JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. All these petitions are being decided by a common judgment as these involve common questions of facts and law. 2. Respondent No.1 (for short “HRTC”) formulated a scheme known as “Passenger Service Delivery Skill Development Programme” vide notification dated 19.02.2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the scheme’) with the object to shift from “prioritizing employment” to “prioritizing employability” in both public and private surface bus transport segment by its capacity building and to inculcate the requisite skills by imparting training as per requirement of the transport industry. Making the skilled force readily available was also underlined as one of its objective. 3. The salient features of the scheme, relevant for adjudication of the issue involved in the instant petitions are as under: - “6. Eligibility Criteria: An aspirant should possess Matriculation certificate and valid conductor licence at the time of submission of application. To be eligible for getting Skill Development allowance, the annual family income should be less than 2.0 lacs. 13. Benefits. (I) Employability opportunity for skilled man power in private/Govt. Bus Transport sectors in HP & outside. (ii) May be in the regular recruitment in HRTC some weightage will be given. While prescribing procedure for skill development programme it was clarified as under: 13. Employment: - HRTC will not be liable to provide employment to such trainee after completion of the skill development programme. However, some casual employment as per requirement may be given.” 4. HRTC invited applications from eligible candidates for participation in the training. Total 8595 applications were received by various units of HRTC across the State. Petitioners had also submitted their applications and were selected for the training under the scheme besides the others. 5. Though, the duration of training initially was for six months, it was subsequently reduced to three months. HRTC, even after completion of training period of petitioners utilized their services as conductors on fixed remunerations. The services of petitioners were utilized as Conductors by HRTC for different periods, which extended even upto three years. The engagement of petitioners was discontinued by HRTC w.e.f. 27.8.2018. 6. On their disengagement and in some cases even prior to that, petitioners had availed legal remedies either by approaching the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal or this Court. The services of petitioners were utilized as Conductors by HRTC for different periods, which extended even upto three years. The engagement of petitioners was discontinued by HRTC w.e.f. 27.8.2018. 6. On their disengagement and in some cases even prior to that, petitioners had availed legal remedies either by approaching the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal or this Court. In some of the matters, few of the petitioners were able to secure interim orders and succeeded in continuing to be engaged as conductors by HRTC, whereas in other cases, the engagement of other petitioners came to an end. 7. The cause commonly raised by the petitioners is against their abrupt disengagement by HRTC without issuance of any prior notice or warning. In addition, petitioners have claimed the continuation of their engagement as conductors by HRTC by formulation of a policy for their regularization. Those petitioners, who have succeeded in continuing their engagement as conductors with HRTC on the strength of interim orders, have raised the plea of their continued employment for about six years. On the other, those who have not been able to continue after 27.8.2018, in addition to seeking parity with the petitioners continuing to be engaged on the basis of interim orders, have also raised a plea that any order in favour of the continuing persons will not only create anomalous position, but will also render advantage to juniors over the seniors. Another ground raised on behalf of the petitioners is that some of the petitioners have become over age and will not get any employment after losing valuable time in the service of HRTC. Another plea that has been raised before us is that on account of subsequent enhancement of qualification by amending the relevant Recruitment and Promotion Rules, many of the petitioners will miss their chance to participate in selection process for the recruitment to the posts of Conductor in HRTC. 8. On the other hand, HRTC has contested the plea of petitioners on the ground that petitioners have not acquired any vested right to claim continuation in their engagement as Conductors by HRTC. It is submitted that the petitioners were neither offered any employment nor were appointed against the posts/vacancies. Petitioners were imparted training under the scheme and it was only a stop gap arrangement that their services were engaged on fixed remunerations. 9. It is submitted that the petitioners were neither offered any employment nor were appointed against the posts/vacancies. Petitioners were imparted training under the scheme and it was only a stop gap arrangement that their services were engaged on fixed remunerations. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records carefully. 10. Indisputably, the post of Conductor in HRTC is a substantive post. HRTC has framed Recruitment and Promotion Rules for recruitment to the posts of Conductors. It is also not in dispute that the engagement of petitioners as conductors was not in pursuance to any selection process undertaken by HRTC in terms of Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Conductor. 11. HRTC is a public sector undertaking and an instrumentality of the State. The employment to all the cadres of employees in HRTC necessarily falls within the ambit of “public employment”. That being so, it has to satisfy the mandatory requirements envisaged by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any appointment in public service without affording equal opportunity of participation to all eligible persons. 12. In Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Uma Devi and others, (2006)4 SCC 1 , the Constitution bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarized the apposite legal position as under:- “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 44.. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 44.. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 45. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service (1985 Appeal Cases 374), National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan, ( 1998 (7) SCC 66 ) and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan ( 2003 (3) SCC 485 ). Vs. S. Raghunathan, ( 1998 (7) SCC 66 ) and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan ( 2003 (3) SCC 485 ). There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.” 13. In Union Public Service Commission vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and others, (2006)2 SCC 482 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while highlighting the requirement of equal opportunity in public employment has held as under: - “12. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words “employment or appointment” cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation, etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. (See B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute [ (1983) 4 SCC 582 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 26 : AIR 1984 SC 363 ].) 14. Similarly in State of Bihar vs. Upendra Narayan Singh & others, (2009)5 SCC 65 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:- “25. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 mandates that every appointment to public posts or office should be made by open advertisement so as to enable all eligible persons to compete for selection on merit - Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others [ (1994) 4 SCC 138 ], Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela [ (2006) 2 SCC 482 ], State of Manipur and others v. Y. Token Singh and others [ (2007) 5 SCC 65 ] and Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad and others v. P. Mary Manoranjani and another [ (2008) 2 SCC 758 ]. Although, the Courts have carved out some exceptions to this rule, for example, compassionate appointment of the dependent of deceased employees, for the purpose of this case it is not necessary to elaborate that aspect.” 15. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is clearly evident that HRTC had not offered any employment or post to the petitioners. Assumingly, it was so, such action of HRTC cannot withstand the judicial scrutiny being in violation of the principle of equality envisaged under the Constitution. Undeniably, neither the HRTC had invited candidature for the posts of Conductor from eligible candidates in accordance with the relevant Recruitment and Promotion Rules, nor any selection process in terms thereof was undertaken. Petitioners are not in possession of any appointment letters or terms of their appointment. Thus, in case in hand the petitioners had been engaged only as stop-gap arrangement and as such the petitioners were not vested with any right to claim continued engagement for all times to come. Petitioners are not in possession of any appointment letters or terms of their appointment. Thus, in case in hand the petitioners had been engaged only as stop-gap arrangement and as such the petitioners were not vested with any right to claim continued engagement for all times to come. The material on record also suggests that the petitioners had secured back door entries and, on such basis, they cannot claim the exemption from strict adherence to the principle of equality enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 16. Learned counsel for petitioners placed reliance on following excerpts from the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh Vs Punjab Ware Housing Corporation reported in (2010) 3 SCC 192 : 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: “10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.” (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [ AIR 1958 SC 923 ], AIR p. 928, para 10.) 30. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts' approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalisation and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'être of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganised workers. The attractive mantras of globalisation and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'être of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganised workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by- lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman/employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. 31. It need no emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity, the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the directive principles of State policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer—public or private. 17. Similarly paragraphs 21 to 23 of judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajay Pal Singh Vs Haryana Warehousing Corporation reported in (2015) 6 SCC 321 have also been pressed into service which read as under: 21. We have held that the provisions of Section 25-H are in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, though the aforesaid provisions (Articles 14 and 16) are not attracted in the matter of re-employment of retrenched workmen in a private industrial establishment and undertakings. We have held that the provisions of Section 25-H are in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, though the aforesaid provisions (Articles 14 and 16) are not attracted in the matter of re-employment of retrenched workmen in a private industrial establishment and undertakings. Without giving any specific reason to that effect at the time of retrenchment, it is not open to the employer of a public industrial establishment and undertaking to take a plea that initial appointment of such workman was made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or the workman was a back door appointee. 22. It is always open to the employer to issue an order of “retrenchment” on the ground that the initial appointment of the workman was not in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or in accordance with rules. Even for retrenchment on such ground, unfair labour practice cannot be resorted to and thereby workman cannot be retrenched on such ground without notice, pay and other benefits in terms of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, if continued for more than 240 days in a calendar year. 23. However, in other cases, when no such plea is taken by the employer in the order of retrenchment that the workman was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or in violation of any statutory rule or his appointment was a back door appointment, while granting relief, the employer cannot take a plea that initial appointment was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in absence of a reference made by the appropriate Government for determination of question whether the initial appointment of the workman was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or the statutory rules. Only if such reference is made, a workman is required to lead evidence to prove that he was appointed by following procedure prescribed under the Rules and his initial appointment was legal. 18. The cases in Harjinder Singh and Ajay Pal Singh supra, in our considered opinion, will not have application in the case in hand for the reasons that the judgments were passed in aforesaid cases in their peculiar facts with involvement and implication of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 18. The cases in Harjinder Singh and Ajay Pal Singh supra, in our considered opinion, will not have application in the case in hand for the reasons that the judgments were passed in aforesaid cases in their peculiar facts with involvement and implication of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The observations or dictum in above referred judgment was in special context of their own factual background, which had arisen out of proceedings Act ibid. 19. Petitioners have also tried to build their case on the premise of what has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. SRTC v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 1 as under: 5. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the training imparted is rather exhaustive and elaborate. Sufficient amount of money is also spent on the trainees by way of payment of stipend to them. What is more, there is an obligation on the employers to provide an apprentice with training in his trade in accordance with the provisions of the Act — Schedule V to the Rules containing details of the obligations; and the employer is also required to ensure that a person possessing prescribed qualification is placed in charge of training of the apprentices. The Act seeks to enforce these obligations on the pain of even prosecution, about which mention has been made in Section 30 of the Act. 6. So the legislature did desire and make adequate provisions to see that the competent persons receive due training to cater to the need of increasing demand for skilled craftsmen on one hand and to improve the employment potential of the trainees on the other. Good amount of money, which would be public money in case of public bodies like the Corporation, is also spent on training the apprentices. Further, during the period of training, the apprentices are put under a discipline akin to that of regular employee inasmuch as Section 17 states that in all matters of conduct and discipline, the apprentice shall be governed by the rules and regulations applicable to employees of the corresponding category in the establishment in which the apprentice is undergoing training. Further, during the period of training, the apprentices are put under a discipline akin to that of regular employee inasmuch as Section 17 states that in all matters of conduct and discipline, the apprentice shall be governed by the rules and regulations applicable to employees of the corresponding category in the establishment in which the apprentice is undergoing training. Section 16 requires payment to the apprentice in case of injury due to accident arising out of and in the course of training, in accordance with the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as modified by the Act. The Rules have dealt with the hours of work (Rule 12) and grant of leave (Rule 13) also. 7. The aforesaid provisions are sufficiently indicative of the fact that the training imparted is desired to be result-oriented; and the trainees are treated akin to employees. Even so, Section 22 of the Act states, and it is this provision which has been pressed into service by the appellants, that it shall not be obligatory on the part of the employer to offer any employment to any apprentice who has completed the period of his apprenticeship training in his establishment unless there be a condition in the contract to the contrary. The model contract form finding place in Schedule VI of the Rules echoes the voice of Section 22(1) in its second para. The Corporation has placed on record a model contract form entered into between it and the trainees which also states about the aforesaid non-obligation. 8. On the strength of these provisions, the contention advanced is that the High Court could not have directed to give employment to the trainees. Reference to the impugned judgment, however, shows that while giving the direction the Court was conscious of what has been provided in Section 22 of the Act; even so, the direction was given on the basis principally of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as already noted. As to this view taken by the High Court, we state that, according to us, the direction in question could not have been given because of this principle, despite what was given out by the Joint General Manager of the Corporation in his circular letter dated (sic) 1977 referred in the judgment. 9. As to this view taken by the High Court, we state that, according to us, the direction in question could not have been given because of this principle, despite what was given out by the Joint General Manager of the Corporation in his circular letter dated (sic) 1977 referred in the judgment. 9. We have said so as reference to that circular shows that all it has done is to lay down the procedure for the selection of the apprentices, which did not require the apprentices to undergo any written examination for selection and their routing through employment exchange was done away with. Something was said about the age also. No promise of employment can be read in this circular which is of 21-12-1977. We would say the same about the memo of the Directorate of Training and Employment of the State of U.P. dated 21-9-1977 as it falls short of any promise of employment, because what it says is that full efforts should be made to provide the trainees with service. In this memo, what had been stated in para 2 of the Government of India's letter dated 31-8-1978 had been quoted in which it was mentioned that the scheme of training had been introduced to promote chances of employment of educated unemployed persons; and that if employers would not provide employment to the qualified apprentices the same would amount to destruction of developed human resources. It is because of this that the Government of India expressed the desire that “other things being equal trained apprentices should be given preference in case of employment”. 10. For a promise to be enforceable, the same has, however, to be clear and unequivocal. We do not read any such promise in the aforesaid three documents and we, therefore, hold that at the call of promissory estoppel, the direction in question could not have been given by the High Court. But then, we are left in no doubt that the Government of India did desire that preference should be given to the trained apprentices and it is because of this that the State Government stated in its letter No. 735/38-6-16 (T)-79 dated 12-11-1979 that where such apprentices are available, direct recruitment should not be made. Indeed, the Government of India in its letter dated 23-3-1983 even desired reservation of 50 per cent vacancies for apprentice trainees. 11. Indeed, the Government of India in its letter dated 23-3-1983 even desired reservation of 50 per cent vacancies for apprentice trainees. 11. The aforesaid being the position, it would not be just and proper to go merely by what has been stated in Section 22(1) of the Act, or for that matter, in the model contract form. What is indeed required is to see that the nation gets the benefit of time, money and energy spent on the trainees, which would be so when they are employed in preference to non-trained direct recruits. This would also meet the legitimate expectations of the trainees. 20. We again do not find ourselves persuaded to subscribe to the view propagated on behalf of petitioners as not only the judgement in UP Parivahan Nigam supra had its peculiar factual foundation built in the context of Apprentices Act , the subsequent exposition by Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Uma Devi also binds us to take different view in the specific fact situation in the case in hand. 21. In the factual and legal background, as noted above, petitioners are disentitled from invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Mandamus as sought by the petitioners against the HRTC to formulate a policy for their continuation or regularization cannot be issued for firstly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a mandamus in the absence of proof of existence of right and its violation and secondly, such mandamus will be de-hors the statutory Rules adopted by the HRTC for recruitment to the posts of Conductor and will amount to suggesting another mode of recruitment which otherwise has no legal sanction. Such exercise by this Court will be nothing short of perpetuating illegality. 22. Petitioners have neither claimed any rights under Industrial Disputes Act nor have claimed any relief arising therefrom, therefore, this Court will not adjudicate on legality of disengagement of the petitioners without notice, as alleged. Further, the mere fact that some of the petitioners have succeeded to continue to work as Conductors with HRTC on the strength of interim orders, will not help their case for the simple reason the interim orders are always subject to final adjudication. It is also worth noticing that the training process under the scheme was subject matter of challenge before this Court in CWP No. 2449 of 2015. It is also worth noticing that the training process under the scheme was subject matter of challenge before this Court in CWP No. 2449 of 2015. While disposing of the said petition, a Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.) was a member held as under:- “5. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of by providing that the private respondents/trainees shall not claim any right, interest, equity or title during the training or after the training, as stated by respondent No.2 in terms of paragraph 2, reproduced supra. Liberty is also reserved to the petitioner or any other person to seek appropriate remedy, as discussed in paragraphs 3 and 4 supra.” 23. Thus, no equity can be claimed by such petitioner at the cost of rule of law. 24. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the actions of HRTC had provided the reasons to the petitioner to entertain legitimate expectations that their engagement would be continued and resultantly they would be able to seek regular employment. Even such contention of the petitioners is liable to be rejected for the reasons firstly, that the petitioners have not laid any factual foundation for raising such plea and secondly, it cannot be said that the petitioner were not aware about the nature of engagement they were getting into, especially when there was no promise express or implied by HRTC to grant any employment to the petitioners. 25. In the light of above discussion, we find no merit in the petitions and the same are dismissed. No order as to costs. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.