the person named Ramesh in whose Company Manjulaben has stayed in the Guest House was really Ramesh, some third person other than her husband or was the accused himself with the fictitious name of Ramesh. In the morning of 14th September, 1995 when the fact of a dead body of a woman lying in room No. 18 of that Guest House came to be disclosed and the information was given to the police there was bound to be sufficient evidence in form of circumstances, articles, finger prints etc. Which could have been collected and identified and led to the identity of person who had stayed in that Guest House with Manjulaben in room No. 18, but unfortunately investigation has not proceeded in that line or collected such evidence. Which could have been collected and identified and led to the identity of person who had stayed in that Guest House with Manjulaben in room No. 18, but unfortunately investigation has not proceeded in that line or collected such evidence. What such evidence could be and how could it be utilized will be discussed here in the later part of the judgment. 15. According to the prosecution, the person who checked in the Guest House with Manjulaben was the accused and to prove the same prosecution has examined PW. 2 and PW. 3 who have identified the accused in the Court room and their evidence is supported by the evidence of identification parade where also they have identified the accused. The question, therefore, is whether the evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 as to identity of the accused established by them is convincing and reliable. If yes, then identity of the accused as the person who checked in the Guest House, be it with the name Rameshchandra is established. As stated earlier, any circumstance on which the prosecution wants to rely must be fully established, meaning thereby, it must be conclusively established without any doubt. It will, therefore, be necessary to read evidence of PWs. 2 and 3. Chisandas PW. 2 is running a Guest House since about 4 years and there are as many as 38 rooms out of which, except 7, the rest are with attached bathroom. He was on the counter in the evening of 13th September, 1995 at about 6.05. A passenger came and demanded room No. 18. After making necessary entry in the register that room was allotted to them. That entry in the register is at Exh. 14. As admitted by him in cross examination, about 25 to 35 persons used to come to his guest house everyday. He had no occasion to see that person who checked-in in the Guest House with the name of Rameshandra again. According to him on 13th September, 1995 about 35 to 36 persons had come in the Guest House. He admits that he had never seen that person Ramesh prior to that date. He does not remember the face of all the 34 persons who came to his Guest House. According to him on 13th September, 1995 about 35 to 36 persons had come in the Guest House. He admits that he had never seen that person Ramesh prior to that date. He does not remember the face of all the 34 persons who came to his Guest House. He has admitted that in his complaint he has not referred to any description as to either person or clothes of that person who checked in as Ramesh. Chisandas PW, 2 has not given any description either as to height, colour, body of that Ramesh who checked in his Guest House in his complaint. He has simply seen this person at the time when he came to his house in the evening of 13th September, 1995 and asked for room No. 18 and he made entry in his register. In our opinion, hardly for few minutes the person would have stood near the counter in the Guest house where Chisandas would be busy for half or more of the time in making entry in his register. Thus, without any special description or a reason or an incident when a person is saying that he can identify a person who is seen only once and for few minutes cannot be accepted. So also is the case with PW. 3. According to PW. 3 when he was cleaning the Guest House in the morning of 14th September, 1995 after about 7.30 a person came downstairs and he inquired from which number he comes and that man replied No. 18 and told him that he is going out for some work. Thereafter at about quarter to 10 when he opened room No. 18 with an intention to clean tried same, he found a woman lying dead in the bathroom. So he had an occasion to see that person who replied that he comes from room No. 18 to whom he had casually asked and when he is not giving any description of that person in his statement before the police, it will be highly hazardous to accept his evidence to identify a person who he has seen casually and hardly for a few seconds. Both of these witness i.e. PWs. 2 and 3 have identified this accused in the Court room but PW. Both of these witness i.e. PWs. 2 and 3 have identified this accused in the Court room but PW. 2 had admitted in his cross examination that the accused is sitting separately in the accused dock and he has seen him coming to the Court under police custody. If a person has seen a person coming in custody of police when particularly he is a lone person in custody and secondly when the trial is going there is a lone person sitting in the accused dock and if such person is identified as an accused of the case and the same evidence is to be used as a substantive piece of evidence, in absence of any other convincing evidence as to identity, we are of the view that evidence being substantive ones by itself docs not become untainted and acceptable and is not required to be accepted on its face value." 21. Thus from the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that in case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to complete various links in chain and there must be a chain of evidence so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, 22. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions, if the facts of the present case and the evidence produced by the prosecution are carefully examined, it is revealed that in the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove motive on the part of the respondent - accused to commit alleged crime and it is well settled that the motive plays important role in a case of circumstantial evidence. Further, the prosecution has also failed to prove the theory of last seen together. 23. Thus on the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial court has discussed in detail that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent - accused beyond reasonable doubt and, thereafter, recorded acquittal in favour of the respondent - accused. 24. Further, the prosecution has also failed to prove the theory of last seen together. 23. Thus on the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial court has discussed in detail that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent - accused beyond reasonable doubt and, thereafter, recorded acquittal in favour of the respondent - accused. 24. At this stage, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Chandrappa (supra) as well as decision in case of Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave (supra) are required to be referred to. 25. In a judgment in case of Chandrappa (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph No.42 as under, "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 26. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 26. In a judgment in case of Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph No.6.2 as under, "6.2 An Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal passed by the Learned trial Court, is required to bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Therefore, while dealing with the cases of acquittal by the trial Court, the Appellate Court would have certain limitations. Even in the case of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court, in the case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai vs. The State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 , it is observed and held by this Court that “Once the appeal is entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would be justified against an acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court even on re-appreciation of the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly erroneous”. However, so far as the appeal against the order of conviction is concerned, there are no such restrictions and the Court of appeal has wide powers of appreciation of evidence and the High Court has to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record being a First Appellate Court. Keeping in mind that once the Learned Trial Court has convicted there shall not be presumption of innocence as would be there in the case of acquittal." 27. Keeping in mind that once the Learned Trial Court has convicted there shall not be presumption of innocence as would be there in the case of acquittal." 27. Thus from the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that while exercising the powers under Section 378 read with Section 384 of the Code, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding recorded by the trial court. 28. Keeping in view the aforesaid two decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, are examined, we are of the view that the view taken by the trial court is also plausible and once the trial court has passed judgment and order of acquittal, we are not inclined to take different view on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. 29. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP for the applicant has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 30. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP for the applicant has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 30. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 31. We have independently re-appreciated the evidence produced by the prosecution before the learned Trial Court and also examined the reasoning recorded by the learned Trial Court while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and we are of the view that if in light of the above circumstances, the learned Trial Court felt that the accused could get the benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of appellate Court are as wide as that of the Trial Court and it can review, re-appreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the facts and circumstances of the present case as discussed hereinabove, the view taken by the learned Trial Court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. Therefore, on the basis of evidence, even if it is to be assumed that the other view is equally possible, even then it is well settled and well-established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the learned Trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the Appellate Court. 32. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is dismissed. Record & Proceedings are ordered to be sent back forthwith.