JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. V.S.Sahay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the First Information Report in connection with Kandra P.S.Case No.6 of 2012 corresponding to G.R. No.255 of 2012 registered for the offence under sections 285, 287, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC, pending in the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, at Seraikalla. 3. The prosecution case has been lodged alleging therein that one Bishwajit Kumar Sharma before the Officer In charge Kandra Police Station has alleged that he is an employee of Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited and was working on the post of Fitter. During the course of his employment on 25.3.2012, in the evening, all of a sudden explosion has taken place in the furnace of SMS Plant due to which huge quantity of smoke came out. The informant has further stated that he has tried to escape from his work place but has got burn injuries on face, right hand and fingers. It is further stated that Harendra Yadav and Praveen Kumar Manjhi were badly injured due to vapour and fire and Jay Prakash Shukla and Nirmal Kumar Singh were also sustained grievous injuries in the said accident. The informant has further stated that all the injured are being treated in T.M.H. Jamshedpur. The informant has lastly alleged that furnace wall of SMS Plant was very weak and there was no safety arrangement provided and such injuries were caused to the workmen. 4. Mr. Sah, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case and only by virtue of their being the Manager, Operator, SMS (General Manager) and Shift Incharge of the factory namely Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited. He submits that the accident took place inside the factory premises and therefore if at all any offence can be said to have been committed, the same would be punishable in terms of the provisions of the Factories Act which fastened the criminal liability on the occupier and the manager and any other worker who has contravened the provisions thereof. He submits that the accident took place inside the factory premises and therefore if at all any offence can be said to have been committed, the same would be punishable in terms of the provisions of the Factories Act which fastened the criminal liability on the occupier and the manager and any other worker who has contravened the provisions thereof. He further submits that it is well settled principle of law that when there are special provisions operating and governing in a particular field, then the provisions of general law cannot be made applicable. According to him, till date the charge sheet has not been submitted in the case in hand. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Sahay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that the occurrence has taken place and that is why the FIR has been lodged. The negligence is there. Only the FIR is under challenge and no relief can be extended to the petitioners. 6. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the contents of the FIR and finds that admittedly the occurrence took place in the factory of Adhunik Alloys and Power Limited. It is sell settled that when the special Act is there the IPC will not apply. In light of Section 92 of the Factories Act clearly provides penalties in case of death, which is caused by the accident within the factory and Section 105 of the said Act prescribed about the cognizance of the offence. There is provision of appeal under Section 107 of the said Act. The Factories Act is having complete provision and so far as the occurrence with regard to the factory is concerned, it is required to be proceeded as per the said Act itself. 7. A reference may be made to the case of “Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi)”, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 18 . Paragraphs 31, 32 and 37 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “31. Having noted the provisions, it has to be recapitulated that Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing, transmitting obscene materials in electronic form. The said provision read with Sections 67-A and 67-B is a complete code relating to the offences that are covered under the IT Act. Having noted the provisions, it has to be recapitulated that Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing, transmitting obscene materials in electronic form. The said provision read with Sections 67-A and 67-B is a complete code relating to the offences that are covered under the IT Act. Section 79, as has been interpreted, is an exemption provision conferring protection to the individuals. However, the said protection has been expanded in the dictum of Shreya Singhal and we concur with the same. 32. Section 81 of the IT Act also specifically provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. All provisions will have their play and significance, if the alleged offence pertains to offence of electronic record. It has to be borne in mind that IT Act is a special enactment. It has special provisions. Section 292 IPC makes offence sale of obscene books, etc. but once the offence has a nexus or connection with the electronic record the protection and effect of Section 79 cannot be ignored and negated. We are inclined to think so as it is a special provision for a specific purpose and the Act has to be given effect to so as to make the protection effective and true to the legislative intent. This is the mandate behind Section 81 of the IT Act. The additional protection granted by the IT Act would apply. xxx xxx xxx 37. The aforesaid passage clearly shows that if legislative intendment is discernible that a latter enactment shall prevail, the same is to be interpreted in accord with the said intention. We have already referred to the scheme of the IT Act and how obscenity pertaining to electronic record falls under the scheme of the Act. We have also referred to Sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act. Once the special provisions having the overriding effect do cover a criminal act and the offender, he 4 Cr. M.P. No. 152 of 2016 gets out of the net of IPC and in this case, Section 292. It is apt to note here that electronic forms of transmission are covered by the IT Act, which is a special law. It is settled position in law that a special law shall prevail over the general and prior laws. M.P. No. 152 of 2016 gets out of the net of IPC and in this case, Section 292. It is apt to note here that electronic forms of transmission are covered by the IT Act, which is a special law. It is settled position in law that a special law shall prevail over the general and prior laws. When the Act in various provisions deals with obscenity in electronic form, it covers the offence under Section 292 IPC.” 8. Identical was the situation in the case of “K.K. Sharan & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Another”, reported in 2005 (2) East Cr C 407 (Jhr). Paragraph 6 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “6. On a careful scrutiny on the facts and circumstances of the case and also the submissions of the parties and legal position in this regard, it appears that petitioners have already faced the trial and they have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Now they have also been chargesheeted under various sections of IPC and when there is a statutory provision for punishing the delinquent, the continuance of the case under other sections of IPC is not justified and not proper. The learned counsel for the petitioners have referred to various sections of the Act and Regulation to show that for the occurrence committed on their part, there is a provision for punishing the delinquent or so under various regulations and, therefore, the instant case should not be allowed to continue and it will amount to abuse of the process of Court. Further a man cannot be prosecuted twice or convicted twice for the. same occurrence or for the same cause of action and here petitioners have already faced criminal prosecution under various sections of Mines Act and Regulation and they have been acquitted of the charges levelled against them and further prosecution of the petitioners under these sections will be violative of the principle of natural justice.” 9. On perusal of the judgment rendered in the case of “Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi)” (supra), it transpires that on conclusion, it was held that the High Court has fallen in error that although charge has not been made out under the provisions of Information Technology Act, yet the appellant could be proceeded under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code. It is well settled that when a special legislation has been enacted having special provisions in a specific cause of action, the same would prevail over the general law. The F.I.R. seems to be with respect to the accident, which was caused in the factory premises, which would attract the penal provisions of Section 92 of the Factories Act. Section 119 of the Factories Act deals with the overriding effect of the provision of the Factories Act. 10. In the case of “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal” reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, it is clearly held in paragraph no.102 of the said judgment that if any statute is barring of the proceeding, the FIR cannot be lodged. 11. As a cumulative effect of the above facts, reasons and analysis, this petition stands allowed and the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Kandra P.S.Case No.6 of 2012, corresponding to G.R. No.255 of 2012, registered for the offence under sections 285, 287, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC, pending in the court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, at Seraikalla including the F.I.R is quashed. 12. Cr.M.P.No.373 of 2013 is allowed and disposed of. 13. Pending petition if any also stands disposed of. 14. It is open to the authority concerned to take appropriate measures in light of the Factories Act.