JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1. The present appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 13.09.2005 passed in Civil Suit No.35-A/2004 by the III Additional District Judge, Raipur whereby the decree was granted in favour of the plaintiff. 2. Brief facts of the case are that a Civil Suit was filed by Smt. Surendra Kaur Gendu, daughter of late Bishen Singh Jabbal, claiming 1/7th share in respect of house situated Raipur over land bearing Khasra No.31/880 to 880/3 & 877 which was shown as the suit land and the residential house. The claim was for partition, separate possession and share in the residential house to the extent of 1/7th and further claim was to have the rent to the extent of 1/7th equivalent to her share. The parties to the suit are interse related to each other. According to the plaint allegations, Bishen Singh Jabbal, the father of the plaintiff died on 14.12.1990 and after his death, Kailash Kaur, the mother defendant no.1 (since deceased) and other defendants 2 to 6 are the legal heirs. The map of the suit premises and residential house is appended to the plaint. The plaintiff alleged that mother Kailash Kaur (D-1) and brothers Shri Rajpal Singh (D-2) Amarjit Singh (D-3), Jaspal Singh (D-4) reside in the residential premises. It was further stated that defendants 1 to 4 were earning rental income of Rs.15,000/- from the said premises and when the plaintiff demanded her share to the extent of 1/7th, it was refused by the brothers and mother. The plaintiff stated that the suit land got recorded in the name of mother Kailash Kaur in the Municipal Corporation Assessment Register wherein the plaintiff Surendra Kaur and another sister Dr. Vinita Naik @ Paramjit who was arrayed as defendant No.6 applied for mutation of their names but it was rejected. The plaintiff asserted that defendant-brothers do not intend to give the part of share, therefore, initially, a notice through advocate was served on 17.04.1999 and responding to it, her brothers Amarjeet Singh (D-3), Jaspal Singh (D-4) replied to the notice on 23.04.1999 and claimed that the property exclusively belonged to them on the basis of a forged will and refused to part with share in respect of the suit property. Consequently, the suit was filed. 3. Consequently, the suit was filed. 3. The defendant mother and brother Rajpal Singh (D-2) and one sister Kamaljeet Kaur who was arrayed as defendant no.5 had jointly filed their written statements and the brothers Amarjit Singh (D-3) and Jaspal Singh (D-4) had separately filed their written statements and stated that late Bishen Singh Jabbal constructed the house No.31/880/2 over the suit premises from his self-earned money and House No.877 devolved on Bishen Singh as a heir by virtue of a Will executed by his father Inder Singh. Subsequently, it was pleaded that on the basis of Will executed by Bishen Singh Jabbal in favour of Amarjeet Singh (D-3) and Jaspal Singh (D-4) they became exclusive owners of the subject suit property. The defendants also alleged that the plaintiffs filed their application to get their names mutated in the Municipal Records, which was rightly rejected. Defendant No.6, the other sister namely Dr. Vinita Naik supported the plaintiff. 4. On the basis of the pleading, learned Additional District Judge framed 7 issues. Issue no.1 is whether the plaintiff has 1/7th share in the suit property ? If yes, whether she is entitled to get the possession by separating 1/7th share from the suit property ?. Issue no.2 is whether the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/7th part of rent which would be received from the suit property ? Both these issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff. With respect to additional issue No.1, the trial Court held that the suit property was the exclusive property of late Bishen Singh Jabbal. In respect of additional issue no.2 which pertains to execution of Will dated 01.11.1988, the Court held that the Will is not proved, consequently the two brothers namely Amarjit Singh (D-3) and Jaspal Singh (D-4) would not become the absolute owners and their ownership right of the entire property got through the Will has not been proved. 5. During the pendency of this appeal, mother Kailash Kaur (D-1) breathed her last, as such, the share would become 1/6th instead of 1/7th to each of the parties to the litigation. 6. (i) The learned senior Counsel Shri Ravish Agrawal assisted by Shri Ashish Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate appearing for the appellants would submit that the suit property i.e., the residential house and other premises belonged to Bishen Singh Jabbal is not in dispute. 6. (i) The learned senior Counsel Shri Ravish Agrawal assisted by Shri Ashish Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate appearing for the appellants would submit that the suit property i.e., the residential house and other premises belonged to Bishen Singh Jabbal is not in dispute. He would submit that on 11.05.1999 the suit was filed wherein 1/7th share was claimed by the contesting plaintiffs. He would contend that the learned ADJ without showing any sufficient cause has held the will to be suspicious for the reasons that no share was given to the wife (D-1) and ailing son Rajpal (D-2) and no reason for disinheritance was given. It was submitted that those reasons cannot be taken as grounds to infer about the authenticity of the Will. Referring to the Will dated 01.11.1988 (Ex.D-2), it is stated that as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the trial Court observed that the attesting witness Bhanu Pratap Singh has stated that he does not know who wrote the will but section 63-(C) of the Act of 1925 contemplates that the attesting witness is required to know who wrote the will except that no further proof is required. 6. (ii) Reading the statement of D.W.3 Dr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, learned senior counsel would submit that signing the will upon receiving the personal acknowledgment from the testator would be a valid compliance of section 63 especially when as per the version of D.W.1 Amarjeet, the will is in the handwriting of his father who was the testator. It was also submitted that the Holograph Will has a greater presumption of its genuineness and statements of Surendra Kaur (P.W.1) and Vineeta Naik (P.W.2) have been appreciated to hold that it was not their father’s handwriting without there being any fact available on record. It is stated that D.W.1 Amarjeet the son has deposed that the Will is in his father’s hand-writing and the attesting witness Bhanu Pratap (D.W.3) has categorically stated that the testator Bishen Singh acknowledged that he has written the Will and asked him to sign the same. 6.(iii) Referring to AIR 1960 Calcutta 551 – Akhil Chandra Majumdar Versus Akhil Chandra Majumdar, it is submitted that the Will written by the testator himself would have a greater presumption in law of the genuineness of it. 6.(iii) Referring to AIR 1960 Calcutta 551 – Akhil Chandra Majumdar Versus Akhil Chandra Majumdar, it is submitted that the Will written by the testator himself would have a greater presumption in law of the genuineness of it. Further referring to AIR 1964 SC 529 – Shashi Kumar Banerjee Versus Subodh Kumar Banerjee it is stated that the Holograph Will in hand-writing of testator signed in presence of witnesses and witnesses signed it in presence of testator raises strong presumption of it being duly executed and attested. He further submitted that the doctrine of Omnia Presumuntur rite esse acta (all things presumed to have been done rightly) would apply in this case. Further reference is made to a case law reported in (1996) 9 SCC 324 (Joyce Primrose Prestor (Mrs) (NEE VAS) -Vs. Vera Marie Vas (Ms) and (2008) 15 SCC 365 to submit that there exists a holographwill, which is wholly in the handwriting of the testator and the case of the holograph-will is a special case which will require a different approach in considering the evidence to find whether the Will has been duly executed and attested. 6. (iv) It is further submitted that the trial Court has drawn inference on Ex.D-5 & D-6 that in such sale deed, the different date of Will is written but it was not confronted to defendant no.3 in cross-examination and no opportunity was given to defendant, therefore, as per section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the parties should have been given opportunity in cross-examination to tender their explanation. Reliance is placed on AIR 1977 SC 1712 and 2013(3) MPLJ 619 . It is stated that the date of Will wrongly described in Ex.D-5 & Ex.D-6 was corrected later on, which would be evident from the document filed with application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, wherein the date of Will which was wrongly mentioned as 11.12.1989 was corrected by the Deputy Registrar and it was rectified as 01.11.1988. Further submission is made that the order of examination of witnesses also caused prejudice to the defendant since defendant no.6 who admitted the plaintiff’s claim was examined after examination of D.W.1 and no foundation was there leading secondary evidence in respect of sale deeds Ex.D-5 & D-6 that the original sale deed was not produced, therefore, in absence of that, secondary evidence will not be available. 6. 6. (v) Referring to the case law reported in AIR 1960 Calcutta 551 – Ajit Chandra Majumdar Vs. Akhil Chandra Majumdar further submission is made that only for the reason that no share was given to the wife and ailing son while deliberately giving preference to one son, it would not make the Will unnatural and further reliance is placed in Mahesh Kumar (dead) by LRs Versus Vinod Kumar (2012) 4 SCC 387 to submit that it would not have decisive effect on the issue relating to genuineness of Will. It is further submitted that no reasons are required for disinheritance and the very purpose of the Will is to alter the natural course of succession. 6. (vi) With respect to the finding of the learned ADJ, learned counsel would submit that defendant no.1 who is mother (since dead) was not examined as witness but the fact is that defendant no.1 has never challenged the Will. It is further stated the writing in the Will was that of the father as being stated by D.W.1. With respect to registration of Will, it is stated that Bishen Singh was an educated person who needed no lawyer’s assistance but the trial Court went in vain to draw inference against it which cannot be a valid ground. It is stated that registration of Will is not required and no inference can be drawn against the genuineness of the Will in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ishwardeo Narain Singh Versus Smt. Kamta Devi AIR 1954 SC 280 . Consequently the judgment and decree of the learned ADJ is required to be set aside and no ambiguity exists in respect of execution of will. 7. (i) Per contra, Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the respondents assisted by Anshul Tiwari, Advocate, would submit that Bishen Singh, the testator died on 14.12.1990 and according to the brother, the Will was executed on 01.11.1988, and after lapse of 11 years of execution of the Will and after 9 years of death of Bishan Singh, for the first time, the existence of Will was disclosed in reply to the notice. 7. (ii) It is further submitted that the plaintiff was not required to challenge the authenticity of the Will as only her share was claimed. 7. (ii) It is further submitted that the plaintiff was not required to challenge the authenticity of the Will as only her share was claimed. Reliance was placed on (2021) 11 SCC 277 (Shivkumar Versus Sharanabasappa) to submit that the right can be adjudicated even in absence of challenge to the Will. Further reliance was placed on a judgment passed by this Court in F.A. No. 69/2017 to submit that the Court has to resort to arm chair theory as has been laid down by Supreme Court and when the ailing son was deprived from part of property, certainly it will create a doubt on the authenticity of Will. It is stated that existence of Will was kept in dark for enormous period and the unjust exclusion of two daughters along with wife apart from ailing son also creates a doubt. He would submit that suspicious circumstances of such deprivation has not been dispelled by any document and the mother who was the primary witness having knowledge of existence of Will in this case was not examined. 7.(iii) Referring to statement of D.W.1, it is further contended that though it was stated to be hand-writing of testator Bishen Singh Jabbal, but nothing is on record to substantiate the same. Referring to the sale deeds Ex.D-5 & D-6, he would submit that in those documents, the existence of another Will dated 11.12.1989 is written and the application before this Court under Order 41 Rule 27 has been filed after 9-10 years though the statement was recorded in the year 2004. Referring to the Will Ex.D-2, he would submit that Dr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, the attesting witness though has stated that he was present while the will was written but subsequently he admitted the fact that he had not seen the fact of writing of Will. Learned counsel would submit that though Defendant Amarjeet Singh admitted that he holds the specimen hand-writing of his father but it was not produced, therefore, the adverse inference is required to be drawn. It is further stated that the other brother Jaspal Singh, the beneficiary, was not examined that also raises doubt in respect of the execution of Will. Consequently the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is well-merited, which do not call for any inference by this Court. 8. It is further stated that the other brother Jaspal Singh, the beneficiary, was not examined that also raises doubt in respect of the execution of Will. Consequently the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is well-merited, which do not call for any inference by this Court. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence on record. In order to appreciate the possession of the parties inasmuch as the dispute is among the family members it would be appropriate to reproduce the genealogical tree of the parties. Inder Singh Bishen Singh Jabbal (died on 14.02.1990) Smt. Kailash Kaur (wife) Rajpal Singh (D-2) Amarjeet Singh (D-3 Jaspal Singh (D-4) Kamaljeet Singh (D-5) Surendra Singh (Plaintiff) Vineeta Nayak Supporting Plaintiff 9. Defendant Amarjeet Singh and Jaspal Singh have claimed the property on the basis of Will to be their exclusive property. The will in the case is marked as Ex.D-2. A perusal of it would show that there is no dispute in between the parties that the property which was subject matter of Will exclusively belonged to Bishen Singh Jabbal. One of the sisters namely Surendra Kaur filed the suit claiming her share in respect of the property left by her father late Bishen Singh Jabbal, who died on 14.12.1990. A perusal of the Will Ex.D-2 would show that it was written in Letter-head of Jabbal Steel Fabricators wherein Dr. B.P. Singh and one Talreja are shown to be attesting witnesses. The plaintiff daughter claims that no Will was ever executed by her father. Plaintiff Surendra Kaur (P.W.1) at Para 12 of her deposition has stated that the handwriting of Ex.D-2 is not of her father nor it bears his signature. She has further stated that her father used to drink lot, as such, his hands used to tremble while writing and due to excessive drinking he died. Defendant no.6 Vineeta Naik after going through the the Will Ex.D-2 has stated that the handwriting of Ex.D-2 is neither that of her father Bishan Singh Jabbal and she has also also stated that the signature of the testator at portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ of the Will is not of Bishan Singh Jabbal. 10. Defendant no.6 Vineeta Naik after going through the the Will Ex.D-2 has stated that the handwriting of Ex.D-2 is neither that of her father Bishan Singh Jabbal and she has also also stated that the signature of the testator at portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ of the Will is not of Bishan Singh Jabbal. 10. D.W.1 Amarjeet Singh who is a beneficiary has stated at Para 23 that it is wrong to to say that the handwriting of Will as also the signature made therein is not of Bishan Singh. He has further stated that the other hand-writing papers of his father is in his possession, which he can produce. It appears that in order to draw inference of a Holograph Will, there is no evidence on record to prove the fact of any other writing which was written by the testator. Though certain handwriting of testator was claimed to be in possession of the propounder, yet it was not produced. When the Will was not admitted to have been in the writing of the testator, no inference can be drawn. In absence of any document to prove the Will to be in writing of Bishen Singh, the specimen handwriting of testator compared and supported by an expert evidence could have been placed when the proponder was in hold of writing of late testator. So in absence thereof, mere presumption that the Will was in writing of testator cannot be allowed to sustain. 11. In order to assess the correctness of the Will, the Courts are required to resort to arm chair theory meaning thereby the Court is required to sit at the arm chair of the testator. This preposition has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Lakshmana Nadar Vs. B. Ramier ( AIR 1953 SC 304 ) further followed by Navneet Lal alias Rangi Vs. Gokul AIR 1976 SC 794 . Further in Rajkumari Vs. Surendra Pal Sharma reported in Civil Appeal No.9683/2019, it is held that the propounder in order to succeed the WILL as genuine, is required to prove by satisfactory evidence that (i) the will was signed by the testator; (ii) the testator at the time was in a sound and disposing state of mind; (iii) the testator understood the nature and effect of the dispositions; and (iv) that the testator had put his signature on the document of his own free WILL. Similar proposition has been laid down in Shivkumar Vs. Sharanbasappa (2021) 11 SCC 277 : 2020 SCC Online SC 385 wherein the parameters have been laid down to test as to the circumstances which may give right to suspicious circumstances about the WILL in question. 12. In the instant case, a minute scrutiny of Ex.D-2 the Will would show that Bishen Singh Jabbal has excluded the daughters, the widow Kailash Kaur and ailing son Rajpal who was mentally retarded. While the will was executed, the wife Kailash Kaur was alive. For examination of will and suspicious circumstances, no straight jacket formula can be adopted and such suspicious circumstances can be dependent on the contents of Will and vary on each set of features. The Supreme Court in Shivkumar v. Sharanabasappa (supra) (2021) 11 SCC 277 has laid down the adjudicatory process concerning the proof of Will and summarized it as under : 12. For what has been noticed hereinabove, the relevant principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will could be broadly summarised as follows:– 12.1. Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind. Alike the principles governing the proof of other documents, in the case of Will too, the proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon. 12.2. Since as per Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence. 12.3. The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. 12.4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. 12.4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 12.5. If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 12.6. A circumstance is “suspicious” when it is not normal or is ‘not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person’. As put by this Court, the suspicious features must be ‘real, germane and valid’ and not merely the ‘fantasy of the doubting mind.’ 12.7. As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependents; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et-cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 12.8. The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance/s. While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? 12.9. In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will.” 13. The Court in Shivkumar v. Sharanabasappa (supra) further held that the Will being a rather solemn document that comes into operation after death of the testator, special provisions are made in the statutes for making of a will and for its proof in a court of law. Section 59 of the Succession Act provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will. Explaining the provisions of section 63 of the Succession Act, it is held that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person, and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. The Court further held that however, when the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the Court would expect that the legitimate suspicion should be removed before the document in question is accepted as the last Will of the testator. 14. Examining the circumstances when it comes to deprivation of widow who is fully dependent on the testator and one son who was not mentally sound apart from the fact that two daughters have been excluded, certainly it creates suspicion for the reason that if the child is weak then out of normal love and affection, compassionately the parents would embrace him with more force and would make a Will which would practically inherit him. A perusal of the Will does not show any reason to unjustly exclude the son who is mentally unsound along with widow who was dependent upon husband. The statement of D.W.6 would show that Rajpal Singh, the brother has been shown to be physically and mentally weak and ailing with epilepsy which requires continuous treatment and the daughter has stated that the father would not have deprived him when compared to the fact that two other brothers who are beneficiaries of the Will are competent and able to earn and survive. Therefore, it creates a doubt on circumstances. 15. The other suspicious circumstance which comes to fore that the beneficiary Amar Jeet Singh who was examined as D.W.1 has stated that they are 3 brothers and 3 sisters and the mother is Kailash Kaur. All the brothers reside with mother and the relation between the father and mother were cordial and his elder brother Rajpal Singh suffers with epilepsy and he fuhrer admitted the fact that Rajpal Singh is mentally weak. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the rent is being recovered by the mother in respect of suit premises though she is not the owner. He has further stated that after death of his father, the property was recorded in the name of Kailash Kaur in the records of municipal corporation. He has further admitted that her mother had given an application in the Municipal Corporation to record her name as the owner of suit premises and on that basis, the name of Kailash Kaur was recorded after death of father Bishan Singh Jabbal. He has further admitted that her mother had given an application in the Municipal Corporation to record her name as the owner of suit premises and on that basis, the name of Kailash Kaur was recorded after death of father Bishan Singh Jabbal. He further admitted the fact that he and his brother Jaspal Singh had knowledge about filing of application by their mother Kailsash Kaur in Municipal Corporation to record her name as owner in place of late Bishan Singh Jabbal and they had not objected to mutate the name of their mother. Therefore, the fact emerges that propounder of Will did not object at any point of time to record the name of mother over the suit property. He further stated that till that time he did not have any knowledge about the existence of Will and further admitted that he did not know whether Kailash Kaur, the mother had knowledge of existence of Will. Mother Kailash Kaur, has not been examined in suit though she was defendant no.1. Deliberate non-examination of mother, who could have revealed facts about existence of Will in her possession and non-disclosure of it for considerable period of time would have led to clear doubts. The contention of the defendant is that he came to know about the existence of Will in 1997-1998 when it was disclosed by their mother. In absence of examination of mother, it also creates a doubt especially when the parties are residing under the same roof. The mother Kailash Kaur on the other hand was silent about this fact. 16. It is obvious that when mutation of name of Kailash Kaur was recorded in Municipal Corporation, it is done according to the procedure as laid down by the Municipal Corporation before her name is mutated, a general public notice is required to be published in the newspaper whereby the objections are invited, along-with fact normally the affidavits are also required to be placed that one person who wants his name to be mutated is the sole and exclusive owner of the property. When such names are mutated, it will be presumed that those official acts have been carried out as per the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 for mutation. When such names are mutated, it will be presumed that those official acts have been carried out as per the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 for mutation. Section 167(3) of the C.G. Municipal Corporation Act purports that in the event of death of a person in whom title to any land or building or in any part of share of any land or building vests, the person who as an heir or otherwise takes title of the deceased or devisee was, shall within three months from the death of the deceased, give notice of his title to the Commissioner in writing. Meaning thereby, the wife of Bishen Singh Jabbal namely Kailash Kaur exercised her right to be the sole exclusive owner of the property and no whisper of Will was made though according to the son, the beneficiary, the will was in favour of sons. 17. Subsequent to such mutation in Municipal Corporation, two of sons came out with the Will after a gap of 11 years from the date of its execution which has the effect to deprive the wife of testator too. So, it appears that the Will was not produced until 11 years after its execution though there were occasions to produce it. In cases like nature when the widow is deprived, it also creates a doubt and the Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh, London Trained Cutter, Johri Bazar, Jaipur Versus Smt. Chhoti (1990) 1 SCC 266 has followed the principles and the analogy laid down by Privy Council in AIR 1937 PC 101 . Para 22 of the said decision is quoted below: 22. The Privy Council in Mr. Biro v. Atma Ram & Ors., AIR 1937 PC 101 had an occasion to consider an analogous case where the wife was practically disinherited and there was unexplained delay in producing the will in public. There the alleged will by a testator gave only a life estate to his daughter who was the only child and who was to get some property at her marriage. The bulk of the estate was vested in the widow of the testator and three other women, namely, his mother, his step-mother and his paternal aunt. These women though entitled under the Hindu Law only to maintenance, were made joint owners equally with the widow of the testator. None of the devisees could get the estate partitioned or alienate it for necessity. These women though entitled under the Hindu Law only to maintenance, were made joint owners equally with the widow of the testator. None of the devisees could get the estate partitioned or alienate it for necessity. It was however, provided that the lady, who survived the other three devisees, would become the absolute owner of the estate. The widow of the testator would not get her husband's estate, if she predeceased any of her co-devisees. The will was not produced until 22 years after its execution though there were occasions to produce it, had it been in existence. Considering these circumstances, the Privy Council observed (at 104): "It is most unlikely that a person having a wife and a minor unmarried daughter, who should be the objects of his affection, would make a will which would practically disinherit them. That the testament is unnatural and runs counter to the ordinary sentiments of persons, having a status in society similar to that of Harbans Lal, cannot be seriously disputed. But this is not the only circumstances which tells against its genuineness. The will purports to have been executed on 24th August 1900, and the testator died within a month of that date. But it is strange that it was not produced until 1922, after the commencement of the present litigation. During this long period of 22 years, which intervened, there were occasions when the widow or her advisers could have produced the document, if it had been in existence; but they did not do so ...... " The Will in the present case, constituting the plaintiff as a sole legatee with no right whatever to the testator's wife seems to be unnatural. It casts a serious doubt on genuine- ness of the will. The will has not been produced for very many years before the court or public authorities even though there were occasions to produce it for asserting plaintiff's title to the property. The plaintiff was required to remove these suspicious circumstances by placing satisfactory material on record. He has failed to discharge his duty. We therefore, concur with the conclusion of the High Court and reject the will as not genuine”. 18. The plaintiff was required to remove these suspicious circumstances by placing satisfactory material on record. He has failed to discharge his duty. We therefore, concur with the conclusion of the High Court and reject the will as not genuine”. 18. Applying the aforesaid analogy in the instant case, the circumstances would go to show that according to the propounder, the Will was kept in dark for about 11 years, which has an effect to disinherit the widow and ailing son apart from the daughters. No plausible explanation has been given by the propounder and he failed to remove the doubt/suspicion existing on the face of record. 19. With respect to statement of attesting witness Bhanu Pratap Singh, at Para 2, it is stated that testator Bishan Singh Jabbal had written the will at his house. At that time, he called one Talreja, the other witness (since deceased) and both were present and had signed the will. He further stated that the will was meant for partition but he himself has not read the Will, it was read before him and Bishan Singh has signed the same and thereafter they had signed. Further in cross examination, he has stated that he does not know as to when the Vasiyatnama (Will) was written. He has further stated that he does not know who wrote the will as he had not seen the testator writing the same before him. So the contention of holograph will is negated. Therefore, there appears a contradictory statement of an attesting witness and according to this witness, to sign the Will he was called by Jaspal Singh, one of the beneficiaries. In cross examination, the attesting witness Bhanupratap Singh has further admitted that Bishen Singh Jabbal has told him that he (Bishen) wrote the Will and asked this witness to sign. The other propounder Jaspal Singh was not examined. A perusal of the statement of attesting witness Dr. Bhanu Pratap, therefore, does not inspire confidence and appear trustworthy as he has not stated that before him anything has happened about the fact of handwriting and as per his evidence, only on oral request of testator Bishen Singh he signed the will. Apart from it, perusal of original Will Ex.D-2 would show that the alleged signature. Bhanu Pratap, therefore, does not inspire confidence and appear trustworthy as he has not stated that before him anything has happened about the fact of handwriting and as per his evidence, only on oral request of testator Bishen Singh he signed the will. Apart from it, perusal of original Will Ex.D-2 would show that the alleged signature. Ex.D-2 would show that the alleged signature of Bishen Singh is not at the front page, but it is on back page and the description of the property is after the attesting witnesses. It is not clear that whether the said properties were subsequently implanted were written in the alleged will. The tenor of the signature of the attesting witnesses and the signature of alleged signature of testator do not remove suspicion. 20. Another suspicion which has come to fore for the reason of execution Ex.D-5 & D-6 which are the sale deeds executed by widow Smt. Kailash Kaur, and sons namely Shri Amarjeet Singh (D-3) Shri Jaspal Singh (D-4) in favour of Simran Builders Pvt. Ltd. The existence of such sale-deeds is not disputed by the appellants. The sale deeds are of the year 2003. A perusal of such sale deed would show that while such sale deeds Ex.D-5 and Ex. D-6 were exhibited during evidence, no objection was taken. The sale deeds would show that part of the suit property was sold. Reading of the contents of sale deed shows it was written in such sale deeds about devolution of subject property and was described to have bequeathed in their favour i.e., widow and two sons by Will dated 11.12.1989. On one hand, the appellants say that it was absolute property of two brothers being propounders / beneficiaries by virtue of sale deed dated 01.11.1988 (Ex.D- 2) whereas sale deeds (Ex.D-5 and D-6) in respect of part of property sold describes devolution by another Will speak about the existence of subsequent Will dated 11.12.1989. 21. The sale deeds which speak about the will dated 11.12.1989 whereby 3 persons i.e., mother and two sons have sold the property to a 3rd party appears on the basis of subsequent will dated 11.12.1989 whereas in defence, the two sons claimed that they became absolute owners by virtue of Will dated 01.11.1988. If by virtue of subsequent will dated 11.12.1989, the appellants have become the owners, the natural existence of earlier Will loose its significance. If by virtue of subsequent will dated 11.12.1989, the appellants have become the owners, the natural existence of earlier Will loose its significance. The subsequent will dated 11.12.1989 has not been produced, but efforts were made by filing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC along with certain documents to show that the said defect in date of Will has been rectified. 22. Before this Court an application was filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC to submit that rectification of such deed has been carried out and correction of date of Will has been made to read it as 01.11.1988. It is stated, it being a typographical mistake, this correction in Deed has been done in 2005. The rectification of instrument is governed by Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. For the sake of convenience, Section 26 is reproduced herein below: “26. When instrument may be rectified.- (1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing [not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) applies] does not express their real intention, then - (a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or (b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or (c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for reification of the instrument. (2) If, any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the court may in its discretion, direct rectification of instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value. (3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced. (3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced. (4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section unless it has been specifically claimed: Provided hat where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim.” 23. Reading of Section 26 would show that when by fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing does not express their real intention, then a suit is required to be instituted to have an instrument rectified, therefore, once the document is registered and thereafter any rectification is sought to be made, the proposed correction is required to be routed through the process of Court as enumerated in provisions of section 26 of the Specific Relief Act. In the instant case, the appellant has privately given a go-bye to the provisions of Section 26 of Specific Relief Act and corrected certain averments in the document of sale deed, which is not permissible and cannot be given or accepted simply on premises that it is again registered by the Sub-Registrar. The Sub- Registrar will have no other power to rectify any document of like nature and in the instant case, the finding arrived at by the learned court below was attempted to be avoided by private arrangement between the parties, which cannot be accepted as a legal precedent. The execution of the sale deed by 3 persons including the mother would also go to show that subsequent to the Will dated 01.11.1988, another Will might have been executed by the testator in the year 11.12.1989 whereby the property appears to have been jointly given to the widow and sons. Therefore, the existence of earlier Will itself comes to a serious doubt by the act of the appellants himself the propounder. 24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the propounders have failed to remove the suspicion over the Will on which they heavily banked upon and have failed to establish the Will to be the last Will of the testator by dispelling suspicious circumstances. 24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the propounders have failed to remove the suspicion over the Will on which they heavily banked upon and have failed to establish the Will to be the last Will of the testator by dispelling suspicious circumstances. Having held the Will to be invalid, the plaintiff would be entitled to the share of 1/6th in the suit property as of now as one sharer mother has expired and the devolution according to Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 can be set into motion so as to give benefit of amended provision of Section 6 on 09.09.2005 and consequent to repeal of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by Act 39 of 2005. Therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge with respect to the validity of Will does not require any interference by this Court. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. A decree be drawn to the above extent. No order as to costs.