ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 06.08.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir Champa, C.G. in Criminal Revision No. 37/2020 whereby the order dated 20.11.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa, C.G. in Complaint Case No. 914/2019 has been affirmed and the revision preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that a complaint case under Section 200 of the CrP.C. alleging therein commission of offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC was filed by the respondent No. 1 against the petitioner, who was posted as Doctor at Community Health Centre, Pamgarh inter-alia on the ground that on 05.12.2014, Smt. Sundariya Bai, Wife of Durgesh Ratnakar was brought to the Community Health Centre, Pamgarh, who was undergoing labour pain. After examining her, Sundariya Bai was hospitalized at about 4 PM by the petitioner on the same day, thereafter, the petitioner left for her home. At about 9 PM on the same day, Sundariya Bai felt extreme labour pain therefore, the petitioner was called by the family members of Sundariya Bai however she refused to attend her call of duty. At about 12 AM and at 3 AM on intervening night of 05-06.12.2014 the petitioner was again called by Sundariya Bai’s family members then also she didn’t turn up. Later on, the delivery was conducted under the supervision of nurses present in the hospital which led to excessive bleeding to Sundariya Bai and consequently, the baby was declared stillborn at birth. At about 4 AM, the petitioner was again requested to attend the patient, however, after 15 minutes she came and declared Sundariya Bai and the baby dead. It was further alleged that the petitioner was negligent towards her duty which led to death of Sundariya Bai and the stillborn baby. A written complaint in this regard was made to the Police Station - Pamgarh on 07.12.2014 however it went in vain. Thereafter on 20.02.2015 the Sub Divisional Officer, Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Chmpa, CG submitted the Magisterial Inquiry report where the petitioner was found negligent towards discharge of duty. A written complaint in this regard was made to the Police Station - Pamgarh on 07.12.2014 however it went in vain. Thereafter on 20.02.2015 the Sub Divisional Officer, Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Chmpa, CG submitted the Magisterial Inquiry report where the petitioner was found negligent towards discharge of duty. On such complaint, the statement of witnesses was recorded and thereafter, learned trial Court took cognizance of the offence on 20.11.2019 and registered the Complaint Case No. 914 of 2019 for commission of offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC against the petitioner and fixed the matter for her appearance. 3. The present petitioner preferred a Criminal Revision No. 37/2020 before the learned Sessions Court against the order of taking cognizance dated 20.11.2019 passed in Complaint Case No. 914 of 2019 but same was dismissed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 06.08.2021, which is under challenge before this Court. 4. Notably, it is worthy to mention here that the petitioner herein preferred a Complaint Case No. 75/2015 on 22.12.2014 against the respondent No. 1 alleging therein commission of offence punishable under Sections 186, 323 and Section 4 of Chhattisgarh Chikitsa Sevak tatha Chikitsa Seva Sansthan (Hinsa Tatha Sampatti Ki Kshati Ya Hani Ki Roktham) Adhiniyam 2010 on the premise that on 06.12.2014 at about 5:45 AM the respondent No. 1 obstructed the petitioner herein being the public servant in discharge of her official functions and also assaulted her resulting into injury. Vide order dated 25.02.2020 the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa (C.G.) dismissed the Complaint Case filed by the petitioner and by extending benefit of doubt, acquitted the respondent No. 1 of the aforesaid offences. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that: (i) The learned trial Court fell into error in not complying with the provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. which specifically provides that no Court shall take cognizance of offence except with the prior sanction for prosecution granted by the competent authority in this regard. Since the petitioner was a government servant and allegation against her is that of negligence in discharge of her official duty, therefore it was imperative on the part of complainant/respondent No. 1 to obtain proper sanction from the department concerned/competent authority. Since the petitioner was a government servant and allegation against her is that of negligence in discharge of her official duty, therefore it was imperative on the part of complainant/respondent No. 1 to obtain proper sanction from the department concerned/competent authority. In this regard he would place reliance upon the matter of Amal Kumar Jha vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 2 SCR 1060 and Indra Devi vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2021) 8 SCC 768 . (ii) He would further contend that absence from duty and delay in attending a patient would not attract criminal offence. In this regard he placed reliance upon the matters of Dr. R. Jairam Iyer vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Cr. M.P. No. 765 of 2010 decided by this Court and Dr. Bhushan vs. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No. 225 of 2018, rendered by the Bombay High Court. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that: (i) The instant petition as preferred under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is barred by virtue of 397(3) of the Cr.P.C. for the reason that the instant petition is in the nature of second revision which is impermissible under the law. He would further submit that the conduct of the petitioner was grossly negligent therefore; a complaint was made to the District Magistrate who in turn ordered for a magisterial inquiry, which was conducted by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Pamgarh District Janjgir-Champa, wherein the petitioner was found negligent in performance of her duty. He would also submit that from the contents of petition it is evident that defence taken by the petitioner are matter of evidence which cannot be decided in a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. He has placed strong reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Krishnan vs. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 . (ii) He would also submit that for prosecuting the petitioner no sanction is required as the alleged act of the petitioner is not connected with her official duty. A public servant is not required to indulge in criminal activities and in such cases sanction under Section 197 is not required. In this regard he placed reliance upon Devinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab through CBI, (2016) 12 SCC 87 . A public servant is not required to indulge in criminal activities and in such cases sanction under Section 197 is not required. In this regard he placed reliance upon Devinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab through CBI, (2016) 12 SCC 87 . (iii) It is also contended on behalf of respondent No. 1 that as per the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics), Regulations, 2002, ‘the patient must not be neglected’ as provided under Chapter 2 ‘Duties of Physicians to their patients’. A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should, however, respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency. Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the patient, nor should he withdraw from the case without giving adequate notice to the patient and his family. Provisionally or fully registered medical practitioner shall not willfully commit an act of negligence that may deprive his patient or patients from necessary medical case. 7. In counter, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present petition as framed and filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. invoking inherent powers of this Court is maintainable. In order to substantiate it, he placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnan vs. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 , wherein it was held that where required statutory procedure has not been complied with, it is, but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. 8. Learned State counsel would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the material available on the record. 10. For the purpose of discussion it would be apt to go through the bare provisions of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It reads thus: 197. 8. Learned State counsel would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the material available on the record. 10. For the purpose of discussion it would be apt to go through the bare provisions of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It reads thus: 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants: (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)]: (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted. Explanation - For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under section 166A, section 166B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB] or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (2).............. (2).............. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the expression “State Government” were substituted. (3A).............. (3B).............. (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held. 11. First of all, this Court considers it appropriate to deal with the judgment relied upon by the counsel for respondent No. 1 as well as by the counsel for the petitioner regarding maintainability of this petition. In Krishnan (supra) it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It reads thus: “10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.........” At Para 14 it was further observed that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code which reads thus: “14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below.........” 12. In view of the above discussion, the argument of counsel for respondent No. 1 does not find any force as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It has been further observed that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice. Thus, the argument advanced on behalf of respondent No. 1 regarding maintainability of this petition is hereby rejected. 13. Now the second issue involved in this petition is whether the petitioner was discharging her official duty so as to attract the provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. In State of Maharashtra vs. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339 , their lordships at the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained how it is to be understood “any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty” it reads thus: 5............So far public servants are concerned the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, ‘no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, ‘no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’. Use of the words, ‘no’ and ‘shall’ make it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. Very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black’s Law Dictionary the word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the exercise of jurisdiction’ or ‘power to try and determine causes’. In common parlance it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have committed during discharge of his official duty. 6. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ be understood? What does it mean? ‘Official’ according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office. And official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In S.B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 , it was held: (SCC pp. 184-185, Para 17) “The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.” Use of the expression, ‘official duty’ implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. In P. Arulswami vs. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 this Court after reviewing the authorities right from the days of Federal Court and Privy Council held: “.......It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dubey vs. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 , thus: “The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty.....there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” (Emphasis supplied) If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. 14. In Amal Kumar Jha vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 6 SCC 734 it was observed thus: 5. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 has observed thus: “18. Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official’s duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is: “197. (1) .......when any public servant.......is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty......” We have therefore first to concentrate on the word “offence.” 19............. 20............. 21. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is: “197. (1) .......when any public servant.......is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty......” We have therefore first to concentrate on the word “offence.” 19............. 20............. 21. We therefore hold that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies and that sanction was necessary, and as there was none the trial is vitiated from the start. We therefore quash the proceedings against the second accused as also his conviction and sentence.” (Emphasis in original) 15. In Indra Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 8 SCC 768 , it was observed that: “10. We have given our thought to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Section 197 Cr.P.C. seeks to protect an officer from unnecessary harassment, who is accused of an offence committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and, thus, prohibits the court from taking cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. Public servants have been treated as a special category in order to protect them from malicious or vexatious prosecution. At the same time, the shield cannot protect corrupt officers and the provisions must be construed in such a manner as to advance the cause of honesty, justice and good governance. (See Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh) The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. However, such sanction is necessary if the offence alleged against the public servant is committed by him “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” and in order to find out whether the alleged offence is committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”, the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Budhikota Subbarao) The real question, therefore, is whether the act committed is directly concerned with the official duty.” 16. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Budhikota Subbarao) The real question, therefore, is whether the act committed is directly concerned with the official duty.” 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in above discussed authoritative pronouncements held that use of the words, ‘no’ and ‘shall’ under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. make it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. Very cognizance is barred. That is the complaint cannot be taken notice of. It has been further observed by their Lordships that in the wider sense, the words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty’ will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. 17. ‘Official duty’ therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction will stand frustrated. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has referred to Devinder Singh (supra) which has recently been relied upon in the matter of A. Srinivasulu vs. State Rep. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction will stand frustrated. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has referred to Devinder Singh (supra) which has recently been relied upon in the matter of A. Srinivasulu vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2023 Live Law (SC) 485 wherein it was observed thus: “37. It is seen from the portion of the decision extracted above that the Federal Court categorised in Dr. Hori Ram Singh (supra), the decisions given under Section 197 of the Code into three groups namely (i) cases where it was held that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it; (ii) cases where more stress has been laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity to commit the offence; and (iii) cases where stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed. While preferring the test laid down in the first category of cases, the Federal Court rejected the test given in the third category of cases by providing the illustration of a medical officer committing rape on one of his patients or committing theft of a jewel from the patient’s person. 39. In State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 , a two Member Bench of this Court explained that the protection under Section 197 has certain limits and that it is available only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The Court also explained that if in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. 41. In Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab through CBI, (2016) 12 SCC 87 , this Court took note of almost all the decisions on the point and summarized the principles emerging therefrom, in paragraph 39 as follows: “39. 41. In Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab through CBI, (2016) 12 SCC 87 , this Court took note of almost all the decisions on the point and summarized the principles emerging therefrom, in paragraph 39 as follows: “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder: 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 Cr.P.C. has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197 Cr.P.C. but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would apply.....” 42. In D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 , this Court explained that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty but also required for any act purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority. This Court also held that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty.” 19. This Court also held that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty.” 19. From the above referred principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it emerges that the sanction as contemplated under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is required only in discharge of official acts, as the there is no shield of law to commit a crime in the garb of discharging official duty. Even if a public servant exceeds in discharge of his official functions, it will not deprive him of the protection under Section 197. Further, in case offence was incomplete without proving the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would apply. The counsel for respondent No. 1 tried to build up the case on the premise that the alleged act of the petitioner would not fall under the term ‘in discharge of official duty’ however the fact and circumstances of the case lead the way otherwise. Even if for the sake of argument it is deemed that the alleged act of the petitioner does fall within the scope of ‘discharge of her official duty’ however without proving the official act of the petitioner, she cannot be made to face prosecution in the instant case as the alleged negligence relates to the act which was committed only in the discharge of official duty, and in such circumstances the provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. would have instant application with its full rigour as held in Devinder Singh (supra). Thus, the principles of law as what emerge from Devinder Singh (supra) instead help the case of the petitioner. As a sequel, applying the ratio laid down in above discussed judgments it is held that the petitioner’s act very well fell within the term ‘in discharge of official duty’ which requires sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. 20. The next issue involved in the present petition is whether absence from duty and delay in attending a patient would attract criminal offence. In Dr. The next issue involved in the present petition is whether absence from duty and delay in attending a patient would attract criminal offence. In Dr. R. Jairam Iyer (supra) this Court relying upon the earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Rakesh Ranjan Gupta vs. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 1888, observed that if there was delay on the part of the doctor to attend on the patient, that may at the worst be a case of civil negligence and not one of culpable negligence falling under the above section. It reads thus: (28) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Rakesh Ranjan Gupta vs. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 1888, while considering the effect of delay by medical professional to attend the patient have held that mere delay to attend on the patient would not attract Section 304-A IPC by holding as under: “3. The above allegations do not disclose, prima facie, a case of rash or negligent act on the part of the appellant so as to attract the penal provision under Section 304-A IPC. If there was delay on the part of the doctor to attend on the patient, that may at the worst be a case of civil negligence and not one of culpable negligence falling under the above section. That apart, the cause of death has now been disclosed from the report of the chemical examiner, as one of consuming poison. The viscera examined in the chemical laboratory showed that result. It is nobody’s case that the appellant has administered poison to the patient. It is now apparently clear that death was not on account of anything which the appellant did to the patient. It was primarily due to the poison being consumed by the deceased. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that death of the deceased was caused by any act done by the appellant.” (29) Thus, taking the allegations against the petitioner as it is and its face value, merely on account of alleged delay by the petitioner in attending the patient (Shri Pingle) in absence of material on record that delay is sole reason for the death of patient Shri Pingle, the petitioner cannot be held to be “gross negligent” requiring prosecution of the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. (30) It is well settled law, that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of the justice, where the allegation made in the complaint or charge-sheet, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or where a criminal complaint is manifestly attended with mala-fide. [Kindly See State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335] 21. Further in Dr. Bhushan (supra) the Bombay High Court though was dealing with a case involving Section 304 of the IPC, yet it was of the view that considering the allegations leveled against the petitioner therein of his absence in the NICU at relevant time would, even if prosecution’s case is presumed to be true, at the most, lay blame of dereliction of duty. It reads thus: 17. We are mindful of the guidelines laid down in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, in Para 102 thereof relating to quashing of F.I.R. In the instant case, considering the allegations as leveled against the petitioner, of his absence in the NICU at the relevant time, would, even if everything as mentioned in the charge-sheet was presumed to be true, at the most, may lay a blame of dereliction of duty at his doorstep, for which Departmental action can always be taken by the authorities, as has been reported to have been done in the case of Dr. Nistane, Professor and Head of Department of Paediatrics, who was absent without sanctioned leave on the fateful day. The material in the charge-sheet is certainly not indicative of the petitioner having prima facie committed an offence under Section 304 of I.P.C. We are, thus, of the view that continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would clearly be an abuse of the process of law, which would always be unsustainable in law. 22. The material in the charge-sheet is certainly not indicative of the petitioner having prima facie committed an offence under Section 304 of I.P.C. We are, thus, of the view that continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would clearly be an abuse of the process of law, which would always be unsustainable in law. 22. In view of the above, it is quiet vivid that the on the fateful day the petitioner did not attend her call of duty despite repeated requests, for it, she can, at the most, be liable for dereliction of duty however she cannot be prosecuted for culpable negligence. Therefore, the stand of the counsel for respondent No. 1 that ‘patient must not be neglected’ is correct, however as observed above the petitioner at the most can be held liable for dereliction of duty. Thus, in this factual backdrop, this Court is of considered view that continuation of proceedings against the petitioner would be clear abuse of process of law. 23. Taking into consideration the law laid down in above discussed authoritative pronouncements, the material available on record and the allegations made against the petitioner, I am inclined to allow this petition. The order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pamgarh, District Janjgir Champa, C.G. in Complaint Case No. 914 of 2019 regarding taking of cognizance of the offence and the subsequent order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir Champa, C.G. in Criminal Revision No. 37/2020 dated 06.08.2021 are hereby set aside. In the result, the petition is allowed.