ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned Executing Court i.e. 3rd Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bastar, Jagdalpur whereby the execution proceeding has been closed vide order dated 18.04.2018 holding that the decree of the specific performance of the contract concerning sale deed has been executed however possession of the suit property cannot be handed over as no such relief was claimed by the petitioner herein. 2. Facts of the present case are that the petitioner filed a civil suit No.6A/1995 for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement to sell entered into between the petitioner and Madhusudan Dewangan (deceased) on 03.01.1992 pertaining to land plot survey No.92 plot No. 165 admeasuring 2232 s.f. situated at Kevaramunda, Jagdalpur. The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 04.05.1999 thereafter F.A. No. 425/1999 was preferred before the High Court of Chhattisgarh and same was dismissed on 21.06.2013 and thereafter SLP was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 21.02.2014. The plaintiff moved an application for execution of the decree before the learned executing Court wherein an application was moved under Order 21 Rule 97, Section 101 read with Section 151 of the CPC by the brother of the defendant and the same was rejected vide order dated 05.03.2016, against that order appeal was preferred and the same was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 13.09.2017. In between an intervention application was moved by Rajesh Dewangan on the ground that the property belongs to him and earlier a suit was filed which travelled up to the High Court in a Second Appeal which was dismissed for want of prosecution. The said Rajesh Dewangan moved an application for restoration of the Second Appeal No.448/1994 before this Court bearing MCC No.844/2017 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 23.02.2018. The said Rajesh Dewangan moved an application for restoration of the Second Appeal No.448/1994 before this Court bearing MCC No.844/2017 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 23.02.2018. In pursuance of the judgment and decree sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner on 22.02.2018 in the execution proceeding, but concerning the possession of the suit property, the learned Court held that from the contents of the agreement, it appears that the original defendant was in possession of 1500 s.f. of the suit property, whereas, his sister-in-law Budhyarin Bai was in possession of remaining part of the suit property and some litigation was going on between them and it was agreed that when lis would be decided between the parties the possession of the property would be handed over to the petitioner. 3. The learned executing Court further held that no relief for possession has been claimed by the petitioner/plaintiff thus no order can be passed and no decree can be executed concerning possession, consequently the learned executing Court closed the execution proceedings. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that in the agreement to sell it was clearly stated that some part of the suit property is in possession of Budhyarinbai and the original defendant was in possession of only 1500 s.f. of land out of 2232 s.f. He would further submit that the original defendant entered into an agreement and the property was in his possession. Later on, the civil suit was decreed in his favour which has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Some objections were raised by one Rajesh Dewangan on behalf of Budhiyarin Bai, but his application for restoration has been rejected and thus, the claim of Rajesh Dewangan came to an end therefore, the issue which has been discussed and relied on by the learned executing Court is misconceived. He would further submit that the relief of possession is ancillary to the decree of specific performance and may not be specifically claimed. He placed reliance on the matter of Manickram @ Thandapani and another Vs. Vasantha, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. 5. He would further submit that the relief of possession is ancillary to the decree of specific performance and may not be specifically claimed. He placed reliance on the matter of Manickram @ Thandapani and another Vs. Vasantha, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 would submit that in the agreement to sell it was clearly stated that some part of the suit property is in possession of Budhyarin Bai and the original defendant was in possession of only 1500 s.f. of land out of 2232 s.f. He would further submit that even the petitioner was aware of this fact, but he did not choose to claim relief of possession in the civil suit, even no application for amendment was moved either before the courts below or before the executing court, therefore, at this stage the petitioner cannot claim the possession. He would submit that the facts of the case of Manickram (supra) are different from the facts of the present case. He would also submit that according to para 2 of the aforesaid judgment the respondent/defendant of that case was in possession of the suit property and there was agreement to hand over the possession, whereas, in the present case the possession of certain part of suit property is with Budhiyarin Bai, therefore, the judgment cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. From the documents annexed with the petition, it appears that a civil suit was filed by the petitioner for specific performance of the contract concerning Survey No. 92 and 165 ad measuring 2232 s.f. and the same was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 04.05.1999. The appeal and SLP preferred against the judgment and decree were dismissed by this High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, respectively. Therefore, the application for execution was moved in which an application under Order 21 Rule 97, Section 101 read with Section 151 of the CPC was preferred by the brother of respondent No.2 which was rejected by the learned executing Court, against which appeal was preferred and the same was also dismissed. An objection was raised in the execution proceeding by Rajesh Dewangan and the same was also dismissed. An objection was raised in the execution proceeding by Rajesh Dewangan and the same was also dismissed. Then an application for restoration of Second Appeal was preferred before this Court which finally came to be dismissed. 8. In pursuance of the decree a sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner on 22.02.2018, but possession of the property was not handed over to the petitioner and the learned executing Court closed the proceedings of the execution on the ground that there is no relief concerning possession and it cannot go beyond the decree. 9. In the matter of Manickam @ Thandapani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 25, 26, 29, 30 and 31 held as under:- 25. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance and need not be specifically claimed. That was the positiion even under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Section 22 of the Act was introduced in pursuance of the recommendation of the Law Commission to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to cut down the delay. Therefore, though the preponderance of judical opinions under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 was in favour of the fact that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree for specific performance, it was further clarified by introducing Section 22 of the Act. 26. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Section 22(2) of the Act, though is worded in negative language, “no relief under clause (a)or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed”, but the proviso takes out the mandatory nature from the substantive provision of subsection(2) when the plaintiff is allowed to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including the plaint for such relief “at any stage of the proceeding”. “At any stage of the proceeding” would include the proceeding in suit or in appeal and also in execution. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act contemplates that the Court shall, at any stage of the proceedings, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. The said proviso makes the provision directory as no penal consequences follow under sub-section (2) of Section 22. The said proviso makes the provision directory as no penal consequences follow under sub-section (2) of Section 22. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 22 is a rule of prudence to ask for possession “in an appropriate case”. The appropriate case would not include a suit for specific performance simpliciter but may include a suit for partition or a suit when the decree is to be executed against a transferee. Subsection (2) cannot be said to be a mandatory provision as the power to claim relief at any stage of the proceeding makes sub-section (2) director. Sub-section (2) is a matter of procedure to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The procedural laws are handmaid of justice and cannot defeat the substantive rights. Reference may be made to M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram [ (1978) 2 SCC 91 ] wherein it was held as under: “2. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take.” 29. To examine whether a provision is directory or mandatory, one of the tests is that the court is required to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scheme of the statute. Keeping in view the scheme of the statute, we find that Section 22(2) of the Act is only directory and thus, the decree-holder cannot be nonsuited for the reason that such relief was not granted in the decree for specific relief. 30. The defendant in terms of the agreement is bound to handover possession of the land agreed to be sold. The expression “at any stage of proceeding” is wide enough to allow the plaintiffs to seek relief of possession even at the appellate stage or in execution even if such prayer was required to be claimed. 30. The defendant in terms of the agreement is bound to handover possession of the land agreed to be sold. The expression “at any stage of proceeding” is wide enough to allow the plaintiffs to seek relief of possession even at the appellate stage or in execution even if such prayer was required to be claimed. This Court in Babu Lal [Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors, (1982) 1 SCC 525 ] has explained the circumstances where relief of possession may be necessary such as in a suit for partition or in a case of separate possession where the property conveyed is a joint property. In the suit for specific performance, the possession is inherent in such suit, therefore, we find that the decree-holders are in fact entitled to possession in pursuance of the sale deed executed in their favor. 31. The judgment debtor in the written statement has admitted that the property is a vacant land and that she has sold other portion in favor of one Lakshmipathy. The stand of the judgment debtor now that the respondent is in possession of 750 sq. feet would not defeat the right of possession of 2400 sq. feet of an area which she has agreed to sell to the plaintiffs in respect of which decree was passed. All sales affected, and the construction, if any, raised are subject to lis pendens and no legal or equitable rights arise in favour of the purchasers during the pendency of the proceedings. Therefore, the decree-holders are entitled to actual physical possession of 2400 sq. feet of land which was agreed to be sold to the appellants.” 10. On careful reading of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manickam @ Thandapani (supra) it is quite vivid that relief of possession is ancillary to the decree of specific performance and need not be specifically claimed and there is no need to claim possession separately and specifically. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in a suit for possession, in case of separate possession the relief of possession is necessary but in the suit for specific performance the possession is inherent in such suit and thus the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal. 11. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in a suit for possession, in case of separate possession the relief of possession is necessary but in the suit for specific performance the possession is inherent in such suit and thus the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal. 11. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manickam @ Thandapani (supra), it appears that the learned executing Court has committed error of law in closing the execution proceedings. The order passed by the learned executing Court in Execution Case No.06-A/1995 dated 18.04.2018 is hereby quashed and the execution case is restored to its original number. The parties are directed to appear before the executing Court on 25.08.2023. 12. Taking into consideration the submission made by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that some part of the property is in possession of Budhyarin Bai, sister-in-law of original defendant Madhusudan, the learned executing Court is directed to call for demarcation report to decide the issue with regard to possession before passing any order with regard to execution of decree in accordance with law. 13. With the aforesaid observation(s) and direction(s), this petition finally stands disposed of. No cost(s).