JUDGMENT : (Sandeep Sharma, J.) 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 12.10.2022, passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., whereby an application bearing C.M.A No.385 of 2021, having been filed by respondent/plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of plaint came to be allowed, petitioner/tenant has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the aforesaid order and reject the application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with section 151 CPC. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/plaintiff instituted eviction petition under Section 14 { 2(i), 2(ii)a} & 14 {2(v)} of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 against the petitioner/respondent on the ground of arrears of rent and subletting, but before framing of issues respondent/plaintiff filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with section 151 CPC, seeking amendment of plaint on the ground that premises sought to be evicted are also bonafidely required for use of wife of respondent/landlord and his daughter-in-law, who intend to expand her business of boutique in the existing residential building. 3. Aforesaid prayer made on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff came to be resisted on behalf of petitioner/tenant, who submitted that in the event of petition being allowed, entire nature and complexion of the suit would be changed. Learned trial court on the basis of pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties allowed the application and as a result of which, petitioner also came to be permitted to seek eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement along with other grounds of arrears of rent and subletting. In the aforesaid background, petitioner/tenant has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the order impugned in the instant proceedings. 4. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned order, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity and as such, no interference is called for. 6. 4. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned order, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity and as such, no interference is called for. 6. Undoubtedly, at the first instance, petition for eviction came to be instituted on behalf of respondent/plaintiff on the ground of arrears of rent and subletting, but before framing of issues, he filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC seeking amendment to the effect that demised premises are also required to be evicted on the ground of bonafide requirement. Though Mr. Vishal Bindra, learned counsel representing the petitioner/tenant vehemently argued that proposed amendment, if allowed, would change the entire complexion of suit/petition, but this Court finds no merit in the aforesaid submissions for the reason that petition sought to be amended is for eviction, may be initially filed on the ground of arrears of rent and subletting, but consequence would remain same in case, additional ground of bonafide requirement sought to be raised by the respondent /plaintiff, is permitted to be raised by way of amendment. 7. Careful perusal of the provision of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC clearly reveals that Court may at any stage permit parties to lis to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and which may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. No doubt, proviso to aforesaid provision suggests that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the commencement of the trial. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that application for amendment came to be filed on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff prior to commencement of trial because issues are yet to be framed. 8. Mr. Bindra, learned counsel representing the petitioner/tenant argued that ground sought to be raised by way of amendment on bonafide requirement is an independent cause of action for which purpose, separate petition under Section 14(d) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act is required to be filed. 8. Mr. Bindra, learned counsel representing the petitioner/tenant argued that ground sought to be raised by way of amendment on bonafide requirement is an independent cause of action for which purpose, separate petition under Section 14(d) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act is required to be filed. No doubt, careful perusal of provision contained under Section 14(d) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act suggests that landlord can seek eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement under aforesaid provision of law, but that doesn’t mean that landlord is estopped from taking or raising aforesaid ground alongwith other grounds, if any, raised for eviction of the demised premises. In the instant case, initially, respondent/landlord sought eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and subletting, but before such petition could be decided on its own merit, another ground of bonafide requirement became available to him and as such, he is within his right to file an application for amendment seeking therein permission to add grounds of bonafide requirement for eviction. 9. In the instant case, while filing application under Order 6 rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, respondent/plaintiff categorically stated that his wife is running a boutique in the residential premises situated in the backside of the shop in question. Since wife of the respondent/plaintiff intends to expand her business by taking assistance of her daughter-in-law, Varsha Sood, she requires frontal display shop where she can put items for display for the public. Whether respondent/plaintiff bonafidely requires the premises, is a question to be decided by the court below in totality of evidence led on record by respective parties, but for allowing prayer for amendment pleadings to the effect that premises are required bonafidely for expansion of business are sufficient. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Ganesh Prasad vs. Rajeshwar Prasad and others, 2023 (3) SCC 374, has recently held that cause of action in a suit has no reference to defence taken in suit, nor is it related to evidence by which that cause of action is established. It has been further held in the aforesaid judgment that all amendments of pleadings should be allowed liberally, which are necessary for determination of real controversies in suit provided that proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action. It would be apt to take note of following paras of the aforesaid judgment:- “32. It has been further held in the aforesaid judgment that all amendments of pleadings should be allowed liberally, which are necessary for determination of real controversies in suit provided that proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action. It would be apt to take note of following paras of the aforesaid judgment:- “32. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order. 33. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the courts should be liberal in allowing applications for leave to amend pleadings but it is also well settled that the courts must bear in mind the statutory limitations brought about by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Acts; the proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 being one of them. In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das reported in (2008) 8 SCC 511 , the law has been laid down by this Court in the following terms: (SCC p. 517, para 16) “16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil [ AIR 1957 SC 363 ] which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. (Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar [ (1990) 1 SCC 166 ].)” 34. In the case of P.A. Jayalakshmi v. H. Saradha and Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 525 , the above observations were reiterated by this Court and in the light of the same, this Court in para 9 held as under: “9. (Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar [ (1990) 1 SCC 166 ].)” 34. In the case of P.A. Jayalakshmi v. H. Saradha and Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 525 , the above observations were reiterated by this Court and in the light of the same, this Court in para 9 held as under: “9. By reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, measures have been taken for early disposal of the suits. In furtherance of the aforementioned parliamentary object, further amendments were carried out in the years 1999 and 2002. With a view to put an end to the practice of filing applications for amendments of pleadings belatedly, a proviso was added to Order 6 Rule 17 which reads as under: “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”” 35. In B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and Another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 712 , this Court referred to the following passage from A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation reported in AIR 1967 SC 96 wherein, it was held as follows:- “4. This Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corpn. [ AIR 1967 SC 96 : (1966) 1 SCR 796 ] held: “The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred: Weldon v. Neal [(1887) 19 QBD 394 : 56 LJ QB 621]. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation: See Charan Das v. Amir Khan [ AIR 1921 PC 50 :ILR 48 Cal 110] and L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. [ AIR 1957 SC 357 : 1957 SCR 438 ]. The principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes (Cropper v. Smith [(1884) 26 ChD 700 : 53 LJ Ch 891 : 51 LT 729] ) and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended (Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant [ILR (1909) 33 Bom 644 : 11 Bom LR 1042] approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil [ AIR 1957 SC 363 : 1957 SCR 595 ] ). The expression ‘cause of action’ in the present context does not mean ‘every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’ as was said in Cooke v. Gill [(1873) 8 CP 107 : 42 LJCP 98 : 28 LT 32] in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corpn. Ltd. [(1962) 2 All ER 24 (CA)] and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words ‘new case’ have been understood to mean ‘new set of ideas’: Dornan v. J.W. Ellis and Co. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corpn. Ltd. [(1962) 2 All ER 24 (CA)] and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile. The words ‘new case’ have been understood to mean ‘new set of ideas’: Dornan v. J.W. Ellis and Co. Ltd. [(1962) 1 All ER 303 (CA)] This also seems to us to be a reasonable view to take. No amendment will be allowed to introduce a new set of ideas to the prejudice of any right acquired by any party by lapse of time.” Again in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar [ (1974) 2 SCC 393 ] this Court held: (SCC p. 399, para 22) “The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the court.” In Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram [ (1978) 2 SCC 91 ] it was held: (SCC p. 93, para 4). “4. It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued.……” 36. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court, in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, Civil Appeal No. 5909 of 2022 dated 01.09.2022, the position of law has been explained as under: “70. ….. (ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. ….. (ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. (iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed (i) if the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and (ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side and (c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). (iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless (i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration, (ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit, (iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or (iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. (v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. (vi) Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed. (vii) Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation. (viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. (ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. (viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. (ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. (x) Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed. (xi) Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay Gupta v. Gagninder Kr. Gandhi & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1897)” 10. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that amendment, which is necessary for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy, can be allowed with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment that a prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration. Most importantly, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that in dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, Court should avoid a hypertechnical approach and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. Most importantly, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that in dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, Court should avoid a hypertechnical approach and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material relevant in the plaint. 11. In the instant case, though it has been argued by Mr. Bindra, learned counsel representing the petitioner/tenant that amendment if allowed, would change the entire complexion of the suit, but such plea of him is not sustainable in the eye of law because by way of eviction petition, petitioner is seeking eviction from the demised premises, on the ground of bonafide requirement which has not ceased to exist, rather to prove aforesaid cause of action, petitioner intends to add on fresh ground of bonafide requirement, which is otherwise available to him under H.P. Arban Rent Control Act. No doubt, under Section 14(d), respondent/plaintiff can file petition for eviction on the sole ground of bonafide requirement, but definitely, he is not estopped from taking ground of bonafide requirement as additional ground besides grounds of arrears of rent and subletting. 12. Leaving everything aside, amendment, if any, sought to be made, if not permitted, would result in multiplicity of litigation. In case, amendment as sought, is not allowed, respondent/plaintiff would be otherwise compelled to file separate suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement, which ground otherwise can be decided in the petition already filed by respondent/plaintiff. Additional ground sought to be taken by the respondent/plaintiff in no manner would give birth to new cause of action or change the nature of petition, rather same would help the court below adjudicating the dispute between the parties for all times to come. 13. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds no merit in the instant petition and accordingly, same is dismissed and impugned order dated 12.10.2022, passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. is upheld. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.