JUDGEMENT 1. With respect to a motor vehicular accident which had taken place on 30.06.1998 resulting in death of one Sunil Kumar, an eight years aged boy, his parents along with his brothers had come forward with a claim petition seeking compensation for the death of said Sunil Kumar the victim of accident caused by the offending vehicle (Truck) bearing registration no. JKR-6152. The offending vehicle was owned by M/s K.C. Vanaspati-respondent no. 1 herein and was driven by Prem Singh-respondent no. 2-herein. The offending vehicle was insured with the appellant herein. 2. The claim petition so filed by the claimants/proforma respondents herein came to be allowed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jammu (in short, 'Tribunal') in terms of an award dated 03.10.2003. 3. Vide said award dated 03.10.2003, whereby compensation of an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- along with interest @ 9% per annum came to be awarded in favour of the proforma respondents, the liability for payment of compensation was fastened upon the appellant, on account of it being the insurer of the offending vehicle, by holding that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving of the respondent no. 2-Prem Singh while driving the offending vehicle (Truck) bearing registration no. JKR-6152 owned by the respondent no. 1-M/s K.C. Vanaspati. 4. Against the said award dated 03.10.2003, the appellant herein came to prefer an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, 'Act of 1988') which came to be on file no. 45/2004. 5. The claimants/proforma respondents herein had also felt aggrieved of duration of interest period with respect to amount of compensation awarded and came forward with an appeal-CIMA No. 13/2004. 6. Both the said appeals came to be disposed of by this Court in terms of a common judgment dated 26.04.2006 whereby the appeal-CIMA No. 13/2004 preferred by the claimants/proforma respondents came to be dismissed but the appeal-CIMA No. 45/2004 filed by the appellant herein resulted in remand with respect to re-hearing on issue no. 3 which was as to 'whether the driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving licence and, therefore, insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured.' 7. 3 which was as to 'whether the driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving licence and, therefore, insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured.' 7. It is, thus, obvious that the appellant herein had felt aggrieved of the award dated 03.10.2003 of the Tribunal insofar as it had held the appellant, as being the insurer of the offending vehicle, to satisfy the payment of compensation as awarded under the award and had absolved the owner as well as the driver of the offending vehicle from bearing the said burden on account of the insurance cover and non-violation of any terms and conditions of the policy. 8. The appellant had reckoned that the respondent no. 2-Prem Singh, the driver of the offending vehicle, was not having a valid and effective driving licence and as such, the same was reckoned to be a major breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy which ought to have relieved the insurer i.e., the appellant from bearing the burden of paying the compensation without having right to recover the same from the owner of the offending vehicle. 9. The appellant, in its appeal-CIMA No. 45/2004, had agitated the issue that despite having deposited the diet expenses for summoning of an official witness from the office of Registering and Licensing Authority, Una (H.P.) along with the original record of driving licence no. P-6278/85, the said witness was not summoned by the Tribunal thereby prejudicing the valid defence of the appellant and consequently resulted in burdening it with the onus of payment of compensation as being the insurer of the offending vehicle without being reserved with the right to recover the same from the owner as well as the driver of the offending vehicle. 10. Thus, the appellant registered its grievance that the Tribunal had, in terms of an order dated 19.09.2003, closed its evidence in the claim petition in a hurried manner although the responsibility to summon the official witness was not resting upon the appellant but upon the Tribunal with whom the appellant had made the deposit of the diet expenses. 11. This Court was persuaded by the submission of the appellant to the said effect and that resulted in remanding of the matter to the Tribunal. 11. This Court was persuaded by the submission of the appellant to the said effect and that resulted in remanding of the matter to the Tribunal. This remand obviously meant that the appellant would be getting the desired witness served for the purpose of proving its contention that the driving licence of the respondent no. 2-Prem Singh was not a valid driving licence and as such he, being the driver of the offending vehicle without possessing a valid driving licence, provided a legal excuse for the appellant from bearing the burden of payment of compensation as insurer of the vehicle without being reserved a right to recover the same from the respondents no. 1 and 2 as being the owner and driver of the offending vehicle. 12. In the remand proceedings, which came to take place qua the said claim petition, the matter primarily centered between the appellant on the one hand and the respondents no. 1 and 2 on the other hand without the claimants/proforma respondents having any role to play as for them the award had attained finality. 13. In the second round of proceedings on file no. 226/Claim, no such official witness was again summoned or got summoned but the Tribunal, in terms of an award dated 30.04.2010, came to reverse the finding which originally obtained in the award dated 03.10.2003 with respect to issue no. 3, by holding that the respondent no. 2-Prem Singh was not having a valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident and that being so the appellant was entitled to invoke the principle of 'pay and recover' against the owner and driver of the offending vehicle. 14. The proceedings in remand had taken place ex parte against the respondents no. 1 and 2. In this regard in the second award dated 30.04.2010, the Tribunal has observed that the respondents No. 1 and 2 despite service chose not to appear and contest the claim petition and were, thus, set ex parte. 15. It was only when the appellant came to set into motion an execution petition for seeking recovery of the awarded amount of compensation paid by it to the claimants/proforma respondents on the principle of 'pay and recover' pursuant to the second award dated 30.04.2010 that the respondents no. 1 and 2 came to be confronted with the impending liability awaiting against them and accordingly the respondent no. 1 and 2 came to be confronted with the impending liability awaiting against them and accordingly the respondent no. 1-owner of the offending vehicle came along with an application for setting aside ex parte award dated 30.04.2010. 16. This application came to be entertained by the Tribunal which, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, came to treat the said application as an application for review and by the jurisdiction of review came to examine the award dated 30.04.2010 and found it afflicted with an error apparent on the face of record which being that without any change of factual scenario obtaining on the record of the case in the context of passing of the first award dated 03.10.2003 in terms whereof the liability to pay the compensation was fastened upon the appellant and award dated 30.04.2010 whereby the appellant was reserved and afforded with right to recover the compensation so paid by it from the owner and driver of the offending vehicle, the Tribunal had reversed the finding without any factual basis and as such, amounted to a perverse finding and an error apparent on the face of record. 17. Thus, the review came to be allowed and the finding on issue no. 3 came to be reversed and reverted to the one as returned in the first award dated 03.10.2003. This review came to be disposed by the Tribunal vide judgment dated 12.10.2011 against which the present appeal has been preferred. 18. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, this Court is of a firm view that perversity has no stay in judicial, quasi judicial and administrative proceedings/decision and accordingly deserves to be upset at any given point getting pointed notwithstanding the mode and manner in which it is being questioned. Perversity, in fact, self nullifies the proceeding/decision be it of judicial, quasi judicial or administrative nature. 19. The Tribunal was very correct in reading and reckoning the revised finding on issue no. 3 in the award dated 30.04.2010 to be a perversity as without any change of factual basis. The finding on issue no. 3 as returned in the first award dated 03.10.2003 came to be reversed in the second award dated 30.04.2010. 20. Therefore, this appeal does not have any merit to warrant its acceptance for setting aside the impugned judgment dated 12.10.2011 passed by the Tribunal. 21. The finding on issue no. 3 as returned in the first award dated 03.10.2003 came to be reversed in the second award dated 30.04.2010. 20. Therefore, this appeal does not have any merit to warrant its acceptance for setting aside the impugned judgment dated 12.10.2011 passed by the Tribunal. 21. Be that as it may be, the appeal is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed.