ORDER : (Ananda Sen, J.) 1. This intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is filed by the appellant-Bank, challenging the order dated 11.08.2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 1985 of 2015, whereby, the punishment order as well as the appellate order in the departmental proceeding has been set aside by the learned Single Judge. 2. The appellant, herein, is the Bank of India (hereinafter to be referred as ‘Bank’), who is respondent before the learned Single Judge. The Original writ petitioner was working as a staff Clerk-cum-Computer Terminal Operator (CTO) under the appellant-Bank. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him. Chargesheet dated 15.11.2013 was issued against him under two heads, which are as follows:- Charge No.I You opened 74 KCC loan accounts in the system, as mentioned hereinbelow, which were sanctioned by Shri C.S.Biswas and S.K.Sardar respectively during their tenure as 2nd line officials in the Branch. You were aware that neither Shri Biswas nor Shri Sardar were having any authority to sanction these loan accounts, inasmuch as only the Branch Manager was having the delegated power to sanction such loans, still you opened the loan accounts in the system. Charge No.II You opened KCC loan a/c No.453032110000321 of one Shri Ajay Bhakat in the system on 10.06.2010, without ensuring that the proposal was sanctioned by the competent authority. Subsequently, the account was found to be a fictitious one. 3. Departmental proceeding was initiated by appointing the Enquiry Officer. Before the Enquiry Officer, several documents were exhibited. The oral evidence was also led. The enquiry Officer, analyzing the evidences adduced in the enquiry proceeding, concluded that both the charges levelled against the delinquent employee were found to be proved. Thereafter, the enquiry report was submitted before the Disciplinary Authority. 4. The Disciplinary Authority issued second show cause notice dated 10.9.2014. Considering the reply of the second show cause notice and also the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority passed the punishment order on 10.10.2014, dismissing the delinquent employee from service in terms of 6(a) of the Bipartite Settlement. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 4.4.2015 also dismissed the appeal, which led to filing of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1985 of 2015. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 4.4.2015 also dismissed the appeal, which led to filing of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1985 of 2015. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 11.8.2021 by setting aside the order dated 10.10.2014 by which, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service, and the appellate order dated 4.4.2015, holding that the quantum of punishment is highly excessive and does not commensurate with the charge. The learned Single Judge has held that though the petitioner has already superannuated yet the Disciplinary Authority should decide the quantum of punishment afresh. Thus the matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority. 5. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, the punishment and the appellate order have been set aside and the matter has been remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority to re-consider the quantum of punishment, the Bank has filed this intra-Court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank and the respondent and have perused the writ petition and the memo of appeal along with documents, filed therein. 7. Mr. A.Allam, learned senior counsel for the appellant argues that in the disciplinary proceeding, the scope of interference is very limited and the writ Court cannot sit in an appeal over the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. He further argues that once the charge is held to be proved, the quantum of punishment is the prerogative of the employer which cannot be interfered with. In the instant case, the punishment “dismissal without notice” cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate, as Charge No. (ii), which relates to opening of KCC Loan Account, without any sanction by the competent authority. The said account was later on found to be fictitious. He further adds that this charge was found to be proved and the writ petitioner being the clerk-cum-C.T.O., involved in the opening of the said fictitious loan account, thus the order of dismissal was correctly passed. He further argues that the findings arrived at page 17 of the impugned order/judgment to the effect that there is contrary statement of the Enquiry Officer in both places i.e. in the enquiry report in respect of proof of the charge is perverse, is not correct. He further argues that the findings arrived at page 17 of the impugned order/judgment to the effect that there is contrary statement of the Enquiry Officer in both places i.e. in the enquiry report in respect of proof of the charge is perverse, is not correct. It is his contention that the learned Single Judge has not considered the enquiry report properly before arriving at the said finding. 8. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the employee-writ petitioner states that in the enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer in respect of Charge Nos. (i) and (ii) had held that both the charge are not proved, but later on, in the last paragraph came to different findings and held that both the charges stand proved, which itself is a perversity. It is his further contention that the writ petitioner being the clerk-cum-CTO had to obey the dictate of his controlling authority, thus he had made entries in the computer in respect of KCC Loan account for which, the petitioner cannot be held responsible. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has only remanded the matter on the quantum of punishment, which needs no interference by this Court in this L.P.A. 9. The facts of this case, which are mentioned in the aforesaid paragraphs-2, 3 and 4 are undisputed. The charge against the writ petitioner has also been reproduced in paragraph-2 above. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has only remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority after setting aside the punishment order and the appellate order, holding that the punishment is excessively harsh, as there is no allegation of fraud and misappropriation against the petitioner. Remanding the matter on the point of quantum of punishment implies that the learned Single Judge has also arrived at a conclusion that the misconduct is proved. Once the misconduct is proved, it is prerogative of the employer to inflict appropriate punishment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Rajendra Singh, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 in paragraph 19 has held as under:- “19.1 When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Rajendra Singh, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 in paragraph 19 has held as under:- “19.1 When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2 The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to ber shocking to the conscience of the Court.” Further, in the case of Cooperative Central Bank Limited and Another Vs. K. Hanumantha Rao and Another, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 528 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 7.2 has also held as under: “7.2 Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the court, that the court steps in and interferes.” 10. In the instant case, from the second charge, it is clear that the petitioner had opened the KCC Loan Account of one Sri Ajay Bhagat in the system on 10.6.2010 without ensuring that the proposal was sanctioned by the competent authority, but subsequently it was found that the account was fictitious, thus, this charge stood proved. 11. We have also gone through the enquiry report. From the enquiry report, we find that the Enquiry Officer in detail has discussed the evidences and the materials, which were placed before him and thereafter in the last paragraph, he concluded that both the charges are found to be proved. 11. We have also gone through the enquiry report. From the enquiry report, we find that the Enquiry Officer in detail has discussed the evidences and the materials, which were placed before him and thereafter in the last paragraph, he concluded that both the charges are found to be proved. The petitioner's case is that in the earlier part of the enqiry report, both the charges were considered not proved and the same has been held to be proved later on by the Enquiry Officer, which is a perversity. After going through the enquiry report, we are not in agreement with the aforesaid contention raised by the learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-employee. Though in the enquiry report, which separately deals with Charge No. (i) and Charge No. (ii), it has been typed as the charge could not be proved, but after reading the entire report, it is clear that the same was the mere submission of the defence, and not the finding of the Enquiry Officer. Running page 90 of this memo of appeal is the part of the enquiry report, wherein, the Enquiry Officer has noted the gist of defence argument. Under the aforesaid head, the evaluation made by the employee-writ petitioner was noted and the submissions of the employee was also noted. This noting to the effect that the “charge stands not proved” is a recording of the submission of the defence of the charged employee and the same is not the finding of the Enquiry Officer. The finding of the Enquiry Officer starts from heading “my analysis of evidence”. After analyzing the evidence, the Enquiry Officer in the last paragraph found that both the charges are proved. Thus, it is factually incorrect to suggest that the Enquiry Officer concluded that the charges are not proved. 12. It is well settled that in a departmental proceeding, the writ Court cannot act an an appellate Court. The Scope of interference is limited. On amonst others, one ground for interference can be disproportionate quantum of punishment to the proved charge. The learned Single Judge has held that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the proved charge, as there was no fraud or misappropriation by the writ petitioner. The Scope of interference is limited. On amonst others, one ground for interference can be disproportionate quantum of punishment to the proved charge. The learned Single Judge has held that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the proved charge, as there was no fraud or misappropriation by the writ petitioner. The second charge, which is levelled against the writ petitioner, as quoted above, is serious charge which is of opening of loan account of KCC without any sanction of the higher authority, which later on was found to be opened in the name of fictitious person. This allegation is a serious allegation that too it is against a Bank employee. This charge was found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. This Act of the writ petitioner definitely shakes the confidence of the employer upon the employee, where the employer is a financial institution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 309 has held that the scope of interference with punishment awarded by a Disciplinary authority is very limited and unless the punishment appears to be shockingly disproportionate, the court cannot interfere with the same. The quantum of punishment, in this case, which is dismissal from service, cannot be said to be disproportionate to the proved charge, considering the charge. 13. When the aforesaid charge stands to be proved, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal from service without notice is disproportionate to the proved charge. Considering this fact that the writ petitioner was a Bank employee, the quantum of punishment thus, cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the proved charge. As held earlier, it is apparent that learned Single Judge remanded the matter with a direction to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order on the quantum of punishment. This means that learned Single Judge also found the charges to be proved. This order is not being challenged by the delinquent employee. 14. In view of what has been held above, the learned Single Judge could not have allowed the writ petition. This letters Patent Appeal is thus allowed. The impugned order dated 11.8.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside. The punishment order dated 10.10.2014 as well as the appellate order dated 4.4.2015 is revived.