ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The petitioners herein seek to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 12 of the Chhattisgarh Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Durg (Acquisition) Act, 2021 (for short, ‘the Act of 2021’) which came into force with effect from 3-9-2021. 2. The Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital Private Limited (CCMH Pvt. Ltd.) is a private company owned and operated by respondent No.3 herein and the said Company operates two establishments – the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College & Hospital, Kachandur, Durg and the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital at Motilal Nehru Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg. It is the claim of the petitioners that they were permanent employees of the said Medical College at Durg that has been acquired by the State Government. In July, 2021, the State Legislature has passed the Act of 2021 acquiring the assets, land, equipment, etc. of the Medical College at Kachandur, Durg by making payment of exorbitant compensation to the previous owners and the present petitioners and other workers were sought to be removed summarily by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act of 2021. It is also their case that no provision was made for paying them any retrenchment compensation nor was any notice served as required by law and it was held that the erstwhile management was to be responsible for the amounts due to the workers before the alleged acquisition. It was further pleaded that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 brought their services to an end. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 provides that none of the employees would have any claim for service under the new management of the Medical College. Similarly, sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that they could claim any dues for services rendered in the past before the takeover from the erstwhile management i.e. respondent No.3 herein. There was no provision in the Act of 2021 to say that their services would be continued with the parent company. This shows that the Act had an awareness that the workers would have no claim to employment in CCMH Pvt. Ltd. after the acquisition of the Medical College at Kachandur, Durg, by the State Government. There was no provision in the Act of 2021 to say that their services would be continued with the parent company. This shows that the Act had an awareness that the workers would have no claim to employment in CCMH Pvt. Ltd. after the acquisition of the Medical College at Kachandur, Durg, by the State Government. It is the further case of the petitioners that the State is obliged to act as model employer and prayer has been made to declare Section 12 of the Act of 2021 as ultra vires and further relief has been sought to direct the State Government to absorb the petitioners as employees in Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg with continuity of service. It has also been prayed that since Section 12 of the Act of 2021 has the effect of removing the workers from their jobs in an absolutely arbitrary manner, it be struck down as unconstitutional and ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. 3. Return to the writ petition has been filed by the State Government. It has been pleaded that the Act of 2021 is not ultra vires and there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality and an Act of Legislature will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. It has further been pleaded that when the validity of a statute or the Act of Legislature is questioned and there are two interpretations, one of which would make the law valid and other void, the former must be preferred avoiding the other interpretation which makes the law void. In pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute, the court is not concerned with the wisdom or otherwise, the justice or injustice of the law. If the Act of Legislature, which is passed into law, is within the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld. It has also been pleaded that Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College was set up and started its operation in 2013 at Kachandur, Durg having 750 bed capacity in the medical college and the said hospital is having permission to offer degree courses of MBBS to 150 students per year. It has also been pleaded that Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College was set up and started its operation in 2013 at Kachandur, Durg having 750 bed capacity in the medical college and the said hospital is having permission to offer degree courses of MBBS to 150 students per year. The said medical college was under the control of the management of a private limited company i.e. respondent No.3 herein. Therefore, the employees who were appointed in the medical college were governed with the terms and conditions of their appointment issued by the private limited company – respondent No.3 herein. A request was made by the management of the private limited company – respondent No.3 to the State to acquire the said medical college on the ground that it is facing financial difficulties in running the business of the medical college upon which the State Government considering the proposal / request made by respondent No.3 in the interest of the medical students pursuing their studies in the medical college as well as in the interest of the citizens of the State, enacted the Act of 2021 to acquire the medical college which was in the verge of its closure due to financial constraints and in consequence of that, the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Distt. Durg was acquired in light of the different provisions contained in the Act for better administration of the medical college. Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is about the status of employees working in the medical college that they shall have no claim for service in the medical college or under the Government, there shall be no liability of the Government for payment of any salary or any other dues of any person who was employed in respondent No.3 and they can recover from respondent No.3 who were owners before the vesting in the Government. Section 14 gives an overriding effect of the Act notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 14 gives an overriding effect of the Act notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. In fact, respondent No.3 is a private limited company and the petitioners were the employees of respondent No.3 Company, as such, the Act of 2021 is not violative of any provisions of the Constitution of India nor it is violative of the petitioners’ fundamental right under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution, nor is it violative of any provisions contained in Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other Acts. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. Rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioners controverting the return filed on behalf of the State / respondents No.1 & 2 holding that the petitioners have made out a case for declaring Section 12 of the Act of 2021 as unconstitutional and violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, therefore, Section 12 deserves to be declared unconstitutional. 5. Mr. Sanjay Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 has the effect of removing the workers from their jobs in an absolutely arbitrary manner. The petitioners were never employed at any other unit of CCMH Pvt. Ltd., but by the Medical College, Kachandur only and they are being deprived of their livelihood without any hearing and for no fault of theirs which is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that Section 12 also falls foul of Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which makes provision that if the workers are not continued in service, they will be given notice and compensation “as if retrenched” and the impugned Section does not provide for that but provides for their summary removal with provision only being made for dues that may have accrued before the takeover. Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is repugnant to Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and since the State Act has not received the assent of the President, it must be held to be ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is repugnant to Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and since the State Act has not received the assent of the President, it must be held to be ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmail Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, (1991) 1 SCC 189 , paragraph 16. In such a case, the State is required to act as model employer and retain the services of the workers whose establishment it has taken over unless there are any cogent reasons for taking the opposite view and therefore it is manifestly arbitrary and thus, the legislation can be struck down as manifestly arbitrary. Further relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 , learned senior counsel would submit that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made it clear that even legislation must answer the same test of reasonableness as administrative action or subordinate legislation. If it does not, it has to be struck down on the basis of manifest arbitrariness. Learned senior counsel would also submit that it is also violative of Article 39(b) (Part IV) of the Constitution of India, as Section 12 of the Act of 2021 brings the services of the workmen to an instant end, which is in utter disregard of Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. He would further contend that the State was fully aware that respondent No.3 Company was facing financial difficulties which is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons (Annexure P-8, page 146) and would not be able to bear the burden of the workers and in fact, CCMH Pvt. Ltd. was facing insolvency proceedings even as the Legislature has approved the Act of 2021 in July, 2021. In such circumstances, to make no provision for the workers is manifestly arbitrary and in any case, the State is the successor-in-interest even though the whole of the company was not taken over but only the assets and thus, is required to act fairly and not arbitrarily and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Workmen represented by Akhil Bhartiya Koyla Kamgar Union v. Employers in relation to the Management of Industry Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others, (2001) 4 SCC 55 . He would also contend that there is no justification for removing workers who have worked for nearly ten years since the inception of CCMH Pvt. Ltd. at Kachandur and then issuing fresh advertisements for the same post. No attempt has been made by the impugned Act to see if the workers are suitable for the jobs, as the petitioners had worked in this same establishment under the State when the medical college / hospital was taken over during the times of COVID-19 and no complaints were made about their performance. It is therefore submitted that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is arbitrary and unreasonable and does not conform to the principles of natural justice. If an Act of Legislature visits any civil consequence on a person without making provision for hearing, then that law must be held to be bad. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1985) 3 SCC 545 in which their Lordships interpreted Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which stipulated that the Municipal Commissioner could remove any structure on the pavement “without notice”, and held that unreasonableness would vitiate law and procedure alike and that if a provision of the Act so made was to be read as a command to deprive a person of their fundamental right without a hearing, then that law must be declared invalid. As such, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 deserves to be declared unconstitutional being ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. As such, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 deserves to be declared unconstitutional being ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr. Amrito Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State / respondents No.1 & 2, would submit that perusal of Section 12 of the Act of 2021 would clearly show that it has only clarified the position that pursuant to vesting of the rights, interests, assets, administration, control and possession of the Hospital with the Government, persons who were in employment of the Hospital shall not have any claim for service with the State Government, however, it did not interfere with the jural relationship of master & servant which was existing as between the petitioners & respondent No.3 Private Limited Company. He would further submit that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 cannot be read in isolation from the object with which the Act of 2021 was enacted as well as fundamental structure of the Act itself and the Act of 2021 was enacted with solemn object to acquire the Hospital run and managed by respondent No.3 in the interest of the students who were pursuing their medical degree course with the College as also the patients who were receiving treatment in the said hospital. He would also submit that the acquisition was only of the assets, rights and interests of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg and not of any of its standing or future liabilities of the private company, which was previously managing the administration and control of the said hospital, as Section 3 of the Act of 2021 clearly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or in any judgment & decree or in any contract or other document or order, the private company which was registered under the Companies Act, 1956 shall handover administration, control and possession of all properties both movable and immovable of the hospital to the Government, and Section 3 was only confining to transfer of administration, control and possession of the hospital which was previously being managed by the private company and was not touching upon any other property / business / activity which was being carried out by the said Private Limited Company i.e. respondent No.3 herein. Learned State counsel would further submit that the petitioners, who alleged to be the employees under respondent No.3 Private Limited Company, would continue to enjoy their jural status vis-a-vis respondent No.3 Private Limited Company since the Act of 2021 did not in any manner interfere and intervene in between the master-servant relationship which the petitioners might have had with respondent No.3 Company. Learned State counsel would also submit that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is not manifestly arbitrary and it cannot be declared ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India, as Section 12 cannot be said to suffer ‘manifest arbitrariness’ so as to oust the presumption of validity attached to a legislation and no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners while enacting the Act of 2021. Therefore, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is intra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India and is not violative of any of the petitioners’ right under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. The power of declaring an Act of the Legislature to be invalid can be derived from the theory in jurisprudence of the eminent jurist Kelsen. In every country, there is a hierarchy of legal norms known as “grundnorms” (basic norms). In India, the grundnorms in the Indian Constitution in hierarchy is as under : (i) Constitution of India, (ii) Statutory Law which may be either law made by Parliament or by the State Legislature; (iii) Delegated legislation, which may be in the form of rules made under the Statute, regulation made under the Statute, etc; (iv) Purely executive order not made under any Statute. 9. The first judgment laying down the principle that the Court has the power to declare a Statute unconstitutional was the well known decision of the US Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, [2 L Ed 60 : 5 US (I Cr) 137 (1803)]. The said principles have been followed thereafter in most countries including India. 10. 9. The first judgment laying down the principle that the Court has the power to declare a Statute unconstitutional was the well known decision of the US Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, [2 L Ed 60 : 5 US (I Cr) 137 (1803)]. The said principles have been followed thereafter in most countries including India. 10. The question that arises for consideration is how and when the power to declare the Statute / Rules / Regulation as unconstitutional / invalid / illegal should be exercised. The US Supreme Court in West Virginia v. Barnette, [ 15 87 L Ed 1628 : 319 US 624 (1943) ] held that since this power prevents the full play of the democratic process, it is vital that it should be exercised with rigorous self-restraint. 11. The US Supreme Court enunciated the principle that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Statute and the burden is always upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional provisions. The aforesaid principle has been adopted by the Constitution Bench of our Supreme Court in the matter of Charanjit Lal Choudhary v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1951 SC 41 and it has been held as under : “10. Prima facie, the argument appears to be a plausible one, but it requires a careful examination, and, while examining it, two principles have to be borne in mind : (1) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual, in those cases where on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (2) that it is the accepted doctrine of the American courts, which I consider to be well-founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. A clear enunciation of this latter doctrine is to be found in Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company, (248 U.S. 152 and 157), in which the relevant passage runs as follows : "It must be presumed that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds." 12. “Ut res magis valeat quam pereat” is a maxim which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void. It is an application of this principle that Courts while pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a Statute starts with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the Statute within the competence of Legislature. 13. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 has held that a Statute has to be read so as to make it valid and if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided, it has to be constructed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 14. Similar is the proposition of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1 wherein it has been held that Statute must be constructed in such a manner so as to make it workable and bearing in mind the legal maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” and it was observed as under : “98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. “The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative.” The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and “to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico”. The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute.” 15. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption is there that Legislature does not have jurisdiction and burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature or that it transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, it is always upon the person who challenges the vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, page 592.) 16. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 17. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 17. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary and manifest arbitrariness is the ground to negate legislation as well under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 18. Thereafter, very recently, in the matter of Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 813, it has been held by three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court that judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive by observing as under: - “68. It could thus be seen that the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the aforesaid two organs of the State i.e. the Legislature and Executive function within the constitutional limits. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. It could thus be seen that the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the aforesaid two organs of the State i.e. the Legislature and Executive function within the constitutional limits. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The role of this Court is limited to examine as to whether the Legislature or the Executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution. However, while doing so, the court must remain within its self-imposed limits.” Thereafter, relying upon its earlier judgment in the matter of Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and others, (2017) 7 SCC 59 and reviewing its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court speaking through B.R. Gavai, J., has held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly, and observed as under: - “70. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. To do so, the Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. It has been held that unless there is flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared bad. 71. It has been the consistent view of this Court that legislative enactment can be struck down only on two grounds. Firstly, that the appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law; and secondly, that it takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. It has been held that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. It has been held that Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. 72. It has been held that Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. 72. It has been held by this Court that there is one and only one ground for declaring an Act of the legislature or a provision in the Act to be invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. It has further been held that if two views are possible, one making the statute constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former view must always be preferred. It has been held that the Court must make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even if that requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope. 73. It has consistently been held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. It has been held that if the law which is passed is within the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it. 74. It could thus be seen that the challenge to the legislative Act would be sustainable only if it is established that the legislature concerned had no legislative competence to enact on the subject it has enacted. The other ground on which the validity can be challenged is that such an enactment is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution. Another ground as could be culled out from the recent judgments of this Court is that the validity of the legislative act can be challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. However, while doing so, it will have to be remembered that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.” 19. Another ground as could be culled out from the recent judgments of this Court is that the validity of the legislative act can be challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. However, while doing so, it will have to be remembered that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.” 19. Now, returning to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for declaring a Parliamentary or a State Legislature unconstitutional and further, in light of the fact that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt, it would be appropriate to notice the objects and reasons for enacting the Act of 2021. The objects and reasons for enacitng the Act of 2021 has been annexed with the Bill i.e. the Chhattisgarh Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Durg (Acquisition) Bill, 2021, which states that since the Medical College has obtained permission for running medical courses from the National Medical Council and students are already studying and the Company has requested the State Government to acquire the Medical College, therefore, considering the financial constraints, in the public interest, it is proposed to acquire the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, District Durg. The Statement of Objects and Reasons states as under: - mn~ns'; vkSj dkj.kksa dk dFku ;r%] panwyky panzkdj Le`fr fpfdRlk egkfo|ky;] xzke& dpkanqj] ftyk&nqxZ] NRrhlxढ+ esa] daiuh vf/kfu;e] 1956 ds rgr iathd`r panwyky panzkdj Le`fr vLirky iath;u Ø- 1997 dk 10&11769 }kjk o"kZ 2013 esa LFkkfir fd;k x;k Fkk vkSj bl fpfdRlk egkfo|ky; us ,e-ch-ch-,l- ikB~;Øe lapkfyr djus ds fy;s igys gh jk"Vªh; fpfdRlk ifj"kn~ dh vuqefr izkIr dj yh gS vkSj cgqr ls fo|kFkhZ] iwoZ ls gh fpfdRlk egkfo|ky; esa v/;;ujr gSa( vkSj ;r%] daiuh vf/kfu;e] 1956 ds rgr iathd`r panwyky panzkdj Le`fr vLirky iath;u Ø- 1997 dk 10&11769] tks panwyky panzkdj Le`fr fpfdRlk egkfo|ky;] dpkanqj] ftyk&nqxZ NRrhlxढ+ ds orZeku Lokeh gS] }kjk viuh foRrh; dfBukb;ksa dks ns[krs gq;s] jkT; 'kklu ls fpfdRlk egkfo|ky; dk vf/kxzg.k djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k x;k gS( vkSj ;r%] jkT; 'kklu larq"V gS fd panwyky panzkdj Le`fr fpfdRlk egkfo|ky;] dpkanqj] ftyk&nqxZ] NRrhlxढ+ dk RkRdky vf/kxzg.k fd;k tkuk yksdfgr esa vko';d gS( vr,o] panwyky panzkdj Le`fr fpfdRlk egkfo|ky;] dpkanqj] ftyk&nqxZ] NRrhlxढ+ dk lHkh vf/kHkkjksa ls eqDr gksdj] rRdky djus gsrq mica/k djuk] yksdfgr esa] vko';d gks x;k gSA vr% fo/ks;d izLrqr gSA jk;iqj] fnukad 24 tqykbZ] 2021 Vh-,l- flagnso fpfdRlk f'k{kk ea=h] ¼Hkkjlk/kd lnL;½ 20. Thereafter, the State has enacted the Act of 2021 with effect from 3-9-2021. As such, the Act of 2021 was enacted with an object to acquire only the Hospital run and managed by respondent No.3 in the interest of the students who were pursuing their medical degree course with the College as also in the interest of the patients who were receiving treatment in the said hospital and the acquisition was only of the assets, rights and interests of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Distt. Durg and not of any of its standing or future liabilities of the private company, which was previously managing the administration and control of the said hospital. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Sections 3 & 4 of the Act of 2021 which state as under: - “3. Handing over control of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, District-Durg, Chhattisgarh to Government.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document or order, Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical, registered under Companies Act, 1956 (No. 1 of 1956), Reg. Handing over control of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, District-Durg, Chhattisgarh to Government.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document or order, Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical, registered under Companies Act, 1956 (No. 1 of 1956), Reg. No. 10-11769 of 1997 shall handover the administration, control and possession of all properties both movable and immovable of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, District-Durg, Chhattisgarh to the Government immediately on the commencement of this Act. 4. Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College Kachandur, District-Durg, Chhattisgarh to vest in Government.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any order or judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document, on and from the date of commencement of this Act, Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College Kachandur, Durg, Chhattisgarh together with its associated Hospital and all its assets, rights and interests, shall vest in Government and any right, possession and interest of any person living or juristic, individuals, companies, shareholders or any other organization in respect of it shall be ceased.” 21. Section 3 of the Act of 2021 clearly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or in any judgment & decree or in any contract or other document or order, the private company i.e. respondent No.3 herein, which was registered under the Companies Act, 1956, shall handover administration, control and possession of all properties both movable and immovable of the hospital to the Government. As such, Section 3 was only confining to transfer of administration, control and possession of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, District Durg, which was previously being managed by respondent No.3 private company and has not interfered or intervened with any other property / business / activity which was being carried out by respondent No.3 private limited company. Similarly, Section 4 of the Act of 2021 provides that all the assets, rights and interests in the Medical College shall vest in the Government and any right, possession and interest of any person in respect of it shall cease. 22. Section 5 of the Act of 2021, which is general effect of vesting, states as under: - “5. Similarly, Section 4 of the Act of 2021 provides that all the assets, rights and interests in the Medical College shall vest in the Government and any right, possession and interest of any person in respect of it shall cease. 22. Section 5 of the Act of 2021, which is general effect of vesting, states as under: - “5. General effect of vesting.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any order or judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document, relating to the establishment vested in the Government under Section 4, immediately before the commencement of this Act, the same shall be deemed to have been terminated on such commencement. (2) On commencement of this Act, the administration and management by any Company, Society, person living or juristic or any organization who had managed and administered these establishment vested before in the Government under Section 4 shall be deemed to ceased.” 23. Section 5 of the Act of 2021 specifically provides that all relationship of any person with the Hospital establishment shall be deemed to have been terminated immediately upon vesting of the rights with the Government. As such, a conjoint reading of Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Act of 2021 would show that the object of the Act of 2021 was only pertaining to the limited acquisition of the Hospital without interfering and touching upon any other activity which the private company was engaged in at the time of acquisition and the Hospital establishment was separated from all relationship either contractual or otherwise and the same was vested with the State Government from the date of acquisition. Thus, relationship, rights, interest, claims, etc. of any person including the petitioners concerning the private company would stand as against the private company and it shall be the responsibility of the private company – respondent No.3 herein to satisfy the said claims, etc., if any, which is evident from Section 9(2) of the Act of 2021. 24. Section 6 of the Act of 2021 provides for payment of amount payable to the Company on account of acquisition and Section 8 provides for valuation of movable and immovable property to be carried out by a Special Officer. 24. Section 6 of the Act of 2021 provides for payment of amount payable to the Company on account of acquisition and Section 8 provides for valuation of movable and immovable property to be carried out by a Special Officer. Section 8(3) of the Act of 2021 clearly provides that no other money shall be payable to any person by the Government pursuant to vesting of the rights in the Government. Section 9 deals with “no payment by Government for liabilities” and Section 9(1) provides for vesting of the hospital in the Government free from all encumbrances and it also provides that the Government shall not be liable to pay any person for any liability of the Company before its vesting. Section 12, which deals with “employees of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College to have no claim on Government Service” and which is sought to be challenged by the petitioners, states as under: - “12. Employees of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College to have no claim on Government Service.—(1) Person, who was in employment of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur Durg, Chhattisgarh or any of its associated hospitals or establishment, whether as a permanent employee, on contract or outsourced, before their vesting in the Government under Section 4, shall have no any claim for service in Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur Durg, Chhattisgarh or under the Government. (2) There shall be no liability of the Government for payment of any salary or any other dues of any person specified in sub-section (1). (3) Persons specified in sub-section (1) who remain unpaid by the owners of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, for services rendered before its vesting in Government under Section 4 shall have a right to recovery of amount from the owners of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College who are owners before its vesting in Government under Section 4.” 25. A focused perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act of 2021 would show that all the persons who were permanent employees, on contract or outsourced, associated with the Medical College before vesting of the Hospital in the Government by virtue of Section 4 shall have no claim for service in Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg, or under the Government which is in consonance with the object, intent and purpose of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 clearly provides that there shall be no liability of the Government for payment of any salary or any other dues of any person specified in sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) provides that persons specified in sub-section (1) who remain unpaid by the owners of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, for services rendered before its vesting in Government under Section 4 shall have a right to recovery of amount from the owners of the said College who are owners before its vesting in Government under Section 4. As such, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is clarificatory in nature that upon vesting of the rights, interests, assets, administration, control and possession of the Medical College and Hospital with the Government, persons who were in employment of the Hospital shall not have any claim for service in the college or under the Government, though the employees working with the Medical College prior to the date of vesting, who were previously appointed by respondent No.3, would have their rights secured as against respondent No.3. Therefore, by virtue of Section 12(1) it has been made specific that the persons working earlier with the Medical College, which is being run by respondent No.3 Company, would have no right, claim or interest upon acquisition with the Government and they can enforce their right to the owner of the Medical College by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Act of 2021. As such, the acquisition of hospital by the State was not in any way interfering with rights of the petitioners and their rights, interest or title are saved by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 12. 26. At this stage, submissions raised by learned Senior Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the petitioners deserve to be considered. 27. The first submission that has been made on behalf of the petitioners is based on the applicability of Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has been argued that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is violative and repugnant to Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is the Central Act and there is no assent from the President of India to the Act of 2021, therefore, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is unconstitutional and void. It would be appropriate to notice that rights of the petitioners vis-a-vis respondent No.3 still survive qua the company. It would be appropriate to notice that rights of the petitioners vis-a-vis respondent No.3 still survive qua the company. The relationship of master & servant as between respondent No.3 & the petitioners did not cease to operate by virtue of Section 12 of the Act of 2021 and as such, it is incorrect to say that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is in any manner violative of Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is repugnant to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 12 is independent of the rights and liabilities as between the petitioners and respondent No.3 Company. The petitioners are always at liberty to enforce, execute and ensure their statutory rights as against the Private Limited Company on account of any violation or breach of any statutory provision governing their conditions of employment. As such, the plea based on Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 28. Mr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel, argued that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 suffers from manifest arbitrariness and relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) and Workmen represented by Akhil Bhartiya Koyla Kamgar Union (supra) to buttress his submission. 29. In Workmen represented by Akhil Bhartiya Koyla Kamgar Union (supra), a Colliery was taken over by the Central Government under the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 which came into effect on 17-10-1971 and the Colliery stood nationalised with effect from 1-5-1972 under the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 contains a provision under Section 17 which was a special provision relating to workmen and their continuance in service providing that workman who was in employment of the mine or the plant shall become from the appointed date an employee of the Central Government. 111 workmen who were working in the Colliery were laid off by the Management in 1971 and substantially retrenched from service on 9-6-1997. The claim raised by such employees was against the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and they were challenging the order of retrenchment. Since the Coal Mine stood nationalized, the issue was as to whether the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. will be the successor-in-interest of the Colliery. The claim raised by such employees was against the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and they were challenging the order of retrenchment. Since the Coal Mine stood nationalized, the issue was as to whether the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. will be the successor-in-interest of the Colliery. In that context, observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said judgment have to be understood in the said perspective and the same will have no application as far as the facts of the present case are concerned. 30. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of The Workmen v. The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others, (1978) 2 SCC 175 . In the said case, the management of the Colliery before its nationalization, dismissed 40 workmen in October, 1969 and an industrial dispute was raised. Subsequently, the Colliery was nationalized on 1-5-1972 and it was in this perspective a question arose whether the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. would be the successive company since the original colliery was nationalized. The Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972 contains Section 17, which categorically provided that workmen who were in service prior to nationalization would become employees of the Central Government. The observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case, therefore, are material and factually based upon different provisions of law and thus, the observations made therein do not have any application to the facts of the present case, as there is no provision under the Act of 2021 which can be said to be akin to Section 17 as was existing in the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972. As such, the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in The Workmen v. The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others (supra) is clearly distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. 31. The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of N.T.C. (South Maharashtra) Limited v. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh and others, (1993) 1 SCC 217 . 31. The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of N.T.C. (South Maharashtra) Limited v. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh and others, (1993) 1 SCC 217 . In the said case, the Textile Mills were sought to be nationalized under the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983, and Section 13 of that Act gave the power to terminate the contract of employment with the custodian, meaning thereby that the employees in contract employment with the mills would become employees of the National Textile Corporation and custodian if it was of the opinion to terminate the employment, was free to do so. The said Act also provided for Section 3(4) which stated that all persons in charge of the management, including persons holding offices as directors, managers or any other managerial personnel of the Textile Company shall be deemed to have vacated their offices on the appointed day. The said provision provided for termination of service. In the present case, there is no such provision in the Act of 2021 which terminates the services of the petitioners. The jural relationship of master & servant as between the Company – respondent No.3 herein and the petitioners exists and will continue. As such, the facts of the present case are entirely different and distinguishable from the judgment referred by the learned Senior Counsel and, therefore, the principle of law laid down in the said judgment would have no application to the facts of the present case. 32. The next judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel is Gurmail Singh (supra). In the said case, the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department of the State of Punjab was being transferred to the Punjab State Tubewell Corporation, which was a company wholly owned and managed by the State of Punjab and consequently, a notification was issued whereby the posts sanctioned for the Tubewell Circle in the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department were declared to be no long needed and the posts be abolished. In the said factual background the judgment was rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court where the rights of the employees who were previously working in the Irrigation Branch were being considered. In the said factual background the judgment was rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court where the rights of the employees who were previously working in the Irrigation Branch were being considered. The employees from the Government Department were being sought to be sent to the Corporation and thus, it was in the said perspective that the observations by the Supreme Court were being made in paragraph 16 of the said judgment, which is of no avail to the petitioners in the present case. Accordingly, the decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in Gurmail Singh (supra) is clearly not applicable and is distinguishable to the facts of the present case. 33. The learned Senior Counsel would further rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of K.I. Shephard and others v. Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 . In the said case, under the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, three private banks were sought to be amalgamated with the nationalized banks. In that perspective, the question was with regard to the rights of the employees. The entire bank with its entire paraphernalia were being merged and in that context their Lordships held that the employer i.e. private bank stood amalgamated in the nationalized banks and have thus lost its identity thereby the nationalized banks becoming successor-in-interest and the jural relationship of master & servant as between the private bank and the employees stood substantially altered on account of amalgamation. In contradiction to this, in the instant case, the private company is still in existence and even the jural relationship of master & servant as between the petitioners and respondent No.3 still exists which has not ceased by the operation of the Act of 2021. As such, the decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in K.I. Shephard (supra) is also not applicable and would have no application to the facts of the present case. 34. Lastly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) has been relied upon on behalf of the petitioners. As such, the decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in K.I. Shephard (supra) is also not applicable and would have no application to the facts of the present case. 34. Lastly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) has been relied upon on behalf of the petitioners. It has already been held that a statute can be declared ultra vires on the ground of manifest arbitrariness, but on a focused perusal of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act of 2021 and on legal analysis, we are of the view that Section 12 does not suffer from vice of manifest arbitrariness and, therefore, the principles laid down in Shayara Bano (supra) would have no help to the petitioners. 35. As such, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is completely in accordance with the object of the Act of 2021 as well as Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 & 9 of the Act of 2021 and there is no manifest arbitrariness on the face of record which would invalidate Section 12 of the Act of 2021. The burden is on the petitioners to demonstrate that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 suffers from ‘manifest arbitrariness’ which they failed to allege and demonstrate and as such, Section 12 cannot be declared ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India. It is held so accordingly. 36. The next ground that has been raised on behalf of the petitioners is that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is arbitrary and unreasonable, as it does not conform to the principles of natural justice. It is the submission of learned Senior Counsel that when a law has the effect of removing a person from his employment without even a hearing, then such law must be held to be manifest arbitrary. Similarly, if a law visits any civil consequence on a person without making a provision for hearing, then the law must be held to be bad and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis (supra). 37. Similarly, if a law visits any civil consequence on a person without making a provision for hearing, then the law must be held to be bad and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis (supra). 37. The principles of law laid down in Olga Tellis (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the said case their Lordships were considering the bar which stipulated that the Municipal Commissioner can remove any structure on the pavement without notice, and held that unreasonableness would vitiate law and procedure alike, which is not the case here. In the present case, the jural relationship of master & servant as between respondent No.3 Company and the petitioners still exists and therefore the principles of law laid down in Olga Tellis (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case. 38. Even otherwise, the Act of 2021 is a Legislative Act which is purely a legislative function and which has been discharged by the State Legislature. It is trite law that principles of natural justice do not apply to a legislative action. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija and others v. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra and others, (1989) 3 SCC 396 have clearly held that the rules of natural justice are not applicable to legislative action primary or subordinate, and observed as under : “28. … The rules of natural justice are not applicable to legislative action plenary or subordinate. The procedural requirement of hearing is not implied in the exercise of legislative powers unless hearing was expressly prescribed. The High Court, therefore, was in error in directing the government to hear the parties are not entitled to be heard under law.” 39. Similarly, in the matter of State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh and others, (2002) 2 SCC 7 , it has been held that if the power exercised is legislative in character, the rules of natural justice would not apply and it has further been held that in case of legislative act of legislature, no question of application of rule of natural justice arises. It has been observed by their Lordships as under:- “9. It has been observed by their Lordships as under:- “9. Once it is found that the power exercisable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act respectively is legislative in character, the question that arises is whether the State Government, while exercising that power, the rule of natural justice is required to be observed. It is almost settled law that an act legislative in character – primary or subordinate, is not subjected to rule of natural justice. In case of legislative act of legislature, no question of application of rule of natural justice arises. ...” 40. This would bring us to the final conclusion that Section 12 of the Act of 2021 neither suffers from manifest arbitrariness nor it is violative of Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India and it is also not violative of Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 12 having been enacted in exercise of legislative function, opportunity of hearing is not required to be afforded to the petitioners, as principles of natural justice do not apply to a legislative action plenary or subordinate. 41. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, Section 12 of the Act of 2021 is held to be intra vires and it is not unconstitutional, and the writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 12 deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).