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2023 DIGILAW 349 (UTT)

Amit Kishore v. State of Uttarakhand

2023-06-06

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. After an extensive arguments, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the applicants in support of the C-482 Application, which arises out of the Criminal Complaint Case No. 3489 of 2016, Pankaj Vaish Vs. Amit Kishore and others, where the applicants have been summoned to be tried by an order dated 06.07.2018, to be tried for the offence under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC, by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar. 2. The judgment was reserved yesterday and consequently, the matter has been placed today for delivery of the judgment. 3. The factual backdrop of the case are, that the claim of the applicant No.1 in the present C482 Application, as pleaded was that the applicant No.1 is a Director of the company called as “M/s Marc Laboratories Ltd., Lucknow, and so is the status of the applicant No.2, who has the connectivity with the functioning of the firm in the capacity of being a Senior Vice President of the Company, whereas, the status of the applicant Nos.2 and 3, is that of the Managing Directors also. 4. The respondent No.2 claims himself to be the proprietor of a firm called as “Vaish Agencies”, situated at Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar. As amongst the applicants and respondent No.2, there was an agreement executed between them which was governing the terms and conditions which were settled as on 4th February, 2013, whereby, the respondent No.2 was said to be appointed as a consignee / sale agent of the firm of the applicants on the basis of the commission to be paid @ 3.5 percent. 5. It is contended that the applicants took three cheques unsigned and undated from the respondent No.2, as a security for the purposes of establishment of the aforesaid agreement for agency as it was executed on 4th February, 2013. 6. 5. It is contended that the applicants took three cheques unsigned and undated from the respondent No.2, as a security for the purposes of establishment of the aforesaid agreement for agency as it was executed on 4th February, 2013. 6. It is contended by the respondent No.2, that he was entitled for commission, as according to the aforesaid settled rate of 3.5 percent for every transaction, which has been dealt with by respondent No.2, and according to him, he contended, that owing to the business transaction, which was carried by him on behalf of the company of the applicants, of which, they there the office bearer, a commission of Rs.35,000/- p.m., which he was entitled to receive, which has ultimately amounted to Rs.5,93,795/- as on the date of the registration of the complaint was not remitted despite request. 7. The respondent No.2 contended, that when despite of the several notices being issued by respondent No.2, to the applicants, raising a demand with regard to the payment of commission, which he claimed to be entitled to be paid in terms of the agreement dated 4th February, 2013, when it was not paid, a legal notice was sent by respondent No.2, to the applicant claiming the commission by sending the same by a registered post on 1st February, 2016. 8. The complainant / respondent No.2, contended that upon the receipt of the notice on 1st February, 2016, the first reaction, which he has received from the present applicants was, that the applicant No.1 abused him on a telephone and threatened him of dire consequences by asserting thereof, that he would be visiting Kashipur and would be teaching a lesson to him for raising a demand by issuance of a notice on 1st February, 2016. 9. It is not only that, after exertion of the said threat through telephone, an actual action too followed on 17th June, 2016, when at about 10:30 a.m., it was alleged that the applicants together with others physically started abusing the respondent No.2, and there started a scuffle between them, it was alleged that applicant Nos. 9. It is not only that, after exertion of the said threat through telephone, an actual action too followed on 17th June, 2016, when at about 10:30 a.m., it was alleged that the applicants together with others physically started abusing the respondent No.2, and there started a scuffle between them, it was alleged that applicant Nos. 2 and 3 had tried to snatch the cash box of respondent No.2 and thereafter, when the respondent No.2 has raised hue and cry, two persons, namely as Satyam Agarwal and Ajay Agarwal, came to the scene, who would be treated as to be the witnesses of the incident, which has chanced on 17th June, 2016. 10. The complainant in his complaint as submitted before the Court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar, on 24th September, 2016, has contended that the applicants despite of all the altercations, which had taken place on account of scuffle, which took place on 17th June, 2016, the applicants still managed to snatch about Rs.2,000/- from respondent No.2, and threatened him of dire consequences, if he ever made any attempt to raise the monetary demand as claimed by him in the notice issued on 1st February, 2016. 11. The complainant, in his complaint of 24th September, 2016, has asserted that respondent No.2, as a consequence of the scuffle, which took place on 17th June, 2016, is said to have suffered some injuries, due to which, he was taken to Govt. Hospital, and had been provided with the medial aid. 12. Consequently, the complainant pleaded, that he had sent a letter to the Police Station giving the narration of the incident, which has chanced on 17th June, 2016. But since, the FIR was not registered on 17th October, 2016, the Court directed the SHO, Kashipur, to investigate into the matter. The SHO consequently, conducted the inspection and submitted his report on 17th June, 2018, after recording the statement of respondent No.2, complainant under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., and the statements of Satyam Agarwal and Ajay Agarwal, who were the eyewitnesses of the incident, while exercising his power under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 13. The SHO consequently, conducted the inspection and submitted his report on 17th June, 2018, after recording the statement of respondent No.2, complainant under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., and the statements of Satyam Agarwal and Ajay Agarwal, who were the eyewitnesses of the incident, while exercising his power under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 13. The Court, upon being satisfied with the report which was submitted by the SHO Kashipur on 17th June, 2018, had issued the impugned summoning order of 6th July, 2018, whereby, the present applicants have been summoned to be tried by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, for the offence under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC. 14. The learned counsel for the applicants had argued the C-482 Application from the view point that :- i. As to whether, the allegation levelled in the complaint as pleaded in para 6, to be read in conjunction to the pleadings raised in para 7, whether at all, the offence, which has been complained, would be a “provocation” to summon the present applicants for being tried for the offences, for which, the summoning order has been issued 15. In order to answer the argument thus extended by the learned counsel for the applicants, a reference may be made to the provisions contained under Section 323 of the IPC, which is extracted hereunder :- “323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” 16. The basic element to be required to be satisfied for the commission of offence under Section 323 of IPC, it shows that there has had to be a “voluntary act”, with knowledge of consequences, which would be an act as covered under Section 324 of the IPC of causing hurt, and a consequential penal action has been provided under law to be under Section 323 of IPC. 17. So far as the use of language under Section 323 of IPC is concerned, it uses the word “voluntarily causing hurt”. 17. So far as the use of language under Section 323 of IPC is concerned, it uses the word “voluntarily causing hurt”. The act of voluntary assault, in the instant case, at the hands of the present applicants stood satisfied prima facie on the perusal of the contents of the complaint itself, particularly, in the light of the pleadings, which have been raised in para 7 of the complaint, wherein, it was specifically stated, that the applicants have visited the place of business of the complainant, and have then assaulted him, and thereafter, and also they have looted Rs.2,000/- from the cash box of the complainant. 18. It’s not only that, the incident of 7th June, 2016, as narrated therein, was eye-witnessed by the two witnesses, who were also examined by the Police Authority, as they conducted the investigation in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 19. The intention of the provisions contained under Section 323 of IPC of voluntarily causing hurt, in the instant case, could further be substantiated because, if the act narrated in para 7 of the complaint, if it is read in consonance to the contents of para 6, where there was a threat perception extended by the applicants on telephone to the respondents, and it was thereafter even followed by the incident of 7th June, 2016. That itself shows that causing of an act of assault and loot from the cash box, which was eye witnessed by the two witnesses, it shows that there was a clear intent, which was already pre-conceived by the present applicants for the commission of the offence dated 17th June, 2018. 20. The aforesaid act, about the intention of the present applicants to commit an offence falling within an ambit of Section 323 of the IPC would also stands fortified by the report submitted by the SHO, as well as the statements of the witnesses. 20. The aforesaid act, about the intention of the present applicants to commit an offence falling within an ambit of Section 323 of the IPC would also stands fortified by the report submitted by the SHO, as well as the statements of the witnesses. The statement of the witnesses, and the report of the SHO dated 17th June, 2018, would in itself be a compliance of the provisions contained under Section 202 (1) of the Cr.P.C. for summoning of an accused person, who are the resident of outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, which is ceased with the complaint proceedings, as the modes of conducting the inspection as provided under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., there are various modes, which are inclusive of the modes of conducting the inspection through the use of police machinery to conduct the inspection. For convenience, Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder :- “202. Postponement of issue of process. - (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made - (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer-in-charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.” 21. Hence, it cannot be said, that once the cognizance has been taken by an order dated 6th July, 2018, based upon the statement of the eyewitnesses, and the report of the SHO dated 17th June, 2018, the provisions contained under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. was not complied with by the learned Court of Judicial Magistrate Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar. 22. The learned counsel for the applicants had further argued, rather stressed upon, as to whether at all the cognizance could be taken with regard to the offence under Section 504 of the IPC, for which also he has been summoned. 23. In order to answer, the elaborated argument extended by the learned counsel for the applicants, the provisions contained under Section 504 of IPC is extracted hereunder :- “504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 24. Particularly, the learned counsel for the applicants has stressed upon the use of word by the legislature, i.e. “a provocation to any person”. What he intended to argue is that the provocation as pleaded in para 6 of the complaint will not fall to be within the ambit of “provocation”, as provided under Section 504 of the IPC, because according to his perception, the “provocation”, could have been only when there happens to be a direct heated interaction between the accused or the victim to bring the offence within an ambit of Section 504 of IPC. 25. 25. This tenacity of argument of the learned counsel for the applicants is not acceptable by this Court, for the reason being, that Section 504 of IPC in itself does not carve out an exception, that the provocation as contemplated therein, has had to be only by way of direct interaction and not by way of a threat, which was extended by the applicants on phone call, which has been referred to in complaint, wherein, the applicants have threatened to the effect, that they would be rather visiting Kashipur and would be teaching a lesson to the complainant, due to the demand raised by him of his commission, which was due to be paid by the present applicants as per the admitted terms of agreement of agency. 26. This Court is of the view that when as per the simple assertions made in the complaint and its interpretation as given in para 6, are taken into consideration, few facts are apparent :- i. that the applicants have abused the complainant. ii. that applicants have threatened the complainant because of the demand of money made by him through notice. iii. He submits that owing to the demand raised by the applicant through notice on 1st February, 2016, he would be coming to Kashipur and teaching him a lesson. 27. To answer this, as to whether the “provocation” as referred to in para 6, would be an actual provocation within the ambit of Section 504 of IPC itself or not, the bare facts of the complaint itself would be an answer to it, because in continuation to a provocation extended by the notice of 1st February, 2015, on the telephone call by abusing the complainant and by creating a threat due to demand raised by the complainant, and by the use of words that he would be teaching a lesson by visiting Kashipur, that itself would be a provocation because not even that it was subsequently followed by an action of 17th June, 2016, which was witnessed by the two witnesses, who were examined and not even that owing to the scuffle, which has taken place between the applicant and the complainant, the complainant was also medically treated and a report was submitted thereto in that regard. 28. 28. Before venturing to answer the third question, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicants, pertaining to that the summoning order is non reasoned, this Court feels that it is apt at this stage itself to deal as to what the terms “provocation” in its literal meaning would mean, as it has been attempted to be interpreted by the learned counsel for the applicants. 29. In accordance with the Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, the provocation has been defined as under :- “provocation. n. Something (such as words or actions) that arouses anger or animosity in another, causing that person to respond in the heat of passion. “Adequate” provocation can reduce a murder charge to voluntary man-slaughter. – provoke, vb. – provocative, adj. See MANSLAUGHTER.” 30. In its literal definition, it provides that something which is exerted by way of a threat or by use of word or action that arouses anger or animosity causing, that person thus provoked to respond in the heat of passion, which would amount to be provocation. The elements of anger, animosity and responding to the heat of passion are the elements which are prima facie deciphered in para 6 of the complaint itself. 31. This Court is of the opinion, that for the purposes of one of the elements as provided under the term “provocation” responding to it, as a result of a heat of passion, would be found to be evident from the assault made and as referred to in the complaint, that was an action followed due to a threat extended by the applicants, which would be falling well within the definition of provocation as provided in the Black’s Law Dictionary. 32. The Government of India, through its Ministry of Law and Justice in its Legal Glossary, has yet again dealt with the definition of provocation, which is extracted hereunder:- “provocation : the action or an act or exciting anger, resentment or irritation.” This would be in a slight elaboration and in extension to the definition, which has been given in Black’s Law Dictionary, which has been extracted above. The distinction, which has been drawn by the Legal Glossary is, that in between the action contemplated for making an offence as to be an act of provocation, it uses a word, by use of word or as a distinction for an action or an act or exciting anger, resentment or irritation. All these elements as provided in the definition in the Legal Glossary are available in the instant case as per the complaint on its prima facie reading, because the anger and resentment resulting to provocation have been specifically followed by an action or an act on the part of the present applicants to make an offence under Section 323 of the IPC. 33. Much deliberation has been made by the learned counsel for the applicants, as to whether the summoning order, which is impugned in the present C-482 Application, whether it has been passed with an application of mind or not. 34. The learned counsel for the applicants, in order to substantiate his argument, has referred to a catena of judgments as to what would be the basic element, which is required to be satisfied as to whether, the summoning order issued by the Court happens to be with an application of mind or not. 35. The learned counsel for the applicants, in support of his contention, has referred to a judgment as reported in AIR 1960 SC 86, R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, and particularly, the dichotomy which he has attempted to draw is from the parameters prescribed in para 6 of the said judgment. In fact, the said para 6 lays down that the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction can and should categorized the cases, as to whether at all the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked, and may also arise in those cases, which are falling under the categories, where either no legal evidence has been adduced by the complainant in support of the case or the evidence thus considered whether the Court thus summoning the accused person has diligently exercised its powers by appreciation of evidence. Para 6 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code. Para 6 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under s. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide : In Re : Shripad G. Chandavarkar A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 184, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress I.L.R. (1899) Cal. 786, Dr. Shanker Singh v. The State of Punjab (1954) 56 Pun L.R. 54, Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobind Bandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar I.L.R. (1924) Mad. 722” 36. This Court is of the view, that the law always happens to be a process of evaluation, and aged old principle is required to be changed with the change of social condition and values, in order to meet the changed circumstances, and the gradual increasing demand of the society. The old principles of scrutinization of evidence at the stage of summoning of an accused person, doesn’t mean that the Court exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is required to elaborately scrutinize the evidence in order to necessitate the summoning of an accused person, to bring it within the philosophy of it being passed after application of mind. 37. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down as to what would be the ambit of exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in its third category, which has been heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants, which provides that the High Courts while exercising the inherent powers, can venture into the summoning order, where the Court, while issuing the summoning order, has not at all appreciated the evidence as adduced by the parties, and has failed to prove the charge, or where the Court has failed to record its rationale for summoning of an accused person. 38. 38. Another judgment, on which, the learned counsel for the applicants has relied is that as reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 , Inder Mohan Goswami and another Vs. State of Uttaranchal and others, and particularly, he has referred to the contents of paragraphs 22, 28, 29 and 30 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder :- “22. The veracity of the facts alleged by the appellants and the respondents can only be ascertained on the basis of evidence and documents by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The dispute in question is purely of civil nature and respondent No. 3 has already instituted a civil suit in the court of Civil Judge. In the facts and circumstances of this case, initiating criminal proceedings by the respondents against the appellants is clearly an abuse of the process of the court. 28. This Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts. 29. In Chandrapal Singh and Ors. v. Maharaj Singh and Anr., in a landlord and tenant matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated, this Court observed in para 1 at page 467 as under: “A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of civil courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous.” 30. The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous.” 30. The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.” 39. There would be a slight factual distinction, which is required to be drawn in the instant case. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the impact of the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., was dealing with the matter, as to what would be the ambit of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to summon an accused person, and particularly, the guiding factor, on which, the learned counsel for the applicants has relied, as particularly contained in para 23, which provides that the scope and ambit of exercise of powers with the High Court, has had to be an act ex debito justitiae that means it should aim to do real and substantial justice. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., though it is wide enough, but still, it has to be sparingly exercised with utmost care and precaution, so that it may not be voluntarily applied invariably in all the cases, which even doesn’t make out a prima facie case for interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Particularly, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the applicants in the context of the paragraphs as extracted above was attempted to, that at the stage of exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is required to go into the matter in the light of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, as reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which prescribes, that the Courts while considering the aspect as to whether at all the summons are required to be issued or not, the Court should appreciate the evidence and should record the prima facie satisfaction as to whether the accused is required to be summoned or not. 40. Bhajan Lal, as reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which prescribes, that the Courts while considering the aspect as to whether at all the summons are required to be issued or not, the Court should appreciate the evidence and should record the prima facie satisfaction as to whether the accused is required to be summoned or not. 40. As far as these two judgments are concerned, this has to be read in the context of the issue involved in the instant case as against the summoning order dated 6th July, 2018. If the summoning order itself is taken into consideration, at the stage when the Court was ceased with the matter, as to whether the accused person is required to be summoned or not, the only material, which was made available before the Court was the complaint, the report of the SHO, the statement of the witnesses, in order to justify as to whether at all the accused persons were required to be summoned or not. 41. The Court of Judicial Magistrate, did took into consideration the report of the police, the statement of the witnesses, and the impact of the pleadings raised in the complaint pertaining to the altercation, which took place on 17th June, 2016, and has also considered the statements recorded by the witnesses. 42. So far as the reference made to the non compliance of the provisions contained under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, this Court is of the opinion, that the very fact that the provisions contained under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. is exclusively not a weapon which is invariably available to an accused person to take a defence, as to whether at all the inquiry, which is required to be contemplated by the Court was satisfactorily resorted to or not, because as per the opinion of this Court, the powers under Sections 202 of the Cr.P.C. is only an enabling provisions and not a substantive provisions available to an accused person to be taken by way of defence. 43. 43. The provisions of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., contemplates, that the issuance of the process is to be postponed subject to the condition, that it is the responsibility of the Court who has to record its satisfaction, as to whether summons are required to be issued to the accused persons, who are the resident of outside the territory of the Court which was ceased with the proceedings. In the instant case, one of the modes, which has been prescribed therein, has been appropriately established to have been resorted to because the inquiry was contemplated by the SHO, who has submitted the report, and as such, the ingredients under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. was satisfied by the Court prior to the issuance of the summoning order. 44. In para 7 of the impugned judgment, the Court has deliberated referred to the statement recorded by the eyewitnesses to the incident, and then had issued the summons to the present applicants. What bearing the report or the reason assigned in the complaint with regard to the set of allegations would have, would be a subject matter, which is to be appreciated by the Trial Court after appreciation of evidence, during the course of trial. 45. The tenacity of argument of the learned counsel for the applicants, that at the stage of summoning of an accused person, the evidence is required to be considered by the Court is absolutely a misnomer because, in view of the changed law scenario, as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment as reported in AIR 2022 SC 41 , State of Odisha Vs. Pratima Mohanty etc., the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in para 6, that at the stage of summoning of an accused person, a detailed and elaborate scrutiny of evidence is not required to be resorted to by the Court, which may amount to be in a shape of mini trial, which may ultimately prejudice the proceedings of the complaint, which is being taken by the learned Trial Court, and while drawing the said distinction, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Pratima Mohanty (Supra) has considered the implications as drawn by the judgment of Bhajan Lal in para 102, as to what would be the parameter required to be satisfied before summoning of an accused person. The relevant para 6 is extracted hereunder :- “6. The relevant para 6 is extracted hereunder :- “6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has entered into the merits of the allegations and has conducted the minitrial by weighing the evidence in detail which, as such, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions is wholly impermissible. As held by this Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 , the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent an abuse of process of any court and/or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the said decision this Court had carved out the exceptions to the general rule that normally in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be quashed. Exceptions to the above general rule are carved out in para 102 in Bhajan Lal (supra) which reads as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable 42 PART E offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 6.1 Looking to the allegations in the present case against the respondents – accused and considering the fact that chargesheet has been filed by the Vigilance Cell after a thorough investigation, it cannot be said that the case falls within any of the exceptions as carved out by this Court in para 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). It cannot be said that the criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents – accused are an abuse of process of any court. It cannot be said that the criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents – accused are an abuse of process of any court. On the contrary, the allegations are an instance of abuse of the powers with a mala fide intention and allotment of the plots to the family members by hatching a criminal conspiracy and to allot the plots to the family members at throw away price causing loss to the B.D.A. and the public exchequer. 6.2 It is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare cases. As per settled proposition of law while examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when after a thorough investigation the charge sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the minitrial. As held by this Court the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 6.3 In the present case the allegations were with respect to allotment of 10 plots which were required to be allotted under the discretionary quota. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time the respondents – accused were connected with the Department concerned with regard to allotment of the plots directly or indirectly. Accused No.4 Smt. Pratima Mohanty was serving as Steno to Vice-Chairman, B.D.A. As per the case of the prosecution an undated application for allotment of plots on plain paper was received from Shri Pradyumna Kumar Mohanty, brother of the accused Smt. Pratima Mohanty. It is also the case on behalf of the prosecution that though the plot was applied in the name of her brother, after the allotment of the plot she is in possession of the same. It is also the case on behalf of the prosecution that though the plot was applied in the name of her brother, after the allotment of the plot she is in possession of the same. So far as accused No.5 – Shri Prakash Chandra Patra is concerned, as per the case on behalf of the prosecution, an application on plain paper for allotment of plot of Ms. Rajalaxmi Samal, sister-in-law of the respondent – Shri Prakash Chandra Patra (accused No.5) was forwarded by the Minister of Housing Urban Development – Mr. Samer Dey (accused No.6) to Shri P.K. Pattanaik, Secretary, B.D.A. It is noted that at the relevant time the said accused was working as Jr. Assistant, Allotment Section, B.D.A. Pursuant to the aforesaid application the sister-in-law of the said accused has been allotted a plot. So far as accused No.3 Rajendra Kumar Samal is concerned, as per the case of the prosecution and as alleged, an application was made for allotment of plot in favour of his wife who was Dealing Assistant, Allotment Section II, B.D.A. and Personal Assistant to Minister, Housing and Urban Development. It is noted that even the then Minister is the original accused No.6. As per the allegation the application was without any date and on the basis of such undated application, the plot has been allotted in favour of his wife.” 46. Hence, in the light of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, and as extracted, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the applicants, the detailed appreciation of evidence is not a subject matter, which is at all required to be ventured into by the Trial Court, at the stage of summoning of an accused person, particularly once the prima facie satisfaction has been recorded by the Court by resorting to the procedure contemplated under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 47. This Court is also of the view, that in the light of the pleadings raised in para 6 and 7 of the complaint, it absolutely prima facie makes an offence under Section 504 of the IPC, because there was a provocation and the provocation was ultimately followed by an action, and as such, the expectation of the learned counsel for the applicants, that there has had to be an appreciation of evidence, is not a subject matter, which the Trial Court has to venture at the stage of summoning of an accused person. 48. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment as rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1025-1026 of 2023, Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Aryan Singh Etc., wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has almost reiterated the issue, that a mini trial is not required to be conducted by the Courts at the stage of summoning of an accused person, because appreciation of evidence would be an aspect, which is required to be gone into by the Trial Court at the stage, when the parties are called upon to adduce the evidence in support of their respective cases. Relevant para is extracted hereunder :- “4. Having gone through the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings and discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in quashing the entire criminal proceedings in exercise of the limited powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4.1 From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution / investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution / investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 4.2 One another reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings / proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been chargesheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings / proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 49. In yet another judgment as reported in (2021) 8 SCC 583 , Saranya Vs. Bharathi and another, in para 10 and 11, it had dealt with similar issue as to what would be the gravity of appreciation of evidence at the stage of summoning of an accused person. In yet another judgment as reported in (2021) 8 SCC 583 , Saranya Vs. Bharathi and another, in para 10 and 11, it had dealt with similar issue as to what would be the gravity of appreciation of evidence at the stage of summoning of an accused person. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed, that the Court has to bear in mind that at the stage of exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is not supposed to delicately go into and appreciate an evidence for the purposes of scrunization of the summoning order. 50. The aforesaid observation has been made in para 11 of the said judgment, and the reason for deriving the said conclusion has been based upon a judgment reported by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in (2019) 13 SCC 62 , State of M.P. Vs. Deepak. The relevant paragraphs 10 and 11 of the aforesaid judgement are extracted herein :- “10. Before considering the rival submissions of the parties, few decisions of this Court on the principles which the High Court must keep in mind while exercising the jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure/at the stage of framing of the charge while considering the discharge application are required to be referred to and considered. 11. In Deepak (2019) 13 SCC 62 , to which one of us (Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) is the author, after considering the other binding decisions of this Court on the point, namely, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 ; State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198 ; and Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 , it is observed and held that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the Accused had committed the offence. It is observed and held that at that stage, the High Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, take at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It is observed and held that at that stage, the High Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, take at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It is further observed and held that at this stage the High Court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded the Accused chargesheeted or against whom the charge is framed is likely to be convicted or not.” 51. Owing to the aforesaid, and for the reasons recorded above, I do not find any merit in the C-482 Application. The same is accordingly dismissed.