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2023 DIGILAW 360 (AP)

Ramireddy Geya Priyanka v. Edara Sudhakar Reddy

2023-02-10

B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI, C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

body2023
JUDGMENT : B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi The present criminal appeal under Section 372 proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘Cr.P.C.,’) came to be filed by one Ramireddy Geya @ Priyanka (P.W.1) and Edara Bhavya (P.W.2) against the Judgment of acquittal delivered in Sessions Case No.120 of 2013 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Court, Ongole. 2. The accused was tried for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘IPC’). 3. The charge against the accused is that on 14.08.2011 at about 1.00 p.m., at the house of the deceased (Ramireddy Shayamala), the accused caused death of the deceased with a knife (M.O.3) by causing injury on her neck. 4. The facts of the case are as under: (i) P.W.1 is the daughter of the deceased and one T.Srinivasa Reddy; P.W.2 is the daughter of the deceased and the accused. The deceased married one T.Srinivasa Reddy and out of their wedlock P.W.1 was born to them. Later, the deceased after getting divorced, married the accused in the year 1991 and P.W.2 was born to them. It is said that the deceased was given Ac.30.00 cents of land by the accused and it was gifted to P.W.1 and P.W.2 showing the accused as guardian. The accused used to quarrel with the deceased for Ac.30.00 cents of land. The deceased, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were residing together and accused was residing separately. It is also said that the accused got separated from the deceased and married another woman. The accused even after the said marriage, was visiting the house of the deceased for the sake of the property. The deceased used to inform P.W.1 that the accused was quarrelling with the deceased over the property. (ii) The accused was living with his parents in his own house at Ongole. P.W.2 was studying in Indian Blossom International School, Ongole and she used to visit the house of the accused during Saturday and Sunday. P.W.1 was studying Intermediate in Sri Chaitanya Junior College at Ongole and going to college every day at 8.00 a.m., and return in between 5.00 and 5.30 p.m. (iii) On 14.08.2011 P.W.1 went to college at about 8.00 a.m., as usual. She used to get lunch either brought by her mother or through an auto-driver (P.W.7). P.W.1 was studying Intermediate in Sri Chaitanya Junior College at Ongole and going to college every day at 8.00 a.m., and return in between 5.00 and 5.30 p.m. (iii) On 14.08.2011 P.W.1 went to college at about 8.00 a.m., as usual. She used to get lunch either brought by her mother or through an auto-driver (P.W.7). On that day, at about 12.35 p.m., P.W.1 called the deceased through a mobile phone of her friends. The deceased did not attend the call. P.W.1 again called the deceased to the landline, but it was also unanswered. Then P.W.1 returned to the house at about 12.40 p.m. and asked the deceased as to why lunch was not sent to the college. The deceased informed P.W.1 that from the morning the accused was quarrelling with her and therefore, she could not prepare lunch. The accused was present in the house at that time. P.W.1 asked the accused not to quarrel with the deceased and later, went to college as she got EAMCET examination at 2.00 p.m. P.W.1 returned home at 5.15 p.m., and noticed several people at the house. P.W.1 asked the owner of the house as to what happened. He replied that somebody murdered her mother. P.W.1 went into the house and found the deceased in a pool of blood in the kitchen. The accused was present at that time. P.W.1 asked the persons present there as to what happened. She came to know that the accused and the deceased were quarrelling upto 1.00 p.m., and later, accused came out from the house. P.W.1 questioned the accused about the murder of the deceased. He did not give any answer and went away. Then P.W.1 and her maternal grandfather went to police station and presented Ex.P.1 report. (iv) The Sub-Inspector of Police, I Town Police Station, Ongole (P.W.17) received report from P.W.1 on 14.08.2011 at 7.00 p.m., and registered the same as a case in Crime No.215 of 2011 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and submitted Ex.P.20 FIR to the Magistrate and copies to all the concerned. (v) The Circle Inspector of Police, Ongole Town Circle (P.W.18) upon receiving a copy of the FIR, secured the presence of P.W.1 and her grandfather, examined and recorded their statements. (v) The Circle Inspector of Police, Ongole Town Circle (P.W.18) upon receiving a copy of the FIR, secured the presence of P.W.1 and her grandfather, examined and recorded their statements. Then, he along with Sub-Inspector of Police, visited the scene of offence i.e., the house of the deceased situated opposite to Ayyappa Swamy Temple, on the southern side of R.R Tank, Dumpa Subbareddy Nagar, Ongole. The dead body was lying in a pool of blood in the kitchen. P.W.18 called for the Clues Team. They visited the scene of offence and tried to take chance prints. P.W.18 observed the scene of offence in the presence of P.W.14 and another mediator and seized blood stained marble (M.O.1), controlled marker (M.O.2) under the cover of a Report (Ex.P.13). He prepared rough sketch. He got photographed the scene of offence under Ex.P.22. (vi) On the next day i.e., on 15.08.2011 he visited the scene of offence and secured the presence of P.W.1 and others, conducted inquest in the presence of P.W.14 and other panchayathdars and got prepared Inquest Report (Ex.P.14) and the dead body was sent to RIMS Hospital, Ongole for autopsy. P.W.15/Dr.M.Ramachandra Rao, working as CAS, RIMS Hospital, Ongole conducted Post-Mortem over the dead body of the deceased on 15.08.2011 at 12.30 p.m., and issued Ex.P.15 Preliminary Post-Mortem Report. Ex.P.17 is Final Post-Mortem Report and he opined that the death may be a homicidal death caused with a sharp-edged weapon like knife. The Doctor also opined that the cause of the death is due to shock and hemorrhage from an incised injury on the neck. (vii) P.W.18 continued with the investigation and arrested the accused on 23.08.2011 at 5.00 p.m., in the presence of mediators/P.W.16 and another at Nellore Bus Stand, Ongole and recorded his confession statement and basing on his confession, recovered knife (M.O.3) kept in the house of the accused and a blood stained T-Shirt (M.O.5) and after collecting all the necessary documents, filed the charge sheet which was taken on file as PRC No.3 of 2011 on the file of II Judicial Magistrate of First Class Court, Ongole. 5. On appearance of the accused, copies of the case documents, as required under Section 207 Cr.P.C., were supplied to him. 5. On appearance of the accused, copies of the case documents, as required under Section 207 Cr.P.C., were supplied to him. As the offence is triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the same was made over to the Court of the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, for trial and disposal in accordance with law. 6. Basing on the material available on record, charge, as referred to earlier, came to be framed, read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.18 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.28 and M.O.1 to M.O.5. After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, to which he denied. Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.33 are marked. 8. Analyzing the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Challenging the same, the present appeal came to be filed by P.W.1 and P.W.2, who are the daughters of the deceased in this case. 9. Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the learned Sessions Judge failed to see that the accused was last seen in the house of the deceased just prior to the murder of the deceased and the learned Sessions Judge did not appreciate the evidence of P.W.6 properly, though the evidence proves the presence of the accused at the house of the deceased just about the time of the death of the deceased. The learned counsel for appellants further submitted that there is no proper explanation from the accused as to how the deceased died and further contended that the blood-stained shirt and knife were recovered at the instance of the accused. The learned counsel for appellants further submitted that there is no proper explanation from the accused as to how the deceased died and further contended that the blood-stained shirt and knife were recovered at the instance of the accused. The material on record also would establish that the motive for the murder is property disputes between the deceased and the accused and therefore, all these circumstances proved by the prosecution, establishes the guilt of the accused and the accused did not discharge his burden as laid down under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the material on record and came to a wrong conclusion. 10. On the other hand, Sri T.Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, learned counsel for the accused submitted that there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that the accused harassed the deceased for the property. The evidence available on record was appreciated on all aspects by the learned Sessions Judge and reasons were given in the Judgment as to why the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 should be disbelieved. He further submitted that the material on record does not show the presence of the accused at the house of the deceased just prior to her death. The learned Sessions Judge has given detailed reasons as to why the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6 should be disbelieved on that aspect. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the circumstances relied on i.e., motive, last seen theory, recovery of knife and blood-stained shirt, beyond all reasonable doubt. He further submits that in a case rested purely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution should prove all the circumstances and the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved and there must be a chain of evidence so far complete so as to not leave out any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused and in support of his arguments he relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Satish Nirankari Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2017 SC 3051 , Uppala Bixam Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 410 . State of Rajasthan, AIR 2017 SC 3051 , Uppala Bixam Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 410 . 10.1 The learned counsel for accused further submitted that the burden to prove the guilt is always on the prosecution and cannot be shifted to the accused by virtue of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and in the present case prosecution failed to adduce acceptable evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and therefore, shifting of proving the innocence upon the accused cannot be made with the aid of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In support of his argument, he relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Surendra Kumar and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2342 . 10.2. The learned counsel for the accused further submitted that when the view taken by the Trial Court is ‘possible view’, having regard to the evidence on record with the cogent and valid reasons, the High Court cannot interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in N.Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 3 SCC 687 . 11. Though, the State did not file appeal, Sri S.Dhushyanth Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor took us through the evidence and findings given by the learned Sessions Judge and contended that the prosecution proved the motive, last seen theory and recovery of the weapon from the accused and that, the medical evidence establish that it is a homicidal death and in that view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge erred in acquitting the accused. 12. The point that arises for consideration is:- “Whether the prosecution is able to bring home the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, beyond reasonable doubt?” 13. POINT:- It is to be noted here that it is an appeal against acquittal filed by P.W.1 (informant) and P.W.2, who are daughters of the deceased. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal was dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Vijay Kumar case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed at para Nos.20 to 23, which are extracted hereunder: “20. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal was dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Vijay Kumar case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed at para Nos.20 to 23, which are extracted hereunder: “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 Cr.P.C., no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this court in the Judgment in Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the Judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p.432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan (Murugesan v. State (2012) 10 SCC 383 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 69) relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said Judgment, distinction from that of ‘possible view’ to ‘erroneous view’ or ‘wrong view’ is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a ‘possible view’, the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. 22. The relevant paragraphs in this regard where meaning and implication of ‘possible view’ distinguishing from ‘erroneous view’ and ‘wrong view’ is discussed are paras 32 to 35 of the judgment, which read as under: (Murugesan case, SCC pp.392-97) “32. In the above facts can it be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view? If the answer is in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the acquittal of the appellant-accused, on the principles of law referred to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial court did not reflect a possible view. In other words, the reversal to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial court did not reflect a possible view. It must be emphasized that the inhibition to interfere must be perceived only in a situation where the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view. The use of the expression ‘possible view’ is conscious and not without good reasons. The said expression is in contradistinction to expressions such as ‘erroneous view’ or ‘wrong view’ which, at first blush, may seem to convey a similar meaning though a fine and subtle difference would be clearly discernible. 33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: ‘erroneous. – wrong; incorrect. Wrong. – (1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral. Possible. – (1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved. (2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable. 34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court. 35. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court. 35. A consideration on the basis on which the learned trial court had founded its order of acquittal in the present case clearly reflects a possible view. There may, however, be disagreement on the correctness of the same. But that is not the test. So long as the view taken is not impossible to be arrived at and reasons therefor, relatable to the evidence and materials on record, are disclosed any further scrutiny in exercise of the power under Section 378 Cr.P.C., was not called for.” 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 653 this Court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the Judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722- 23) “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court’s judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e., under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m., to 7.00 p.m., of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m., to 7.00 p.m., of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court’s ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.” 14. Keeping in view of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above, we shall proceed to deal with the present appeal. 15. The case of the prosecution as disclosed in the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and also in Ex.P.1 is that, the deceased originally married one T.Srinivasa Reddy from Nellore and P.W1 was born to them and later, they took divorce and P.W.1 went to Hyderabad and started living there and her grandfather was looking after her. Subsequently, the accused married the deceased in the year 1991 and P.W.2 was born to them and later, disputes arose between the deceased and the accused and then, P.W.1, P.W.2 and deceased were living in a house at Ongole and the accused is living with his parents in another house at Ongole. But the accused was visiting the house of the deceased, though he married another woman, he harassed the deceased regarding Ac.30.00 cents of land, which was kept in the name of P.W.1 and P.W.2, showing the accused as guardian. But the accused was visiting the house of the deceased, though he married another woman, he harassed the deceased regarding Ac.30.00 cents of land, which was kept in the name of P.W.1 and P.W.2, showing the accused as guardian. On 14.08.2011 P.W.1 went to college at about 8.00 a.m., as usual and at about 12.45 p.m., she called her mother over a mobile phone of her friend to the mobile phone of her mother, but the deceased did not take the call and then, she again called the deceased to the landline, but, it was also not answered. Then, P.W.1 came to the house at 12.45 p.m., and found the deceased in the house and P.W.1 questioned her as to why lunch was not sent to her on that day and the deceased informed her that the accused was quarrelling with her and therefore, she could not prepare lunch. At that time, accused was present in the house. P.W.1 asked the accused not to quarrel with the deceased and then, went to college as she is having EAMCET examination at 2.00 p.m., and later, in the evening at about 5.00 to 5.30 p.m., she returned home and noticed people gathering at the house and accused was also present at the house. P.W.1 noticed the dead body of her mother in kitchen in a pool of blood and she asked the accused about the cause of the death, but the accused did not give any reply and went away and one of the persons present there, informed P.W.1 that the accused and deceased were quarrelling and that, sometime thereafter, accused left the house and thereupon P.W.1 along with her grandfather went to police station and presented Ex.P.1 report to P.W.17, who registered Ex.P.20 and P.W.18 started investigation in the case. This is the substance of testimony of P.W.1 about the motive and last seen theory. 16. But, in cross-examination of P.W.1 it was suggested that land in question was purchased with the money of the accused and it was kept in the name of P.W.1 and P.W.2 showing the accused as guardian and the maternal grandfather of P.W.1 mortgaged the said land to a bank for taking loan and subsequently, the loan was not discharged and then, the bank filed case before DRT, Visakhapatnam against P.W.1, P.W.2, deceased and grandfather. Then, accused filed an application before DRT, Visakhapatnam to save the property and further, the property was in the name of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and therefore, the accused will not get anything if he causes death of the deceased and therefore, the alleged motive is false and brought into the picture to foist a false case against the accused by the maternal grandfather of P.W.1 and P.W.2. The accused during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in support of the suggestions made to P.W.1, filed certain documents relating to the said DRT proceedings and several documents showing that certain LIC policies that were taken in the name of P.W.1 and P.W.2 by the accused to safeguard their welfare. 17. P.W.2 is the daughter of the deceased and the accused. She deposed that the accused used to reside at Lawyerpet in Ongole along with his parents and she used to visit her grandparents’ house and the accused used to visit her mother’s house daily and on 14.08.2011 she was called by her father at about 12.00 noon from his house and her father answered that he was outside and will come soon. Then, she went to bed and woke up at 3.00 p.m., and his father was in the house. Later, she went to dance class near Ayyappa Swamy temple. She found so many people at her mother’s house and she went inside the house to examine and found her mother in a pool of blood in the kitchen and her father was also present at that time. She also deposed that her grandfather gave Ac.30.00 cents of land and the same is registered in her name and in the name of P.W.1 and he also gave Ac.30.00 cents of land to her mother and that her father used to quarrel with her mother in respect of properties. She also deposed that her grandfather gave Ac.30.00 cents of land and the same is registered in her name and in the name of P.W.1 and he also gave Ac.30.00 cents of land to her mother and that her father used to quarrel with her mother in respect of properties. In the cross-examination, she pleaded ignorance about the transactions relating to the said lands, stating that she did not know whether the property given to her and her mother was mortgaged by her grandfather with Axis Bank and a case was filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and it was decreed ex parte and her father has taken steps to set-aside the ex parte decree to safeguard the property and she admitted that the accused is shown as guardian for the property given to her i.e., P.W.2 and the house of the accused and his parents is own house of the accused and it is known as ‘Baavya Residency’, which is in the name of P.W.2 and her father was paying school fee and also the bus fee to go to school and she was staying at her father’s house and at her mother’s house. 18. The prosecution, in order to establish the last seen theory, relied upon the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6. As discussed above, P.W.1 evidence is that she came to house at about 12.40 p.m., and at that time, accused was present in the house and she again went to college as she was having EAMCET examination at 2.00 p.m. 19. Admittedly, P.W.6 is a chance witness, examined by the prosecution. He deposed that he is resident of Markapur and studying IX class and he know the deceased and the accused. Admittedly, P.W.6 is a chance witness, examined by the prosecution. He deposed that he is resident of Markapur and studying IX class and he know the deceased and the accused. His father is living by doing ironing of clothes and on 14.08.2011 at about 12.30 noon, his father asked him to give iron clothes to the deceased and he went to the house of the deceased and called her and then, deceased came and took the clothes and he informed her that charge for ironing the clothes is Rs.50/- and the accused, who was present there, made an attempt to give money, but the deceased did not agree and then, deceased gave one hundred rupee note and asked him to bring change and then, he came out and again went to the house of the deceased within ten minutes and called the deceased, but she did not come out and then, he gave the change to the accused and the accused informed that the deceased was inside the house and then, he left the house and narrated the incident to his father. In the cross-examination, it was elicited that he was studying at Markapur at that time, and he came to the house of his father three days prior to the incident, and he does not know whether there are any mobile cloth iron carts located in between the house of the deceased and his house. He also deposed that prior to the incident he does not know the house of the accused. He saw the accused first time on the date of incident only and after that he seen the accused only in the court i.e., after a gap of three years. He admitted that in his statement before police he did not state that he returned to the house of the deceased within ten minutes as he did not get change. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.6 would show that prior to the date of incident, he does not know the accused and he saw the accused first time on the date of incident for few minutes only and later, after three years in the Court. It is an admitted fact that P.W.6 was examined one week after the incident and the delay in examination was not explained by the Investigating Officer. 20. It is an admitted fact that P.W.6 was examined one week after the incident and the delay in examination was not explained by the Investigating Officer. 20. It is pertinent to note down here that the prosecution though cited the father of P.W.6 as a witness in the case, did not examine him to corroborate the statement before the Court that P.W.6 is studying in Markapur, came to Ongole three days prior to the incident and he sent P.W.6 to the house of the deceased on 14.08.2011 at about 12.30 p.m., to hand over the iron clothes. P.W.6 evidence establish that he does not know the house address of the deceased also. It is pertinent to note down here that it is the evidence of P.W.1 that she came to house at about 12.40 p.m. Therefore, P.W.1 might have seen P.W.6 when he went to the house of the deceased for giving change. P.W.1 did not depose anything about the presence of P.W.6 at the house. 21. The prosecution has examined the auto-driver as P.W.7, who used to carry food to P.W.1 everyday to the college. He was examined on 16.09.2014. On that day, the prosecution did not ask the Court to treat the witness as hostile witness. It appears that he was recalled on 09.12.2015 and on that day, without putting any further question, straightaway declared as ‘hostile’ and cross-examined him by the prosecution. As per his evidence, on 14.08.2011 at about 12.30 noon he brought the empty carriage and powder of Raagulu to the house of the deceased and he pressed the calling bell and deceased opened the door and she received the Raagulu powder and she handed over two carriages to him to hand over one carriage in the college and another carriage at Bhagyanagar and accordingly, he handed over the two carriages. P.W.1 deposed that as she could not get lunch on 14.08.2011, she tried to call her mother, but the deceased did not respond and then, she went to the house at about 12.40 p.m. Whereas, the auto-driver/P.W.7 evidence would show that on that day the deceased handed over food to P.W.7 and in turn, he handed over the same at the college. As rightly contended by the defence, it appears that the prosecution as an after-thought recalled P.W.7 and sought permission to cross-examine him by declaring him as hostile witness to get over his evidence. 22. The other crucial evidence is P.W.15, the Doctor, who conducted Post-Mortem Examination over the dead body of the deceased. He opined that the time of death was about 24 hours prior to his examination which was commenced on 12.45 p.m., and concluded at 1.45 p.m., on 15.08.2011. The contention of prosecution appears to be that death of deceased might have occurred at about 1.00 p.m. P.W.1 deposed that she left the home at about 12.45 p.m., to attend the examination conducted in the college at 2.00 p.m. P.W.6 deposed that he went to the house at about 12.30 p.m., and later, after ten minutes he came back and again went away. In the evidence of P.W.1, she deposed that food was not sent to her on that day. Further, father of P.W.6 was not examined by the prosecution to corroborate the evidence of P.W.6 that he came to Ongole and he was present at Ongole on 14.08.2011. In the light of above circumstances, it creates a doubt about the truth of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6 visiting the house of the deceased during noon time and that, they saw the accused in the house, it cannot be held as proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. In those circumstances, there is no evidence to show that accused was present in the house in between 12.30 p.m., and 1.00 p.m., in the house of the deceased. 23. The other circumstance relied on by the prosecution is regarding recovery of M.O.3/knife and M.O.5/blood-stained T-Shirt from the house of the accused basing on the alleged confession statement of the accused recorded by P.W.18 in the presence of P.W.16. 23. The other circumstance relied on by the prosecution is regarding recovery of M.O.3/knife and M.O.5/blood-stained T-Shirt from the house of the accused basing on the alleged confession statement of the accused recorded by P.W.18 in the presence of P.W.16. P.W.16 deposed that on 23.08.2011 at about 5.30 p.m., while he was at Municipal Office, he received an intimation from P.W.18 to come to police station and then, he went to police station and thereupon, he along with police and other mediators went to Nellore Bus stand, there they found the accused and then, CI of Police interrogated him and he confessed that he would show the knife used for the commission of offence and also the blood stained clothes and then, accused went to his house and produced M.O.3/knife and M.O.5/T-shirt. In the cross-examination, it was elicited that he used to work as an auto-driver under L.W.2, who is the father of the deceased and he cannot say whether P.W.18 drafted Ex.P.18 and he cannot say in which direction the accused house is located. In the chief-examination, he deposed as if accused is known to him, stating that when they went to Nellore Bus stand, they found one person moving in a suspicious condition and on interrogation the person disclosed his name as that of the accused. The learned counsel for accused contended that he is a planted witness, who is close to the father of the deceased and therefore, recovery of knife and blood-stained clothes from the accused cannot be believable as the prosecution did not prove the said story beyond reasonable doubt. The learned counsel for the appellant took us to certain news items published in Daily Newspapers covered by Ex.D.27, Ex.D.28, Ex.D.29, Ex.D.30, Ex.D.31, Ex.D.32 and Ex.D.33, which were filed by the accused during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., contending that though it cannot be treated as evidence, they would show whether accused was in custody of the police from 15.08.2011 and therefore, alleged recovery is a false one. Even if it is assumed that recovery is established, mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of prosecution against the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Vijay Kumar case (supra) at para Nos.26 and 27, which are extracted hereunder: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot be prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Vijay Kumar case (supra) at para Nos.26 and 27, which are extracted hereunder: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot be prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M.Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 and in B.Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543. In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said Judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for an acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B.Jayaraj case (supra) read as under: (SCC pp.58- 59) “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M.Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89 and C.M.Girish Babu case (supra). 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M.Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89 and C.M.Girish Babu case (supra). 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.P-11) before LW9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW1 and the contents of Ext.P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” The above said view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment of the High Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. N.Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098 is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.” 24. In the light of above circumstances elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.6 and P.W.16, as discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the circumstances relied on by the prosecution are not proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the prosecution cannot rely upon Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to contend that accused failed to explain the circumstances under which the deceased died. 25. Therefore, the prosecution cannot rely upon Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to contend that accused failed to explain the circumstances under which the deceased died. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar case (supra) in regard to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, at para No.17, held as under: “We may now examine the role and conduct of the appellant No.1/Surendra Kumar who was escorting the deceased from her parental home on his scooter and is the last person seen in the company of the deceased. The Court below however has relied upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act to connect him with the crime. This according to us was the incorrect approach inasmuch as the burden to prove the guilt is always on the prosecution and cannot be shifted to the accused by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This proposition of law on criminal jurisprudence stood the test of time since Emperor Vs. Santa Singh, 4AIR 1944 Lahore 339 (FB) where Din Mohammad J., observed as under:- “28. …………Section 106 of the Evidence Act, cannot be used to strengthen the evidence for the prosecution. The prosecution must stand or fall on the evidence adduced by it and until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift on to the accused. Mere proof that an incriminating article is found in premises occupied by a number of persons does not in itself establish prima facie the guilt of any particular person or all of them jointly. That being so, they cannot be called upon after such evidence to establish their innocence. They can only be called upon to do that when the evidence has established a prima facie case against any one or more of them or all of them…….” In the present case, the prosecution failed to adduce acceptable evidence to prove the crime against the appellants and the Court according to us erred in shifting the burden of proving the innocence upon the accused, with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.” 26. In the above Judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court on circumstantial evidence, at para-No.12 held as under: “The nature, character and essential proof required in criminal cases was discussed in detail by Fazal Ali J in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 and the proposition of law culled out on circumstantial evidence was approved in many subsequent judgments and was recently reiterated by Krishna Murari J., writing the opinion for a three Judges Bench in Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan vs. State of Gujarat, (2020) 14 SCC 750 where it was succinctly laid down as under: - “17. It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.” 27. By applying the above said principles and the evidence on record in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having regard to the material contradictions which had already been discussed above, and also as referred to in the Trial Court Judgment, it can be said that acquittal is a “possible view”. Therefore, by applying the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in N.Vijay Kumar case which is stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appeal for the offence alleged. Hence, we did not find any material to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, since the findings of the Trial Court are probable and cannot be said to be perverse, even if another view is possible, basing on the same, in our view may not be correct. 28. Having regard to the above findings, we see no grounds to interfere with the impugned Judgment and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 29. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is ‘Dismissed’ confirming the Judgment, dated 05.05.2015, passed in Sessions Case No.120 of 2013 on the file of the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.