JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant herein against the impugned judgment dated 09/02/2015 passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh in Sessions Trial No. 131/2013 whereby he has been convicted and sentenced as under with a direction to run all the sentences concurrently: Conviction Sentence U/s 302 of IPC Life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month. U/s 364 of IPC Life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month. U/s 201 of IPC R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 18/05/2013 at about 09:45 PM, the appellant herein abducted Annu Singh and took her on his motorcycle to Domnara Forest and caused her death by strangulating her with the help of her scarf and in order to screen himself from the offence, he threw her dead body under the dumping yard and also threw her mobile, spectacles and purse and further burnt her wallet and her ATM card at Sarasmar Road and thereby, committed the aforesaid offences. 3. Further case of the prosecution is that Tarachand Singh (PW-1), father of the deceased, lodged a missing complaint regarding her daughter Annu Singh at Police Station Kharsiya. During investigation, it came to the knowledge of police authorities that Annu Singh was last seen together with the appellant as informed by her father Tarachand Singh (PW-1). Thereafter, on 30/05/2013 at about 8:30 PM, memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P/5 in the presence of Dhur Singh Rathiya (PW-2) and Nirmaldas (PW-4) pursuant to which, dead body seizure panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P/6 and dead body of Annu Singh was found in the dumping yard in decomposed condition which was identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) and Milan Singh Rajput (PW-5) vide Ex.P/7. Appellant's motorcycle was seized vide Ex.P/8 and at his instance, burnt wallet and ATM card belonging to the deceased were seized from the bushes in Sarasmal Road vide Ex.P/9 and mobile phone and spectacles belonging to the deceased were seized from Chhal Dam vide Ex.P/10. The said seized articles were also identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) vide Ex.P/4. Appellant's motorcycle was seized vide Ex.P/8 and at his instance, burnt wallet and ATM card belonging to the deceased were seized from the bushes in Sarasmal Road vide Ex.P/9 and mobile phone and spectacles belonging to the deceased were seized from Chhal Dam vide Ex.P/10. The said seized articles were also identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) vide Ex.P/4. Thereafter, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P/23 and first information report was lodged against the appellant vide Ex.P/19. An application for postmortem of deceased Annu Singh was made by the Investigating Officer B.S. Singh (PW-9) vide Ex.P/18 to which Dr. U.S. Rathiya (PW-8) opined that the body was in stage of advanced decomposition and referred for performing autopsy to CIMS, Bilaspur pursuant to which report was submitted by Dr. R.K. Singh (PW-10) vide Ex.P/25 stating that dead body was in moderate to advanced stage of decomposition with partial mummification and cause of death and duration of death could not be determined. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 201 of IPC which was committed to Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and brought on record 36 documents. Statement of the appellant was taken under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein he denied guilt, however, he neither examined any witness nor brought any document in his defence. 5. Learned trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, finding the appellant to be author of crime in question, proceeded to convict him for offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 201 of IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. 6. Mr. Rahul Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. It has not been established that appellant kidnapped the deceased and took her along with him as the appellant and deceased were last seen together on 18/05/2013 whereas dead body of the deceased was recovered with a considerable gap on 30/05/2013, as such, the theory of last seen together has not been established. It has not been established that appellant kidnapped the deceased and took her along with him as the appellant and deceased were last seen together on 18/05/2013 whereas dead body of the deceased was recovered with a considerable gap on 30/05/2013, as such, the theory of last seen together has not been established. He would further submit that that the dead body of deceased Annu Singh was recovered in a highly decomposed condition with partial mummification and it could not be ascertained as to whether her death was homicidal in nature. Furthermore, the articles allegedly belonging to the deceased were seized on 30/05/2013, however, they have been identified on 05/08/2013 i.e. after two and a half months which is a long time gap, as such, the chain of circumstances is not complete and five golden principles that constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 have not been proved. He would lastly submit that appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of principle of benefit of doubt and he would rely upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Chandrapal vs. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2022 SC 2542 and Shailendra vs. State of Gujarat, (2020) 14 SCC 750 to buttress his submission. 7. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State, would submit that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt as the theory of last seen together has duly been established by father of the deceased Tarachand Singh (PW-1) and even otherwise, it has not been explained by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to when he parted with the company of the deceased and how she died under suspicious circumstances. As it is, recovery of dead body of deceased Annu Singh has been made vide Ex.P/6 pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5, as such, five golden principles that constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) have duly been established by the prosecution and the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offences. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The question with regard to the nature of death of the deceased has not been clearly answered by the trial Court, however, the trial Court has rightly held that skeletal dead body of deceased Annu Singh was recovered vide Ex.P/6 pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5 which has been duly proved by Nirmaldas (PW-4) and it was identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) and Milan Singh Rajput (PW-5). The trial Court has held the death of the deceased to be unnatural as postmortem also could not be conducted as dead body was in a highly decomposed condition and ultimately, it was sent for autopsy which was conducted by Dr. R.K. Singh and in his report (Ex.P/25), he has opined that dead body was moderate to advanced stage of decomposition with partial mummification and cause of death and duration of death could not be determined. 10. In the matter of Rama Nand and Others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCC 511 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in no uncertain terms that discovery of the dead body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Their Lordships further held that the ‘body’ doctrine is merely a rule of caution and not of law. It has also been held that where the dead body of the victim in a murder is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Their Lordships further held that the ‘body’ doctrine is merely a rule of caution and not of law. It has also been held that where the dead body of the victim in a murder is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. But where the fact of corpus delicti or homicidal death is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, or by both, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Their Lordships observed as under: “28. This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English law, the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. “I would never convict,” said Sir Mathew Hale “a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead.” This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Discovery of the dead body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old “body” doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply because they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Sir Hale’s enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of the homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. In the context of our law, Sir Hale’s enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of the homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eyewitness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti i.e. ‘homicidal death’ is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be “proved” if the court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned......” 11. The principle of law laid down in Rama Nand (supra) has been reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramjee Rai and Others vs. State of Bihar, (2006) 13 SCC 229 and similar proposition has been made in the matter of Rishi Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cri. L.J. 1534 following Rama Nand (supra) and it has been held that absence of corpus delicti is insignificant if cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of victim is adduced. The decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Nand (supra) has further been followed in the matter of Sanjay Rajak vs. State of Bihar, (2019) 12 SCC 552 . 12. L.J. 1534 following Rama Nand (supra) and it has been held that absence of corpus delicti is insignificant if cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of victim is adduced. The decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Nand (supra) has further been followed in the matter of Sanjay Rajak vs. State of Bihar, (2019) 12 SCC 552 . 12. However, in the matter of S. Kaleeswaran vs. State by the Inspector of Police Pollachi Town East Police Station, Coimbatore, 2022 SCC Online SC 1511, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made exception to the rule of corpus delicti that if the entire chain is duly proved by cogent evidence, the conviction could be recorded even if the corpus is not found, but when as per the case of the prosecution, the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else, and it was held as under: “14.......but when as per the case of the prosecution, the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.” 13. Recently, in the matter of John Anthonisamy alias John vs. State, (2023) 3 SCC 536 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that where cause of death was unascertainable, it has to be proved by the prosecution by establishing other circumstances that deceased was killed and held in paragraph 20 as under: “20. Now so far as the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the prosecution has failed to prove that the death of the deceased was the homicidal as in the post-mortem report the cause of death was unascertainable is concerned, it is required to be noted that as the dead body was buried and was found after numbers of months, it may not be possible for the prosecution to prove that the death was a homicidal death. However, at the same time and as rightly observed by the High Court, by other circumstances the prosecution has established and proved that the deceased was killed after his car was stolen/taken away by the appellant-Accused.” 14. In the instant case, though it is evident from the statement of Dr. U.S. Rathiya (PW-8) that postmortem could not be conducted and though as per the report of Dr. R.K. Singh (PW-10) vide Ex.P/25, the dead body was in a highly decomposed condition but body of Annu Singh it has clearly been identified by father of the deceased, Tarachand Singh (PW-1) vide Ex.P/7 in the presence of witnesses Dhur Singh Rathiya (PW-2) and Nirmaldas (PW-4) and apart from that, the articles recovered pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant have also been identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) vide Ex.P/4, as such, it is clearly established that the dead body which was recovered vide Ex.P/6 was of deceased Annu Singh and therefore, it is clearly established that deceased was killed after she was taken by the appellant and we hereby hold that the death of deceased Annu Singh was homicidal in nature. 15. Now so far as the question with regard to author of the crime in question is concerned, the trial Court has held the appellant to be the author of crime in question relying upon the theory of last seen together that the appellant had taken deceased Annu Singh with him on 18/05/2013 at about 9:45 PM which has been proved by father of the deceased Tarachand Singh (PW-1) and thereafter, dead body of the deceased was recovered vide Ex.P/6 pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5 which has been proved by Nirmaldas (PW-4). 16. Tarachand Singh (PW-1), in his statement before the Court, has clearly stated that though there was some affair between the appellant and the deceased but the deceased was engaged to be married to some other person at Ambikapur and their marriage was likely to be solemnized on 04/06/2013. 16. Tarachand Singh (PW-1), in his statement before the Court, has clearly stated that though there was some affair between the appellant and the deceased but the deceased was engaged to be married to some other person at Ambikapur and their marriage was likely to be solemnized on 04/06/2013. He has further stated that on 18/05/2013, appellant came in his motorcycle and took deceased Annu Singh with him stating that they have to attend marriage of one Hemant Patel (PW-3) at village Chaple but his daughter did not return back to her home in the evening and when the appellant did not inform him properly as to where deceased was, missing report was lodged by Tarachand Singh (PW-1). As such, nothing has been brought on record as to where deceased had gone which was required to be explained by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. particularly when charges for abduction and murder were framed against the appellant and he was tried. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sucha Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2001) 4 SCC 375 while dealing with a case where two persons were taken away by armed assailants from their house at night and their dead bodies, studded with gunshot injuries, were found next morning lying near their house and the abductors did not explain and furnish any information, which was within their exclusive knowledge as to what happened to the deceased therein after they were abducted. It was held that presumption can be drawn and the abductors were responsible for murder of the deceased therein and observed in Para-15, 18, 19 and 20 as under: “15. The abductors alone could tell the court as to what happened to the deceased after they were abducted. When the abductors withheld that information from the court there is every justification for drawing the inference, in the light of all the preceding and succeeding circumstances adverted to above, that the abductors are the murderers of the deceased. *** *** *** 18. Learned senior counsel contended that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended for the purpose of filling up the vacuum in prosecution evidence. He invited our attention to the observations made by the Privy Council in Attygalle and Another vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 and also in Stephen Seneviratne vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 289 . He invited our attention to the observations made by the Privy Council in Attygalle and Another vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 and also in Stephen Seneviratne vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 289 . In fact the observations contained therein were considered by this Court in an early decision authored by Vivian Bose, J. in Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 . The statement of law made by the learned Judge in the aforesaid decision has been extracted by us in State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (supra). It is useful to extract a further portion of the observation made by us in the aforesaid decision: “33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.” 19. We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases where prosecution has succeeded in proving facts for which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. 20. We have seriously bestowed our consideration to the arguments addressed by the learned senior counsel. 20. We have seriously bestowed our consideration to the arguments addressed by the learned senior counsel. We only reiterate the legal principle adumbrated in State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 1936 PC 169 that when more persons than one have abducted the victim, who was later murdered, it is within the legal province of the court to justifiably draw a presumption depending on the factual situation, that all the abductors are responsible for the murder. Section 34 of the IPC could be invoked for the aid to that end, unless any particular abductor satisfies the court with his explanation as to what else he did with the victim subsequently, i.e. whether he left his associates en-route or whether he dissuaded others from doing the extreme act etc. etc.” 18. In view of the aforesaid principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that appellant took deceased Annu Singh with him on 18/05/2013 and thereafter, her dead body was recovered on 30/05/2013 vide Ex.P/6, that too, pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5 which has been duly proved by Nirmaldas (PW-4), as such, appellant was required to give an explanation in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to what happened to the deceased and how she died after he had taken her from her home. 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 held that if an incriminating material is recovered pursuant to memorandum statement of accused, he is required to explain as to how else he came to know of such concealment and non-explanation is fatal to the accused and observed in Para-26 as under: “26. We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was conceded by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. One is that he himself would have concealed it Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities me criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because accused is the only person who can Offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal court mat the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.” 20. The aforesaid principle of law laid down in Suresh (supra) was followed with approval in the matter of Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani vs. State of Karnataka, 2009 (14) SCC 582 . 21. Thereafter, in the matter of Arvind Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1 this Court has observed as under: “88........In the present case, the dead body was lying in a concealed place and that there was no possible explanation on behalf of the accused as to how the body came to be concealed at that particular place, when the prosecution evidence proves that the accused were near the place of recovery of dead body almost at the probable time of death.” 22. Reverting finally to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal analysis, it is quite vivid that as per the statement of Tarachand Singh (PW-1), father of deceased, it is the appellant who took the deceased Annu Singh from her home and caused her death and threw her body in the dumping yard and thereafter, the dead body of deceased Annu Singh was recovered vide Ex.P/6 from the spot as disclosed by the appellant in his memorandum statement which has been duly proved by Nirmaldas (PW-4) and the appellant has failed to explain in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to how he came to know about the dead body, which he was required to explain in order to prove that he is not guilty of the offence. As such, the trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant who abducted deceased Annu Singh and caused her death by strangulating her with her scarf and thereafter, threw her dead body into the dumping yard. 23. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, it is quite established that motive of offence and theory of last seen together have duly been found proved by Tarachand Singh (PW-1) and seizure of dead body of deceased Annu Singh vide Ex.P/6 as well as seizure of certain articles like wallet and ATM card pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/5 has also been found proved by Nirmaldas (PW-4) which have duly been identified by Tarachand Singh (PW-1). Thus, in our considered opinion, five golden principles that constitute panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) have duly been established by the prosecution and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 201 of IPC. We do not find any merit in this appeal. 24. Accordingly, this criminal appeal stands dismissed. 25. Let a certified copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned trial Court as well as the jail authorities for necessary information and compliance.