JUDGMENT : RADHAKISHAN AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellants herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.08.2015 passed in Sessions Trial No. 71/2014 by the Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.) by which the appellants stand convicted and sentenced as under: Name of the appellant Conviction Sentence Krishnachandra 342 IPC To pay fine amount of Rs. 1000/- in default, additional RI for three months. 302 IPC Life imprisonment with fine amount of Rs. 1000/- in default, additional RI for three months. Babulal 342/34 IPC To pay fine amount of Rs. 1000/- in default, additional RI for three months. 302/34 IPC Life imprisonment with fine amount of Rs. 1000/- in default, additional RI for three months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that at village Chhindiya, in the intervening night of 10/11.03.2014, the appellants along with other co-accused persons, namely, Jugeshwar and Lalla Prasad @ Lala, in furtherance of common intention and motive, have committed assault upon deceased Gulabram by fist, leg and sharp edged weapon after confining him in the house of appellant No. 1, as a result of which, the deceased Gulabram sustained grievous injuries and took him to Government Hospital, Baikunthpur, for treatment, the deceased has died during treatment. The matter was reported to the Police Station Baikunthpur where vide Ex.P.28 F.I.R. was lodged at zero number, on the basis of which, numbered F.I.R. was registered at Patna, District Korea, vide Ex.P.29 by Inspector F. Kerketta (PW-17). Merg intimation vide Ex.P.1 was recorded. Investigating Officer prepared inquest proceedings vide Ex.P.4. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.10. Thereafter, dead body was sent for examination to Government Hospital, Baikunthpur where Dr. S.H. Shende (PW-10) conducted postmortem vide Ex.P.21 and opined that cause of death was due to haemorrhagic shock on account of head injury and no definite opinion could be given with respect to death of deceased. Plain soil and bloodstained soil were seized on the spot vide Ex.P.6. During investigation, the appellants were taken into custody. Memorandum statement of the appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra was taken vide Ex.P.11 and at his behest an adze (Kulhadi or Tangi) was seized from him vide Ex.P.12. Similarly, memorandum statement of Babulal (appellant No. 2) was taken vide Ex.P.13 and bamboo stick was seized from him vide Ex.P.14. Vide Ex.P.17 cloths of deceased was seized. Memorandum statement of the appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra was taken vide Ex.P.11 and at his behest an adze (Kulhadi or Tangi) was seized from him vide Ex.P.12. Similarly, memorandum statement of Babulal (appellant No. 2) was taken vide Ex.P.13 and bamboo stick was seized from him vide Ex.P.14. Vide Ex.P.17 cloths of deceased was seized. Vide Ex.P.8 spot map was prepared, in which, details of spot were mentioned. Vide Ex.P.22 query report with respect to injuries caused on the body of deceased has been obtained from Dr. S.H. Shende who has opined that those injuries could be caused by other person. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L. and vide Ex.P.34, F.S.L. report was brought on record and blood was found on the cloths of the deceased, soil and lathi seized from the appellant Babulal whereas no blood was found on weapon of offence, i.e. adze and lathi/stick, seized from the appellants Krishnachandra and Jugeshwar. Vide Exs.P.18, 19 and 20 the appellants were arrested. 3. After due investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baikunthpur and the case was committed to the Sessions Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, appellants/accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 17 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 34 documents whereas the appellants-accused persons in support of their defence have not examined any witness. 5. The trial Court, after completion of trial and upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, by its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the paragraph 1 of this judgment against which this appeal has been preferred by them under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. However, the trial Court acquitted co-accused persons Jugeshwar and Lalla Prasad @ Lala @ Doctor of the charges. 6. 6. Shri Sushil Dubey and Shri Aman Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that conviction of the appellants is based on oral dying declaration and extra judicial confession of PW-8 before whom the appellant/accused person Krishnachandra made extra judicial confession, which is not voluntary and true and does not inspire confidence and in absence of corroboration, the extra judicial confession made by the appellant could not be made basis to convict the appellant. The oral dying declaration made by the deceased before PW-7 Laxmaniya (mother of deceased) is also not reliable as the deceased was not in a position to speak, making the same suspicious. It would next contend that the Doctor, who examined the deceased, could not give any definite opinion with respect to the injuries and death of deceased and that, the weapon of offence seized from Krishnachandra does not contain bloodstains as is evident from the Ex.P.34, as per report of F.S.L. He would further submit that it is also not clear that it was the appellants, who have committed the offence. Merely on the basis of provision contained in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the appellants having not offered their explanation, cannot be convicted with the help of Section 106 and there is no other evidence to connect the appellants with the crime in question, therefore, they deserve to be acquitted. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the matter of Devendra Kumar Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh decided on 11.07.2022 in Criminal Appeal No. 1033/2013. On these premises, he urged that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence deserves to be set aside and the appellants be set at liberty. 7. On the other hand, Shri Sudeep Verma, learned counsel for the State, while supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, would submit that on the date of incident, deceased was confined in the house of appellant No. 1, which fact was confirmed by the evidence of PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha, before whom, appellant made an extra judicial confession, which was made voluntarily by him. He would next contend that although Doctor could not give any definite opinion with respect to injuries and death of deceased, but the fact remains that deceased made oral dying declaration before PW-7 Laxmaniya that appellant Krishnachandra and his relatives vehemently beaten him, which cannot be ignored. He would next contend that although Doctor could not give any definite opinion with respect to injuries and death of deceased, but the fact remains that deceased made oral dying declaration before PW-7 Laxmaniya that appellant Krishnachandra and his relatives vehemently beaten him, which cannot be ignored. Lastly, he would submit that the learned trial Court, considering the evidence and material brought by the prosecution, was fully justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants, which does not call for interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question that falls for our consideration would be whether the death of the deceased-Gulabram was homicidal in nature? 10. A careful perusal of statement of Dr. S.H. Shende (PW-10), who has proved the post-mortem (Ex.P.21), would show that cause of death of deceased was severe haemorrhagic shock associated with head injury. It is also apparent from his statement that there are total 10 injuries, which were inflicted by other persons. Although no definite opinion could be given by him, but it is clear that because of such injuries inflicted by the appellants, the deceased has died during the course of treatment, which shows that how severely the deceased was assaulted by the appellants. The trial Court, after discussing elaborately with respect to death of deceased Gulabram, held that death of deceased was homicidal in nature, which, in our considered opinion, is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, we shall deal with the second question as to whether the appellants were the authors of the crime in question? 12. Conviction of the appellants is based on extra judicial confession and oral dying declaration made by the deceased coupled with circumstantial evidence of the case. PW-3 Ramchandra is the brother of deceased Gulabram. In his statement, he has stated that PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha came to him and informed about the incident. After receipt of information, parents of this witness and deceased Gulabram have been to village Chhindiya along with PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha. PW-3 Ramchandra is the brother of deceased Gulabram. In his statement, he has stated that PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha came to him and informed about the incident. After receipt of information, parents of this witness and deceased Gulabram have been to village Chhindiya along with PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha. After that, he reached to village Chhindiya and on reaching village Chhindiya, he came to know that his parents had brought Gulabram from the house of Krishnachandra (appellant No. 1 herein) in an injured condition and his condition is serious on account of injuries sustained by him and then the deceased has been taken to District Hospital Baikunthpur, where Gulabram has died during treatment. Although this witness has been declared hostile but his statement to the effect that Gulabram was brought by her parents from the house of Krishnachandra in an injured condition cannot be thrown away. 13. PW-7 Laxmaniya is the mother of deceased Gulabram. She has testified that when she was sleeping in her house, then her grand son-in-law (PW-8) came there and informed her that Gulabram was beaten by Krishnachandra and his relatives after tying him at village Chhindiya. After receipt of such information, they have been to Bandhpara, Chhindiya and saw her son in a pool of blood and there were injuries over both sides of his head and legs and blood was oozing. Gulabram was trying to make gestures and was saying little by little that appellant No. 1 Krishnachandra and his relatives assaulted him. In her cross-examination, she has stated that even in the deserted night if anybody shouts from the house of Krishnachandra, then the sound reaches to her house. She has denied that Gulabram did not interact with her. She has further admitted that there is no enmity between them and her son (deceased Gulabram) used to visit the house of Krishnachandra. In para 6 of her cross-examination, she has reiterated the factum of assault on her son by Krishnachandra and his relatives, but, whose names were not disclosed by Lakshmaniya PW-7. 14. PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha is a crucial witness and his statement is very significant. He has stated that the deceased Gulabram was his father-in-law. The incident had happened on 10.03.2014 in the night. 14. PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha is a crucial witness and his statement is very significant. He has stated that the deceased Gulabram was his father-in-law. The incident had happened on 10.03.2014 in the night. At the dawn of 11.03.2014 at 04.30 am, Krishnachandra and his relative Babulal had come to his house and told him that they have beaten his father-inlaw by tying him in his (Krishnachandra) house, immediately he rushed to his in-laws’ house and informed the same to his mother-in-law, namely, Lilawati and then went to village Khairi and informed about the incident his one more father-in-law, namely, Sudama Ram and thereafter all of them went to village Chhindiya with the help of one Umesh and then they reached to the house of Krishnachandra, where they saw that Gulabram was weeping and there are injuries on his legs and blood was oozing and he could not speak. Thereafter, they brought the injured Gulabram to village Patna and then to Baikunthpur for treatment and during course of treatment, Gulabram died. In his cross-examination, it has come on record that Gulabram had illicit relations with the wife of Krishnachandra and a meeting was convened in this regard. In Para 12 of cross-examination, he has denied that Gulabram met with vehicular accident and sustained injuries and thereafter he was shifted to the house of Krishnachandra. He has further stated in cross-examination Para 14 that Gulabram was beaten and caused injuries on his body and he was not in bound condition. 15. When we examine the evidence of aforesaid witnesses, it emerged that Gulabram was brought by Krishnachandra and his relatives to the house of appellant No. 1 Krishnachara and after confining him wrongfully started assaulting him with the help of fists, leg and sharp edged weapon in furtherance of common intention. Thereafter, when the deceased was brought in an injured condition before PW-7 Laxmaniya (mother of the deceased), he made oral dying declaration by making gestures and speaking little by little that Krishnachandra and his relatives assaulted him, which was corroborated by the evidence of PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha (son-in-law of deceased), before whom the appellant made extra judicial confession to the effect that they had beaten Gulabram after confining him in the house of Krishnachandra. It also emerged that accused Krishnachandra along with his other relatives was involved in causing death of Gulabram, but, those names were not specifically disclosed by this witness (PW-8) as well, as it appears that many persons may have similar relatives of even single relation. 16. After due and proper appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution and after taking into account the extra judicial confession made by Krishnachandra before PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha and oral dying declaration made by the deceased before PW-7 Laxmaniya, the learned trial Court held that the appellant/accused Krishnachandra is the author of the crime in question. 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 18. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 19. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J. observed as under: “11...........The word “especially” stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle vs. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) and Seneviratne vs. R. 1936 (3) ER 36.” 20. Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 21. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah vs. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always drawn an appropriate inference. 23. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always drawn an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 22. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima-facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. 23. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or nor the accused has made out a specific defence. 24. 24. The five golden principles to constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been narrated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which it was observed in paragraph 153 as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 held in Para 22 as under: “22. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 held in Para 22 as under: “22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1972) 2 SCC 80 , it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with ‘khokhri’ and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal vs. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time.” 26. Now, we shall consider incriminating circumstances found proved by the trial Court against the appellant one by one. 27. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive loses its importance. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time.” 26. Now, we shall consider incriminating circumstances found proved by the trial Court against the appellant one by one. 27. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive loses its importance. Even otherwise, it is aid in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. In the present case, as per case of the prosecution, grave wounds and contusions were found over the body of the deceased, which shows grave intention of the appellants to commit his murder. The assault made by the appellant-Krishnachandra was so severe that the deceased could not recover and died during treatment. 28. The trial Court has relied upon the circumstance as to how the deceased Gulabram was reached to the courtyard of the house of Krishnachandra in an injured condition. Further circumstance that has been relied upon by the trial Court is extra judicial confession made by Krishnachandra on 11.03.2014 at 04.30 am, before PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha that his father-in-law (deceased) was beaten by them after confining him in the courtyard of house of Krishnachandra. The next circumstance that has been relied upon by the trial Court is oral dying declaration made by the deceased Gulabram before PW-7 Laxmaniya by making gestures and speaking little by little that Krishnachandra and his relatives had assaulted him and caused injuries. As such, the evidence of the deceased being brought to the courtyard of the house of Krishnachandra, the assault made by accused/appellant Krishnachandra along with other persons coupled with extra judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 (Krishnachandra) before PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha and oral dying declaration by the deceased before his mother PW-7 Laxmaniya is borne out from the testimonies of PW-7 Laxmaniya and PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha, which is established by the prosecution coupled with the fact that the appellants have not offered any explanation in their statements made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. as to how the deceased was reached to the courtyard of house of Krishnachandra and how he sustained injuries over his body. As such, it can safely be inferred that it was appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra, who has brought the deceased Gulabram, confined him and thereafter, along with other persons, caused grave injuries over his body and on account of injuries, which are fatal for the life of deceased, he has died during course of treatment at Baikunthpur. 29. It is also to be noted that seizure of weapon offence used in the crime question was made vide memorandum statement of the appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra (Ex.P.11) and at his behest an adze (Kulhadi or Tangi) was seized from him vide Ex.P.12. Similarly, memorandum statement of Babulal (appellant No. 2) was taken vide Ex.P.13 and bamboo stick was seized from him vide Ex.P.14 and as per F.S.L. report (Ex.P.34) though blood was found on the cloths of the deceased, soil and lathi seized from the appellant Babulal but no blood was found on weapon of offence, i.e. adze seized from the appellant Krishnachandra, which makes no relevance in view of the evidence of extra judicial confession made by Krishnachandra before PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha and oral dying declaration made by the deceased before his mother PW-7 Laxmaniya. Vide Ex.P.22 query report with respect to injuries caused on the body of deceased has been obtained from Dr. S.H. Shende who has opined that those injuries could be caused by other person, but, the fact that those injuries found on the body of deceased could have been caused by the said weapon of offence, i.e. adze by Krishnachandra cannot be ignored. The case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable to the facts of the present case and does not help him. 30. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the above chain of circumstances is complete and leads only to the conclusion that it was appellant No. 1/accused-Krishnachandra, who, along with the other persons, caused the injuries over the body of deceased and on account of injuries suffered by him, he died and appellant No. 1- Krishnachandra alone was responsible for the cause of death of deceased. Thus, the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and the learned trial Court, upon due and proper appreciation of the evidence led before it, has rightly arrived at a conclusion in so far as the accused-appellant Krishnachandra is concerned that he is the perpetrator/author of the crime in question. We are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court was absolutely justified in convicting and sentencing appellant No. 1 Krishnachandra for the offences punishable under the aforesaid sections as appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra was named by PW-7 Laxmaniya and PW-8 Anil Kumar Kushwaha in their testimonies, which shows that he was actively involved in crime in question. However, we are not inclined to sustain the conviction and sentence of appellant No. 2 Babulal as the role played by him is not borne out from the record. Therefore, appellant No. 2 is acquitted of all the charges. 31. Resultantly, we hereby set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24.08.2015 in so far as its relates to appellant No. 2 Babulal, while upolding the conviction and sentence of appellant No. 1-Krishnachandra. Accordingly, appellant No. 2 Babulal be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 32. The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated made herein-above. 33. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and concerned Superintendent of Jail forthwith for necessary information and action, if any.