ORDER : 1. With the request and consent of learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, these first appeals are taken up for final disposal. Since the issue involved in these appeals are identical and as such these appeals are taken up conjointly by treating the First Appeal No. 4907 of 2018 as a lead matter and the facts are taken from it for the sake of convenience. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. Paritosh R. Gupta for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Siddharth Dave appearing for Mr. Devang Vyas, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondent authorities. 3. By way of this First Appeal under Section 35 of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the order dated 18.04.2018 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Prevention of Money Laundering Act in Appeal No. FPA-FE- 24/AHD/2013. 4. The background of the present first appeal is that the appellant is a merchant exporter as well as an importer dealing in various products including agricultural commodities as well as other manufactures products. 4.1 The Government of India issued policy governing exports from India to Russia called “Repayment of State Rupee Credits” under which the goods were supposed to be exported to Russia. On an information that an abuse of policy was being made by various exporters, which was causing loos to the exchequer and that the goods exported never reached Russia, but were being off-loaded in third countries, which was contrary to the conditions stipulated governing such exports to Russia, inquiries were initiated. That in fact, the funds from “Repayment of State Rupee Credits” were to be utilized for export to Russian Federation only and that no third country exports were permitted against such funds. 4.2 That from the information, it transpired that Russian letters of credit/consignees found to be involved were reported to be non existent. During the course of investigation, according to the investing team, it was revealed that the company had effected shipment of 500 M.T. of wheat flour valued at Rs.70,00,000/- as declared in relevant documents under the scheme of “Repayment of State Rupee Credits” agreed to between the Government of India and Government of Russian Federation. That the final destination declared was Russia and port of discharge as Saint Peters Berg etc. in the relevant documents. That the final destination declared was Russia and port of discharge as Saint Peters Berg etc. in the relevant documents. That there was failure on the part of the company and its shipping agents to furnish any documentary evidence to show that the goods had actually reached Russia. 4.3 As far as the company is concerned, the company had exported 500 M.T. of wheat flour to Russian importers namely M/s. Termoekostroy/Arina under two bills of lading dated 20.02.1998 and 10.03.1998 from Kandla Port. Prior thereto, during the year 1977-1999, the company had submitted export documents to its bankers and received payment for effecting exports shipments to Russian consignee/ Letters of Credit opening firms/companies, but the goods were allegedly off-loaded in the third country, which never reached Russia. During the course of investigation, a letter dated 24.04.2002, was addressed by the Enforcement Directorate to the company inquiring on various issues, to which the company responded vide its letter dated 03.05.2002 giving requisite details. 4.4 In view of such investigation, which was initiated around month of June-2001, referred to earlier, a show cause memorandum dated 31.05.2002, was issued to appellant, wherein it was alleged that by way of making exports in the manner stated therein, the company and the appellant appeared to have contravened the provisions of Section 48 and Section 73(3) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 read with Reserve Bank Circulars referred to therein read with Section 68(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 read with Sections 49(3) and 49(4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. That in view thereof, appellant had rendered itself liable to be proceeded against under Section 50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 read with Sections 49(3) and 49(4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. In view thereof, the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why adjudication proceedings as contemplated under Section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 read with Section 49(3) and 49)4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, should not be held against the appellant. 4.5 It is pertinent to note that Foreign Exchange Regulation Act stood repealed with effect from 01.06.2000, whereas Foreign Exchange Management Act, was brought into force with effect from 01.06.2000 vide notification dated 01.05.2000. 4.5 It is pertinent to note that Foreign Exchange Regulation Act stood repealed with effect from 01.06.2000, whereas Foreign Exchange Management Act, was brought into force with effect from 01.06.2000 vide notification dated 01.05.2000. Section 49(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall take cognizance under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, and no adjudication shall take place of any contravention under Section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, after expiry of a period of two years from the date of commencement of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. The appellant through its advocate filed a reply dated 06.02.2010 to the aforesaid memorandum raising various contentions on facts as well as law, which were further supplemented by written submissions dated 15.04.2010 filed by the appellant. It is contended by the appellant, that the respondent passed adjudication order (original) dated 16.07.2010 without considering the contentions raised and submissions made in the proper perspective and imposed penalty of Rs.10,00,000/- on the appellant. 4.6 The appellant has challenged the said adjudication order (original) by way of an appeal under Section 17(4) of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, before the appellate authority, which was partly allowed vide order dated 06.03.2013 by the appellate authority by reducing the penalty from Rs.10,00,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/-. The appellant challenged the said order dated 06.03.2013, by way of appeal before the Tribunal along with the stay application. The said appeal was registered as FPA-23/AHD/2013. In the said appeal and stay application, various contentions were raised by the appellant including the contention regarding maintainability of proceedings as well as financial hardship. During the course of stay application before the Tribunal, contention on merits, financial condition as well as maintainability of proceedings were raised. Submissions were also made on the aspect of undue hardship as provided for in Section 19 of the Act. However, the Tribunal, without addressing contentions raised by the appellant passed order dated 18.04.2018 directing the appellant to deposit entire amount of penalty in question within the period stated. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 18.04.2018, preferred this first appeal. 5. However, the Tribunal, without addressing contentions raised by the appellant passed order dated 18.04.2018 directing the appellant to deposit entire amount of penalty in question within the period stated. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 18.04.2018, preferred this first appeal. 5. The appellant has specifically raised the contentions with regard to Section 19 of the Act which otherwise gives authority to the Appellate Tribunal to dispense with deposit of amount of penalty if it would cause ‘undue hardship’ to the assessee. The said non-consideration of the material produced before the authority, has been raised as ground Nos. (b), (c) and (d) mentioned in the appeal memo. A question of law while preferring this appeal under Section 35 has also been formulated in Paragraph No. 5, which reads as under: (a) That whether the term ‘undue hardship’ which specifically finds a mention in second proviso to section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 covers financial hardship also? (b) That in the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the Tribunal grossly erred in not considering the financial hardship of the appellant, when the term ‘undue hardship’ specifically finds a mention in second proviso to section 35 of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999? 6. The present first appeal came to be entertained by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 04.04.2019 and notice was issued and was made returnable on 16.04.2019. Thereafter, by order dated 30.01.2023, this Court had directed Registry to list these appeals along with First Appeal No. 1258 of 2018, First Appeal No. 1260 of 2018 and First Appeal No. 1262 of 2018 wherein similar issue with regard to the Authority having failed to examine the ground of extreme financial hardships raised by the appellant was pending consideration. It is in this background, the present first appeals have come up for consideration finally before this Court. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Paritosh R. Gupta appearing for the appellant has submitted that the ground with regard to undue hardship has already been specifically raised and pleaded not only in the application but also while tendering written submissions and to substantiate this contention, the learned advocate Mr. Gupta has made a reference to the said contention, which are reflecting in grounds (b), (c) and (d) raised in the memo of petition. He has submitted that various financial documents were placed on record, however, Tribunal has ignored the same. Gupta has made a reference to the said contention, which are reflecting in grounds (b), (c) and (d) raised in the memo of petition. He has submitted that various financial documents were placed on record, however, Tribunal has ignored the same. He has submitted the decision making process is suffering from the vice of non application of mind. It has been further contended that non consideration of the material, which has been produced is also a good ground for remanding the matter back for fresh consideration and for that purpose, the learned advocate has relied upon two decisions reported in the case of Himatsu Bimet Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2014 (306) ELT 84 (Guj) and the decision delivered by the High Court of Judicature of Chattisgarsh in case of Kailash Agrawal vs. Commissioner of C.Ex. and Customs, 2015 (322) ELT 276 (Chattisgardh) and by referring this a contention is reiterated that non-consideration of this material is sufficient enough to direct the authority to reconsider the issue about pre-deposit and as such has requested to pass the suitable order in the interest of justice. 8. As against these submissions, the learned advocate Mr. Siddharth Dave appearing for Mr. Devang Vyas, learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the contesting respondent authority, has vehemently contended that this is nothing but a clear case of financial evasion by the appellant and as such considering the object of the Act even if the Authority has not considered the material, the discretion cannot be considered to be vitiated since the object of the act has been taken into consideration by the Authority, while passing the order. Learned advocate Mr. Dave has submitted that even otherwise the discretion is vested in the authority has been properly exercised by considering the overall material on record and the pre-deposit condition has been rather fixed at a very reasonable rate, and therefore, the Hon’ble Court may not interfere with the order. No further submissions have been made by learned advocate Mr. Dave appearing for the respondent authority. 9. No further submissions have been made by learned advocate Mr. Dave appearing for the respondent authority. 9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the record, we are of the opinion that since cognate appeals were directed to be heard together, wherein similar question of law was raised and where, we have accepted the plea of hardship noticing the averments though raised being ignored by the appellate tribunal, the present appeal requires consideration. Though no separate paper book of relevant papers produced before the Appellate Tribunal, has been placed on record in present appeal, however, considering the aspect of ‘undue hardship’ to be looked into under Section 35 of the Act, we deem it fit to remand present appeal as well. 10. In the background of aforesaid circumstances, we may also further considered that a question of law, which has been framed in Paragraph No. 5 is also to the effect that the authority has exercised the discretion without considering the documents pertaining to financial conditions as submitted by way of an affidavit. The said question of law is also clearly reflecting in Paragraph No. 5 of the appeal memo. 11. In view of the aforesaid situation, which is prevailing on record, a perusal of the first order passed by the co-ordinate Bench while issuing notice in the cognate group of appeals, is also to the effect that authority has failed to examine the ground of extreme financial hardship raised by the appellant. We may deem it proper to quote the said order hereunder: “1. Counsel for the appellant submitted that while imposing condition of pre-deposit, the authority failed to examine the ground of extreme financial hardships raised by the appellant. 2. NOTICE, returnable on 26.07.2018.” 12. Trite would be to reproduce the relevant observations of this Court in cognate group of appeals being First Appeal No. 1258 of 2018 and allied matters, which is as under: “12. 2. NOTICE, returnable on 26.07.2018.” 12. Trite would be to reproduce the relevant observations of this Court in cognate group of appeals being First Appeal No. 1258 of 2018 and allied matters, which is as under: “12. As such from the overall material on record, a perusal of the impugned order clearly reflects that at the stage of admission of appeal, the Appellate Tribunal has failed to look into ground of financial crunch, which has been projected before the authority along with submission and relevant material appears to have not been dealt in its true perspective and as such, we are of the considered opinion that the discretion exercised by the authority appears to be perverse. 13. Time and again, the Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded that while exercising due discretion, the relevant submission and the contention raised deserves to be dealt and that having not been reflecting in the impugned order, we are of the opinion that orders suffers from the vice of non application of mind and as a consequent thereof, we are also of the opinion that the said issue with regard to the request for waiver of predeposit deserves to be reconsidered by the authority in the context of material, which has been placed before it. 14. Since we have considered the proposition of Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions reported in 2019 (5) SCC 149 : 2019 (5) SCC 744 and 2019 (4) SCC 357 , we deem it proper to quote hereunder the relevant observations: 14.1 In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax-I vs. Rashtradoot (Huf), 2019 (5) SCC 149 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “13. This Court has consistently laid emphasis that every order/judgment, which decides the lis between the parties, must contain the reason(s)/ground(s) for arriving at a particular conclusion. Indeed, what is decisive for deciding the case is not the conclusion alone but the reason(s)/ground(s) assigned in support of such conclusion, which results in reaching to such conclusion. 14. In order to decide as to whether the impugned order is legally sustainable or not, the Appellate Court is entitled to know as to what impelled the Court below to pass such order in favour of one party and against the aggrieved party. We find that this requirement is missing in the impugned order of this case and hence the interference is called for. We find that this requirement is missing in the impugned order of this case and hence the interference is called for. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh vs. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. vs. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar and State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar)” 14.2 In the case of Kushuma Devi vs. Sheopati Devi (Dead) and Others, 2019 (5) SCC 744 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “7. The need to remand the case to the High Court has occasioned because from the perusal of the impugned order dated 27.07.2012 quoted above, we find that it is an unreasoned order. In other words, the High Court neither discussed the issues arising in the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has dismissed the writ petition.” 14.3 In the case of State of Orissa and Others vs. Chandra Nandi, 2019 (4) SCC 357 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “9. The need to remand the case to the High Court has occasioned because from the perusal of the impugned order, we find that it is an unreasoned order. In other words, the High Court neither discussed the issues arising in the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has allowed the writ petition and granted the reliefs to the writ petitioner which were declined by the Tribunal. 10. This Court has consistently laid down that every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the Court/Tribunal/Authority for reaching to such conclusion. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh vs. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. vs. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar and State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar)” 13. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, Jawahar Lal Singh vs. Naresh Singh, State of U.P. vs. Battan, Raj Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar and State of Orissa vs. Dhaniram Luhar)” 13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh, out of which this appeal arises, for its disposal in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above.” 15. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court and in view of overall the material placed before us, we are of the considered opinion that Authority while passing the impugned order has not taken into consideration the financial hardship, which has been projected before it. Hence, the request of the appellant deserves to be reconsidered in light of the aforesaid observations.” 13. Accordingly, we pass following order: (A) The present first appeals stand allowed. The impugned order dated 18.04.2018 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Prevention of Money Laundering Act in Appeal No. FPA-FE-24/AHD/2013 is hereby quashed and set aside and as a consequent thereof, the Appellate Tribunal, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, is directed to reconsider and reexamine the issue with regard to the waiver of pre-deposit afresh and pass the suitable order in the interest of justice.” (B) It is made clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits. It is independently left it open for the authority to pass a fresh order in the interest of justice after due compliance of principles of nature justice in the light of material, which has been placed before it. We are also making it clear that disposal of these appeals would not have any bearing upon any other pending proceedings, which are initiated by the Authority against the appellant. (C) Since the issue with regard to financial hardship is agitated for quite some time, we deem it proper to direct the authorities to reconsider and take a fresh decision strictly in accordance with law within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. (D) With such observations and directions, present appeals stand allowed to the aforesaid extent. Since the main appeals are disposed of in aforesaid terms, connected civil applications are consigned to record and disposed of accordingly.