JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. K.S. Nanda, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Jitendra Pandey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. On repeated call, nobody has responded on behalf of the O.P.No.2. Identical was the situation on 06.05.2022 and 15.09.2022. In that view of the matter, the case has been heard on merits. 3. This petition has been filed for quashing of the order taking congnizance dated 11.05.2009 passed by Judicial Magistrate, at Dhanbad in C.P.Case No.726 of 2002 as well as the entire criminal proceeding, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, at Dhanbad. 4. The complaint case was filed alleging therein that the O.P.No.2 is an employee of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited and staying at Khan Mansion, Koiribandh along with his other family members. It is further alleged that on 23.5.2003 the O.P.No.2 and his family members were in their house, the accused no.1 namely Rama Kant Prasad, the then Inspector of Police, Jharia came to his house along with other accused persons including the petitioner no.2 and 3 and started abusing them and also assaulting them with sticks and threatened with dire consequences. It is further alleged that the accused persons asked the O.P.No.2 to withdraw the C.P.Case No.559 of 1994 and on refusal to do the same, the accused no.1 of the complaint petition ordered the other accused persons to break and demolish and damage the house of O.P.No.2 and accordingly all the accused persons looted the household articles and broke the iron gate with gas cutter. It is further alleged that all the accused persons broke the locker of the same with gas cutter and looted Rs.65,000/- cash. The witnesses gathered there and saw the occurrence but the accused no.1 of the complaint petition and petitioners threatened everybody not to open their mouth. It is further alleged that the O.P.no.2 requested the accused no.1 of the complaint petition and petitioners that he is all along on bail in connection with Jharia P.S.Case no.48 of 2002 and the property seized by the accused persons belonged to the complainant but the accused persons did not listen to them. It is further alleged that the O.P.no.2 requested the accused no.1 of the complaint petition and petitioners that he is all along on bail in connection with Jharia P.S.Case no.48 of 2002 and the property seized by the accused persons belonged to the complainant but the accused persons did not listen to them. It is further alleged that on the same date the accused persons also looted the household articles of the brother of the complainant who stays at Satmarua More, Koiribandh and who is not an accused in Jharia P.S. Case No.48 of 2002. The accused no.1 of the complaint petition and petitioners threatened the O.P.No.2 and others to implicate them in false cases. It is further alleged that on 27.5.2002 the accused no.1 of the complaint petition further threatened the O.P.No.2 on telephone not to give evidence in C.P.Case No.559 of 1994 pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, hence the present complaint. 5. Mr. Nanda, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the petitioners were posted at Jharia police station and on that date, at the time of occurrence the petitioners on the strength of attachment order issued against the absconding accused persons, brother of the complainant in Jharia P.S.Case No.48 of 2002 went along with other accused persons including the accused no.9, B.D.O, Jharia, at the relevant time to the house of Khan Mansion, for execution of the attachment order against the absconding accused persons. He submits that they were on duty and under the direction of the learned court, they had gone there. He submits that the petitioners are public servant and they are protected under section 197 of the Cr.P.C. He further submits by way of referring Annexure-2 that there are so many cases registered against the family members of the complainant and in retaliation, the complaint case has been filed. He further submits that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has quashed the proceeding so far two accused persons namely Dr. Subhash Singh and Rama Kant Prasad are concerned in Cr.M.P.No.393 of 2011 and Cr.M.P.No.411 of 2011 by order dated 08.05.2012. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Subhash Singh and Rama Kant Prasad are concerned in Cr.M.P.No.393 of 2011 and Cr.M.P.No.411 of 2011 by order dated 08.05.2012. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Pandey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State admits this position that these petitioners are the police officials and they have gone there for execution of the order of the learned court for process under section 83 Cr.P.C. 7. In view of the above submission of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the order taking cognizance as well as the materials on record and finds that it has been stated in the complaint case that the complainant is all along on bail in connection with Jharia P.S.Case No.48 of 2002 and thus it is admitted position that the complainant was an accused in the Jharia P.S.Case No.48 of 2002 and for execution of the order of the learned Magistrate, the police officials were went there and if that was the situation, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not discharging their duty. The petitioners are the police officials and for correct appreciation of section 197 Cr.P.C, it is quoted hereinbelow: “197. The petitioners are the police officials and for correct appreciation of section 197 Cr.P.C, it is quoted hereinbelow: “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013]— (a) in the case of person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: [Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted.] [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under Section 166-A, Section 166-B, Section 354, Section 354-A, Section 354-B, Section 354-C, Section 354-D, Section 370, Section 375, Section 376, 5[Section 376-A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB] or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the expression “State Government” were substituted. [(3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3-B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.] (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held. 8. In the case of P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704 , at paragraph no.5, it has been held as under: “5. 8. In the case of P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704 , at paragraph no.5, it has been held as under: “5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code: “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What a court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.” 9. With regard to Section 197 Cr.P.C. again it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 5 SCC 15 , wherein at paragraph no.7, it has been held as under: 7. With regard to Section 197 Cr.P.C. again it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 5 SCC 15 , wherein at paragraph no.7, it has been held as under: 7. Section 197 CrPC affords protection to a Judge or a magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government against any offence which is alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The protection is provided in the form that no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. The object of the section is to save officials from vexatious proceedings against Judges, magistrates and public servants but it is no part of the policy to set an official above the common law. If he commits an offence not connected with his official duty he has no privilege. But if one of his official acts is alleged to be an offence, the State will not allow him to be prosecuted without its sanction. Section 197 embodies one of the exceptions to the general rules laid down in Section 190 CrPC, that any offence may be taken cognizance of by the Magistrates enumerated therein. Before this section can be invoked in the case of a public servant two conditions must be satisfied i.e. (1) that the accused was a public servant who was removable from his office only with the sanction of the State Government or the Central Government; and (2) he must be accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. 10. Section 197 Cr.P.C was earlier the subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 8 SCC 500 , wherein at paragraph no.7 it has been held as under: 7. 10. Section 197 Cr.P.C was earlier the subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 8 SCC 500 , wherein at paragraph no.7 it has been held as under: 7. Previous sanction of the competent authority being a precondition for the court in taking cognizance of the offence if the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused can be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty, the question touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and, therefore, there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges are framed. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan a similar contention had been advanced by Mr Sibal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in that case. In that case, the High Court had held on the application of the accused that the provisions of Section 197 get attracted. Rejecting the contention, this Court had observed: (SCC pp. 217- 18, para 23) “The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with a previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance, the accused after appearing before the court on process being issued, by an application indicating that Section 197(1) is attracted merely assists the court to rectify its error where jurisdiction has been exercised which it does not possess. In such a case there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. In such a case there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. It is no longer in dispute and has been indicated by this Court in several cases that the question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings.” The Court had further observed: (SCC pp. 218-19, para 24) “The question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary materials which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority.” 11. The action of the police was against the subject matter in the case of K.Kalimuthu v. State by D.S.P, (2005) 4 SCC 512 , wherein at paragraph no.15 it has been held as quoted below: 15. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned, the effect of Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has also to be noted. 12. In view of the above judgments, it is crystal clear that the court is precluded from entertaining the complaint or taking note of it or exercising judicial power if a public servant has committed offence in discharge of his official duty. 12. In view of the above judgments, it is crystal clear that the court is precluded from entertaining the complaint or taking note of it or exercising judicial power if a public servant has committed offence in discharge of his official duty. From this view of the Apex Court, it is clear that if the public servant in discharge of his official duty has committed any offence in which complaint is made, sanction of the Government or the competent authority is pre-requisite condition. Moreover, there are many cases against the family members of the complainant which is disclosed in Annexure-2. It is well settled that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge a complaint or the first information report can be quashed in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, [(1992) Supp.(1) SCC 335]. 13. In the instant case, it appears that the petitioners have gone there for execution of the process under section 83 Cr.P.C issued by the learned court. Further criminal proceeding with regard to two accused persons has already been quashed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court as disclosed hereinabove. In view of the above reasons and analysis, the entire criminal proceeding, so far these petitioners are concerned, in connection with C.P.Case No.726 of 2002, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, at Dhanbad is quashed. 14. Cr.M.P. No.763 of 2013 is allowed in the above terms and disposed of. 15. Pending petition, if any, also stands disposed of.