ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The short question involved in this writ appeal is, whether in absence of one non-judicial member of the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) established under Section 22B(2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, ‘the Act of 1987’), the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) consisting of Chairman and other non-judicial member can adjudicate the dispute and pass a valid award under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987? 2. The aforesaid question has fallen for consideration in the following factual backdrop: - 3. The Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services), Bilaspur, in Case No.12/2019 (Arshad Ahmad v. Executive Engineer, uxj laHkkx&2] if'pe CSPDCL and another) passed an award on 10-11- 2021 under Section 22A of the Act of 1987 consisted of a Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat and a non-judicial member which came to be challenged by the petitioner herein by way of W.P.(C)No.5022/2021 on the ground of jurisdiction that the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) did not have proper and full quorum under Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987, but that was dismissed by the impugned order by the learned Single Judge finding no merit. 4. It is the case of the petitioner/writ appellant herein that the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) was not duly constituted in terms of Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 and therefore the award was not passed by majority as provided in Section 22E(3) of the Act and therefore the award so passed has no sanctity in eye of law and thus, the award is void and it is liable to be set aside which the learned Single Judge has not found favour with and dismissed the writ petition. 5. Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant herein, would submit that the application filed under Section 22A of the Act of 1987 was dismissed by award dated 10-11-2021 by the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) consisted of the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat and one member i.e. only two members and therefore it was not duly constituted under Section 22B of the Act of 1987. He would further submit that since the award was not passed under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987 by majority, therefore, the award was liable to be set aside in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Bar Council of India v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 243 . According to Mr. Soni, learned counsel, Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 is mandatory in nature and award passed in contravention of the aforesaid provision is bad and is liable to be set aside. 6. Mr. Raja Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited (CSPDCL)/respondents herein, would support the impugned order and submit that the Chairman and one member of the Permanent Lok Adalat duly constituted have heard the case of the petitioner/writ appellant herein and passed the award. He would further submit that in absence of one member, the award cannot be held to be void or illegal and cannot be set aside on this technical ground and therefore the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae, would submit that in fact, the very fact that dissent which is the very soul of a judicial process is permissible under sub-section (3) of Section 22E of the Act of 1987 and furthermore, the aforesaid provision indicates that the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) has to act as a composite judicial body in full quorum of one judicial member and two nonjudicial members and in absence of one of them, the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) cannot be said to be duly constituted. He would further submit that every award passed under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987 shall be final under Section 22E(4) and it has to be executed by the civil court as if it is a decree by that court and therefore in the case in hand, the award has not been passed by majority and the learned Single Judge has only considered the rule without considering the provisions of the Act which is not in accordance with law. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae as well and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae as well and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to consider the provisions contained in the Act of 1987 as also the nature and scope of the said Act. 10. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to constitute legal services authorities to provide for free and competent legal service to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. The Act of 1987 is divided in seven chapters. Section 2(d) defines, “Lok Adalat” means a Lok Adalat organised under Chapter VI. Clause (a) of Section 22A defines, “Permanent Lok Adalat” means a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of Section 22B, only with respect to “public utility service” as envisaged under clause (b) of Section 22A and such Permanent Lok Adalats have to be established under Section 22B. Section 22B which relates to Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats states as under: - “22B. Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 19, the Central Authority or, as the case may be, every State Authority shall, by notification, establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places and for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services and for such areas as may be specified in the notification. Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 19, the Central Authority or, as the case may be, every State Authority shall, by notification, establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places and for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services and for such areas as may be specified in the notification. (2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified under sub-section (1) shall consist of— (a) a person who is, or has been, a district judge or additional district judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a district judge, shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat; and (b) two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government on the recommendation of the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, appointed by the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok Adalat and the other terms and conditions of the appointment of the Chairman and other persons referred to in clause (b) shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government. 11. In order to appreciate as to whether Section 22B of the Act of 1987 is mandatory or not, the entire Chapter VIA of the Act has to read as whole and in context of the said Act of 1987. Section 22D provides for “Procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat” and Section 22E provides for “Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final”. Sections 22A, 22B, 22C, 22D & 22E have been inserted in the Act of 1987 by the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 (37 of 2002) with effect from 11-6-2002 and an alternative institutional mechanism in Chapter VIA with regard to the disputes concerning public utility service is intended to provide an affordable, speedy and efficient mechanism to secure justice. By not making applicable the Code of Civil Procedure and the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act, there is no compromise on the quality of determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be objective, decide the dispute with fairness and follow the principles of natural justice. By not making applicable the Code of Civil Procedure and the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act, there is no compromise on the quality of determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be objective, decide the dispute with fairness and follow the principles of natural justice. Sense of justice and equity continue to guide the Permanent Lok Adalat while conducting conciliation proceedings or when the conciliation proceedings fail, in deciding a dispute on merit. It has been conferred with the power of adjudication. In Bar Council of India (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court while highlighting the object of having non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat, have held as under: - “36. It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising of judicial as well as non-judicial members. The whole idea of having non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat is to make sure that the legal technicalities do not get paramountcy in conciliation or adjudicatory proceedings. The fact that a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B comprises of one judicial officer and two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service does not show any abhorrence to the rule of law nor such composition becomes violative of principles of fairness and justice or is contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” Their Lordships further held that Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act of 1987 has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat, and observed as under: - “37. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under the 1987 Act has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a given case, it may be that the two non-judicial members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice.” 12. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987, which states as under: - “22E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final.— (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat.” 13. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987, which states as under: - “22E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final.— (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat.” 13. A careful perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 22E of the Act of 1987, would show that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat, as it consists of Chairman (judicial) and two non-judicial members. By virtue of Section 22D of the Act of 1987, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under this Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 22E(3) mandates that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act of 1987 shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat, as such, it has to be by majority of the persons constituting Permanent Lok Adalat. By virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 22E, every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or executing proceeding. 14. The Supreme Court in Bar Council of India (supra) has also held that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22E of the Act of 1987 has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat and it has further been held that in a given case, it may be that the two non-judicial members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice. 15. As such, sub-section (3) of Section 22E of the Act of 1987 indicates that the Permanent Lok Adalat has to act as a composite judicial body in full quorum as it recognizes the dissent which is the very soul of a judicial process. The entire concept of “dissent”, “dissenting view” hold a sacramental place in the judicial process. 15. As such, sub-section (3) of Section 22E of the Act of 1987 indicates that the Permanent Lok Adalat has to act as a composite judicial body in full quorum as it recognizes the dissent which is the very soul of a judicial process. The entire concept of “dissent”, “dissenting view” hold a sacramental place in the judicial process. Borrowing words of the learned and erudite Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice William O. Douglas, who wrote many dissenting opinions, – “The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a Judge of the Appellate Court”. He also said – “It is the right to dissent, not the right or duty to conform, which gives dignity, worth and individuality to man …”. According to William Brennan: “dissents contribute to the integrity of the (judicial) process not only by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority’s opinion but... also by contributing to the marketplace of competing ideas”[Wayne V. McIntosh & Cynthia L. Cates, Judicial Entrepreneurship: The Role of the Judge in the Market Place of Ideas, GRNWD, PUB. GRP. (1997)]. As such, by virtue of subsection (3) of Section 22E of the Act of 1987, freedom to dissent has been given to Chairman and members of the Permanent Lok Adalat, which is a power of great judicial virtue and wisdom and therefore in order to decide the dispute by Permanent Lok Adalat, the mandate contained in sub-section (2) of Section 22B has to be followed strictly and quorum of one judicial member as a Chairman and two non-judicial members has to be fulfilled under Section 22B(2) to decide the dispute competently and to pass a valid award under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987. 16. In the matter of Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Parkash Wanti (Smt) (Dead) and another, (1995) 5 SCC 159 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering a matter rendered by a Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short, ‘the Act of 1922’), while examining the Act of 1922 found that under Section 2(5), the Tribunal constituted under Section 60(1) shall consist of a President and two assessors. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships held as under: - “6. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships held as under: - “6. A conspectus of the above provisions would given us unerring indication of the legislative animation that the Tribunal shall consist of three members, namely, the President and two assessors and each is co-existent with the others. The Tribunal is a civil court and the President is the Presiding Judge of the court. Being a judicial member, undoubtedly, he has been conferred with power to preside over the Tribunal, summon the witnesses, secure the evidence and decide on questions of law and title and procedure. ...” Their Lordships further held in paragraphs 7 & 12 as under: - “7. The award of the Tribunal has been designated to be the award of the court and the Tribunal is the court and each member is entitled to his own opinion in determination of the compensation or measurements of the land. The Chairperson as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority opinion of the members shall be the decree of the Tribunal. The mandatory quorum, therefore, is three members and the award of the Tribunal is a decree of a civil court. … When the Tribunal consists of three members, the opinion has to be of the composite body, and not of the sole President. … In case of difference of opinion, the majority view would be the executable decree. In other words, it indicates that it is a three-member statutory body and does not consist of the Presiding Judge only. He is left with no option but has to associate the other members in determining the compensation of the acquired land for the trust or its nature or extent. Any other interpretation would be inconsistent with and derogatory to the scheme, purpose and intendment of the Act. The presence and participation of each member in the adjudication of the compensation or measurement or quality of land is of necessity, mandatory. … It would, therefore, be clear that all the three members should be present and should participate at the time of enquiry unless unavoidable, hear the matter on merits and the decision of the Tribunal, if not unanimous and if there be difference of opinion, be as per the majority. 12. … It would, therefore, be clear that all the three members should be present and should participate at the time of enquiry unless unavoidable, hear the matter on merits and the decision of the Tribunal, if not unanimous and if there be difference of opinion, be as per the majority. 12. The question thus arises whether the function by the Tribunal as a body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of the duties under the Act are quasi-judicial. The power to determine compensation and other questions involves adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal being quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine compensation etc. and designates the award as judgment and decree of a civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication by the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory. Determination of the compensation in disregard thereof renders the adjudication void, invalid and inoperative.” 17. The principle of law laid down in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra) applies with full vigour to the facts of the present case, as in the instant case also by virtue of Section 22(3) of the Act of 1987, all proceedings before a Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The function of Permanent Lok Adalat is not ministerial and therefore the composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be strictly in accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 (one judicial member as Chairman and other two members being non-judicial members), and decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be unanimous and as per the scheme of the Act of 1987 and in case of difference of opinion, it should be as per majority. Quorum of the Permanent Lok Adalat i.e. one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members, is mandatory quorum which is necessary for constituting competent Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate the dispute by way of conciliation or on merits. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra) further repelled the argument that the parties to the dispute have participated in the proceedings of the Tribunal without any demur or protest and therefore setting aside of the award would put them at great hardship. Their Lordships repelling the argument held that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate defeating legislative animation. It has been observed as under: - “22. It is next contended that since the matter is long pending and the appellant has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the single member award, it is not a fit case warranting interference under Article 136. Acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate defeating of legislative animation. ...” 18. As such, in absence of mandatory quorum of one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra), the impugned award of the Permanent Lok Adalat would be void, invalid and inoperative. 19. The learned Single Judge has relied upon sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 and Rule 6 of the Permanent Lok Adalat (Other Terms and Conditions of Appointment of Chairman and Other Persons) Rules, 2003 (for short, ‘the Rules of 2003’) to hold that quorum as contemplated under Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 is not required and still, valid award can be passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, which runs contrary to Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987. Even otherwise, Rule 4(4) of the Rules of 2003 takes stock of contingency, when the Chairman is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause as such, that is confined for day to day function of the Permanent Lok Adalat, but valid award under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987 cannot be passed in absence of duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987. Similarly, Rule 6 of the Rules of 2003 cannot be read and interpreted to hold that valid award under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987 can be passed in absence of one of its members or Chairman. 20. Even otherwise, it is well settled law that in case of conflict between the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the provisions of the Act will prevail. In the matter of Indian Young Lawyers Association and others v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 2018 SC (Supp) 1650 it has been held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that the rule-making authority does not have the power to make a rule beyond the scope of the enabling law or inconsistent with the law by observing as under: - “267. When the rule-making power is conferred by legislation on a delegate, the latter cannot make a rule contrary to the provisions of the parent legislation. The rule-making authority does not have the power to make a rule beyond the scope of the enabling law or inconsistent with the law., Additional District Magistrate v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451 Whether delegated legislation is in excess of the power conferred on the delegate is determined with reference to the specific provisions of the statute conferring the power and the object of the Act as gathered from its provisions., Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 ” 21. Similarly, in the matter of Hukam Chand etc. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1972 SC 2427 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the rules made under the statute being created by virtue of delegated legislation cannot override the statute which is manifestation of sovereign functions of the Government. In the matter of Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement and others v. Union of India and others, (2022) 7 SCC 323 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that a statutory provision will have precedence over delegated legislation. 22. In the matter of Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement and others v. Union of India and others, (2022) 7 SCC 323 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that a statutory provision will have precedence over delegated legislation. 22. In that view of clear legal position and in light of the legal analysis made herein-above, the provisions contained in sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 and Rule 6 of the Rules of 2003, upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge, are not applicable to hold that in absence of one non-judicial member, the Chairman and one other non-judicial member can pass valid award under Section 22E(3) of the Act of 1987. 23. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion and legal analysis, we are of the considered opinion that adjudication of dispute by the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) consisting of one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members, total three members, is mandatory and imperative and determination of dispute on merits by two members (one judicial member and one non-judicial member), the impugned award passed is void, inoperative and invalid and consequently, liable to be set aside. As such, the award dated 10-11-2021 passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Bilaspur in Case No.12/2019 (Arshad Ahmad v. Executive Engineer, uxj laHkkx&2] if’pe CSPDCL and another) as well as the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge are hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services), Bilaspur to decide the dispute afresh in accordance with law by duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987. 24. The writ appeal is allowed. No order as to cost(s). 25. Before we part with the record, we hereby appreciate the excellent assistance rendered by Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, amicus curiae.